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The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was one of the most influential
political parties in Canadian history. Without doubt, from a social welfare perspective, the CCF
helped build and develop an extensive social welfare system across Canada. It has been justly
credited with being one of the major influences over Canadian social welfare policy during the
critical years following the Great Depression. This was especially true of the period of the
Second World War when the federal Liberal government of Mackenzie King adroitly borrowed
CCF policy planks to remove the harsh edges of capitalism and put Canada on the path to a
modern Welfare State.
Despite the party’s success in shifting the role of the state in society, electoral triumphs
proved more difficult for the CCF to obtain. On the federal level, there has been a great deal of
discussion about the third-party status of the CCF. One of the objectives of this Dissertation is to
indicate that such a role was not pre-ordained for Canada’s democratic socialist group. From
1942 to 1944, it appeared that the CCF was a significant electoral threat to the monopoly of the

Conservative and Liberal parties. Ultimately, the party fell short of ending the dominance of the
traditional governing bodies.
The failure of the CCF to break through the Canadian voting public is often blamed on
the underwhelming performance of the party in the two most populous provinces: Ontario and
Quebec. This work explores the efforts put forth by the party to expand the CCF beyond its
western base of support and shows how both provinces were inhospitable to the CCF prior to
World War II. In addition, evidence is presented that clearly demonstrates that the CCF in
Ontario and Quebec often hindered its own efforts to grow the movement. Poor organization,
non-existent leadership, and serious divisions within the party all helped to contribute to the
anemic state of the CCF in Canada’s two largest provinces. These problems were compounded
by thinly-veiled racism towards members of the French-Canadian community in Quebec.
However, by 1942, the Ontario CCF addressed these issues and became a force to be
reckoned with in the province. Attempts were made to incorporate this model into the Quebec
branch of the party. The Quebec CCF made some in-roads in expanding their small base on the
Island of Montreal. Despite these advances, the party failed to break through in the
predominately French-speaking province.

The 1945 Ontario and federal elections stemmed the tide of CCF momentum. From that
point, the party was relegated to a permanent third-party status at the federal level. In Ontario,
the party maintained a substantial degree of public support and would play a role in maintaining
the three-party political system in that province. The Quebec CCF could make no such boast.
The party’s weak support ensured they would remain on the fringes of Quebec politics during the
remainder of the party’s days. While numerous factors are often credited with dooming the CCF

in Quebec (opposition from the Roman Catholic Church, the centralizing nature of CCF policy,
and media disdain), the available evidence indicates the party failed to address persistent
concerns over leadership and organization.
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INTRODUCTION

The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was an important political
movement and party in Canadian history. Born of the Great Depression, the CCF was
Canada's democratic-socialist movement, and its footprint is still visible to this day on the
Canadian political, economic and social scenes. During those economically dire years of
the 1930s, the CCF created and advocated for strong government intervention in
economic and social policy spheres for the benefit of “ordinary” citizens. Indeed, it is
stunning to see how many of the party’s policies eventually formed the backbone of
Canadian society – and Canadian identity. Long overlooked by many historians and the
citizens of Canada is the reality that, prior to the CCF’s arrival on the political stage,
Canada was a laggard in terms of social policy – even in comparison to the United States
to its south. The growth in public support for the CCF during the years of World War II
changed Canada in significant ways. Though the CCF was an important element in the
development of the welfare state in Canada, the party was not an electoral success. This
dissertation examines the party’s earliest attempts to break through in Canada’s two
largest provinces, Ontario and Québec, during those crucial years of the Second World
War. More specifically, it explores the many exterior obstacles the CCF faced and the
internal issues that hampered the party’s electoral results.
When scholars discuss the life and contributions of the Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation to the Canadian political landscape, the party is universally
referred to as Canada’s “third party.” During the party’s existence (1932–1961), such a
label was appropriate in terms of votes won and seats captured in federal and provincial
elections. While a case could be made that Social Credit was Canada’s third party during
1

the period under discussion, in the geographic region of Central Canada, that party had
almost zero impact until the early 1960s (even then, only in Québec). Indeed, the CCF
and its successor, the New Democratic Party (NDP), operated in this "third party" status
for nearly eighty years. The party escaped that label in 2011 when the NDP won 103
seats in Canada's House of Commons and made their leader, Jack Layton, the leader of
the Official Opposition. Most surprising about the New Democrats’ “Orange Wave” (socalled because of the party's official color) breakthrough was their performance in
Québec, capturing fifty-nine of the seventy-five available seats in the province. As this
dissertation will examine in great depth, the CCF struggled mightily in the largely
French-speaking province. Even before the New Democratic Party breakthrough in the
2011 federal election, the ability of the CCF and NDP to remain significant third-party
players on the Canadian political stage was impressive given the history of third parties
prior to their arrival.
Before 1932, parties and political movements would rise in protest of the
dominant Liberal and Conservative parties. The finest example of the fleeting third-party
in Canada occurred during the 1921 federal election when the young Progressive Party
captured sixty-five seats and supplanted the Conservative Party as the Official
Opposition. In subsequent elections, the Progressives saw both their seat totals and
electoral support drop dramatically. By 1930, the party was a spent force in Canadian
politics. Thus, the longevity of the CCF and NDP is a testament to the women and men
who attempted to build a more progressive Canada through democratic socialism.
Furthermore, the CCF/NDP were considered successful third-parties because of the
influence they provided on a series of Liberal and Conservative governments. These
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traditional parties were willing to adopt CCF policies – including the establishment of the
modern welfare state. Still, there can be no debate that the CCF had a difficult time
establishing itself in Canada’s most populous provinces of Ontario and Québec during the
party’s first decade in existence.
Although there is ample evidence to support the aforementioned points, one area
of Canadian political history is virtually ignored by many historians: the significant rise
in popularity of the CCF during the Second World War. Many academics concede that
the CCF led both the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party in public opinion surveys
by late 1943, and that the provincial CCF nearly pulled off a major upset during the
election in Canada’s most populous province, Ontario, in August of that year. Despite
many scholars’ acknowledgments of these events, very little has been offered to explain
the sudden surge in CCF popularity. One of the tasks of this work is to examine the fate
of the CCF during the Second World War and to consider the reasons for the party’s
abrupt improvement in political fortunes from 1942-1944. In particular, this work will
focus on the CCF performance in the vote-rich areas of Ontario and Québec. In addition,
it will examine rationales for the decline of public support of Canada’s party of
democratic socialism during the last year of the Second World War. A good deal of
discussion will center on the question of why the CCF lost momentum in the period prior
to a pair of vital elections in June 1945 (the Ontario provincial election of June 4 and the
federal election of June 11). Before exploring such elements, it is useful to understand
first how socialism came to a position of relevance in Canada.
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The Genesis of Canadian Socialism
During the 1921 election campaign, the forces that would eventually combine to
establish the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation made their initial way onto the
political stage. As the Progressive Party unraveled, the surviving members joined with
labor members of parliament to form a third force in the House of Commons. This
"Ginger Group" was led by future CCF leader, J.S. Woodsworth, along with William
Irvine and Agnes Macphail.1 While leading this socialist fringe, Woodsworth used his
bargaining power with a minority Liberal government to establish Canada’s first old-age
pension legislation.2 It would not be the last time that Liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie
King would turn to Woodsworth and later, the CCF, for policy initiatives.3 As the 1920s
came to a close and the Great Depression commenced in Canada, members of the Ginger
Group, along with farmers, trade unionists, and a band of intellectuals, discussed forming
a political party to replace the capitalist economic system. Thus, in 1933, the Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation was established to place the well-being of working people
before the accumulation of profits. The CCF platform emphasized economic planning,
nationalization of public institutions, socialized health services, and greatly increased
economic powers for the federal government.4 Despite operating in tragic economic
times, the CCF message did not make serious headway across much of Canada until the
early years of World War II.

1. Desmond Morton, The New Democrats, 1961-1986 (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, Toronto,
1986), 11. The “Ginger Group” was so-named due to its firm socialist beliefs.
2. Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J. S. Woodsworth (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1959), 216-19.
3. Morton, The New Democrats, 12-13.
4. Morton, The New Democrats, 12-13.
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Historiography
A generation of academics has produced material about the history, politics,
successes and failures of the CCF. Much of this was published from the early 1950s
through the early 1980s. From the mid-1980s to the early 2010s, the party received scant
attention from the political history community. It should be noted that since the NDP’s
strong showing in the 2011 federal campaign there has been renewed academic interest in
the party. The various works will be presented thematically in this historiography section.
Those studies that have explored the CCF from a broad, national perspective will be
looked at first; next, works that examined specific provinces will be presented; and
finally, discussion will be proffered concerning the contributions of CCF-related
biographical and autobiographical works.

The CCF Writ-large
Walter Young’s The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-1961 is
probably the most important work regarding the history of the CCF. First published in
1969, political scientist Young’s study made the argument that the CCF was both helped
and hindered by its status as a movement and a political party.
Regarding the CCF’s rise to prominence, Young offered several observations. The
first was that the swift increase in CCF support in Canada was not the result of the party
making significant changes to its program but rather that the party had gained momentum
because people began to accept CCF solutions to anticipated post-war issues.5 Young’s
second point was that the party appeared to be gaining support during 1942, and the

5. Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-1961 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1969), 98.
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Ontario provincial election results of 1943 were proof of the party’s momentum.6 While
Young acknowledged that CCF candidate, Joe Noseworthy's, upset victory in the
February 1942, York South by-election was cause for optimism, he made no other
mention of this in his work.7 Young did establish the foundation that the years from 1942
to 1944 were ones of large advances for the party in terms of membership, finances and
organization; however, discontent about the purity of the CCF’s policies remained in the
background.8 Yet, when it came to explaining the failure of the party to break through
during the “dual” elections of 1945 (Ontario provincial election, June 4, 1945; federal
election, June 11, 1945), Young provided limited insight as to the factors that led to these
disappointing results. He did cite the effective anti-CCF campaign waged by B.A.
Trestrail and Gladstone Murray as one of the causes for the party’s underwhelming
showing in both campaigns, yet that was all he offered about these massive efforts to turn
Canadians against the party.9 Finally, Young believed the 1945 dual election was the
turning point for the party. This dissertation reinforces that point.
A second book of note is Ivan Avakumovic's Socialism in Canada: A Study of the
CCF-NDP in Federal and Provincial Politics. Avakumovic was a historian who
examined leftist parties in Canada and in Central and Eastern Europe. This tome, written
in 1977, provided a thorough overview of the CCF-NDP over four and a half decades
from both national and provincial perspectives. As the title suggests, the author attempted
to cover a large geographic area, thus contributing to the book’s weaknesses, leading to a
lack of depth on many issues. Still, this work was helpful in establishing the health of the
6. Young, The Anatomy of a Party, 109.
7. Young, The Anatomy of a Party, 106. More information on Noseworthy’s background will be
posted in the chapter where his triumph is chronicled.
8. Young, The Anatomy of a Party, 109-117.
9. Young, The Anatomy of a Party, 117.
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CCF during the war years. In particular, Socialism in Canada neatly provides background
information about the malaise the party endured during the 1940-1942 period as the CCF
struggled to articulate its position regarding the desired extent of Canadian involvement
in the Second World War.10
This angst was especially true for the party in Ontario and Québec. Along with
Young, Avakumovic pointed to 1942 as the year that the tide turned in favor of the CCF.
He also concurred with Young that the Noseworthy triumph provided a sorely-needed
morale boost for the CCF. Unlike Young, Avakumovic did not claim that the South York
by-election victory was the turning point in CCF fortunes.11 He posited the surprise
showing of the CCF in the 1943 Ontario provincial election as the defining moment for
opposition politicians and the business community, and that which led the media to
launch a campaign that would slander socialism in general and the CCF in particular.12
Like Young, Avakumovic asserted that the CCF disappointments in the 1945 Ontario and
federal elections could be traced to the convincing campaign against the party by hired
specialists and the available media of the day. In addition, Avakumovic insisted on the
role of the Communist Party in siphoning likely CCF votes during the Ontario election.
As a result, the CCF was able to maintain its number of votes from the 1943 election, yet
still lose twenty-six of its thirty-four seats.13 Finally, Avakumovic argued that, regardless
of the reasons why the CCF underperformed in the 1945 Ontario election, it negatively

10. Ivan Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada: A Study of the CCF-NDP in Federal and Provincial
Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), 84-94.
11. Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada, 97.
12. Ayakumovic, Socialism in Canada, 99-100.
13. Ayakumovic, Socialism in Canada, 131.
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affected the federal vote a week later and crippled the possibility of the CCF shaking the
bonds of its “third-party” status.14
Another major work on the CCF was Dean McHenry’s The Third Force in
Canada: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, 1932-1948. Published in 1950,
this was one of the first treatises devoted to the CCF. McHenry focused much attention
on the formation and structure of the party. The second half of the book examined the
electoral performance of the CCF across Canada through the 1949 federal election.
Given the breadth of jurisdictions that were covered, not much depth was evident in
McHenry’s work. He provided thumbnail sketches of the provincial organizations, and
briefly described the provincial and federal results for each of the nine provinces. For
example, in discussing Ontario, McHenry offered that the Ontario CCF party structure
was in modest condition and that the party’s electoral fortunes were subject to violent
fluctuations.15 The province of Québec received even less analysis. Here, McHenry stated
that the CCF had made little impression on the province to date. Furthermore, he noted
that the party had had very poor showings in Québec, but offered next to no explanation
as to why.16 Despite these shortcomings, McHenry’s work undoubtedly provided an
excellent framework from which researchers could draw and build upon.
Another major work about the national CCF was Leo Zakuta’s A Protest
Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF. Zakuta offered an insider’s view of
the changes the party underwent during its three decades of existence.17 He wrote that

14. Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada, 132-33.
15. Dean E. McHenry, The Third Force in Canada: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation,
1932-1948 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950), 71, 166-67.
16. McHenry, The Third Force in Canada, 72, 167-72.
17. Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1964), 5. Zakuta stated he was a “deeply involved CCFer” from 1942 to 1945.
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the CCF experienced a series of changes in which the group lost its original, radical
character and eventually developed an outlook and structure similar to the traditional
parties it sought to replace.18
Zakuta described the stages of the CCF as political movement, major party and
minor party. He pinpoints that the moment the party went from a major to a minor party
was during the twin electoral defeats in June 1945. He claimed those defeats led to a
sense of hopelessness and defeatism from party members and a loss of interest from the
general public.19 In this respect, his contention that the CCF peaked as a political force in
1945 coincided with Young and Avakumovic’s assessment. While the bulk of Zakuta’s
book is focused on the province of Ontario, he also examined changes that occurred at the
federal and local levels. As such, it is included in this section of national works.
J. L. Granatstein’s 1967 article in the Canadian Historical Review about the
election of Joe Noseworthy to the House of Commons in February 1942, was also an
important source for this dissertation. His text, “The York South By-Election of 1942: A
Turning Point in Canadian Politics” highlighted the campaign that saw the CCF elect its
first Member of Parliament from Ontario. Granatstein argued that this was no ordinary
election. Indeed, he contended that this election was a rejection of the “old” Canada and
an endorsement of an emerging “new” one. Granatstein stated that the CCF’s social
welfare program was becoming more attractive while their chief opponent, Conservative
Party leader Arthur Meighen, ignored Noseworthy and social welfare issues.20
Granatstein claimed the results forced both the Liberal and Conservative parties to

18. Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, 4.
19. Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, 150.
20. J. L.Granatstein, “The York South By-Election of February 9, 1942: A Turning Point in
Canadian Politics,” The Canadian Historical Review, 158, no. 2 (June 1967): 145.
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liberalize their platforms and adopt far-reaching social welfare policies.21 In that respect,
this by-election also altered the face of Canadian social policy.
The most compelling recent work has been James Naylor’s The Fate of Labour
Socialism: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and the Dream of a WorkingClass Future. The main theme that separates Naylor’s 2016 contribution from the earlier
analysis of the CCF was his argument that those works that defined the CCF as a liberal,
middle-class reformist movement were not entirely correct. He instead stated that those
depictions overlooked the role of the party’s activist core and its strong belief that
capitalism could not be reformed, but rather that it needed to be replaced.22

Single-Province Studies
Perhaps the finest work from the early CCF examinations was the single-province
study, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in
Saskatchewan—A Study in Political Sociology, by Seymour Martin Lipset. This epic
study was first published in 1950 and stemmed from Lipset’s doctoral dissertation. A
third edition was produced in 1971 that examined changes to the CCF in the two decades
since Agrarian Socialism first appeared. In the original research, Lipset masterfully made
a strong case that the socialism that emerged in Saskatchewan in the 1930s and won
power in the 1940s (from 1944-1964) was a combination of the cooperative movement

21. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 158.
22. James Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
and the Dream of a Working-Class Future (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 6.
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prevalent in the largely one-crop province, and the desire to find an effective political
tool with which to combat the “vested, Eastern Interests” of Central Canada.23
Lipset’s work is strong in the sections where he focused intently on the
incremental growth of the CCF in Saskatchewan and explained in great detail the nuances
of such a development. However, Lipset did not discuss the rise of the national CCF
during the period beginning in early 1942. Indeed, he devoted less than one page in
attempting to show and explain the vast improvement of political fortunes for the party at
the national level.24 In addition, Lipset argued that the 1949 federal election forever
doomed the CCF to third-party status.25 Finally, he made no mention of the antisocialist/anti-CCF campaign waged after 1943. Each of these issues will be central
features of this dissertation.
The book that proved to be vitally useful in providing secondary source materials
for this study was Gerald Caplan’s The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in
Ontario. Particularly helpful was a chapter entitled “The Golden Age.” Caplan, a
historian, provided excellent background information regarding the state of affairs in
Ontario during the Second World War. He examined the dispirited state of the party prior
to 1942 in the province – and the abrupt turn of fortunes for the CCF after Joe
Noseworthy’s near “accidental” victory over the former Canadian prime minister and
Conservative Party leader, Arthur Meighen, in the February 1942, York South byelection. Among all the literature produced to date, Caplan came the closest to citing this
event as the turning point for the CCF in Ontario. He also noted the selection of Ted
23. Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in
Saskatchewan, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 71.
24. Seymour Lipset. Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in
Saskatchewan – A Study in Political Sociology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), 151-52.
25. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, 3rd ed., 7.
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Jolliffe as new provincial party leader in April 1942, and the increased interest of trade
union leaders in the Ontario CCF as factors that contributed to the party’s renaissance.26
As was the case with the other scholars, Caplan wrote that the near triumph of the
CCF during the 1943 Ontario election squarely placed the party in a position to become a
national force.27 Indeed, he asserted that many political pundits between 1943 and 1945
wrote that the CCF would likely hold the balance of power after the next federal election
– if they did not win it outright.28 Caplan went into greater detail about the anti-CCF
campaign that began in earnest after the 1943 Ontario election than did any of the other
early CCF scholars. In addition, while Caplan listed the individuals, groups and interests
that worked to defame the CCF, he noted the party’s response that the “common man”
would see through these attacks by the defenders of the status quo. However, Caplan
contended that the common man was deceived by the factually dubious arguments put
forth by Gladstone Murray and B.A. Trestrail, among others.29 Regarding the 1945 CCF
electoral disappointments, Caplan broke new ground by stating the party was wounded
by internal overconfidence.30 Finally, he opined that the twin setbacks from the 1945
Ontario and national election marked the beginning of the end of the CCF movement.31
This proclamation was not universal among the academic community.
A second work focusing on the CCF (and NDP) in Ontario was J. T. Morley’s
Secular Socialists: The CCF/NDP in Ontario, A Biography. Morley begins with the
thesis that political parties evolve like human beings. He argued that the CCF/NDP

26. Gerald L. Caplan. The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973), 93-96.
27. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 106-07.
28. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 88.
29. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 194-95.
30. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 196.
31. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 196.
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“personality” has a character that can be analyzed and which patterns the internal crisis of
the party and constrains the effect of external stimuli from the political milieu of
Ontario.32 In short, political parties grow and change by interpreting and incorporating
outside events while attempting to maintain as much of their identity as possible. In terms
of contributions to this dissertation, Morley provided additional insights to the divisions
of the Ontario CCF of the early 1930s, the significant rise of the party in Ontario during
the first half of the following decade, and the uneven performance of the CCF in the
period following 1945. Furthermore, Morley differed from Caplan’s contention that the
twin electoral defeats of 1945 crushed CCF fortunes. Indeed, he argued that the CCF
decline in Ontario was not solidified until after the provincial election of 1951.33
A major work focused on the early years of the CCF in Québec. Andrée
Lévesque-Olssen’s dissertation examined the fierce battle waged between the CCF and
the Communist Party in winning over working-class voters in that predominantly Frenchspeaking province during the Great Depression. The main thrust of The Canadian Left in
Québec during the Great Depression: The Communist Party and the Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation in Québec, 1929-1939 was that the communists attempted to
win over rank-and-file employees in their respective workplaces. She contrasted the
communist’s recruitment methods to the CCF approach of coercing union leaders and
more middle-class citizens to join them in their quest.34 By focusing on the economic
chaos of the 1930s, Lévesque-Olssen wrote this financial duress should have created

32. J. T. Morley, Secular Socialists: The CCF/NDP in Ontario; A Biography (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1984), 6.
33. Morley, Secular Socialists, 53-54.
34. Andrée Lévesque-Olssen, The Canadian Left in Québec during the Great Depression: The
Communist Party and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Quebec, 1929-1939 (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1973), 126-27.
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fertile ground for both left-wing organizations. She noted that, while Québec met the
usual prerequisites for leftist political development during the Great Depression, the hard
reality was that the history of the Québec Left during the 1930s was one of repeated
electoral failures.35 Her work is cited frequently in Chapter Two of this dissertation,
especially the argument that the CCF was a “foreign” entity in Québec politics.36
Chronologically, Lévesque-Olssen’s study concluded just as this work commences in
earnest.

Biographical Contributions
Biographical works were also fine source material for this project. The first CCF
leader, J.S. Woodsworth, was the subject of two such biographies. Kenneth McNaught's
A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth is considered the seminal offering
concerning the former minister turned working-class activist. In doing so, McNaught
sheds light on the genesis of Canadian socialism and the integral role Woodsworth played
in the development and early conduct of the CCF. For this dissertation, McNaught’s
largest contributions are in highlighting Woodsworth’s firm opposition towards
cooperation with other left-wing groups (especially the Communist Party of Canada) and
his unwavering pacifism during the difficult discussions the CCF had in regards to
Canada’s participation in the Second World War.37 McNaught’s book did examine
Woodsworth’s role in the dissolution and re-shaping of the party in Ontario in 1934 when
the more radical group of the three main branches wanted closer cooperation with United

35. Lévesque-Olssen, The Canadian Left in Quebec, 9.
36. Lévesque-Olssen, The Canadian Left in Quebec, 16.
37. Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J. S. Woodsworth (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1959) 304-07.
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Front entities.38 As was the case with other publications, McNaught’s book did not delve
very deeply into the CCF’s difficulties in Québec. A second biography was written by
Woodsworth’s daughter, Grace MacInnis. Her work is useful in that it captured the very
brief enthusiasm for the CCF in Ontario shortly after its formation in 1932. MacInnis also
highlighted how quickly the press linked the new party to Moscow.39 She offered little
insight to Woodsworth’s connection to Québec aside from making the point that her
father regretted never having learned French, and mentioning his friendship with Henri
Bourassa.40
Another leading figure has received far less interest from the academic
community. M.J. Coldwell was the longest-serving and more electorally successful of the
two CCF leaders. However, his life and achievements have been largely overlooked. In
2000, Walter Stewart published M.J.: The Life and Times of M.J. Coldwell. In this work,
Stewart depicts Coldwell as a leader who gave the CCF and Canadian socialism a degree
of respectability due to his own core decency.41 Unfortunately, Stewart’s book offered
only a brief overview of the heady days of the CCF in 1942-1944, the subsequent antisocialist campaign waged against the party, and the resultant electoral disappointments in
June 1945 (both in Ontario and federally).42 There is little mention made regarding the
state of the CCF in Québec. Less than two pages are devoted to the problems the party

38. McNaught , A Prophet in Politics, 266-70.
39. Grace MacInnis, J.S. Woodsworth: A Man to Remember (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada
Limited, 1953), 268-71.
40. MacInnis, J. S. Woodsworth, 251, 174.
41.Walter Stewart, M.J.: The Life and Time of M. J. Coldwell (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing
Company, Limited, 2000), 153.
42. Stewart, M. J.: The Life and Times of M. J. Coldwell, 146-59.
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had in that province. Stewart contended that Coldwell and other CCF leaders displayed
no real understanding of the historical, cultural or sectional factors at play in Québec.43
Another entry in this vein is David Lewis’s autobiography, The Good Fight:
Political Memoirs, 1909-1958. As National Secretary of the CCF from 1936 to 1950,
Lewis was involved in virtually every aspect of the daily operation of the party across the
country. Lewis had tremendous influence on shaping the CCF during these formative
years, given the centralizing nature of the CCF. Naturally, there are drawbacks and
limitations to Lewis’s work. The prime issue is one of bias. Lewis was clearly a partisan,
however, he also had clear opinions of problems the party faced and those they created
for themselves. Lewis focused much of his energy on the fortunes of the CCF in Ontario
and Quebec, much as I have done in this dissertation. Particularly useful for this project
was Lewis’s insights into the party’s struggles and obstacles in Ontario and Quebec, the
1943 Cartier by-election, and the devastation the CCF suffered in the twin June 1945,
election rebukes.44 Furthermore, Lewis gets full marks for locating the hard evidence that
the “Gestapo Affair,” which took place during the Ontario election of 1945, was not a
figment of Ted Jolliffe’s imagination. The CCF was being spied upon by the Ontario
Provincial Police with the full knowledge of Premier George Drew. Furthermore, Lewis
disagreed with Caplan’s assertion that the incident had no influence on the election
results. Lewis claimed that while the exact damage to the CCF was difficult to ascertain,
he was of the opinion that the “Gestapo Affair” had a considerably negative impact on
those June 1945, elections for the party.45 Those disappointing results, he argued, sealed

43. Stewart, M. J.: The Life and Times of M. J. Coldwell, 208-09.
44. David Lewis, The Good Fight: Political Memoirs 1909-1958 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada,
1981), 224-33, 267-69.
45. Lewis, The Good Fight, 270-87.
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the fate of the CCF. Thus, Lewis was in agreement with Young, Avakumovic and Caplan
on the crushing and irretrievable consequences for the party as a result of those 1945
elections.

Other Recent Works
The CCF stirred up little in the way of academic interest after the period of 1984
until the strong showing by the federal NDP in the 2011 election. During this dry period,
John Boyko produced Into the Hurricane: Attacking Socialism and the CCF. In this 2006
study, Boyko examined the concerted efforts by various business groups and well-paid
propagandists to stem the surge of CCF support during the 1943–1945 period.46 Boyko
did not go into much detail about the CCF as an organization other than to highlight how
poorly equipped the CCF was in terms of responding to the myriad attacks against the
party. He asserted that the CCF’s failure to counter these attacks led to the disappointing
election results of June 1945.47 Boyko also contended that the anti-CCF campaign especially the one spearheaded by Gladstone Murray - continued well beyond that
election.48
Other compelling recent studies include Remaining Loyal: Social Democracy in
Quebec and Saskatchewan. Here, historian David McGrane described how social
democratic elements have “remained loyal” to their roots in the provinces of

46. John Boyko, Into the Hurricane: Attacking Socialism and the CCF (Winnipeg: J. Gordon
Shillingfood Publishing, 2006), 18.
47. Boyko, Into the Hurricane, 69, 86. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven
and Chapter Eight.
48. Boyko. Into the Hurricane, 65-70. Indeed, Boyko asserted that the anti-CCF campaign
stretched well into the 1950s.
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Saskatchewan and Québec.49 In addition, Stephanie Bangarth (King’s University College
at Western University), Roberta Lexier (Mount Royal University), and Jonathan Weier
(Atkinson Foundation) released Party of Conscience: The CCF, the NDP, and Social
Democracy in Canada in fall 2018. This work examines the place of social democracy in
Canadian history and politics.

This Dissertation’s Contribution to the Historiography of the CCF
This dissertation will examine the CCF in specific geographic and political
arenas—Ontario and Québec—during a concentrated period of time during the Second
World War. The choice of these provinces stems from the fact that although people
outside of Ontario and Québec resent the political power afforded to the provinces of
“Central Canada,” compelling evidence suggests that this was (and still is) home to over
sixty percent of Canadians. For practical purposes, any political group hoping to achieve
a degree of national support needed to establish a significant presence in this area.
Without breakthroughs and substantial support in Ontario and Québec, it was (and still is)
virtually impossible to win office at the federal level. This time frame was selected
because political life was rapidly changing in Canada during the Second World War.
New parties with fresh ideas had arrived on the scene and the traditional parties
scrambled to find their place in this emerging world. This uncertainty meant that no party
could expect support as had been the case to date.
As stated previously, while the CCF (and later the NDP) would become resilient
“third-party” performers on the Canadian political stage, it is often overlooked by

49. David McGrane, Remaining Loyal: Social Democracy in Quebec and Saskatchewan (Montreal
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), 3.
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historians that such a label was pre-ordained for the party. Two of the objectives of this
work are to demonstrate why the CCF nearly escaped this station and to more fully
explain why they did not.
This work will also make the case that the upset victory for Joe Noseworthy in
February 1942, was more than a simple by-election “protest vote.” Rather, it will present
an argument that Noseworthy’s victory was a signature event that helped re-shape
Canada – especially in terms of the development of the welfare state. Records in
Mackenzie King’s diaries indicate the CCF upset in York South at once rattled and
emboldened the Canadian prime minister to move forward with the establishment of a
Canadian welfare state.50 Desmond Morton cites King’s anxiety about CCF advances as
the prime minister’s rationale for pushing through family allowances and a more
generous veteran’s charter into law with a promise of more to come.51
Furthermore, this dissertation uses primary source documents at McGill
University and Library and Archives Canada to argue that Noseworthy became a political
“superstar” for the CCF. The Québec CCF papers indicate that Noseworthy went from a
virtually unknown schoolmaster near Toronto to one of Canada’s most sought-after
public speakers, at least for a brief period of time. Moreover, most of the secondary
sources indicate that the Noseworthy victory brought a degree of enthusiasm for the CCF.
What they do not tell us is that this “Noseworthy Effect” was also making in-roads for the
party in Québec - a heretofore barren area for the party.
All of the existing scholarly sources concerning the CCF in Québec have
maintained the standard line that the party did poorly and was a non-factor in the
50. J.W. Pickersgill. The Mackenzie King Record Volume 1, 1939-1944 (Toronto: University of
Toronto, 1959), 569.
51. Morton, The New Democrats, 14.
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province. For much of the CCF’s history, this depiction was an accurate one. However,
for a brief period during the Second World War, the party experienced a noticeable gain
in interest and support. Again, the timing of the Noseworthy victory and the improvement
of CCF fortunes in Québec align in a compelling fashion.
While finances remained tight for the Québec CCF, compared to those of the
period prior to 1942 and after 1945, they were relatively robust. While Caplan wrote this
was the “Golden Age” for the CCF in Ontario, the documentation indicates the same
holds true for Québec.52
Granted, the electoral results for the party in the province were significantly more
modest than those achieved in Ontario; still, a breakthrough did occur for the Québec
CCF when they elected one member to the provincial legislature, David Coté, during the
1944 Québec campaign. Despite this limited success, the Québec CCF hoped to leap
from relative obscurity to a position of considerable political power like the party had
done in Ontario. The Québec CCF never achieved this objective, but the Noseworthy
upset and the Ontario 1943 election results had given the Québec provincial leaders both
a sorely needed morale boost and a blueprint from which to work.
In addition to the impact of Noseworthy’s importance to the party, this work will
attempt to ascertain what happened to the CCF vote in Ontario and Québec during those
crucial June 1945, elections. Dr. Caplan’s “overconfidence” theory on the part of the
Ontario and federal CCF is intriguing.
The author of this work has yet to come across any documentation in the party
files that indicate the CCF leadership was certain of victory in the period prior to these
critical elections. During the heady days in late 1943, after the Ontario provincial election
52. Caplan, Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 88.
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and the Gallup Poll that indicate a slim lead for the federal CCF, a case could be argued
for the “inevitability” of a socialist triumph. However, by 1945, after a nearly two-year
onslaught of anti-CCF propaganda by business groups, elected officials and the corporate
media, it is difficult to imagine the CCF was in a position to be overconfident. Indeed,
Boyko’s more recent entry into this topic makes a stronger case that the CCF was simply
unable to compete financially with big business interests and the mainstream media’s
attacks on the party of Canadian socialism.53
Finally, this work seeks to remove the “victim” tag that has been applied to the
CCF during the bruising they absorbed from various quarters during this period. While
this work acknowledges that outside sources inflicted serious damage to the party, it will
provide significant evidence to forcefully argue that the CCF in Québec and, to a lesser
degree, Ontario, inflicted a good deal of damage to their own cause through a serious lack
of organization and mediocre leadership. Indeed, other parties were afflicted by some of
these same symptoms. However, both of the “old” parties had sufficient history with the
Canadian electorate that mistakes in planning and leadership could be and were forgiven
or overlooked. The CCF’s lack of history and espousal of a new, socialistic economic
agenda provided the party with almost no margin for error.

Chapter Overview
The chapters of this dissertation follow a chronological pattern. Chapter One
examines the political landscape in Québec when the CCF was born. Those interests that
opposed Canada’s democratic socialist party are discussed. Particular attention is paid to
the firm condemnation the CCF received by authorities of the Catholic Church in the
53

Boyko, Into the Hurricane, 16-17.

21

province. The silent treatment of the print media towards the CCF also receives some
discussion as does the difficult trade union terrain. This chapter also exposes the core
issues that would hamper the party through the Second World War in Québec: poor
organization, a glaring leadership deficit, and thinly-veiled racism towards French
Canadians by a handful of Québec CCF executives.

Chapter Two focuses on the situation in Ontario during the early years of the
CCF. In theory, Ontario should have been more fertile ground for the party than Québec.
Catholic Church authorities in Ontario were indifferent to the establishment of a socialist
political party. While not warm to the CCF, they offered none of the static the party
experienced in Québec. Furthermore, the trade union movement was a more vital entity
in Canada’s most industrial province. Still, there is overwhelming evidence that the CCF
struggled to gain any traction in Ontario. To explain why, the various factions that
comprised the Ontario CCF are examined. Indeed, the party was made up of elements
that simply did not mesh well.
Shortly after the establishment of the provincial branch of the CCF, national party
leader J. S. Woodsworth disbanded the party and forced its members to start fresh. The
expulsion of the more “radical” group did not help the party connect with Ontario voters.
Organization and leadership in the Ontario CCF were sorely lacking. The main point
illustrated in these first two chapters was the anemic state of the CCF in Canada’s two
most populous provinces prior to the Second World War.
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Chapter Three examines the intense and divisive debate concerning the CCF’s
war policy before and during the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. This discussion was
especially heated in Québec given the decidedly anti-war stance of French Canadians
during World War I and the violent opposition to conscription during the latter years of
that conflict. The party attempted to locate a compromise solution on a predominantly
“yes-no” issue, and the resulting unclear stance drew scorn from both sides of the debate.
In addition, the ultimate “limited support” for Canadian involvement in the war separated
the party leader (Woodsworth) from much of the rest of the CCF executives.

Chapter Four explores the elections called in Québec (October, 1939) and
federally (March, 1940) during the early months of the war. In Québec, premier Maurice
Duplessis hoped to take advantage of the anti-war opinion in his province. His move
backfired and he went down in a resounding defeat.
For the provincial CCF, the snap election caught the already disorganized group
flat-footed. Predictably, the Québec CCF was not prepared, and the dismal results
highlighted all of the weaknesses in organization and leadership. The party was better
prepared for the 1940 federal election. Indeed, they thought that Mackenzie King would
call an election for some time in 1939. For the branches in Ontario and Québec, “better
prepared” did not amount to much. Again, the party was shut out in Canada’s two most
populous provinces. While these elections produced clear results for the governments that
initiated these campaigns, for the CCF the outcome indicated their message was gaining
few converts in Ontario and Québec.
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Chapter Five focuses on the events of 1942. It is here that the political arguments
of the CCF start to gain traction. This happened in Ontario with the victory of Joe
Noseworthy in a by-election in South York. Almost immediately, CCF fortunes across
Canada improved dramatically. This election set off a chain-reaction of events that
influenced the traditional Canadian parties and helped usher in the national welfare state.
The enthusiasm for the CCF, while still muted, even crossed over the border to
Québec. For the first time, some elements of Québec society expressed at least a passing
interest in the party. Groups began to assemble in Québec City, Sherbrooke, and other
population centers outside of Montreal. Joe Noseworthy was an in-demand speaker at
these events.
In addition, 1942 witnessed a divisive plebiscite on the issue of conscription. The
referendum also divided the Québec CCF. As had been the case, the debate produced a
declaration that was far from clear. Despite the party’s murky position, party leaders
realized that the specter of conscription was deeply unpopular among francophone
Québecers. CCF executives viewed this as an opportunity to break the hold that the
Liberal Party had on voters in that province. Indeed, the CCF was not the only political
group that saw an opportunity for growth. Opposition to conscription produced the Bloc
populaire, a federal and provincial political entity with a clear position on this thorny
question.

Chapter Six bears witness to the increase in CCF popularity in Ontario and
Québec during 1943. The most concrete proof of the party’s success was its near-win in
the Ontario provincial legislature in August. With thirty-two percent of the vote and
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thirty-four seats, the Ontario CCF became the Official Opposition. Considering the fact
that it won five percent of the tally and zero seats in the previous provincial election, this
result meant the party was a significant player on the Canadian political stage.
In addition, the Québec CCF was able to gain twenty percent in a by-election in
the Montreal riding a few days after the Ontario results. Previously hesitant friends and
hostile foes decided it was time for action. Under the “friends” category, we see the
leadership of the Canadian Congress of Labour endorse the CCF as the political arm of
labor in Canada. Despite this declaration, organized labor was still leery of attaching
itself too tightly to the CCF. The “foes” were large business groups featuring an
organization named Responsible Enterprise. The latter group was founded by Gladstone
Murray, who had previously been the Director of the Canadian Broadcasting Company
during its early years. Murray proved to be a polished propagandist who was financed by
the largest corporations operating in Canada. Unfortunately for the CCF, Murray was
very good at his job. From late 1943 through the June 1945 elections, new anti-CCF
opponents would add to the party’s misery.

Chapter Seven examines CCF fortunes in 1944. The party achieved its first
electoral triumph with a landslide victory in Saskatchewan in June. In Ontario, anti-CCF
propaganda was ratcheted up as powerful interests attempted to thwart the party’s
advance. The party fought back and was partially successful in combating these groups
through legal action. As it turned out, these court victories would prove short-lived for
the CCF.
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In Québec, the party attempted to reach beyond its Montreal base and hired its
first full-time Québec organizer, Jacques Casgrain. This year also marked the CCF’s first
taste of victory when David Coté captured the riding of Rouyn-Noranda in the August
provincial election. Neither Casgrain nor Coté would stay with the party for very long.

Chapter Eight discusses several important topics that shaped the June 1945,
Ontario and federal elections and the subsequent post-war political scene. This chapter
examines the jockeying for election dates between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and
Ontario Premier George Drew to maximize the timing of the war’s end and gain political
advantage.
With all parties focused on improving the post-war welfare state, the campaigns
resembled the CCF’s laundry list of social policy objectives. These campaigns also
witnessed the anti-CCF message that produced the desired results.
The question of the CCF harming its own electoral chances will be discussed with
the “Gestapo Affair,” in which the Ontario CCF leader stated that the provincial
government had been spying on his party. Finally, the chapter explores the results of the
respective Ontario and national CCF elections of June 4 and June 11, 1945.

Chapter Nine explores the immediate aftermath of the twin electoral
disappointments for the CCF. In Ontario, the CCF leadership set out to prove it was
correct in its assertion that the provincial government was spying on them during
hearings of the Lebel Commission. While the Ontario government was (wrongly)
exonerated of wrong-doing, the CCF and its leader, Ted Jolliffe, appeared to rehabilitate
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their reputation. Indeed, in the next provincial campaign (1948), Jolliffe and twenty CCF
members returned to the provincial assembly at Queen’s Park as the Official Opposition.
The news and immediate future were less favorable in Québec. Less than one
month after the 1945 federal election, the provincial CCF lost its sole member in the
Québec assembly when David Coté resigned as a member of the party to sit as an
independent. This action triggered acrimony from many factions of the Québec CCF,
culminating with the expulsion of members of the Verdun group, one of the strongest
branches the party possessed. Slowly, the Québec CCF began to revert to its English,
Montreal-centric posture, thus dooming the party to the political hinterlands in the years
to come.
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CHAPTER I
THE CCF IN QUEBEC PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

Early Evidence of CCF Issues in Québec
A number of factors hindered CCF development in Central Canada and were
compounded by elements of political life in Québec. These factors fall into two broad
categories: external forces and internal party dynamics. In the historiography of the party
of this region, much attention has focused on the external factors that were beyond the
CCF’s control. These outside forces should not be minimized; the evidence is clear that
numerous groups had a vested interest in stunting CCF growth, and these associations
worked very hard to make certain that the party’s advancement did not occur. However,
significantly less attention has been given to the words and actions of the CCF itself that
contributed to the party’s difficulty in attaining a position of influence on the Canadian
and Québec political stages. The next two chapters will provide a fuller understanding of
how the provincial CCF in Québec and Ontario, respectively and with a helping hand
from the National Office in Ottawa, undermined its own party’s quest for electoral
significance during the 1930s.
Advocates and leaders of the CCF did, however, work doggedly to improve the
lot of the party in Central Canada, and those efforts will also be discussed in this
dissertation. In addition, some external events aided the cause of Canadian democratic
socialism and the party that best reflected those beliefs was indeed the CCF. Throughout
this chapter, these beneficial developments will likewise be examined. However, for this
pre-war period, the negative factors far outweighed the more positive ones.
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External Issues for the CCF in Québec
Early Condemnation by the Catholic Church
The debate regarding socialism and the role it could play, if any, in a
predominantly Catholic society was broached in 1931 by Pope Pius XI. In a wide-ranging
encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, the Pope discussed the dangers in the face of
unrestrained capitalism and totalitarian communism. In addition, Pius XI called for a
remodeling of society based on the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. From that
edict, it would seem at first glance that the Church had a great deal in common with much
of the policies and social programs of the CCF. That turned out not to be the case. In this
encyclical, Pope Pius made the case for socialism to solve societal ills, but had little use
for socialists, per se. The Pope warned that capital interests can become dangerous for
states that would be reduced to “chained slaves of individual interests” and sought greater
solidarity than possible with the present capitalist system.1
While Pope Pius advocated many of the same elements located in socialist party
platforms, he held no great affection for that economic system. He asserted “Whether
considered as a doctrine, or an historical fact, or a movement, Socialism, if it remains
truly, Socialism, even after it has yielded to truth and justice on the points we have
mentioned, cannot be reconciled with teachings of the Catholic Church because its
concept of society itself is utterly foreign to Christian truth.”2 In short, the Church
believed that any socialist party, no matter how well-meaning, would ultimately devolve
into a totalitarian, communist state. Diverse political leaders including U.S. President

1. Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Pius XI: Quadragesimo Anno (Washington, D.C.: National
Catholic Welfare conference) 1931, 109.
2. Quadragesimo Anno, 117.
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Franklin Roosevelt and Fascist rulers in Europe such as Francisco Franco (Spain), Benito
Mussolini (Italy), and Antonio Salazar (Portugal) all praised this latest encyclical and
selected elements of the document that suited their political interests.3
After the CCF was born in 1932, the debate began in Canada as to how Pope
Pius’s encyclical should be interpreted. CCF officials widely believed that the Church’s
opposition was based on a misunderstanding of party doctrine and that, if the leaders
could only clarify their positions, the Catholic objections would disappear.4 Murray
Ballantyne, a Catholic journalist who specialized in the relationship between the Catholic
Church and the CCF, pointed out that “The CCF proclaimed itself to be socialist. Its
programme could be read as evincing a materialistic philosophy, and there was some
doubt in its early days as to whether or not it could free itself from the Communists who
were trying to penetrate it.”5 Ballantyne added that the CCF possessed elements that were
more radical in their brand of socialism. He explained that “Certain speeches of CCF
adherents, particularly in the West, gave weight to these fears.”6
Ballantyne claimed that the CCF’s socialist solutions to the Great Depression
faced two important obstacles. The first was that the Canadian economy was still
profoundly depressed “and many people feared for the very foundations of social life as

3. Mario Dinunzio, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Third American Revolution (Santa Barbara, CA,
Praeger/ABC-CLIO, 2011), 49.
4. Andrée Lévesque-Olssen, The Canadian Left in Québec During the Great Depression: The
Communist Party of Canada and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Québec, 1929-1939
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1973), 103.
5. Murray Ballantyne, “The Catholic Church and the CCF,” Canadian Catholic Historical
Association Report (1963), 33.
6. Ballantyne, 33. It should be noted that the CCF, and later, the NDP, always housed a “ginger”
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they had known it.”7 The second issue negatively affected the CCF in Québec. Ballantyne
asserted that “The French-Canadian mind has always tended to reason more formally and
to use words more carefully than the English-Canadian mind. The English mentality is
not bothered by seeming contradictions by using the same word to connote shifting or
even altered conceptions.”8 As a result, Ballantyne argued, “An English-speaking party
which calls itself ‘socialist’ does not necessarily adhere to a strictly socialist philosophy.
This method of behavior is not familiar to the French.”9 While Ballantyne may have been
correct in his observation that something was lost in translation for the CCF in Québec,
one must also consider the fact that the CCF was perceived in the province as an
“English” party trying to break into a largely francophone region.
Matters came to a head in early 1934 when Archbishop Georges Gauthier of
Montreal issued a pastoral letter in which he condemned the CCF’s program on the
grounds that “it denied man’s fundamental right to possess private property, incited to
class war, and was inevitably materialistic in philosophy.”10 The message was clear: one
could not be both a good Catholic and a socialist.11
Similar sentiments were subsequently expressed by Cardinal Villeneuve of
Montreal, while other bishops were also critical of the party.12 CCF leader J.S.
Woodsworth replied to Gauthier that there was nothing Communistic about the CCF. To
bolster his claim, Woodsworth highlighted the full religious liberty, autonomy, and
minority rights his new party guaranteed.13 Ballantyne noted that Archbishop Gauthier’s
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letter applied only to his diocesans, and further was more of a stern suggestion (as
opposed to an outright order) to his parishioners.14 Still, Ballantyne contended that
“Catholics are quite properly accustomed to following the counsels of their Bishops
without minute scrutiny as to the extent to which they were bound to conscience to do
so.”15 The result was “that from day one, Catholics in the rest of Canada were on the
defensive if they supported the CCF, while Catholics in the Archdiocese of Montreal
found it almost impossible to do so.”16
In February 1934, Joseph Wall, a Montreal Catholic who was a well-known labor
leader and member of the CCF, wrote to Monsignor Gauthier asking if the pastoral letter
forbade Montreal Catholics to work, be candidates, or vote for the CCF. The Archbishop
replied, “A Catholic in your position and of your caliber knows very well wherein his
duty lies.”17 These edicts meant, according to Ballantyne, that “Catholics were uneasy in
their minds about the CCF, and it was generally believed among them that the Party had
been condemned by the Church. This attitude was particularly prevalent among Frenchspeaking Canadians.”18 Despite this obstacle, Ballantyne believed there was significant
common ground between the CCF and the Church. He remarked, “The raison d’être of
the CCF was reform and, although it started from premises other than Catholic, the new
Party produced a programme containing practical proposals – many of which harmonized
with or could be made to harmonize with Christian principles.”19 This is clear evidence of
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the “social gospel” aspect of the CCF that pre-dated the party’s existence, as well as a
disagreement between Ballantyne’s interpretation of the encyclical and the opinion of
leading Catholic authorities in Québec.

The Two Solitudes: English and French Catholics Consider Canadian Socialism
The condemnation of the CCF by Québec Catholic authorities was not shared by
Catholic leaders in other parts of the country. The Montreal Beacon newspaper reported
in early 1934 that not all Catholic institutions were automatically opposed to the policies
of the newly organized CCF.20 The Catholic Register of Toronto pronounced that it came
away with a far different impression of the “socialist” program of the CCF than did the
Catholic hierarchy in Québec. The Associate Editor of The Catholic Register, Henry
Sommerville, wrote, “A responsible person – a priest and religious – has urged me to deal
with the CCF. I accept the task because there is evidence of Catholics looking for
guidance.”21 As Sommerville claimed, “The CCF is accused of being Socialist. This is
why there is some question of it being a proper organization for a Catholic to join.”22 As
such, Sommerville concurred “Many things are called Socialist which are not
Socialism.”23 Once more, Sommerville reached the same conclusion as had Ballantyne:
the CCF’s “socialism” was not really socialism but a linguistic misinterpretation.
Sommerville claimed, “Many of its (CCF’s) leaders call themselves Socialists but it is
understood that the word carries no specific meaning.”24 To back up his claim of the
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CCF’s elusive socialism, Sommerville quoted CCF leader J.S. Woodsworth’s address at
the Regina Convention of July 1933, in which the CCF president asserted, “Socialism has
so many variations that we hesitate to use the class name.”25 Regarding the propriety of
Catholics to support the CCF, Sommerville again used Woodsworth’s words to make the
case in the affirmative. In his presidential address in Regina, Woodsworth stated that "If
the CCF socialized everything in its programme, from banks to gas stations, the resultant
condition would be more out of harmony with Catholic doctrine than is the existing
capitalist condition.”26
Sommerville also located evidence that the CCF program provided guarantees
that should have made the party acceptable for Canadian Catholics. He argued that “The
CCF programme reassures us that it does not propose any policy of outright
confiscation,” adding that “There is a paragraph about compensation, the wording of
which is capable of an interpretation satisfactory to Catholics.”27 Sommerville
ascertained that, after reading the CCF program “the drafters have done nothing more
original than borrow from the propaganda literature of the British Labour Party.”28
Taking that another step, he asserted that the CCF leaders “out of deference to Canadian
conservatism have toned down the language of the British Labourites.”29
To Sommerville, the CCF was at the level of the British Labour Party and
“nobody says that a Catholic in Britain may not belong to the Labour Party.”30 Based on
this analysis, Sommerville unequivocally concluded, “As long as there is no
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pronouncement by ecclesiastical authority against the CCF, a Catholic is free to join that
organization.”31 Unfortunately for the CCF, just three weeks later Archbishop Gauthier
let his strong negative feelings toward the CCF be known in his previously discussed
pastoral letter. While this highlighted a divide among Catholics regarding the suitability
of supporting the CCF, in Québec Archbishop Gauthier’s words carried far more weight
than did Sommerville’s. Still, not all prominent French-Canadians viewed the CCF in a
dim light.
Henri Bourassa was one of the most influential French-Canadian politicians of the
first half of the twentieth century. From his long legislative career to his vision of panCanadian nationalism and his role in establishing and editing Le Devoir newspaper,
Bourassa left a vivid mark on Québec and Canadian society.32 He cited Canada’s strong
ties to the British Empire as the chief factor that divided the nation along linguistic,
ultramontane lines.33 Bourassa’s approach to economics was essentially Catholic, and he
embraced the idea that the Church was responsible for faith, morals, discipline and
administration.34 Still, Bourassa resisted Church involvement in the political sphere and
rejected the corporatism espoused by the Church.35
Shortly after Archbishop Gauthier issued his pastoral letter, the Liberal and
Conservative parties took jabs at the new party in the House of Commons. Bourassa,
sitting as an Independent Member of Parliament, defended the CCF and chided Canada’s
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two main political parties. In the House of Commons on January 30, 1934, Bourassa
asked, “When you make use of the Pope’s encyclical to denounce the CCF, why do you
not read the part of it which denounces the system that has been built up, maintained, and
protected by the two great historic parties since confederation?”36 The former Liberal MP
continued, “If you do, you will find in the Pope’s encyclical as much against our social
and economic system as there is against communism and socialism. Let us admit that
there is much good in the programme of the CCF.”37
It was rare praise for the party by a leading French-Canadian politician.
Unfortunately for the CCF, Bourassa’s speech did little to change public perception of the
party in his home province. Still, it does indicate that divisions existed with regard to the
interpretation of policies and objectives for Catholic voters across Canada, and especially
in Québec. Even for non-CCF supporters like Ballantyne, the censure of the CCF created
moral and ethical concerns. Ballantyne admitted the situation “left me feeling profoundly
uneasy as both a Catholic and as a Canadian.”38 Ballantyne realized that the Catholic
Church’s stance would be a severe hindrance to the fortunes of the CCF, especially in
Québec. As he noted, “It is an exceedingly grave matter for the Church to condemn a
political party. Such condemnations often run a grave risk of doing more harm than
good.”39 In addition to the negative effects of the unfavorable judgment of the CCF in
regard to Canadian democracy, Ballantyne was also concerned that the Church’s stance
might eventually be counterproductive. He noted, “These acts expose the Church to
criticism and misunderstanding, and, by arousing hostility and depriving the condemned
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organization of Catholic influence, they sometimes tend to produce the result they warn
against.”40
The question of how Roman Catholic authorities in Québec should address the
CCF would linger for close to a decade. Moreover, the movement to clarify the Church’s
stance regarding the party of Canadian socialism would obtain greater urgency in the
early 1940s, as support for the party began to increase significantly. Until that time, the
CCF would struggle to make headway in Québec.

Anti-Union Stance of the Catholic Church and the Duplessis Government
Another dimension in Catholic Church opposition to progressive elements in
Québec society pertained to the church’s disapproval of the trade union movement.
Journalist Eugene Forsey stated this was a prime example of church interference with
modernization forces. Writing in the Canadian Forum, Forsey was a consistent voice
against the role of the Roman Catholic Church, especially when it came to the issue of
trade unionism and the general welfare of working-class francophones. In June 1937, he
stated, “Québec has been for some time the scene of a formidable, carefully organized
campaign to transform the province into a clerical-Fascist state.”41 In particular, Forsey
was concerned with the development of “Catholic trade unions” that he viewed as
working against the best interest of the working class in Québec. Forsey stated, “The
spearhead of the clerical-Fascist attack, however, is not speeches or lectures. It is the
organization of Catholic trade unions. These ‘answer exactly,’ says Father Archambault,
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‘to the desires of the Sovereign Pontiff.’ Small wonder! They are completely under the
control of the clergy.”42 Forsey continued his attack on these Catholic unions: “By a
happy coincidence they also answer very nicely to the desires of employers. Again small
wonder, for they are based on the proposition that workers should ‘love and agree with’
their employers and should strike only as a last resort.”43
A pliant workforce was an important “selling point” when various Quebec
governments sought to convince foreign capital to invest in the province. This was
especially true during the reign of Maurice Duplessis and his Union Nationale party.
Concrete evidence of Duplessis’s anti-union stance in Québec was located in Bills 19 and
20, which exempted provincial public works from the purview of the Fair Wages Act,
prohibited the closed shop, and authorized the state to modify collective agreements
unilaterally.44 In 1937, ten thousand textile workers, union members of the Confédération
des travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC, confederation of Catholic workers of
Canada) went on strike and the Duplessis government sided with the employers.45 In
addition, the Québec premier’s choice for Labor Minister was William Tremblay, who
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was described as “the assassin of the working class.”46 Enacted early in Duplessis’s first
mandate, these actions and edicts set the tone for his provincial party’s (Union Nationale)
relationship with the labor movement.
Indeed, Maurice Duplessis presented a formidable opponent to CCF ambitions in
the province. Duplessis rose to prominence when he was selected leader of the
Conservative Party of Québec in October, 1933.47 A lawyer by trade, Duplessis started
his political career by winning a seat in his hometown riding of Trois-Rivières during the
1927 Québec election. He quickly developed a reputation for being a fine debater and a
skilled parliamentarian. These traits helped him rise through the Conservative Party ranks
in subsequent years.48 In the run-up to the 1935 provincial campaign, Duplessis aligned
with Paul Gouin’s Action Libérale Nationale (ALN) group which promoted economic,
political, and social reforms in Québec.49 One of the main terms of the détente was
Duplessis’s agreement to implement the entire ALN reform package. When the Union
Nationale won power in the 1936 election, Duplessis set about marginalizing and
eliminating the more radical members of the ALN.50 In breathtaking fashion, Duplessis
wrested total control of the Union Nationale and embarked on a far more conservative
agenda than the one from which he was elected.51 To that end, the new premier of
Québec declared that the role of government was to facilitate and cooperate with—not to
regulate—business in the province. Furthermore, Duplessis promoted an economic
philosophy that eschewed government ownership of industry. Anything that remotely
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resembled socialism was to be absolutely rejected.52 Throughout his long career,
Duplessis did little to dispel the English-Canadian stereotype of Québec as being a
backward, reactionary, and church-dominated society. Herbert Quinn noted that the
Catholic Church in Québec provided Duplessis’s party with its greatest source of
strength.53 Indeed, the policy program for the Union Nationale reflected the basic
principles of the Catholic Church regarding questions of social reform. According to
Quinn, a significant example of the harmony between the Church in Québec and the
Union Nationale was that both still idealized the rural way of life and were not fully
reconciled to the new industrial society.54
Naturally, the Duplessis economic ethos ran counter to that of the CCF. This
provided another problem for the party in Québec. With the CCF promoting democratic
socialism and the government of Québec comfortable with corporatist and authoritarian
practices and policies, there was bound to be confrontation. The most striking example of
state-sponsored Fascism in Québec during the latter part of the 1930s was the “Padlock
Law,” instituted by Premier Duplessis’s Union Nationale government. According to
Andrée Lévesque-Olssen, the repeal of Article 98 (a federal anti-communism measure)
and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War provided Duplessis ammunition to “protect”
Québec from communist infiltration.55 Yet, communism had already been on Canadian
soil for some time. During the early 1920s, the Communist Party of Canada was formed
by former members of three socialist parties: the Socialist Party of Canada, the Social-
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Democratic Party of Canada, and the Socialist Party of North America.56 Political
historian Norman Penner remarked in his book, The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis
(1977), that what emerged from these Canadian socialist movements was a communist
party based on the conviction that the problems hampering socialist movements could be
remedied by the teachings of Lenin and by affiliation to the Communist International.57
By 1930, Tim Buck was the acknowledged leader of the party. Buck was a
British-born machinist who immigrated to Canada in 1910.58 He was attracted to
Marxism as a result of the Russian Revolution and was disillusioned with reformism as a
result of the Farmer-Labor experience of 1920.59 Buck established a reputation as a solid
and reliable unionist and he quickly rose out of the rank and file. Throughout the 1920s,
he served as the trade union director for the Communist Party of Canada (CPC).60 Buck
was selected leader of the CPC in July 1929 and his early tenure marked the beginning of
a new course for the party. With Buck at the head, the party swung behind Stalin’s
leadership and never wavered from that position.61
During the 1930s, Buck would spend time behind bars for his political beliefs as
communism was under attack in much of Canada. Indeed, the very definition of what
constituted “communism” came under greater scrutiny. This was especially true in
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Québec. A Canadian Forum editorial from April 1937 remarked, “A new [provincial]
law has been put through which will seek to prevent ‘Communist’ meetings by
padlocking their meeting places. This is a good example of the working of the ultrareactionary Catholic mentality in the province, for whom the Premier is undoubtedly the
spokesman.”62 The editorial continued, “The enormous wealth and power of the Québec
church, derived from a populace largely poverty-stricken and backward, is producing the
inevitable discontent, and the ecclesiastical authorities are seeking to justify repression of
perfectly legal opposition by dubbing the anti-clerical as communist.”63 The following
month, the Canadian Forum editorialized the fascist nature of Québec’s Bill 98, widely
known as the “Padlock Act.” The editorial stated, “Mr. Duplessis’ ‘Padlock Act’ is an
incredible document, probably without parallel in the world outside Italy and
Germany.”64 The Canadian Forum remarked that the Attorney-General can close a house
or order the seizure and destruction of literature “at his own sweet will. He does not have
to prove anything before a court.”65 The Forum noted “The sweeping powers granted to
the Attorney-General, the heavy penalties, the placing of the burden of proof on the
accused, the denial of the right of appeal, these in themselves are serious enough threats
to the civil liberties of all citizens.”66 Even with that, the editors claimed there was a more
menacing facet to the law: it failed to define “communism.”67 That determination (or
lack thereof) would rest solely on the shoulders of the Attorney-General of Québec, who
was also the premier of the province. The editorial remarked, “When the premier was

62. “Québec Fascism,” Canadian Forum 17, no. 195 (April 1937): 4.
63. “Québec Fascism,” 4-5.
64. “Civil Liberties in Québec,” Canadian Forum 17, no. 196 (May 1937): 42.
65. “Civil Liberties,” 42.
66. “Civil Liberties,” 42.
67. “Civil Liberties,” 42.

42

asked for a definition, he replied that it was unnecessary: ‘Communism can be felt…We
shall understand by Communism what everyone understands by Communism….Any
definition would prevent the application of the law.’”68 The Canadian Forum opined that
the lack of a concrete definition meant, in reality, that the law gave Duplessis a free hand
to suppress any opinions he did not like.69 The editors stated that Bill 98 would not have
to be frequently used because the mere threat (of its use) would be sufficient for
Duplessis to stifle criticism or opposition.70
The reality of this law hit home for the Québec CCF at the end of October 1937.
According to Forsey, “On October 31, the City (Montreal) suddenly cancelled permission
for a meeting of the Federation of the Unemployed in a city-owned hall. The speakers
were to have been Colonel R. L. Calder, former Crown prosecutor, Hubert Desaulniers,
French provincial secretary of the CCF and a member of the CCF National Council, and
Miss Madeline Sheridan, a member of the CCF National Council.”71 The mayor,
questioned by a delegation of the Civil Liberties Union, explained he understood that
there was to be a Communist speaker and that made the meeting a Communist meeting.72
The description of the cancellation of this event illustrates the draconian nature of Bill 98
and the immediate association of democratic-socialists with “Communists.” The National
CCF was quick to respond to Duplessis’s assertion. National CCF Secretary David Lewis
fired off a wire to the Québec premier defending his party: “I officially deny and
vigorously protest your reference that [the] CCF is un movement d’inspiration
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communiste [a communist inspired movement].”73 Lewis added, “Anyone acquainted
with current Canadian politics knows the CCF is (a) Dominion political party not only
independent of Communists but in origin and policy at variance with them.”74 After
pointing out to the Québec premier that the CCF polled 400,000 votes in the last
Dominion election, was the official opposition in the Saskatchewan legislature, and
possessed a significant presence in other provincial legislatures, Lewis declared, “Your
statement (is) entirely unwarranted, unfounded and misleading.”75 The CCF Secretary
closed by chastising Duplessis: “Such misrepresentation is (a) disservice to the people of
Québec who are searching (for an) effective democratic solution for their problems.”76
In its December 1937 issue, The Canadian Forum sarcastically “gave thanks” for “our
own Canadian brand of clerico-fascism in Québec that now prevents public meetings by
threats of violence and padlocked newspapers of which the Cardinal does not approve.”77
In terms of additional difficulties facing organized labor in central Canada, heavyhanded actions by the governments of Ontario and Québec received scrutiny in the pages
of the Canadian Forum. An editorial (likely authored by Managing Editor George Grube)
asserted, “We have the further disadvantage that potential fascism is much better
organized here than anywhere in the United States because of the domination of our two
chief industrial provinces by the Hepburn and Duplessis machines, the latter supported by
the matchless power of the French Catholic hierarchy.”78 The relationship between
organized labor and the Ontario government will be discussed in the following chapter.
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Challenges in Gaining Media and Public Interest
The CCF also struggled to make its message heard in the province of Québec. For
the party, the issue was a disinterested media and an incurious public. Certainly, a
socialist party had a difficult time gaining positive (or even impartial) space in the
Québec newspapers in the 1930s. Perhaps worse for the CCF, the party had a rough
challenge receiving any mention of speeches, pronouncements and activities. A July 1939
letter from Norman Allen, Secretary of the Québec CCF Youth Movement, to David
Lewis was typical. M. J. Coldwell, CCF Member of Parliament, had made a statement
regarding the formation of the New Democracy Party being established by former
Conservative William Herridge. Allen wrote, “I watched the three local [Montreal]
English papers for a report on this statement.” Allen reported that the Montreal Gazette
did provide a “good write-up in the early edition,” however, he noted the article had been
withdrawn from the following morning edition.79 Allen remarked the CCF article had
likely been pulled due to political pressure.80 He also alerted Lewis that the other two
English Montreal papers, the Montreal Star and the Montreal Herald, made no mention
of Coldwell’s announcement, while the address was published in “two [unnamed] local
French newspapers.”81 This inconsistent treatment of the CCF in Montreal and, indeed,
throughout much of the rest of the country, would be a consistent obstacle the party
would have to overcome.
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Along with media difficulties, the CCF also had issues searching for an audience
prepared to hear its message. The Canadian Forum noted, “The CCF has often seemed to
be preaching to deaf ears when it addressed labor audiences, not because its message was
unsuitable but because the audience was not yet ready for the message.”82 It is unclear
whether the editors believed that the CCF policies were failing to register because
working people in Québec were not comfortable with socialism, or whether they were not
able to comprehend the platform being put forth by the party due to poor education.
Subsequent Canadian Forum issues took the provincial government and the educational
system in Québec to task for failing to provide an adequate education to its people.83 In
an article about Protestant education in Québec, Eric Wiseman stated that under-funding
was the root of the educational problems in the province. He argued that the solution was
obvious: more money needed to be spent on education by the Québec government.84
Wiseman claimed that this underfunding produced poor educational results in the
later grades. He stated, “Of the 300,000 boys and girls between the ages of 15 and 19 in
Québec, only 71,000 are enrolled in any kind of school, and of these only 8,000 are in
Vocational Schools.”85 The Superintendent’s report for 1935 stated, “It is well known
that our children have no taste for reading, and this explains their weakness in
composition.”86 Lastly, Wiseman condemned the province for being the only one in
Canada in which education was not compulsory. As a result, he estimated that, in rural
Québec, only one boy in nine and one girl in six between the ages of fifteen and nineteen
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were in school.87 This reality affected overall educational standards in Québec. It also
colored how people in the CCF viewed the province’s working people.

Internal Issues for the CCF in Québec
The CCF enjoyed virtually no “honeymoon” period in Québec. The party’s
formation was either ignored or ridiculed in the French and English press. Since only two
delegates from Québec attended the founding CCF convention, it is not surprising that the
party was quickly labeled a “foreign” or “English” party by Québec citizens. The party
helped establish this label for itself and perpetuated it during those formative years. The
Canadian Forum was one of the few publications that was overwhelmingly (but not
always) partial to the CCF. Indeed, the editorial staff of this journal was comprised of
leading members of the League for Social Reconstruction, individuals who acted as the
intellectual backbone of the CCF.88
Throughout the pre-war period, there was no French-language publication
sympathetic to the CCF cause. Furthermore, it took the party nearly a full decade to
publish a French-language periodical to trumpet the objectives and actions of the CCF.
As early as 1934, written records indicated a party struggling to make in-roads in Québec
and clumsily trying to understand the political situation in the predominantly Frenchspeaking region.
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In October 1934, Dugald McLean, Secretary of the Québec CCF Provincial
Council, explained to the federal CCF Secretary, N.F. Priestly, that “The French clubs
have been a financial liability to the Council – rather than an asset.”89 He added that the
French clubs had not contributed any dues even though the Provincial Council had used
its meager resources to finance the activities of these French groups in Montreal.90
Earlier that month, McLean and Priestly exchanged letters in which the two Québec
delegates to the National CCF Council, Jean Peron and Daniel Lapointe, would no longer
be permitted to represent the Québec Council on the National Council. McLean claimed
that the pair had “defied the authority of the Québec Provincial Council.”91 As McLean
later explained, Peron and Lapointe had decided to merge all French clubs into one large
club. Moreover, Peron had determined that this “Central CCF French Club of Montreal”
would have complete jurisdiction over all French activities in the city.92 Thus Peron and,
to a lesser degree, Lapointe were guilty of upsetting established French CCF clubs in
Montreal and stepping beyond the parameters that the Québec CCF Council was willing
to allow. Peron was quite upset with his removal from the National Council and appealed
to CCF National Leader, J.S. Woodsworth, to intervene. McLean added that he was
pleased with Woodsworth’s involvement due to the significant degree of respect the CCF
leader enjoyed from both the French people in Montreal and the Provincial Council.93
These letters highlight two recurring tensions between French and English leaders of the
CCF in Québec: the tight resources allotted to French-Canadian activities and the sense
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by the English leaders that they were having a difficult time “controlling” their French
counterparts.
Further evidence of financial difficulties for the Québec CCF was discussed in
early 1935. McLean wrote to M. J. Coldwell, the Secretary and Treasurer of the national
CCF, to report that “Collections for the National Office Fund are coming in much more
slowly than I had anticipated.” He added that he was hopeful of having a check to send
the National Office by the end of the month.94 In that same letter, McLean lamented the
reality that known public figures interested in the CCF were few. He noted that only
Alderman Schubert, of the Montreal City Council, and Mr. E. Wilson, an ex-alderman for
the City of Verdun, had publicly supported the party.95 This lack of enthusiasm toward
the CCF would manifest with an underwhelming performance by the party in Québec in
the 1935 federal election. Of sixty-five available districts in the province, the CCF
managed to locate candidates for five of these ridings. New Québec CCF Provincial
Secretary Squire Blackshaw complained that the party would not be able to locate any
more candidates for the general election, and noted that all five CCF hopefuls were from
the island of Montreal.96 Blackshaw added that only two of the party’s candidates were
“straight” (as in strictly CCF candidates). The other three were either CCF party
nominees endorsed by the Labor Party, or Labor Party candidates endorsed by the CCF. 97
These developments highlight two issues that continually hounded the party. The first
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was the anemic interest in the party among voters throughout the province. The second
issue was the Montreal-centric nature of the Québec CCF.
Significantly, one of the party’s candidates was the censured Jean Peron. Less
than a year after being removed from the CCF National Council for upsetting the
provincial wing of the party, Peron was endorsed by the CCF as a nominee of the Labor
Party.98 Despite the dispute between Peron and the Québec provincial party hierarchy, the
CCF was anxious to maintain ties with this leading French-Canadian prospect. As events
unfolded, it became evident that this marriage of convenience was destined to fail. Eight
months after the 1935 federal election, Peron and the CCF suffered a permanent break.
Peron was an advocate for a united front of all parties of the left, a position that
was forbidden by the CCF Constitution. Québec CCF Provincial Secretary, Hubert
Pearson, wrote to acting CCF National Secretary-Treasurer M. J. Coldwell to explain
Peron’s dismissal. Pearson informed Coldwell that, at the April 8 Provincial Council
meeting, the Québec CCF leadership decided to expel Peron from the party for repeated
acts of disloyalty.99 Once more, Peron appealed his expulsion to Woodsworth. The CCF
leader rejected this appeal because the party had definitively decided against a united
front policy.100 Woodsworth added that Peron not only supported the united front but had
“advocated such a position, notwithstanding the repeated warnings from your
colleagues.”101 Woodsworth was resigned in his decision but pained at the Peron
expulsion. He remarked, “I had thought that you might have performed a very great work
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among the French-Canadians, but as a Socialist, you must recognize that our own
individual ambitions must be subordinate to the general movement.”102 Thus, the CCF in
Québec lost one of the leading French-Canadian spokesmen for socialism.
Unfortunately for the party, this dynamic would repeat itself throughout the
decade to come. The Peron episode capped off a series of correspondences highlighting
the main difficulties that hampered the party in Québec. In January of that year, Québec
CCF Secretary Pearson submitted a list of people comprising the party’s Provincial
Council. Of the eleven persons listed, only two were francophones (one of them being the
aforementioned Jean Peron).103 In short, the CCF in Québec was an Anglo-dominated
group, and would become even more so after Peron’s expulsion in the spring of that year.
Peron himself weighed in on this situation after his final break with the CCF. He
remarked that he wanted to concentrate on the organization of French-Canadian workers,
while the Provincial Council was more concerned with certain anglophone clubs in
Montreal.104 Peron explained that the CCF’s organizational efforts were a product of the
party’s belief that the working class was “ignorant” and that socialism could only be
achieved by the educated middle class. He concluded that perception was one of the chief
reasons for the weakness of the CCF in Québec.105
Clearly, the charge of being an English party in the largely French-speaking
province had a firm basis in reality during the party’s early years. Young argued the
Québec CCF was comprised of English-Canadians who frequently demonstrated great
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ignorance and prejudice where French-Canadian rights were concerned.106 He added that
the CCF “spoke to Québec with an English accent.”107 This situation was acutely
recognized by the Québec CCF and efforts were made to correct that perception. In
October 1936 Pearson sent a letter to the CCF National Council seeking their assistance
in appointing a French-Canadian organizer.108 Citing a National Convention resolution
that recommended just such a position, Pearson pointed to the need of the CCF across
Canada to give “all assistance possible in financing the work of converting the French
people to our movement.”109 He further explained, “The importance of bringing our
movement in this province to the level attained in the provinces west of our borders needs
no emphasis. Without a majority of the sixty-five Québec seats in our name, no amount
of success in the west will be effective.”110 While displaying a strong Central Canada
bias, Pearson’s words reflected the realpolitik of Canadian politics in that era; for the
CCF to achieve national prominence, it needed to gain support in Québec. Specifically,
while seeking monetary assistance to establish a French-Canadian organizer, Pearson also
requested funding for “some twenty weekly [radio] broadcasts.”111 This evidence is
useful because it expresses both the financially strapped situation that hamstrung the
Québec CCF and the organizational difficulties the party experienced in the province.
These themes would be repeated throughout the 1930s and 1940s.
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Less than three years later, the CCF would again be embroiled in controversy
regarding the search for suitable French-Canadian leaders. On this occasion, the party
was seeking capable French-Canadians to enlist with the CCF’s Youth Movement
(CCYM). Andrew Andrashnik, a member of the CCYM’s executive committee,
described events of a formational meeting with the French section, headed up by a Mr.
Martel. He and two English CCYM members were introduced and “immediately
suspected the young Frenchman speaking of being a Communist.”112 Martel admitted to
Andrashnik that the young French-Canadian speaker was a YCL (Youth Communist
League) member, and that he [Martel] was aware of that fact.113 Martel explained to
Andrashnik that the young French-Canadian had been warned that he would be tolerated
only if he did not make trouble, a position that disturbed Andrashnik.114 Martel explained
to the confounded Andrashnik that “We have no suitable French organizers with the
proper experience within our ranks and that if we can make use of this young man we
should avail ourselves of his services until we have trained some of those about to be
organized and then put him out.”115 Andrashnik reported to David Lewis that the CCYM
previously discussed the matter at great length and agreed that allowing the YCL to work
with the CCF Youth Movement would lead to a “disruption within the party, and would
lead to the loss of good members, morale, and prestige” for the CCYM (and the CCF by
extension).116 Andrashnik also displayed concern for the optics of opposing the French
section too vigorously, noting “The (CCYM) Council also feel that we cannot buck the
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French organization without creating ill-will and we are, of course, very anxious to form
a French unit.”117 Andrashnik closed by reminding Lewis that Martel had stated that
“there were about thirty-five C.P. (Communist Party) members in the French section that
he (Martel) knew of and who are being tolerated in the organization.”118 In his prompt
response, National Secretary David Lewis clearly supported the CCYM Council for its
firm stand on the matter by pointing out “It would be simply silly to admit a Y.C.L.-er to
the organization at this or any other stage.”119 Lewis further advised the CCYM to have
Martel and “one or two others of the English speaking CCF and CCYM, who can get
along in French, to help with the young French-Canadians interested in the
organization.”120 In closing, he suggested that the group enlist the assistance of Michael
Rubenstein, Madeline Sheridan, or Hubert Desaulniers to bolster French recruitment for
the CCYM.121
This episode highlights at least three persistent problems of the early years of the
CCF in Québec. First, by turning to acknowledged Communists, it was evident that the
CCF was having serious difficulties recruiting French-Canadian party members from the
working class. The difference of opinions between Martel and the CCYM Council shines
a light on the deep divide that existed between English and French members of the CCF
in Québec, at least in regards to acceptable political recruitment policies. In addition, this
episode was a microcosm of the troublesome role the Communist Party posed for the
CCF. Throughout the second half of the 1930s the two rival parties remained on the
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fringes of Québec political life. The Communist Party had recruitment difficulties in
large part because of its legal standing in Canada. Following the Winnipeg General
Strike, the Canadian government adopted new regressive legislation to combat
communism.122 In 1924, the King government passed the Unlawful Associations Act
which was incorporated as Article 98. This law made it illegal to attend a meeting of an
association deemed to be revolutionary, to pass out radical literature, or possess any
identification of holding membership in such an association.123 Without question, this
statute severely hindered communist recruitment efforts. Lévesque-Olssen estimated that
during the late 1930s, Communist Party membership in Québec hovered between 500 and
1,000 persons.124 Furthermore, she noted the Communist Party was experiencing
difficulties recruiting French Canadians to the cause. Her figures indicate that roughly
twenty percent of party members in Québec were of French-Canadian extraction.125 As
had been the case for the CCF, Lévesque-Olssen wrote that the Communist Party had
difficulty finding a French-Canadian leader.126 In the 1936 provincial election, the
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation ran only one candidate (out of ninety districts),
while the Parti communiste du Canada placed just four candidates up for election.127 The
CCF amassed less than 1,500 votes (0.26%) and Communists fared only slightly better
with over 1,800 votes (0.32%).128 Despite these paltry numbers, the competition between
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these marginalized parties remained fierce throughout the period, each seeking to become
the party of working-class Québecers, largely francophones.
In his 1935 federal election analysis, CCF National Secretary-Treasurer M.J.
Coldwell made some interesting statements and some noteworthy omissions. He cited the
“intrusion” of Social Credit in Alberta and Saskatchewan as a primary reason for the
inability of the CCF to make a more impressive showing in the general election.129
Coldwell lauded the efforts of the CCF in British Columbia. Nonetheless, he claimed the
results in Saskatchewan were underwhelming and added that “much work needs to be
done in that province.”130 Not only did Coldwell complain about the results in
Saskatchewan (where the party won two seats out of twenty-one, and nearly twenty-two
percent of the vote, compared to no seats and zero-point six percent of the tally for the
CCF in Québec), but the National Secretary, when writing to the Québec Secretary, failed
to even mention the dismal showing of the CCF in Québec and its negative effects.
Coldwell, a future leader of the National CCF, further displayed his lack of
political acumen by predicting that Social Credit candidate “[William] Aberhart is but a
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passing cloud which will be dispelled within two years.”131 Coldwell could not have been
more mistaken. The Social Credit party ruled the province of Alberta from 1935 to 1971,
with Aberhart acting as Premier from 1935 until his death in 1943.132 As background,
Aberhart had been born in Ontario but moved to Calgary in 1911 to accept a position as a
high school principal. A deeply religious man, Aberhart became famous for his work as a
fundamentalist radio preacher in the mid-1920s. With a weekly audience of 300,000,
Aberhart gained both widespread recognition and political converts once he began
infusing social credit doctrines into his sermons in 1932.133
While Coldwell can be excused for his lack of political foresight, a telling trait of
the Québec Secretary revealed itself in subsequent correspondences: a firm distrust of
French-Canadians. In a letter to National CCF Secretary David Lewis, Squire Blackshaw
displayed subtle and overt contempt for French Canadians working in the Québec
provincial section. He reported, “A French organizing committee was set up and
functioned fairly well – at first,” Blackshaw claimed, but when the provincial secretary
left the group to attend to other party business, the group “stopped meeting – the result
being the dissolution of two French clubs which were functioning as affiliated CCF
units.” 134 Blackshaw cited the tale of his St-Jean-Baptiste CCF Club. It started, he
maintains, with “a frenzy and gave every promise of flourishing like a giant oak tree. But
two of its most prominent officers, the President and the Treasurer (Messrs. Tremblay
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and Boutenyer), have almost wrecked the club. They have been mixing the club’s money
with their own.”135
Blackshaw stated that an audit of the clubs was currently taking place and noted
that, “whatever the results of the inquiry happen to be, the loss of confidence in the
movement is already too evident to be ignored.”136 He added, “This unfortunate incident
has led to the reaping up of a vast amount of corruption that existed in the French section
during the reign of Jean Peron, and I am now convinced that raiding the cash box has
been a profitable pastime in CCF groups among the French.”137 Blackshaw also informed
Lewis of a second French club with more than 100 members and “Scarcely any one of
them pay dues – and many of them were Communists.”138 These experiences taught the
Québec CCF Secretary that “we shall have a rough meadow to plough among the French.
They are not over impressed by honesty and truth. They are greatly impressed by
demagogues, either Fascists or Communists.”139 The Québec Secretary explained how
“every (French) club, past and present, under the wing of the CCF has been overrun with
communist rats; as yet my French is not good enough to understand everything I hear,
and certainly not good enough to enter into an argument, so I am compelled to bide my
time.”140 Blackshaw closed by pleading with David Lewis to send copies of Hansard—in
French—for distribution to the French clubs, adding “These people have nothing but
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communist and fascist rags to read in their own language.”141 From the wording and tone
of this submission, it is obvious that the head of the CCF in Québec during these
formative years did not trust French Canadians and harbored a degree of contempt for
that ethnic group. Lévesque-Olssen stated that this mistrust may have stemmed from the
fact that these French-speaking members came from lower socio-economic strata.
Furthermore, she stated that in the Communist Party, French-Canadian members still
considered themselves inferior.142 In the CCF, Lévesque-Olssen confirmed that French
Canadians often enjoyed favored treatment such as being financially supported, but they
seldom received any sympathetic understanding from their own Provincial Council.143
Certainly, it was a handicap to have the party head unable to communicate
effectively in the language of over eighty percent of the province. It is also telling that
nearly four years after the CCF was formed, French literature was virtually non-existent
for those French Canadians who might be curious about the party. In short, despite
possessing the objective of reaching out to French Canadians (especially FrenchCanadian workers), the CCF was painfully slow in providing French language material
and leadership that was willing to welcome this group.
Further evidence of racial discrimination on the part of Québec CCF leaders can
be located in the search for a French-Canadian organizer in 1936. CCF Provincial
Council member Bill Sauvé wrote to David Lewis explaining how they had found a
dynamic but untrustworthy candidate for the position. Sauvé explained, “The consensus
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of opinion is that the man (J. A. Saint-André) has undoubted talent and ability for
political organization, but is as crooked as a ram’s horn.”144 Sauvé added that “Some of
us feel that the man’s past is so well-known that he would do us more harm than
good.”145 Despite these reservations, Sauvé argued that he was inclined to take a chance
on him, but would closely scrutinize his activities.146 Sauvé’s misgivings provide more
compelling evidence of the distrust that the largely Anglo-Québec CCF leaders exhibited
to French Canadians working on behalf of the party. The hiring of Saint-André, despite
the Québec CCF’s misgivings over his candidacy, was indicative of how desperate the
party was in trying to locate French-Canadian leaders for the CCF in Québec. Moreover,
this could be considered a prime example of the anglophone leaders’ lack of
understanding and connections to the French-Canadian community at large.
More anti-French and anti-communist sentiments were exhibited by Squire
Blackshaw in a letter to David Lewis in the summer of 1938. At that time, the CCF
Québec Provincial Secretary informed the National Secretary that there were more
difficulties with some of the CCF French clubs. He explained that the St-Jean-Baptiste
Club, a French club, was “nonexistent. It had collapsed because most of the members
were apostles of political confusion, and a good many dishonest in money affairs.”147 In
that same letter, Blackshaw criticized a member of the St-Jean-Baptiste Club, a Mr.
Desrochers, as being unreliable and untrustworthy. He claimed, “Desrochers seldom
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brings the copy (of Hansard) to the club – and he has turned out to be a rat – or at least
the lackey of communist rats.”148
Blackshaw was not alone in his anti-French sentiments. H. H. Haydon was a
pioneer who sat on the first Montreal Council of the CCF. He wrote that French
Canadians were much more illiterate and subject to emotional appeal and guidance from
those in authority than their English-speaking counterparts.149 Haydon exposed the
Québec CCF’s preference for anglophone middle-class support by stating the party
sought the “potentially more intelligent” elector of Notre-Dame-de-Grace.150
The CCF’s difficulty in recruiting interested and capable French-Canadians is
made stark when reviewing the names in leading positions of the party in the province. A
speech to the Laurier-St. Louis CCF Club in April 1938, by party leader J.S.
Woodsworth, indicated the group was an anglophone-dominated group; none of the
officers or members of the eleven-person executive were francophone.151 Woodsworth
made few trips to Québec, and this one, to highlight the push for a Bill of Rights for
Labour, would have been an ideal opportunity for the party to reach out to working-class
French-Canadians.
Squire Blackshaw maintained that the National CCF also suffered due to an
inability to defend the party’s interest and leaders. In a 1937 letter to CCF General
Secretary M. J. Coldwell, the Québec Provincial Secretary lambasted the CCF press for
allowing other media to attack the party and its top officials. Blackshaw was appalled that
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The Clarion, the official newspaper of the Communist Party, “persistently attacks the
CCF, its leaders, and Mr. Woodsworth in particular.”152 He continued, “These scurrilous
attacks, principally directed against this man (Woodsworth) were reprinted in the
Montreal French paper Clarité, and circulated among the French, some of whom are
members of CCF clubs.”153 While Blackshaw was displeased with these salvos at the
CCF and with Woodsworth, he was also irate with the party’s response to the written
barrage. He fumed, “These vulgar attacks on our leader are both known and ignored by
the editorial staffs of our own press. This statement applies, particularly, to the Toronto
New Commonwealth.”154 Blackshaw highlighted a recent The Clarion editorial in which
the paper argued the CCF membership should be critical of Woodsworth.155 Blackshaw
wrote to the editors at the New Commonwealth to defend Woodsworth. To his chagrin,
not only did the editors not print his rebuttal, they did nothing. “It appears that the New
Commonwealth editorial staff believes it can stand in splendid isolation above the battle,”
he noted.156 Blackshaw called for “a damned good blood transfusion” of the CCF press,
one that would “fight for our movement against all other parties – especially those
seeking the destruction of our own, and the political downfall of Mr. Woodsworth.”157
Blackshaw’s complaints drew the ire of CCF National Secretary David Lewis. He
wrote, “I have for some time been very much disturbed by the unreasonably bitter and
vicious opposition which you show to the C.P. [Communist Party]. I am confident that
your attitude and the people who think like you will, in the long run, harm the Socialist
152. Squire Blackshaw to M. J. Coldwell, 1937 (unspecified date), CCF Papers – Provinces,
General Correspondences, 1932-1958, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
153. Blackshaw to Coldwell, 1.
154. Blackshaw to Coldwell, 1.
155. Blackshaw to Coldwell, 2.
156. Blackshaw to Coldwell, 2.
157. Blackshaw to Coldwell, 2.

62

cause in Canada.”158 Lewis made clear that he was not upset with Blackshaw over a
policy divide between the CCF leaders but rather the intemperate tone of his antiCommunism. Lewis explained that he did not wish to diminish the differences between
the CCF and the Communist Party but pleaded that Blackshaw be “more reasonable,
more comradely, in short, more Socialist and less vicious” in tone.159
Another prominent and persistent criticism of the CCF in Québec during the
formative years surrounded the issue of organization. The party struggled mightily to
attract and recruit both candidates and members. Speaking at the provincial CCF
convention in October 1937, National Secretary David Lewis stated that “The period of
organization had now definitely set in for the CCF.”160 According to Québec CCF
Provincial Council member and secretary for the provincial wing of the party, Madeline
Sheridan, “The great difficulty of finding anyone organized, seems to prove that we have
a great deal of spade work to do yet.”161 As Sheridan viewed the situation, “We have still
to convince the mass of our fellow Québeckers that we are not sinister in our final intent
– and that we are practical idealists in our immediate and remote plans.”162 Sheridan saw
the potential for the party to break through with French Canadians if the party followed
through on issues she believed were close to the heart of French-speaking Québeckers.
For example, Sheridan noted that French Canadians were fond of the work performed by
Woodsworth during the armaments debates of the previous year.163 She suggested that
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the party could make a positive impact on French Canadians if the CCF leadership
championed issues such as expanded relief payments and improved employment
opportunities.164
Sheridan closed by telling the CCF National Secretary that the party needed to
focus attention on “those on relief, and the low-wage and part-time worker. Someplace
among them we should find strength for our movement.”165 Her argument was typical of
CCF leadership in general. Party officials theorized that during difficult economic times,
workers would give working-class based parties like the CCF due consideration and be
converted to this brand of Canadian socialism on the strength of the party’s policies and
economic solutions. Although the CCF (eventually) won over converts, it never
materialized as easily as party leaders hoped or expected.

CCF Outreach Efforts in Québec in the 1930s
Despite the grumbling of the Québec CCF leadership regarding French
Canadians, there is no doubt that the party craved support from this group. This was
certainly true from the perspective of the National Office. David Lewis, in particular, was
quite keen on establishing a strong CCF presence in Québec. Further evidence of the
CCF’s desire to connect with French Canadians was found in correspondence from the
National Secretary to individual Québecers who expressed interest in the party. As Lewis
maintained, the CCF was thrilled that Canadians were interested in the party and its

164. Sheridan to Lewis, 2. Furthermore, Sheridan explained to Lewis that “the desire for public
ownership of public utilities – especially electricity – is more widespread in Québec than you might expect
to think it is at the moment."
165. Sheridan to Lewis, 5.
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policies. He exclaimed this was especially true with regards to “our French-Canadian
brothers.”166
While ample evidence exists indicating the Québec CCF was inept in its efforts to
woo Québec voters, it should be stated that the party did attempt to improve the lot of the
party in the province. For instance, the party hosted a number of noted speakers who
talked about the benefits of the CCF. While Woodsworth and Lewis were the preferred
speakers at the various CCF clubs, other noted politicians also contributed to boosting the
party’s profile. One such favorite speaker was Harold Winch, leader of the provincial
British Columbia CCF. Winch was seen as an attractive person for both his speaking and
organizing abilities. R.N. Elliot, Secretary of the Montreal Central CCF Association
(English Section), wrote to Grace MacInnis, Secretary of the CCF Parliamentary Group,
to seek out Winch’s availability to help reorganize the CCF in Verdun.167
The Québec-based wing of the party also encountered problems gaining approval
from the National Office. The treatment of this speaker request demonstrates this, as it
was passed on from MacInnis to David Lewis, who then decided against having Winch
speak to the Montreal group. He explained, “There have been a large number of requests
for Mr. Winch in northern and western Ontario and in Manitoba, and Mr. Winch is
anxious to get back home as soon as possible. Thus, another visit to Montreal is not
possible.”168 Regarding the situation in Verdun, Lewis wrote that he and another Member
of Parliament would work to resolve problems with that group.169 In fact, the National
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CCF did send some of its more coveted speakers to attend this Montreal Central Meeting
in March 1939. J. S. Woodsworth, M. J. Coldwell (MP), Angus McInnis (MP), Grace
MacInnis (Secretary of CCF Parliamentary Group, and the lone French speaker of this
group) and T.C. Douglas (MP and future CCF Premier of Saskatchewan) were all on the
roster for the program of public addresses.170
This vignette provides some interesting insights into the operation of the CCF at
the national and Québec levels in the period before the war. The first and most important
lesson here was the influence wielded by David Lewis as CCF National Secretary. While
the request was originally sent to Grace MacInnis, it was Lewis who held final approval
of party activities everywhere. Certainly, there were talented individuals working for the
party: Woodsworth, Coldwell, Grace MacInnis, Frank Scott, Eugene Forsey, to name just
a few. Still, when it came to questions of day-to-day operations, the CCF was very much
a “one-man” show during the 1930s. This dynamic extended until Lewis resigned as
party secretary in 1950. The second point is that the National Office did help out the
Montreal club in this instance, which indicates how the party attempted to assist the
Québec CCF English section. However, this program also highlights the limitations the
party had in addressing French Canadians. Of those enlisted to speak at this event, only
Grace MacInnis had a working knowledge of French. Third, while the National Office
supported the Québec CCF, it also made clear that other areas of Canada were,
electorally, more promising than was the city of Montreal. Indeed, during this period,
much of northern and western Ontario was experiencing economic booms due to the
natural resources located in those regions. Lumber, nickel, copper and, later, uranium

170. Elliott to MacInnis, 1.

66

were extracted from the region. All were important resources when World War II
commenced.171 Rural regions of Québec such as Abitibi and Lac Saint-Jean also
experienced significant mining and logging activity in the years after World War I and
again just before the start of World War II.172 In addition, these extractive industries
hired much unskilled and semi-skilled labor; as such, they were seen by both labor
organizers and the federal CCF as prime target groups for recruitment.
Later, in March 1939, the CCF National Office was asked to speak to the Jewish
Labor Committee in Montreal. At this juncture, David Lewis addressed this group about
accepting (or refusing) mostly Jewish refugees from Europe. According to Michael
Rubenstein of the Jewish Labor Group, this issue “was probably the first time that we
have been able to get together all the Trade Unions and other organizations for one
purpose in which our movement is interested.”173 Noted Canadian Jewish historian,
Irving Abella, wrote that Canadian immigration policy had always been ethnically
selective “with Jews, Orientals and blacks at the bottom of the list.”174 The Great
Depression allowed the Canadian government to further restrict immigration. In 1931, an
Order-in-Council effectively banned all non-agricultural immigrants unless they came
from either Britain or the United States.175 By 1938, Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies forced a
mass exodus of Jews from Germany, Austria and Hungary. Unfortunately, Canada and
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175. Abella and Troper, None is Too Many, 5-6.

67

many other nations did not accept many refugees.176 While the welcoming of refugees
was largely a humanitarian issue, Rubinstein also saw potential benefits for the CCF due
to the party’s active support of refugee acceptance. He argued, “We certainly believe that
the CCF’s stand for refugees in Canada will have the proper political repercussions in
time, especially among Jews.”177 While not strictly a labor issue, it does exemplify CCF
efforts to reach out to trade unions in Québec. Lévesque-Olssen stated this was another
example of the CCF trying to gain support from working-class groups by working
through their leadership councils.178
Later that same month, evidence emerged of a confluence of the labor movement,
the resource industry and CCF hopes in the Abitibi region of Québec. CCF Secretary Bill
Sauvé wrote to David Lewis explaining the possibility of the party locating a promising
candidate in the Pontiac electoral district. Sauvé stated that F. W. Metcalfe of
Temiscamingue had phoned the Québec CCF “urging the election of a CCF candidate in
his riding (Pontiac).”179 Metcalfe explained that the region was fertile territory for the
CCF because the electors in the riding were “partly paper mill employees, partly farmers.
There is a mixture of French and English, of Catholic and Protestant.”180 Sauvé indicated
that Metcalfe thought Francis Cork, local President of the Brotherhood of Sulphide and
Paper Workers, might be approached to run as the CCF candidate.181 While Metcalfe was
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promoting Cork, the CCF leadership was clearly impressed by Metcalfe himself. Sauvé
wrote, “Metcalfe appears in his early thirties and worked for the 20th Century Liberal
Association. He is tired of both old parties, has studied Social Credit but says the Social
Credit has made no headway in the riding.”182
Again touting Metcalfe, Sauvé added that "Four members of our group (Mr.
Woodsworth, Mr. P.J. Rowe, Mr. Coldwell, and Mr. McInnis) met with Mr. Metcalfe
today and were, I believe, favourably impressed.”183 Sauvé closed by claiming there was
absolutely no CCF organization there (in the Pontiac riding), “but if direction and
literature were available I believe Mr. Metcalfe would consider doing some work
himself.”184
The party failed to run a candidate in the Pontiac riding during the 1940 federal
campaign. Nonetheless, this exchange is important because it represented an effort by the
CCF to reconsider the Montreal-centric dynamic of the party in Québec. Indeed, as will
be discussed in a later chapter, the demographics of Pontiac that Metcalfe described were
also present in the neighboring riding of Rouyn-Noranda. That district would provide the
Québec CCF its lone triumph during the 1944 provincial election. In closing the analysis
of the Québec portion of this pre-World War II phase, it is worth noting that Metcalf’s
claim of Social Credit making no headway in the region was premature; that party won a
federal by-election in 1946 under Social Credit candidate, and eventual leader, Real
Caouette.185
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that Verdun was “an anomaly” in Quebec due its exceptional British character (58 percent English
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CHAPTER II
THE CCF IN ONTARIO PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

It was a given that the CCF struggled in the province of Québec, and the academic
community concluded that the electoral terrain was more fertile in Ontario. There is,
however, little evidence to support that contention, at least in the party’s first decade of
existence. While the Ontario branch of the CCF did become a force during the Second
World War, prior to 1942 the Ontario party was a significant albatross to the national
movement. Indeed, along with Quebec and the Maritime provinces, Ontario badly trailed
the CCF from the Prairie and Western provinces in terms of public support.
It is often overlooked that the Ontario CCF started out with a degree of
enthusiasm coming out of the Regina Conference.1 Historian Gerald Caplan noted that
party rallies with large crowds were taking place across the province. Furthermore, even
the “unfriendly” press described these events as “enthusiastic” and “excited.” Speakers
and organizers blitzed across Ontario leaving a number of new CCF clubs in their wake.2
The rapid rise of the CCF in Canada’s most populous province disconcerted both its
political opponents as well as the media.3 This impressive start was far different than
what the party experienced in Québec. As events unfolded, the Ontario CCF was unable
1. Gerald Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 39. The Regina Conference took place in July 1933, one year after the
formation of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Calgary. The meeting in Calgary was driven
by the need to address the inadequacies of the existing economic system that had created the Great
Depression. The Regina Conference was important because it offered more concrete solutions through the
Regina Manifesto. This document was largely composed by Frank Underhill, F. R. Scott, Eugene Forsey,
and other members of the League for Social Reconstruction. The Regina Manifesto called for a planned
economy that placed people before profits, the nationalization of transportation, communications, and
electrical power, and wide array of social welfare proposals including old age pensions, unemployment
insurance, and publicly funded health care. This program would act as the CCF’s guiding doctrine until it
was replaced by the more reformist Winnipeg Declaration in 1956. See Walter Young, The Anatomy of a
Party: The National CCF, 1932-1961 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1969), 32-46.
2. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 39.
3. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 40.
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to maintain this early momentum. Whereas in Québec the party was hamstrung by
clerical damnation, poor organization and an element of anti-French sentiment from
Ontario, in Ontario the major source of friction was class conflict.
In its early years, the Ontario CCF was home to three distinct, class-based
contingents: farmers, labor, and CCF clubs.4 The conservative element of the Ontario
CCF comprised the remnants of the United Farmers of Ontario, reform-minded liberals
(who made up the political center of the party), as well as the labor section, which was
populated by fervent anti-capitalists on the party’s left.5 The farmers were uncomfortable
with the tolerance of Communist elements by the labor socialists and even by the
language used by the latter section.6 As events played out, it became clear that the UFO
followers were simply ill-suited for the CCF and their affiliation with the party came to
an end in 1934. However, before their departure, the UFO was instrumental in helping to
shape the Ontario branch.7 The UFO group was led by Elmore Philpott, who joined the
Ontario CCF in spring of 1933 and quickly became its leading spokesman. Philpott came
from the reformist wing of the provincial Liberal Party and had placed second to Mitchell

4. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 24–26.
5. James Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and
the Dream of a Working-Class Future (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2016), 112-113. The United
Farmers of Ontario were founded in 1914 to promote the educational, economic, and political needs of
farmers. The UFO formed a minority government in Ontario in the 1919 provincial election. Federally, the
party captured sixty-five seats (twenty-four from Ontario) during the 1921 federal election. By the mid1920s, the party was in severe decline and was a shell of its former self by the time the CCF arrived in the
early 1930s. See Kerry A. Badgley, Ringing in the Common Good: The United Farmers of Ontario, 19141926 (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 4-5.
6. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 37.
7. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 112. Naylor stated that while different notions of
socialism circulated within the CCF, the UFO subscribed to none of them. Naylor, 134. Caplan remarked
that the UFO realized the CCF was not their party. First, the CCF had “Communist” sympathizers and
overtones. Second, left-wing academics and politicized working-class activists felt at home with the CCF.
Thus, it was more of an urban party and largely irrelevant to rural Ontario. See Caplan, The Dilemma of
Canadian Socialism, 46.
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Hepburn in that party’s 1930 leadership race.8 After the 1933 Regina Conference,
Philpott toured much of Canada touting the CCF as a “Christian movement that had no
sympathy for communism.”9 Upon his return to Ontario, Philpott commenced the task of
ridding the Ontario branch of any Communist elements. To that end, Philpott proposed
restructuring the CCF, arguing that the emergence of CCF clubs had made the Labour
Conference redundant.10 The Labour Conference was already facing opposition from the
centrists and the UFO. Philpott’s move was another attempt to marginalize the group.
The following month, he sought to purify the party by recommending that no former
officer of the Communist Party be accepted as a CCF member. The motion was carried
by a combined UFO-Club section vote of the Provincial Council.11 In hopes of fending
off a public split, the Ontario Provincial Council postponed the question of reorganizing
the provincial party during its December 1933 meeting. Furthermore, a committee had
been convened to tackle the thorny issue of acceptable political membership. Here, a
compromise was reached in which CCF membership was closed to any person who was a
member of any other party.12
Internal harmony did not last long for the Ontario CCF. In February 1934, the
Ontario Labour Conference and five CCF clubs passed resolutions seeking the release of
Communist Party leader Tim Buck. Philpott and the United Farmers of Ontario had seen
enough. The executive committees of both the UFO and the CCF clubs asked the
8. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 129. Along with Philpott, Agnes Macphail played an
important role in lending the new CCF with a degree of respectability. She was the first elected female
Member of Parliament, and was, briefly, the first president of the Ontario CCF. See J.T. Morley, Secular
Socialists: The CCF/NDP in Ontario, A Biography (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1984),
39-40.
9. Norman Priestly to J.S. Woodsworth, letter, February 6, 1934, CCF Papers – J.S. Woodsworth
correspondences, 1933-1942, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 107, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
10. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 129-30.
11. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 44.
12. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 44-45.
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National Council to expel the Labour Conference.13 While supportive of the purge, CCF
National leader J. S. Woodsworth stated that CCF affiliation was a provincial concern. As
such, the Provincial Council would have to deal with this matter.14 The council never got
the chance to do so. By the time the next meeting had been scheduled, the UFO had quit
the CCF. In addition, the provincial party lost its president, Agnes Macphail, because her
organization (the UFO) was no longer affiliated with the party, and Elmore Philpott
resigned his post as well.15 Though he had hoped the Ontario CCF would re-organize
itself, the task of doing so fell to Woodsworth. He acted quickly by immediately
suspending the Ontario Provincial Council of the CCF at the close of the March 10
meeting.16 With the Labour Conference purged and the UFO withdrawn from the party,
only the CCF clubs remained. With that new reality, Woodsworth brought in the National
Secretary of the League for Social Reconstruction, Graham Spry, to report to the National
Council on developments taking place in Ontario.
The LSR had held considerable sway among the CCF clubs and it became clear
that it would be instrumental in reconstructing the party in Ontario.17 The flip side of this
class conflict meant that the CCF purge was seen as an anti-working-class assault on
socialist politics in the province. The reality was that the new CCF leadership did not
want to exclude labor; it simply wanted to remain open to “responsible labor leaders”
who were committed to working for a less class-driven political party.18
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The purge and defections had an immediate negative impact on the new party. In
the 1934 Ontario election, the CCF garnered just seven percent of the vote, while
claiming a solitary seat in the provincial legislature.19 Caplan wrote that the internal
conflict hurt the CCF’s first electoral campaign and caused the party to lose a good deal
of optimism.20 Morley concurred by noting that the disillusionment meant that the CCF
endured rather than flourished through the remaining years of the decade.21 This episode
of the party’s early class divisions highlighted the self-inflicted tendency active within
the Ontario CCF.

Communication Issues for the Ontario CCF
As was the case in neighboring Québec, the CCF in Ontario was hampered by a
mixture of external and internal forces. While the Ontario wing was largely spared from
interference from religious authorities, it was not well received by the media and faced
fierce opposition from Communist elements. The cool reception toward the CCF by
corporate print media was expected.
Print journalism was not the only section of the media where the CCF struggled to
receive positive attention. The party hoped for more neutral treatment from the newlyminted public broadcasting network. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) had
been created by the federal government of R.B. Bennett in 1934. The CBC came into
being after the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting (Aird Commission) favored the

19. Morley, Secular Socialists, 41. The Ontario legislature had ninety seats available during the
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establishment of public Canadian radio.22 The motion was taken up by Prime Minister
R.B. Bennett, who viewed the public presence of radio to be essential if it were to be kept
from becoming an exclusively profit-driven enterprise dominated by American
commercial interests.23 According to historian H. Blair Neatby, the establishment of the
CBC represented a remarkable extension of government activity and had been significant
in shaping the Canadian nation.24 As a public broadcaster, part of the CBC mandate was
that it be independent of political influence and not a tool for state propagandists.25 Still,
Bennett believed that due to its appeal to all classes, public broadcasting could be used
for both information and propaganda.26
In The Mass Media in Canada, historian Mary Vipond argued that governmental
policies had restricted the CBC’s ability to serve all Canadians.27 As a result, the network
quickly became a model of “administrative broadcasting,” which served not the public
interest but rather that of the state, the government of the day, and the network itself. The
fledgling Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) proved problematic for the CCF.
The Canadian Forum was an early critic of the CBC despite the CBC mandate to
promote and shape Canadian identity while permitting voices and opinions to be heard
over the public airwaves. The antagonism of Canada’s public radio broadcaster can be
traced to a May 1937 chiding from that magazine’s editorial staff. The Canadian Forum
implored CBC General Manager Major Gladstone Murray not to duplicate American
22. Tony Manera, A Dream Betrayed: The Battle for the CBC (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing
Company, Limited, 1996), 14.
23. Manera, A Dream Betrayed, 14.
24. H. Blair Neatby, The Politics of Chaos: Canada in the Thirties (Toronto: Macmillan Company
of Canada, 1972), 53.
25. Wade Rowland, Canada Lives Here: The Case for Public Broadcasting (Westmount, Quebec:
Linda Leith Publishing, 2015), 23
26. Mary Vipond, The Mass Media in Canada (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1992), 4344.
27. Vipond, The Mass Media in Canada, 157.
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programming over Canadian airwaves. “If Mr. Murray wants to hold the support of the
public, a support which he may need some day against attacks by the private interests, his
staff must give us programs that a large section of the radio owning public will enjoy. It
is highly unlikely that Canada can beat the American chains in programs of the popular
mass-appeal variety,” the Forum offered.28 The Canadian Forum editorial added,
“Would it be too impossibly high-brow, therefore, to suggest that our program-makers
might build up some support in hitherto neglected quarters by occasionally giving us
something after eight o’clock in the evening that frankly wouldn’t attempt to rival Rudy
Vallee?”29 While these comments toward the CBC and Gladstone Murray do not appear
overly harsh, the CCF would later receive serious criticism from Mr. Murray. This fairly
innocuous editorial was but the first salvo of a battle that helped to cripple the CCF in the
early 1940s as the party aspired to an electoral breakthrough.
Mainstream print media, largely in the form of newspapers, was seldom a source
of support for the CCF. Indeed, most news outlets treated the new party with either
tremendous indifference or unadulterated hatred. To help counter this negative press, the
CCF established its own publications to promote the party’s policies and programs. In
Ontario, that newspaper was The New Commonwealth. The paper was an official party
organ and CCF leaders at all levels expected the paper to act as the party’s propaganda
arm.30 That mandate was not always fulfilled and provided another example of the party
working against itself. Following the CCF National Convention in August 1937, National
CCF Secretary David Lewis was so outraged at the coverage that the convention received
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in The New Commonwealth that he composed a lengthy letter of complaint to John
Dewer, managing editor of the party newspaper. Lewis wrote, “Over the weekend I saw
last week’s edition of The New Commonwealth and came back to the office determined to
write as sizzling a letter to you as I can compose. This is an attempt to fulfill that
determination.”31
Lewis expressed his displeasure with the party’s Ontario paper; he claimed the
paper provided the CCF no favors with its coverage of this convention.32 Lewis wrote
that the last two issues of The New Commonwealth failed to report accurately both the
substance and spirit of the convention to its readers.33 Lewis highlighted four instances of
CCF convention motions that The New Commonwealth deemed unworthy of print space:
CCF initiatives on drought relief, M.J. Coldwell’s speech regarding the drought issue, a
resolution on democratic freedom and civil rights, and the CCF’s resolution condemning
the non-intervention into the conflict in Spain.34 He then pointed out the fallacy of these
accusations: “We took the initiative on the drought problem. We issued a call to the
Canadian people to defend our democratic rights setting out in clear and unambiguous
terms our realization that those rights are being threatened in Quebec and Ontario. We
declared ourselves eager to work with all groups and we condemned, clearly, the nonintervention policy and we are not neutral in the Spanish conflict.”35 Lewis then remarked
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to Dewer, “to you and me this is not news but to the public at large it is stimulating even
if not new.”36 The CCF secretary then made his pitch to Dewer. “If our papers, if The
New Commonwealth, does not tell the CCF members what the CCF stands for and does at
the most important event of the year, the national convention, then how in all that’s holy
can we expect those people either to disbelieve what they read in The Clarion (newspaper
of the Communist Party of Canada) or to be able to answer the accusation to the
satisfaction of the average bewildered person.”37
Two important elements are in play here. First, Lewis believed the party was not
getting the support they needed from its own propaganda arm. The second issue was the
wariness Lewis displayed in trusting the “wisdom of the common man.” This explained
the necessity of having friendly newspapers to promote the CCF cause. Lewis was by no
means finished with his diatribe against The New Commonwealth. He was upset that the
paper had omitted a resolution on trade unionism and the acceptance of a motion urging
the CCF National Council to affiliate with trade unions.38 The CCF National Secretary
then admonished The New Commonwealth editor for failing to make mention of the
accomplishments of CCF parliamentarians and the enthusiasm of convention delegates.39
Lewis stated, “The point is, if I may speak with brutal frankness, that in my opinion you
failed completely to take advantage of the tremendously stimulating material which the
convention presented to you.”40 He added that the failure by The New Commonwealth to

Italian governments on the side of General Francisco Franco. See William Beeching, Canadian Volunteers:
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36. Lewis to Dewer, 1-2.
37. Lewis to Dewer, 1-2.
38. Lewis to Dewer. 2. Lewis was a staunch advocate of the party’s need to create strong ties and
alliances with the trade union movement. He considered these tights bonds to be essential to CCF success,
especially in industrial and manufacturing regions of Canada.
39. Lewis to Dewer, 3.
40. Lewis to Dewer, 3.
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generate positive publicity was part of an ongoing problem for the CCF. Lewis lamented
that the paper’s coverage was symptomatic of the way in which “we constantly fail to
popularize with effect and vigour.”41 Lewis tartly added, “And then we wonder why more
people are not enthusiastic about it.”42 Clearly, Lewis wanted The New Commonwealth to
appeal to working-class readers and that meant writing in a manner that would connect
with that group. To that end, Lewis sent his copy of the unrevised minutes of the
convention. These included complete texts of speeches delivered by Coldwell on the
drought and one by King Gordon on democracy. Lewis then gamely added, “I look
forward to hearing from you about my outburst.”43
This letter is important because it highlights two facts that were persistent issues
of the CCF in Ontario. The first is that the party had a hard time getting its message out,
even with its own press apparatus. This admission supported the argument that CCF
actions undermined its own agenda. The second indicated the central role that David
Lewis played in trying to whip the party into the organization that he envisioned. In the
correspondence, we see the demanding nature of Lewis’s character. He expected a great
deal from himself – and from others throughout the party. As evidenced in this letter,
Lewis was a straightforward and frank task-master. Without a doubt, Lewis developed
this authoritarian style because he was the main (and often, the lone) figure for the party
for decades. The primacy for Lewis was the health and promotion of Canadian socialism;
anything that threatened this objective received Lewis’ quick and, at times, stern
attention. This made Lewis an unpopular figure within the CCF and, later, in the New
Democratic Party.
41. Lewis to Dewer, 3.
42. Lewis to Dewer, 3.
43. Lewis to Dewer, 4.
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A Preview of the Ontario Election of 1937
During the 1934 Ontario election campaign, Liberal leader Mitch Hepburn cast
himself in the role of “reformer.” After the election in which his Liberal Party was swept
into office, Premier Hepburn began using far less radical language.44 This was most
evident in the realm of labor relations. To be fair, Hepburn’s Liberal government did pass
the Industrial Standards Act during its first session in 1935. This legislation provided that
where workers and employers representing a preponderant group in any industry agreed
upon minimum standards of wages and hours in the presence of a government
representative, these rates and hours were to be imposed on the rest of the industry
operating in the province.45 This act was considered one of the most advanced pieces of
labor legislation in Canada. Despite his reformer rhetoric, Hepburn admitted that he was
never enamored with the Industrial Standards Act and that he “tried to keep the brakes on
it as much as possible.”46
The conflict between Hepburn’s liberal humanitarian instincts and his social
conservative traditions played out frequently during his first term in office. In April 1935,
Hepburn visited welfare recipients who were striking near Welland, Ontario who had
threatened to cease performing public works. The premier ordered extra provincial police
into the area and threatened the strikers and their leaders with jail time if there was any
further disturbance.47 As premier, Hepburn believed his main job was to balance the
budget. In his view, labor agitation for higher wages and relief allowances had to be
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suppressed because these would threaten the province’s primary industries.48 Hepburn
was far less concerned with labor’s aims than with its apparent threat to law and order
and the province’s economy.49 With this background, Hepburn’s actions during the sitdown strikes of 1937 were entirely predictable.
Early in 1937, the Congress of Industrial Organization was imported into Ontario
from the United States.50 That move touched off a series of events that culminated in
Hepburn calling a provincial election. Between the arrival of the CIO and the election
announcement, the labor movement took hold in the province, as did the forces opposed
to the CIO.51 During the spring of 1937, General Motors workers at the Oshawa, Ontario
plant conducted a protracted sit-down strike on the heels of a similar protest at Flint,
Michigan. The strike coverage is useful in highlighting the media bias faced by the CCF
and other progressive elements in Canadian society. The CCF whole-heartedly supported
the striking workers, as did the Toronto Star. “Its editorials and its leading news stories
on Oshawa have been the best bit of journalistic writing produced in Canada for a long
time,” pronounced a June 1937 Canadian Forum editorial.52 The Toronto Star and the
Canadian Forum were the lone media voices supporting this work action. The editorial
continued, “The Winnipeg Free Press professes to be puzzled by events in Ontario, and
sometimes we wonder whether vague recollections of the Winnipeg strike are not stirring
48. McKenty, Mitch Hepburn, 103.
49. McKenty, Mitch Hepburn, 103.
50. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 83. The first unions in Canada and the United
States had been craft unions and were reluctant to admit unskilled workers. In an age of mass production
and geometric industrial growth this situation proved to be intolerable. In the U.S., John L. Lewis and
others broke with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) which largely represented craft unions. They
founded the CIO and began to organize both skilled and unskilled workers in major American industrial
enterprises. As many of these companies were established in Ontario, it is not surprising that this renewed
union activity quickly spilled over the border. See Morley, Secular Socialists, 28.
51. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 83.
52. Editorial, “Our Class-Conscious Newspapers,” Canadian Forum 17, no. 197 (June 1937): 7980.
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in its mind.”53 The most damning words were saved for Toronto’s other major
newspapers. The Forum declared, “the most remarkable and significant performances
have been given by the Toronto Globe and Mail and the Financial Post. They have outHepburned Hepburn.”54 Hepburn held strong anti-union beliefs and, when the Oshawa
workers conducted their sit-down strike, he organized a volunteer police force to try and
put down the strike. These “Hepburn’s Hussars”—as they were derisively referred to—
was the Ontario premier’s response to Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s decision not to
send in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to break up the strike.55 Grudgingly,
Hepburn capitulated to the striking workers and allowed CIO organization of the Oshawa
plant.
This episode highlighted the rift between the provincial Liberal premier of
Ontario and the Canadian Prime Minister. It also exposed the Toronto Globe’s assertion
that behind the Oshawa strikers lay a “Communist-Fascist conspiracy to overthrow our
British democratic institutions which will certainly rank as the journalistic coup of 1937,”
as the Canadian Forum mockingly proclaimed.56 The Forum concluded, “The most
sinister fact of all has been the solidarity of the business community in Toronto and
Montreal in supporting the extreme utterances of such journals as these and the most

53. Editorial, 80. The Winnipeg General Strike was a momentous event in Canadian labor and
social history. During the severe recession that took place immediately after the end of World War One, the
working class in the city of Winnipeg went out a general strike to support trade unions’ demand for
collective bargaining. Soon, sympathy strikes took place across Canada. Both politicians and conservative
trade union leaders were nervous about the radical bent of rank and file labor. The arrest of the strike
leaders (including future CCF leader J. S. Woodsworth) and the violent repression of their followers on
Winnipeg’s “Bloody Sunday” ended the great strike. See John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager, Canada:
1922-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), 139-40.
54. Editorial, 80. Mitchell “Mitch” Hepburn was the premier of Ontario from 1934-1942.
55. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 134.
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extreme actions of Messrs. Hepburn and Duplessis. When these men feel that their
domination of the community is threatened, they go fascist overnight.”57
Later that year, Canadian Forum contributor John Charles, while assessing the
coming provincial election in Ontario, wrote, “More significant and more dangerous than
this egotistical onion-farmer [Hepburn] is the group which is backing him in his
reactionary policies. Most newspaper owners, following the lead of the mining-interest
Globe and Mail, are supporting reaction in news columns as well as editorials.”58 Caplan
asserted that the sit-down strike provided Hepburn the momentum to transform a minor
labor dispute into the most notorious strike in Ontario history.59 He stated that Hepburn’s
decision to physically confront the union movement was a “masterful political stroke”
because the premier won the gratitude of industrialists, large numbers of rural Ontarians,
and other players from the trade union movement.60 Once the chaos had receded in
Oshawa, Premier Hepburn immediately called an “unexpected” election for October 6.61
On the heels of the divisive Oshawa sit-down strike earlier in the year, political
commentator John Charles framed the Ontario election as a “new kind of battle wherein
the sham Grit- and Tory-staged battles of the past were over.”62 He observed, “For the
first time in the history of Ontario the class struggle has been dragged into politics. The
main point: That the interests of capital and labor are opposed.”63 Charles stated, “In
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Ontario the dominant figure is Mitchell Hepburn. This man approves the maiming of sitdown strikers by an armed mob without interference from the authorities and organizes
his own private army.”64 While stating that in Hepburn the Liberals had a “vigorous,
dynamic leader,” Charles pointed out the CCF fell short in that area.65 He remarked, “The
CCF lacks a leader who will catch the imagination of the people, though its chiefs are
respected and personally liked by their intimates.”66 As was the case in Québec, the
Ontario CCF did not have an official leader. Charles also maintained that the CCF was
hamstrung in terms of media outreach. He stated they had “no press of any use in
winning support of non-party voters.”67 Given these handicaps, Charles urged the CCF
and its supporters to “run candidates in only 30 (of 90) ridings, exclusively in urban
areas, and every effort should be made to see that only one left-wing candidate is in the
field in any constituency.”68 He predicted that a “happy outcome is very possible, but
only on condition that proper strategy is employed.”69 Conversely, Charles also warned
that in the event of an “unhappy” outcome, socialists will have to take a large share of the
blame.70
CCF Efforts to “Right” the Party in Ontario Following the
1937 Provincial Election Debacle
The “unhappy” outcome that John Charles spoke of in the Canadian Forum was that
of the results for the provincial CCF on election night 1937 in Ontario. The party lost its
64. Charles, “Tactics in the Ontario Election,” 194.
65. Charles, “Tactics in the Ontario Election,” 194-95.
66. Charles, “Tactics in the Ontario Election,” 195. As discussed earlier, the Ontario CCF lost its
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lone seat in the provincial legislature and saw its share of the popular vote dwindle to just
five and a half percent of the votes tallied, down from eight percent in the previous 1934
election.71 After two underwhelming campaigns, it was evident the CCF was not gaining
any traction in the province. Many elements come into play when trying to dissect the
party’s weakness in Canada’s most populous province.
Prior to the Ontario election announcement, the Canadian Forum had declared,
“The struggle between industrial workers in Ontario and Quebec and their employers,
with the governments of both provinces vigorously supporting the employers, seems
likely to usher in a new era both in industry and politics.”72 The editors believed that
working people in Canada were starting to develop a degree of class consciousness that
would expose itself in coming elections in British Columbia and Ontario. They noted,
“We suggest that, in English-speaking Canada at least, there is emerging a fairly definite
connection between the alignment of Canadian citizens on the one issue and their
alignment on the other.”73
Both the British Columbia and Ontario elections of 1937 produced disappointing
results for the CCF. The Canadian Forum offered several assessments that helped to
explain the poor showing of the CCF in Ontario. The first-past-the-post electoral system
was condemned for making the CCF’s results appear worse than they actually were.74
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The journal remarked, “The Liberals get three-quarters of the seats with a bare majority
of the votes; the CCF and labor groups won 100,000 votes and do not get a single seat.”75
The Canadian Forum next highlighted the role that suspiciously drawn electoral districts
played in thwarting parties sympathetic to working people. The editors lamented, “The
most scandalous part of the Ontario electoral machinery is in Toronto. The capital city is
gerrymandered into long narrow strip-constituencies running from working-class to
bourgeois residential sections.”76 They added that this practice had been used for years by
both the old parties in federal and provincial elections to prevent the successful growth of
a political working-class movement.77 The Canadian Forum also complained about the
lack of basic fairness in terms of radio air time in the campaign, which it called a gross
abuse by Liberals and Conservatives.78 The editorial stated, “We seem to remember
having been told in some distant past that the CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Company)
was going to ration time on the air among competing political parties. Both the old parties
crowded everything else off the air in the evenings of the fortnight before the polling
day.”79
Despite these salvos against the unfairness of the provincial campaign, the
Canadian Forum saved its harshest observations for the Ontario CCF. They noted, “As
for the CCF, it is useless to pretend that it did not suffer a serious set-back in the election.
A radical party which fails to increase its vote in spite of the opportunity given to it by
75. Editorial. Earlier that year, Canadian Forum had complained about the “grotesque” electoral
result that had emerged from the 1937 British Columbia election. The Forum editors were angry that the
British Columbia Liberal Party captured 67% of the seats in the legislature despite polling just 37% of the
votes cast. They argued, “The chief sufferers of the single-member-constituency system are the CCF and
other new political movements.” See Editorial, “Another Mythical Landslide”, Canadian Forum 17, no.
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labor developments in the province should give serious thought to its condition.”80 The
Forum opined, “The truth is that after five years of existence it still has not the
organization for getting out the vote or for looking after constituencies between election
periods, and that its leaders have shown no capacity for seizing a situation like that
presented by the Oshawa strike and exploiting it.”81 The criticism did not stop there: “In
St. Andrews, the communist candidate would have been elected had the CCF, with a
stupidity and malice that cannot be too strongly condemned, ran a candidate who polled a
few hundred votes, just enough to ensure the election of the Hepburn man.”82
The editors chastised the Ontario CCF for its academic approach to socialism.
“The CCF speakers are still talking about socialism in general instead of concentrating
their own and the public attention upon specific concrete issues.”83 The Canadian Forum
lamented, “Worst of all, the Ontario leaders seem to be quite happy with their little
following, who now vote CCF from a conservative devotion to habit.”84 The editorial
board concluded, “It looks as if they (Ontario CCF leaders) will be content to fuss about
their petty obscure routine activities while the main currents of political developments
sweep past them unobserved.”85 Importantly, these are the words and opinions of a
magazine that was overwhelmingly sympathetic to the CCF and its objectives. In this
instance, however, the Canadian Forum was but one source of severe criticism for the
Ontario CCF after the 1937 provincial campaign. Caplan noted that the party lost its only
seat and failed to place second in any riding during the election.86 According to the
80. Editorial, “The Ontario Election,” Canadian Forum 17, no. 202, (November 1937): 262.
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Canadian Annual Review, the disappearance of the CCF in Ontario virtually “eliminated
the last struggling relics of third parties in Ontario.”87 Indeed, Caplan wrote that from
1935 to 1942, the Ontario CCF simply did not count as a political factor in the province.
Little the party said or did was of any significance outside of its small, faithful band of
followers.88
National Secretary David Lewis had a number of explanations for the CCF’s
struggles in Ontario; he shared these insights with political scientist and CCF activist,
Eugene Forsey, in a lengthy letter dated September 1937. Lewis stated, “My personal
conviction is that the lamentable condition of the movement in Ontario is due less to right
wingers as a theory or attitude but more to right wingism, which is the result of simple
second-rateness of the so-called leadership.”89 Lewis conceded this criticism “may sound
brutal and presumptuous but it is nevertheless true.”90 The CCF secretary then explained
where the Ontario branch of the party was falling short. “In concrete terms, the main
concern of the CCF in Ontario at the present time should be to find a way of tying the
growing political consciousness of the trade unions to the CCF,” Lewis asserted.91 He
added, “The crux of the matter is that the people in Toronto simply don’t seem to get the
significance of the present development in the working-class movement, simple though it
may seem to you and to me.”92 Indeed, the severe class differences discussed earlier were
still evident in the Ontario CCF. Given this continued friction, it is easier to understand
the internal issues that hindered the Ontario CCF from making significant headway
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during the 1930s. Lewis remarked that if the CCF hoped to become the party of labor in
Canada it needed to tap the growing political consciousness in the trade union ranks.93
Speaking paternalistically, Lewis stated, “If the Ontario leadership had taken this view,
then they would have approached this election in the way in which I begged them to do
almost five weeks ago, they would have been interested in seeing genuine, not
communists but genuine, labor candidates in the field.”94 Had the Ontario CCF heeded
this advice, Lewis declared the election results would have been significantly better and
closer cooperation between the party and the labor movement would be established.95
During the Great Depression, organized labor membership was on the increase
across Ontario. While the Congress of Industrial Organization had no official presence in
Canada, activists and rank-and-file workers were inspired by the CIO’s breakthroughs in
the United States.96 Evidence of this CIO influence can be located in a series of sit-down
strikes that took place at industrial centers across Ontario during 1936-37. Industrial
workers at Chatham, Windsor, Sarnia, and Oshawa experienced spontaneous strike action
against their employers.97 With organized labor gaining in terms of members and stature,
it is little wonder that Lewis wanted the CCF to command ownership of this block of
voters. Lewis chided the Ontario CCF’s leadership for their hesitancy to aid candidates
friendly toward organized labor, who were also openly Communist. Lewis admitted that
he had “been trying to influence them in the direction to not oppose the candidacy of Joe
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Salzberg, the Communist running as Labor candidate with the endorsation of the Trades
and Labor Council of Toronto.”98
This admission is surprising due to Lewis’ reputation as a fierce opponent of
Communism. His suggestion that the Ontario CCF practice a degree of cooperation with
an open Communist did not convince the provincial wing of the party to do so. Lewis
stated, “The provincial council on the whole agreed with me that Salzberg should not be
opposed. [Regardless] the CCF candidate was put up in his riding as a result of
pressure.”99 Lewis wondered, “What can be gained by opposing Salzberg? This is the
sort of argument I have been continually hammering at the Toronto people.”100 The CCF
National Secretary observed, “We have been, and shall be, accused, in this case rightly,
of splitting the labor vote.”101 With a keen eye toward making the CCF the party of labor,
Lewis believed the Ontario CCF ran the risk of upsetting trade union members.
Not all CCF officials were pleased by the tactics suggested by Lewis. Chief
among them was National Party leader J.S. Woodsworth, who remained adamant about
yielding any ground to the Communist Party. Before he became leader of the CCF,
Woodsworth was a Methodist minister, who was described as a “prophet in politics.”102
A man ruled by conscience, Woodsworth was jailed for his role in the 1919 Winnipeg
General Strike, was the founder of a political party, and the dominant force in the CCF
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during its formative years.103 Indeed, Woodsworth sharply rebuked Lewis’s strategy in a
letter to the CCF national secretary less than one week later. Woodsworth wrote, “I have
been informed that you have advised the withdrawal of our candidate Simon in favor of
Salsberg who is a well-know Communist. It strikes me that in doing this, apparently on
your own, you are going beyond what might be expected of the National Secretary of the
CCF.”104 Woodsworth also suggested how the Ontario CCF should proceed: “In my
judgment, Simon should stay in the field and there should be no withdrawals or sawoffs.”105 The CCF leader then pulled rank on Lewis, explaining, “I think perhaps as
President of the movement my opinion should have some weight and in my opinion the
policy you advocate is entirely out of line with the decisions of past National
Conventions and of Council meetings.”106 Woodsworth closed by warning Lewis there
might be serious repercussions from having the CCF cooperate with Communist
candidates, and it was essential that the National Office maintain a strong and clear
policy in this regard.107
Nothing in Lewis’s demeanor suggests he would let such direct criticism stand
uncontested. He was, however, taken aback by Woodsworth’s stern attack. Two days
later, he responded, “I must say that the implied rebuke rather shocked me for it was, and
is, entirely unwarranted.”108 Lewis argued that Woodsworth’s attack was not germane
because, “I did not, at any time, presume to speak as the National Secretary. I felt it was
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my duty simply as a member of the CCF to do all I could to persuade the provincial
executive to take, in that case, the line which I felt convinced was the correct one.”109
Lewis’s defense became even weaker when he reminded Woodsworth that, “At the last
Ontario Provincial convention I was elected a member of the Provincial Council.”110
Regardless, Lewis remained “sure that no one in Toronto received the impression that I
was presuming to express my opinion as National Secretary and I am rather at a loss to
understand why you should have reached this conclusion.”111
Lewis’s argument stretches credibility. Lewis asked Woodsworth to believe that
he was merely a concerned CCF member offering advice to the Ontario leadership. To
his credit, Lewis turned to the topic of CCF cooperation with their rivals in the
Communist Party and honestly stated there were significant differences between his
strategy and that of party leader Woodsworth. Lewis flatly stated that the party leader
was in the wrong and that he was on firm ground in terms of CCF policies on the issue of
cooperation with other parties.112 Next, Lewis reiterated his rationale for supporting
Salzberg in the coming election: he did not want the CCF to help split the trade union
vote.113 Lewis asserted that the party should coerce Simon to withdraw from the
campaign.114
The disagreement between Lewis and Woodsworth came down to two very
divergent ideas with how to handle the competition from the Communist Party. First,
Woodsworth was adamantly opposed to taking any action that might strengthen the
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CCF’s rival for working-class support, and second, Lewis believed his approach of casespecific non-intervention would pay dividends to the CCF in the future. Lewis noted,
“The future of the CCF in Ontario depends on whether or not we shall succeed in
winning the support and goodwill of the trade unions. So far we have not won it.”115 To
help produce that breakthrough with working-class Ontarians, Lewis warned that the
party would harm its credibility with this group of the electorate if they insisted on
running Simon. Furthermore, Lewis was confident the damage could be long-term.116 To
drive home his point, he stated that the CCF was not expecting victory in the coming
election. Indeed, this campaign was seen as being an educational exercise to lay the
foundation for future elections.117 Again referring to the well-being of the party, Lewis
claimed, “It seemed to me, therefore, that in our actions we had to be guided by
considerations as to the effect which any given action is likely to have on the future and
the progress of the movement after the election.”118 In closing, Lewis acknowledged
Woodsworth’s influence over both Lewis and the CCF. Regardless of that sentiment,
Lewis remarked that he could not agree with the CCF leader in this matter.119 In a
correspondence to Forsey, Lewis provided evidence that suggests there was justification
for Woodworth’s stance. He noted, “Having said all this in what I believe to be justifiable
criticism of the CCF leadership it is equally important to condemn the action of the C.P.
in the last two weeks.”120 Lewis added, “They have either nominated C.P. candidates or
stimulated the nomination of so-called Labor candidates in ridings where the CCF has, by
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all odds, the best chance.”121 Lewis explained the Communist motives for undermining
the CCF. He stated, “The tactic is to nominate these opposition candidates, then cry that
there should not be more than one left candidate in the riding, to call upon the CCF
candidate to withdraw, and to work for a united convention of everybody to elect one
candidate. In other words, the tactic is to force the CCF into some form of People’s Front
action.”122 After addressing the Communist rationale, Lewis added, “The C.P. would like
to use this election as a means to still further weaken the CCF, in order that it may then
be free to stimulate the formation of the kind of Farmer-Labor party which it
propagates.”123 Lewis continued, “This sort of explanation is the only one that is
satisfactory in view of the fact that many of the C.P. candidates directly or indirectly
opposing CCF candidates have been put up in the strongest CCF constituencies—
strongest both because the CCF support is large and because the candidate himself is very
strong.”124 From these actions, Lewis concluded that the Communist Party was guilty of
vote-splitting tactics in the most fertile CCF ridings. He argued, “There is not the
slightest doubt in the world that the CCF candidate has much the better chance and that
these labor candidates were nominated through Communist efforts.”125 The battle for the
votes of these organized workers became more spirited as their ranks swelled in Ontario
from 125,000, to more than 700,000 during the ten-year period from 1933 to 1943.126

121. Lewis to Forsey, 4.
122. Lewis to Forsey, 4. This is reminiscent of Elmore Philpott’s 1933 declaration that the
Communist Party objective was either to run the CCF—or ruin it. See Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian
Socialism, 41.
123. Lewis to Forsey, 4.
124. Lewis to Forsey, 4.
125. Lewis to Forsey, 4.
126. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 91. Caplan conceded that the 125,000 figure
from 1933 was an attractive base from which the new party could build, even if it represented a small
percentage of the Ontario electorate.
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From this tirade against the Communist Party, it would appear that Lewis was,
indeed, proving Woodsworth’s point: the Communists were trying to eradicate the CCF
as competition for working-class voters and any cooperation with them was ill-advised.
Yet, in concluding his lengthy letter to Forsey, the CCF National Secretary argued the
complete opposite. He wrote, “The nomination of opposition labor candidates to, what I
would call, unimpeachable CCF candidates has strengthened my conviction that the CCF
candidate opposing Salzberg ought to be withdrawn.”127 Lewis explained to Forsey just
how the Ontario CCF would be further ahead in the long run if they demonstrated their
good faith to the leadership of the trades and union leaders by refusing to split the labor
vote. Furthermore, he hoped that the Communist Party’s refusal to act in a similar manner
would produce a backlash from organized labor.128
Lewis then turned his attention to the question of the leadership of the Ontario
CCF. He declared “that steps will have to be taken after the election to shake the Ontario
leadership out of its turgid ineptitude.”129 To that end, Lewis suggested “a carefully
worded public criticism that will give the leadership all possible credit at the same time
and that will also be directed against the C.P. and its associates, will be one effective way
of starting the ball rolling.”130 Lewis shared his strategy with Forsey when discussing just
who should write the critique of the Ontario CCF. He trusted that this criticism of the
Ontario CCF leadership should remain between himself, Forsey, and other members of
the League for Social Reconstruction.131

127. Lewis to Forsey, September 21, 1937, 5.
128. Lewis to Forsey, 5.
129. Lewis to Forsey, 5.
130. Lewis to Forsey, 5.
131. Lewis to Forsey, 5. Presumably, Lewis was referring to other ranking CCF leaders at the
National level.
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The exchanges between Lewis, Forsey and Woodsworth highlight the many
factors of early CCF problems in Ontario and help to explain why the party struggled
well into the years of the Second World War. These letters illustrated CCF difficulties
with “outside” forces. Here, Lewis shed the spotlight on the battle waged between the
Communist Party and the CCF for the hearts, minds and support of the trade union
leadership and of working-class Ontarians. Not only was there fierce competition
between the two entities to emerge as the “labor party” of Canada, but we also see the
divisions this rivalry created within the CCF hierarchy. On one side, the national leader,
Woodsworth, showed no inclination toward accommodating the CP at any level. This
clashed with the likes of Lewis and M.J. Coldwell, who were willing to assist strong,
non-CCF labor candidates. However, there were some caveats. For Lewis, the rationale
was in the necessity, at times, for the CCF to aid its mortal enemy in hopes of eventually
winning favor with the leadership of trade union councils. As was the case in the United
States, organized labor in Canada was cautious in its approach to aligning with any
political entity. In 1933, the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada was the nation’s
largest and most influential trade union organization and was affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor.132 The AFL first reached into Canada at the turn of the twentieth
century alongside employers who were constructing branch plants there.
Both companies and labor unions extended their structures beyond the American
environment that had shaped them.133 As had been the practice of the AFL, the TLC also
had a policy to “act as the legislative mouthpiece for organized labor…independent of
132. Caplan, 19.
133. Robert H. Babcock, Gompers in Canada: A Study in American Continentalism before the
First World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), vii-viii. As Babcock noted, trade unions
had come to Canada in last four decades of the nineteenth century as part of an effort to protect American
members against unorganized Canadian workers as part of a larger continental labor market. See 10-11.
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any political organization.”134 Historian Robert Babcock expounded that founder and
president of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers, had established this
independent political stance in the early 1890s. He condemned any attempts to channel
political sentiments of unionists into a labor party. By 1895, the AFL banned partisan
politics from discussion at all future conventions.135 This business unionism ideology
held sway with the AFL long after Gompers’s death in 1924. Given this reality, a more
likely CCF ally was found in Canada’s second largest union, the All-Canada Congress of
Labour (ACCL).136 Led by A.R. Mosher, head of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway
Employees, the ACCL called for public ownership at the municipal level, nationalization
of mines, minerals, and railways, and improved wages and working conditions.137
Uncomfortable with pro-capitalist Liberal and Conservative governments, the ACCL also
advocated for a strong workers’ party. Gerald Caplan, however, wrote that instead of
building such a party, the ACCL spent a large part of its energy in violent denunciation of
the TLC.138 Likewise, the Trades and Labour Council counterattacked its chief rival. This
devotion to undermining the efforts of the respective unions caused Frank Underhill to
remark, “As for Canadian labour, the energy its various factions spend fighting one
another would suffice for several social revolutions; in the meantime, most of them vote
Liberal or Tory.”139
The Canadian political situation sharply contrasted to the one in the United States
at this critical juncture in history. During the Depression and New Deal, American labor

134. Harold A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada, (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada,
1948), 431.
135. Babcock, Gompers in Canada, 13-14.
136. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 20.
137. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 20.
138. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 20-21.
139. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 21.
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leaders had a ready ally in the government of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Great
Depression was, in many respects, even more pronounced in Canada than in the United
States. Neatby remarked that even though not everyone in Canada experienced the
Depression in the same way, nobody who lived through the 1930s was unscathed.140
Thompson and Seager wrote that due to Canada’s resource-based economy the country
was especially vulnerable to international instability and to a decline in foreign demand
for its staples.141 They remarked that while seasonal fluctuations in employment had been
the norm in Canada, unemployment continued to accelerate in spring of 1930.
A delegation of Western mayors went to Ottawa to seek federal assistance for the
burgeoning unemployment problem. At a meeting with Mackenzie King, the prime
minister was unsympathetic to their situation and claimed that the number of unemployed
persons was normal for that time of year. Furthermore, King added to the delegation –
and to the House of Commons throughout the spring sitting—that there was no
unemployment problem and if there were, it was a responsibility of the provinces.142
Neatby added that the Depression was a psychological as well as an economic event.
Thus, it created a loss of faith in stability and security. It was at this juncture where many
Canadians began to question the structure of their society and the role of social
institutions.143 Since both major Canadian federal parties (the Conservatives and
Liberals) offered nothing resembling the Roosevelt New Deal, labor was left to play the
field in terms of supporting political parties.

140. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 21.
141. Thompson and Seager, Canada: 1922-1939, 195.
142. Thompson and Seager, Canada: 1922-1939, 197-202.
143. Thompson and Seager, Canada: 1922-1939, 22-24.
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It was into this vacuum that the CCF and Tim Buck, the leader of the Communist
Party, hoped to become the de facto party of labor in Canada. Buck had an impressive
career as a trade union militant during and after World War I, who became attracted to
Marxism as a result of the Russian Revolution.144 Disillusioned with reformism as a
result of the Farmer-Labor experience of 1920, Buck opted to join the Communist
movement. According to Ian Angus, Buck’s reputation as a reliable unionist won him the
respect of other Communists and helped him rise to leadership positions.145 By 1930,
Buck had become General Secretary of the party and was hailed as the founder of
Canadian Communism.146 In 1930, Buck and Tom McEwen made a push toward
industrial unionism with the formation of the Workers Unity League.147 As mentioned
earlier, the formation of the CIO in the United States in 1935 inspired Canadian
communist activists and encouraged a spate of sit-down strikes across Ontario. These
victories were short-lived and did not return until after 1939. After the birth of the CCF in
1932, there was a bitter and long-lasting conflict between that party and the Communist
Party of Canada in winning over the trade union movement.148 While both parties agreed
that labor needed to break away from the capitalist parties, the CPC and the CCF held
widely divergent ideas as to where the union movement should align.149

144. Ian Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks: The Early Years of the Communist Party of Canada
(Montreal: Vanguard Publications, 1981), 86.
145. Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 86.
146. Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 82.
147. Palmer, “Taking It: Ontario Workers’ Struggles,” 188-89.
148. Norman Penner, The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall of
Canada, 1977), 156.
149. Penner, The Canadian Left, 157. The CCF believed they should become the political arm of
labor. The Communists understood that such an undertaking was beyond their grasp. They proposed a joint
Communist-CCF arrangement whereby Communist candidates could be supported in certain ridings. Such
an arrangement would prove impossible since the Communists saw the CCF as their chief foe and rival for
the leadership of the working class. The CPC saw social-democrats as betrayers to the socialist cause. See
Penner, The Canadian Left, 169.
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Given the shifting sands of the labor movement in Ontario prior to World War II,
we need to understand how Lewis and Buck positioned their respective parties so as to
curry favor with organized labor in Ontario, and across the country. In sum, Lewis hoped
to paint the Communists as an unscrupulous group that was too willing to sacrifice the
well-being of labor-inclined voters for the benefit of their party. Moreover, he wanted to
establish the CCF as the “reasonable” alternative, one that wanted to win seats but was
not anxious to split votes among other parties of the Left (which in Canada, was the
Communist Party). It was a strategy that was not a guaranteed winner for the CCF. As
noted above, a number of ranking CCF leaders in Ontario and across the country were not
comfortable with the strategy that Lewis promoted. As was the case in the United States,
organized labor was deliberate in remaining non-committal with choosing sides in the
political arena. Eventually, the Lewis strategy paid dividends for the CCF, but it fell far
short of making it the “Labor Party of Canada.”
The second clear picture that Lewis painted in his letter to Forsey was how the
CCF was its own worst enemy. While Lewis’s words for the Ontario CCF leadership
were, without doubt, harsh, there is also no denying that the party was on the edge of
political obscurity in Canada’s most populous province. Indeed, weak and ineffective
leadership were trademarks of the Quebec CCF as well. With the party stumbling so
badly in Central Canada, Lewis acknowledged the party needed better leaders. It is not a
coincidence that Ontario CCF fortunes improved only after the leadership of the party
was placed in the hands of Ted Jolliffe in 1942. In the last part of his letter, we see Lewis,
in a very real sense, promoting the undermining of his party in Ontario. This is a prime
example of self-criticism designed, in his mind, to make the movement stronger. It is
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indicative of how driven Lewis was to push the movement to succeed, even if that meant,
in the short-term, forcing the various CCF provincial parties to engage in a thorough reevaluation. Regardless, this section demonstrates how the party was waging a multi-front
campaign in Ontario. One was against its “enemies” from the outside, such as the
Communist Party. The second battleground was an internal affair where the CCF
hindered its own cause by both accidental and deliberate sabotage from within.
Further insight into this dynamic is gained by an assessment of an exchange of
letters between Frank Madill, the Secretary from the Danforth (Toronto) CCF Club and
National Secretary David Lewis in early 1939. Both men offered rationales for the lack of
CCF success in the province to that date. Madill got right to the point by asking Lewis to
stand for the position of President of the Ontario CCF.150 As Madill set out his argument
for Lewis to run for the Ontario CCF Presidency, a distinctly chaotic and unflattering
picture of the party in that province emerged. Madill informed Lewis “It is with a deep
feeling of concern that I view the unnecessary dissension that has crept into our ranks,
especially among our leaders.”151 He reminded Lewis of the obvious division within the
CCF ranks during the recent Toronto municipal elections and added that this discord was
“wrecking our movement in Toronto.”152 Madill stated, “the members feel that the time is
ripe for action but find it discouraging to be surrounded by so much apathy. It is evident
that activity is what the CCF in Ontario needs to make it forget petty squabbles.”153
Madill was also acutely aware of the negative ramifications the Toronto troubles were
having on the larger movement. He asserted the difficulties in Toronto were hindering
150. Frank Madill to David Lewis, letter, March 8, 1939, CCF Papers – Ontario Membership:
Danforth Club, 1939, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 57, File 6, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
151. Madill to Lewis, 1.
152. Madill to Lewis, 1.
153. Madill to Lewis, 1.
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CCF development in the rest of Ontario.154 He then lamented, “When one sees what is
being done in the West and the wonderful leadership of the Parliamentary Group it is
nothing short of disgraceful.”155 In closing, Madill urged Lewis to run for the Ontario
CCF presidency, claiming “You would have the whole-hearted support of the movement
and could exert an influence that would pull us out of the morass of petty dissension that
now surrounds us.”156 Once more, we see evidence that the CCF, this time in Toronto,
was undermining the cause of democratic socialism in Toronto, the province, and across
Canada.
Lewis gracefully declined the suggestion from the Danforth Club that he seek the
presidency of the Ontario CCF. While flattered, Lewis explained, “The National Council
has entrusted me with my present position which takes all the time, energy and ability
that I can give it. It would not be fair to the movement if, in addition, I undertook the very
arduous responsibility of Ontario President.”157 The CCF National Secretary attempted to
pinpoint where the Ontario branch of the party had thus far fallen short. Having conceded
that leadership had been a persistent problem for the party in Ontario, Lewis added that it
would be wrong to entirely place the blame on the leaders.158 He stated, “A movement
such as ours is made or destroyed by the failure of the rank and file and more particularly
by the officials of local organizations to contribute their share and to act loyally in the
interest of the movement.”159 In short, Lewis was casting the blame over all the key
actors for the CCF’s sorry fortunes in Ontario. He then explained to Madill the real
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reasons for the party’s struggles in Ontario: “I have said this many times before and I
repeat it again because I am convinced of its validity and of its relevance; the thing that
has been mainly responsible for our failure to progress as we ought to have done in
Ontario has been a narrowness in outlook and a lack of genuine loyalty to the
movement.”160 This letter illustrates that Lewis agreed with Madill’s assessment that the
Ontario CCF leadership lacked the “democratic” element of democratic socialism. Lewis
observed, “Unfortunately we now have too many cliques, each with a particular pet idea,
which the members of the clique refuse to give up even though the idea may be both
irrelevant and unimportant to our great cause.”161 Lewis concurred with Madill about the
“pettiness” that was obstructing the Ontario branch of the party from tending to the more
germane tasks that confronted the movement. Despite the difficulties for the Ontario
CCF, Lewis was hopeful that the party could start fresh with the coming provincial
convention.162 He confided to Madill, “I feel confident that if all the delegates to that
convention come with the determination to wipe the slate clean as far as past
disagreements are concerned, we can still make the CCF into a powerful political force in
Ontario.”163 Lewis then warned Madill, “We have not much time. The Federal election is
almost certain to come this fall. We must prepare for it and we must win a number of
seats.”164
This chapter demonstrated that the CCF in Ontario struggled in its first years of
existence. As had been the case in Québec, some of the obstacles were created by
160. Lewis to Madill, 1.
161. Lewis to Madill, 1.
162. Lewis to Madill, 1.
163. Lewis to Madill, 1.
164. Lewis Madill, 1. Lewis was incorrect in the timing of the next federal election; it did not take
place until spring 1940. However, despite having extra time to prepare, the Ontario CCF gave another
underwhelming performance; it remained seatless from Ontario in the House of Commons while running
only twenty-four candidates in the eighty-two federal ridings in the province.
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external elements, while other damage was self-inflicted. In Ontario, the CCF suffered
internal strife due to class-based conflict within the new party. Purges and withdrawals
left the party with a very thin base upon which to build. Organizationally, the Ontario
wing of the CCF was hampered by a Toronto-centric hub that did not easily reach out to
the remainder of the province. Unlike the Liberal and Conservative parties, the CCF had
no well of history, no “natural” base of voters, and no support in the media of the day
from which to draw. The CCF had very little margin for error in those early years and,
unfortunately for the party, it made many. The result was that by 1939, the party’s
standing in Ontario and Quebec can best be described as irrelevant on the Canadian
political scene.
In spring of 1939, upcoming elections were not the only subject of much
discussion. Despite Neville Chamberlain’s declaration that the Munich Agreement (1938)
had brought about “Peace in our time,” events since that signing indicated that the world
was sliding toward full-scale war once more. In Canada, this meant that the political
parties were fine-tuning their position in the increasingly likely event that war would
erupt.
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CHAPTER III
THE CCF AND THE QUESTION OF WAR

While the Western world did not actually become engulfed in conflict until
September of 1939, the storm clouds that preceded the shooting began building
throughout the 1930s. The CCF was painfully aware that armed hostility was a very real
possibility and attempted to form a coherent policy in the event that another far-reaching
war occurred. As will be demonstrated, the CCF was severely divided about the proper
course of action to take; the party’s efforts to steer a “middle course” would be viewed as
insufficient by one sector of Canadian society, and too enthusiastic by another (largely
French Canadians).
The changing nature of the CCF war policy did nothing to aid the party’s public
perception. The CCF was not alone in this regard. The Liberal government of Mackenzie
King was, at least nominally, attempting to locate a balanced approach to Canada’s
reaction in the event of war. Frank Underhill wrote that King’s verbal posing was false.1
Underhill added, “There is no middle path between two extremes. There are only two
alternatives; either we join in the next war, or we stay out. Mr. King will not take the
necessary steps that lead to the second alternative.”2 Underhill further predicted that, “On
the day that Britain declares war the Liberal party will be swept off its feet by a storm of
emotion in which it will be impossible to ignore the British call for help.”3
1. Frank Underhill, “The Debate on Foreign Policy,” Canadian Forum 17, no. 194, (March 1937):
150.
2. Underhill, “The Debate on Foreign Policy,” 150.
3. Underhill, “The Debate on Foreign Policy,” 149. Once France and Britain declared war against
Germany, King summoned Parliament to determine Canada’s participation. Declaration of war was
postponed for one week. It was a very important decision on his part; this move indicated that Canada was,
indeed, independent and in control of its foreign policy decisions.
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In early 1937, the party was clearly on an anti-war footing as it began an “AntiArmament Campaign.” In an open letter to CCF members, National Secretary David
Lewis announced the CCF National Council would be, “opposing the proposed increase
in military spending.”4 Lewis added, “The National Council felt these increases are an
outrage and that opposition to them would win wide-spread support.”5 In his note, Lewis
announced the party would set aside the week of March 8-13, 1937, for concerted activity
against the proposed increases in military expenditure and for the “Take Profits out of
War” campaign.”6 Mass rallies were scheduled across the country for March 12. To add
substance to these affairs, Lewis proclaimed that CCF Members of Parliament would be
available for these meetings and that the party would produce a pamphlet to support its
profit-motive argument.7 If there remained any uncertainty of the CCF’s stance on war,
Lewis cemented the anti-war nature of the party by suggesting CCF members “draw into
this campaign all peace organizations, church groups, and the like.”8 He also envisioned a
massive letter - writing campaign to express widespread opposition to these increases and
to highlight the determination the party possessed in important matters.9
At the same time, Lewis and the CCF were making the case against increased
spending for the Canadian military, and by extension, against use of that military; the
party was staking out ground that would make military action unprofitable for Canadian
commerce. The party demanded that parliament “enact legislation providing that

http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/second-world-war-wwii/, article written by C.P. Stacey.
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automatically and immediately on entering into war every industry in Canada which may
be thereby stimulated shall be conscripted for the duration of the war.”10 In addition, the
CCF sought to dampen the profit motive for war industries. One party suggestion was
that Canada move to nationalize nickel mines and munitions factories.11 The party was
strident in its belief that no “individual or corporation should be permitted to make profit
out of a nation’s extremity, nor out the lives and bodies of our fellows.”12 By removing
the financial incentives of war, the CCF believed that political and business leaders
would have a muted desire to partake in such activities. The petition noted: “We believe
by thus taking profit out of war the impetuosity of influential concerns, which stand to
gain by the nation entering an unnecessary conflict, may be restrained.”13 As the world
inched closer to war, the CCF position on Canadian participation gradually shifted from
its decidedly anti-war stance of early 1937.
One year later, the CCF position on Canadian participation in any conflict
involving Great Britain and France remained staunchly anti-war. The party’s policy was
clearly demonstrated in a memorandum authored by two of its two most influential
leaders, Frank Scott and Eugene Forsey. Their memo listed numerous reasons for
opposing active Canadian participation.14 From an international perspective, Scott and
Forsey concluded that the CCF should steer clear of war support because, “It is almost
certain that the next war will come only when Great Britain (and France) will feel her

10. Lewis to CCF, 2.
11. Lewis to CCF, 2.
12. Lewis to CCF, 2.
13. Lewis to CCF, 2.
14. Frank Scott and Eugene Forsey, “Memorandum of CCF Foreign Policy,” April 1938, CCF
Papers – David Lewis Papers, Eugene Forsey materials, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 94, File 6, Library and
Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
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imperial interests in danger. It will simply be a war between two power groups.”15 Both
men feared that the next war would repeat the horrors of World War I and expressed
concern that the outcome would produce “a peace settlement as bad—or worse—than the
Versailles settlement.”16 Scott and Forsey further added that there was “no guarantee that
reaction would not follow the next war as it followed the last.”17 Finally, on the
international front, they claimed it was “important to consider the position and likely
action of the United States.”18
While Canada was, technically, independent in the realm of foreign policy, many
Canadians maintained familial and emotional bonds to Great Britain. Still, the CCF
leadership was considering what role their American neighbor might play in the coming
conflict. Just prior to the beginning of World War II, Canadian Forum contributor W.L.
MacDonald wrote that Canada should not be following Great Britain regarding foreign
policy at this point in history.19 MacDonald remarked that Canadian confidence in the
direction of British foreign policy was badly strained and it would appear an act of “wise
realism” for Canada to turn to the United States for guidance in the realm of foreign
policy.20 Domestically, Scott and Forsey viewed war participation as detrimental to
Canada. As they noted, “The contribution in terms of man power which Canada can make
to such a war is very small—and participation in the next war would very seriously
endanger national unity regarding anticipated Quebec opposition to it.”21 In
overwhelming numbers, French Canadians vehemently opposed Canadian participation
15. Scott and Forsey, 1.
16. Scott and Forsey, 1.
17. Scott and Forsey, 1.
18. Scott and Forsey, 1.
19. W.L. MacDonald, “Towards a Canadian Foreign Policy,” Canadian Forum 19, no. 223,
(August 1939): 146.
20. MacDonald, “Towards a Canadian Foreign Policy,” 146.
21. Scott and Forsey, 2.
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in the “imperial conflict,” while English Canadians (many with strong ties to Great
Britain) were firmly supportive of an all-out war effort. Military historian, Jack
Granatstein stated that Canada went to war because Britain went to war; the fundamental
reason for this Canadian decision was sentiment.22 He added that the enthusiasm of 1914
was absent in 1939 due to the terrible losses and deep divisions to Canada’s national
fabric caused by World War I.23 Military and political historian Desmond Morton
concurred that this sentimental allegiance to Great Britain was given a boost with the
Royal Visit of 1939.24 While English Canada was generally resigned to the war, the
majority opinion in Québec favored staying out of the conflict.25 Scott and Forsey knew
that positions along the English-French divide in Canada had not softened much in the
twenty years since the last war had ended. Last, on a purely political level, the
memorandum’s authors felt that CCF opposition to war participation was an astute party
maneuver. “Opposition to participation would gain wide-spread support for the CCF, not
only now but even more so after the post-war disillusionment sets in,” Scott and Forsey
predicted.26
As war clouds grew more ominous, the CCF stance regarding Canadian
participation in any armed conflict continued to evolve. By late 1938, the likelihood of
war grew more real to the national leadership in Ottawa, especially after the capitulation
of France and Great Britain at Munich. Mackenzie King had started to realize that war
was likely while attending the Imperial Conference in May and June 1937. At that
22. J. L. Granatstein, Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 19.
23. Granatstein, Canada’s War, 20.
24. Desmond Morton, Canada and War: A Military and Political History (Toronto: Butterworth
and Company, 1981), 103. Morton admitted that this rush of Royal enthusiasm was often temporary in
nature.
25. Morton, Canada and War, 20-21.
26. Scott and Forsey, 2.
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meeting, King informed Hitler that an attack on the United Kingdom would bring Canada
(and all the other Dominions) to Great Britain’s aid. The Munich Crisis in September
1938 confirmed to the Canadian prime minister that armed conflict was inevitable.27
Prime Minister King viewed Munich as the last major attempt to appease Hitler. It was at
this juncture that King realized his hopes for British neutrality in a European war were
wishful thinking. He concluded that the unthinkable had become probable.28 Above all,
King was concerned that another war would threaten Canadian national unity, so he
remained vague in expressing Canada’s position. King believed that a forthright policy
either for Canadian participation or neutrality would divide the country.29 As such, during
the 1938 legislative session, King asked for increased defense expenditures while arguing
that, “Canadians will decide their policy during any European war when—and if—that
emergency arises.”30 If war was going to take place, the CCF wanted to position itself as
a defender of Canadian interests and not return Canada to a colonial mentality with
regards to British participation. National Secretary David Lewis suggested that the party
put forth motions that would assure the Canadian House of Commons would act
independently. To that end, Lewis recommended that CCF party leader J.S. Woodsworth
propose a “redrafted resolution demanding legislation to give Canada freedom of action
in the event of war.”31 Lewis added that such a motion had been discussed by the League
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for Social Reconstruction and that that group was preparing a draft for Mr. Woodsworth’s
consideration.32 Lewis asserted that Woodsworth should lead the party’s position in the
House of Commons because “The issue has become so urgent since Munich that it seems
good policy to put it in the hands of the leader.”33
As war became increasingly likely, tensions mounted between National CCF
figures like Lewis, Coldwell, and Woodsworth. A former Methodist minister,
Woodsworth was an avowed pacifist and, as the party crept closer to supporting Great
Britain and France, he felt uneasy with the CCF’s position shift. Whereas the argument
for war was presented as a necessary act of good versus evil, Woodsworth held a
distinctly different take on the conflict. In a dramatic speech on September 7, 1939,
Woodsworth agreed that Hitler might very well be a “devil incarnate.” He hastened to
add that the world got rid of the Kaiser only to create the conditions that brought Hitler to
power.34 Indeed, Woodsworth believed that capitalism was the root cause of all war. He
stated that capitalists used war as an answer to periodic economic imbalance or
depression.35 Thus, Woodsworth argued, war grew out of capitalist profit-seeking and

32. Lewis to CCF, 1. The League for Social Reconstruction was an organization of Canadian
academics (largely, but not exclusively, located at universities in Montreal and Toronto) that was borne of
the economic calamity of the Great Depression. Michiel Horn writes that the original purpose of the group
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Canadian society. Initially non-partisan, the LSR became active supporters and leaders of the CCF. The
LSR’s critique of monopoly capitalism meshed nicely with the attitude of the CCF. Both groups believed
that capitalism was subverting to political democracy and proposed to overturn this by means of an ethical
revolution. In this society, the principles of regulating production, distribution, and service would be driven
by the common good rather than private profit. Regarding the question of war, the LSR had a desire for
neutrality and believed that all connections to Britain should be severed. See Michiel Horn, The League for
Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the Democratic Left in Canada, 1930-1942 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1980), 202-04.
33. Lewis to CCF, 1.
34. Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1959), 310.
35. McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, 298.
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would remain active until the profit motive was replaced by democratic planning and
production.36
The natural conclusion, based on these assumptions, was that a true social
democrat should actively fight against his country’s involvement in foreign war and press
for social revolution at home.37 As armed conflict drew closer, Woodsworth’s firm stance
against war increasingly placed him in direct conflict with much of the CCF leadership.
Complicating matters were the decidedly anti-war sentiments coming from most sectors
of Québec. This placed the provincial wing of the party in a terrible political bind.

The CCF’s Complicated War Policy Regarding Conflict in Europe
As conflict grew increasingly likely, the national office and all the provincial CCF
branches dedicated a good deal of time to articulating a response in the event that war
broke out in Europe. The issue was particularly tricky for the Québec branch. Memories
of French-Canadian resistance to participation in World War I and the imposition of
conscription by the federal government were quite fresh and still raw. The Québec branch
recalled that by 1917 the Allied war effort was not going well and that voluntary
recruitment in Canada was falling short.38 In May 1917, Prime Minister Robert Borden
introduced the Military Service Bill, which brought about the conscription of men to
bolster the Canadian contribution to the conflict.39 The opinion between French and
English Canadians was almost unanimous; French Canadians were adamant in opposition

36. McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, 298.
37. McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, 298.
38. Elizabeth H. Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-1918 (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart
Limited, 1974), 161.
39. Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec, 173.
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of the motion while English Canadians were enthusiastic proponents of conscription.40
Mindful of this grave threat to national unity, the issue was treated with serious reverence
by political leaders of all stripes as the prospect of another widespread war threatened.
While British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and German Chancellor Adolf
Hitler were discussing the fate of Czechoslovakia in 1938, new Quebec CCF Secretary
Hubert Pearson sought a clear decision of what the party intended to do in the event of
military conflict. As he noted, “The thing I feel should be done is that the National
Council decide, at once, the question of policy and this should be shoved down the throat
(if necessary) of our newspapers so that every CCF-er might know where we stand and
that the country might generally know also.”41 For Pearson, it was more important to
make a decision and get that in front of Canadians, as opposed to the shape that decision
should take.42 Well aware of the difficulties that the First World War and conscription
brought to Québec, Pearson did have an opinion on the issue of Canadian participation in
any future conflict. He noted, “If we decide we are against sending one man to Europe, I
will be happy, and I think in the long run this policy will win us the most support. As for
economic support to (our side) I don’t give a raf one way or the other.”43 Despite listing
his preferences, Pearson emphasized that the party needed to make an immediate
decision: “The main thing is this: our policy should be decided on at once; it should be
announced at once; at all costs it should be known before anything actually happens in

40. Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec, 177. Armstrong noted that with debate taking place in the
House of Commons, anti-conscription demonstrations took place throughout Quebec. Many of these
gatherings erupted in violence. The Borden government was not swayed by the anti-conscription protests
and passed the bill in August 1917. This set off another round of violent protests across the province.
41. Hubert Pearson to David Lewis, letter, September 12, 1938, CCF Papers – Provinces, General
Correspondences, 1932-1958, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
42. Pearson to Lewis, 1.
43. Pearson to Lewis, 2.
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Europe.”44 The Quebec secretary recommended the policy be phased in with “great care”
and added that the “reasons for our actions are not important.”45 He concluded by telling
Lewis that the most important thing was for the CCF position to be swift, clear and
straightforward.46 As will be discussed below, Pearson did not receive such a war policy
position from the National Office, and the issue would hound the party in Québec and the
other provinces.
Other men also wanted a clear policy position from the CCF and they had very
distinct opinions of what that policy should look like. Writing in the Montreal Jewish
Eagle in April 1939, A.M. Klein took CCF leader Woodsworth to task for his
unadulterated pacifism. While the CCF had yet to develop a concrete policy toward
possible conflict, Woodsworth left no doubt of his position on the matter: Canada should
refrain from participation at all costs. Klein ridiculed Woodsworth’s approach to the
coming conflict. He acidly noted, “Mr. Woodsworth does not believe in war; he believes
rather in a form of Little Lord Fauntleroy good behavior which would set an example to
the dictators and which would shame Hitler and Mussolini into turning over a new
leaf.”47 Klein chastised Woodsworth for possessing a “naiveté that was hardly becoming
to the leader of a political party which hopes to someday rule the destiny of the nation.”48
Klein closed his column with one final salvo at the CCF leader’s unshakable pacifism. He
argued, “Mr. Woodsworth, like the Bourbons, does not seem to learn by events – even a
schoolboy knows that Fascism will be destroyed, not by etiquette, not by gospel, but only

44. Pearson to Lewis, 2.
45. Pearson to Lewis, 2.
46. Pearson to Lewis, 2.
47. A.M. Klein, “Of All Things,” column, Montreal Jewish Eagle, April 12, 1939, CCF Papers –
Provinces, General Correspondences, 1932-1958, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, Library and Archives Canada,
Ottawa, 3.
48. Klein, 3.
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by force.”49 Klein’s column was passed along to CCF National Secretary David Lewis.
Although tempted to reply to Klein’s piece, Lewis opted to refrain from attacking the
author. Part of Lewis’s rationale lay in his belief that Klein was not “particularly
important in the political world.”50
Another consideration shaping the muted CCF response was the fact that Klein
was right. Lewis lamented, “The main difficulty is that Mr. Woodsworth does take a
position which is to some extent pacifist.”51 He exclaimed that while Klein’s column was
“annoying because of its smart-alecky and arrogant tone,” it was in the CCF’s best
interest “not to drag on a controversy – and better to leave the matter alone.”52 What
Lewis’s letter does not state is the internal party divide the CCF was facing with the
looming crisis in Europe.
By the spring of 1939, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation was split along
two lines regarding the notion of Canadian participation in any coming war. At a CCF
caucus meeting in March of that year, the divisions were clearly spelled out. At the
meeting on the 27th, the discussion turned quickly to the issue of Canadian foreign
policy. With debate expected on the subject in the House of Commons very shortly, the
party found itself “with two opinions” on the subject.53

49. Klein, “Of All Things,” 3.
50. David Lewis to Sol Berman, letter, April 24,1939, CCF Papers – Provinces, General
Correspondences, 1932-1958, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1. While
agitated with Woodsworth’s pacifism, Klein was on friendly terms with David Lewis. The two attended
high school together in Montreal and Klein introduced Lewis to his future wife. Klein also collaborated
with Lewis and Frank Scott in producing a pair of publications at McGill University. In addition, Klein ran
for the CCF in the 1949 federal election. Klein achieved far greater acclaim for his poetry than he did as a
political commentator. See Cameron Smith, Unfinished Journey: The Lewis Family (Toronto, University of
Toronto Press, 1989), 146-57.
51. Lewis to Berman, 1.
52. Lewis to Berman, 1.
53. CCF Caucus Meeting Minutes, March 27, 1939, CCF Papers – David Lewis Papers, Caucus
Meeting Notes, 1937-1942, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 110, File 5, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
There was also a degree of debate about the role for Canada in any major war within the governing Liberal
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On one side, party leader J.S. Woodsworth and P.J. Roe believed that the olive
branch should be held out to the dictators. They stated that “the CCF should place the
emphasis on the readjustment of the grievances of dictatorship countries rather than on
the restraining of the aggression of the dictators.”54 On the other hand, M.J. Coldwell,
G.C. MacNeil, T.C. Douglas, and Angus MacInnis reasoned that international order
would have to be restored before international justice could be created.55 Coldwell added
that there were three points he would be willing to press: “Freedom of action for Canada
in case of war, Canada to give economic support to the efforts of the League of Nations,
and defense for Canada to be used in Canada only.”56 After a “good deal of inconclusive
discussion,” the CCF caucus decided to reopen the discussion at the following caucus
meeting.57 These notes expose two realities for Canada’s party of democratic socialism.
The first was that it was clear from this exchange that the party leadership was deeply
divided on the major question of the day: should war come, what should be Canada’s
position; and second, the notes indicate the issue of Canadian participation had
dramatically shifted among some the CCF’s top leaders over the past two years.
From a strongly anti-armament position to one of qualified military and financial
support, Coldwell, Douglas, MacInnis, and many other CCF officials were talking far
differently than they had been during the less threatening days of early 1937. Indeed,
after Germany attacked Poland and the sequel to World War I commenced in Europe,
Prime Minister Mackenzie King took note of the isolation of the CCF leader from his

Party. While there was near unanimous support for Canadian participation, the level of the Canadian effort
was subject to considerable discussion between King, his Defense Minister O.D. Skelton, the Liberal
Cabinet, and the Chiefs of Staff. See J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s War, 1-13.
54. CCF Minutes, 1
55. CCF Minutes, 1
56. CCF Minutes, 1
57. CCF Minutes, 1
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colleagues. King noted, “I realize that Woodsworth is getting older and is in an extremely
difficult position; that he is fighting alone against terrible odds.”58 The Liberal leader
added prophetically, “I shall not be surprised if, before this war is over, his day will have
come.”59
When the conflict began in September 1939, the CCF leaders once more
attempted to devise a coherent policy agreeable to both the leaders and the rank and file
members. Again, such a solution remained elusive. CCF party leader Woodsworth held
firm that “this was fundamentally an imperialist war, and that the British Labour Party
had deserted internationalism.”60 Woodsworth maintained that his war position would be
justified in three or four years.61 Coldwell and MacInnis countered by asking
Woodsworth what he would think of a fascist victory, and questioning how fascism could
be stopped.62 The CCF leader responded that “Wars settle nothing—although they are
justified by various reasons at the time.”63 MacInnis countered by asking Woodsworth,
“What could be given to Hitler to sufficiently satisfy him?”64 Woodsworth replied that
“we had bred Hitler.”65 As he had done previously, Woodsworth offered his resignation if
“retaining his position would embarrass the organization.”66 Ultimately, Woodsworth
kept his position as party president; however, ill health would soon reduce him to a
figurehead leader.

58. Mackenzie King, September 8, 1939, Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1939, MG
26-J13, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 4.
59. Mackenzie King entry, 4.
60. CCF Caucus Meeting Minutes, May 17, 1940, CCF Papers -- David Lewis papers, Caucus
Meeting Notes, 1937-1942, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 110, File 5, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 2.
61. CCF Caucus Minutes, 2.
62. CCF Caucus Minutes, 2.
63. CCF Caucus Minutes, 2.
64. CCF Caucus Minutes, 2.
65. CCF Caucus Minutes, 2.
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These caucus meeting notes indicate how the issue divided the party. While the
CCF publicly expressed limited Canadian participation, Woodsworth’s strong pacifist
leanings were well-known. Thus, CCF policy on this critical issue came across as
decidedly unclear in the immediate period before the war, and in the early stages of the
conflict as well. Other CCF leaders, such as Coldwell, MacInnis, and Lewis, began to
shift their opinion on this topic as efforts to appease Hitler repeatedly failed. This led
them to conclude that only armed opposition to the German leader would stop him.
Furthermore, it was also clear there was an element within the CCF that believed, like
Woodsworth did, that this conflict was nothing more than an imperialist war and the
party’s nuanced stance was not winning the party any converts in the province of Québec,
the home of strongest opposition to the emerging conflict. Historian Mason Wade wrote
that Quebecers were traditionally anti-imperialist and had not shared the general
development toward a belief in collective security. As war grew nearer, Québec became
more isolationist.67 In this immediate pre-war period, he explained that the dream of a
separate French-Canadian state was never more popular.68 However, once the war started,
Québecers began to express a qualified degree of cooperation for Britain and France. This
assistance stopped well short of armed Canadian participation.69 According to Québec
historians Linteau, Durocher, Robert, and Ricard, the Depression worked to solidify
traditionalist nationalism in Québec. They noted the devastated economy led to a
declining birth rate, little immigration, and a rural population that stayed on the land.70

67. Mason Wade, The French-Canadians, 1760-1967 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968), 916.
68. Wade, The French-Canadians, 916. He also noted that “some” Québecers felt a certain
sympathy for the totalitarian nationalism of Mussolini, Franco, Salazar, and Hitler.
69. Wade, The French-Canadians, 917-21. By mid 1942, much of the early Québec support for
the war effort faded away.
70. Paul-André Linteau, René Durocher, Jean-Claude Robert, and François Ricard, (translated by
Robert Chodos and Ellen Garmaise) Quebec Since 1930 (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1991), 5.
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Regarding the question of French-Canadian readiness to partake in the coming world
conflict, these authors echoed Wade’s sentiments by stating that French-speaking
Québecers had little awareness of, or information about, the reasons for the war and the
situation in Europe.71
On September 8, 1939, full debate took place in the House of Commons regarding
Canada’s role in this new conflict. Prior to their parliamentary speeches, King and
Woodsworth met for two hours explaining their particular war position.72 In the House of
Commons, King spoke at length about why war with Germany was unavoidable and his
government’s justification for the impending war declaration. Before relinquishing the
floor to the CCF leader, the prime minister lauded Woodsworth for the courage of his
conscience, regardless of what the world thought of him.73 Woodsworth prefaced his
remarks by saying that he did not speak for the CCF’s official policy, and then put forth
the rationale for his unshakable opposition to armed conflict.74 When he finished,
Woodsworth sat down, his dissent voiced. M. J. Coldwell then spoke on behalf of the
CCF and assured the government of their cooperation. Coldwell stated that the CCF
position was the result of “general consensus” from party leaders across Canada.75
Indeed, Woodsworth was alone in the House of Commons in his opposition to Canadian
participation in the war. The main motion on the subject was then passed without
recorded vote. This prompted Woodsworth to rise and exclaim, “There were some of us
opposed to the main motion.” The Speaker replied, “Only one member rose.”76

71. Wade, The French-Canadians, 104.
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74. McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, 310.
75. McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, 312.
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Even after the war began, and the CCF had settled into its qualified support for
the war effort, elements of the party remained adamant in their pacifist position. J.S.
Woodworth was the chief supporter of Canadian neutrality in the conflict; this placed him
in direct conflict with the approved party stance. Woodsworth, however, would not
remain in his position for long. Poor health forced him to resign from the CCF presidency
in October 1940.77 According to the Montreal Star, Woodsworth’s decision to step down
as CCF president was, “regrettable,” but they added that there was, “no room for any
form of Pacifism in Canada today.”78 The Montreal Star claimed that the CCF, which
held just seven seats in parliament, was in decline and only possessed “a nuisance value”
in the House of Commons.79 The paper continued to denigrate the party, claiming that the
resolutions from the recent CCF convention “smell strangely of Nazi theories.” The Star
then offered, “It may be just as well that the CCF should just lie doggo for the duration of
the war.”80 The editorial concluded that it was for the good that the CCF had virtually
vanished from the Canadian political scene.81
The Montreal Star editorial is useful for several reasons. First, it indicates the
level of discord within the CCF regarding its ultimate war position. Second, it shows that
the qualified support for the war effort won the party very little support from proponents

77. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 94, File 6, Eugene Forsey Papers, Montreal Star editorial, October 20,
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of all-out war. Third, the editorial highlights The Montreal Star’s disdain for the party by
taking the opportunity to diminish the policies and prospects of the CCF. This provided a
clear example of leading print media’s antagonistic view of the party of Canadian
socialism. Within six months after the war’s commencement, two significant elections
were held in Canada that allowed voters to pass judgment on the various parties’ war
positions.
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CHAPTER IV
IMMEDIATE POLITICAL CHALLENGES, 1939-1940

Immediate Electoral Battles
Within six months of the beginning of the Second World War, elections were held
both at the federal level and in the province of Québec. The federal election had been
anticipated for some time. Indeed, the CCF leadership had expected it to take place
sometime during 1939. The real political surprise came out of Québec when Premier
Maurice Duplessis decided to make Canadian participation in the conflict a central piece
of a snap election announcement three weeks after the war began.1

Québec 1939 Provincial Election
While the CCF was scurrying to locate candidates for an imminent federal
election throughout much of 1939, it was not seriously concerned about an election at the
provincial level in Québec. Premier Maurice Duplessis had won a commanding majority
government in August 1936, and the next contest was expected in late 1940 or early
1941. The correspondences in the CCF files indicated total fixation on an expected
federal campaign, with no mention made of a possible provincial one. With the signing of
the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the fate of the United Front was determined.2 While some CCF
supporters had little trouble cooperating with communist candidates, the leadership had

1. Herbert Quinn, The Union Nationale: A Study in Québec Nationalism (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1963) 04-105. Duplessis made the election call on September 24, 1939 and the election was
held on October 25, 1939.
2. Andrée Lévesque-Olssen, The Canadian Left in Québec During the Great Depression: The
Communist Party of Canada and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Québec, 1929-1939
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1973), 229.
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held firm against any such arrangement. The agreement between Hitler and Stalin was
seen as confirmation of the suspicion of communist unreliability.3
On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland and the world was at war once
again. This commencement of hostilities had immediate political implications for
Québec. Premier Duplessis, citing French-Canadian fear of another round of
conscription, called a snap election.4 The election did not go well for Duplessis’s Union
Nationale government. During his brief time in office, Duplessis had upset large
segments of the population. The Canadian Forum stated that the Duplessis government
had become detested for its Padlock Act and for its antagonism toward the trade union
movement.5 Furthermore, the Canadian Forum remarked that the Union Nationale
government was hampered by its poor financial performance and for its “fake” concern
for provincial autonomy.6 Regarding the vital issue of troop conscription, Duplessis was
caught flat-footed when federal Justice Minister Ernest Lapointe intervened in the
provincial election. Lapointe, who also served as Mackenzie King’s Québec lieutenant,
announced that if Duplessis were re-elected, he and all of his French colleagues in the
federal cabinet would resign.7 With that stroke, the sizeable anti-conscription forces in
Québec rallied behind the respected Lapointe and deprived Duplessis of his raison-d’être
for calling the election. Liberal leader Adelard Godbout attacked the Union Nationale for

3. Levesque-Olssen, The Canadian Left in Québec, 229-30.
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its financial practices and was handsomely rewarded with a comfortable majority victory
on election day.8
The Union Nationale was not the only political party that had a bad day on
October 25, 1939. The election was another embarrassing chapter in the history of the
CCF in Québec. Throughout the summer, the party had focused on preparations for an
anticipated federal election. After the war commenced, the Québec CCF was still
searching to find a suitable public stance on the important issue of the degree of Canadian
involvement in the conflict.9 When Duplessis announced a snap election, the CCF was
totally unprepared. The party announced at the end of September that it was going to be a
full participant in the Québec election.10 However, the party hedged its bet by stating it
was uncertain whether it would run candidates of its own or support candidates from
other parties.11 CCF Québec Secretary, Bill Sauvé, wrote that “The provincial election
had been discussed with the CCF National Office but that no decision had yet been made
to the extent the party would be involved.”12 Under the best of circumstances, the Québec
CCF was organizationally weak. This degree of organizational futility was on full display
when the party fielded only one candidate and captured less than one-half of one percent
of the votes cast.13 In short, the CCF was a non-factor in this campaign. This weak result
was indicative of the CCF in Québec from the party’s foundation to shortly after World
War II commenced. By any measure, it was evident that democratic socialism was not

8. Feigart, Canada Votes: 1935 – 1988 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), Table 8-21,
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11. Sauvé, 1.
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making progress in the province. Party records did not indicate that the Québec CCF
conducted a thorough examination of the dismal tallies posted by the party. Frank Scott
contributed an article to the Canadian Forum in December 1939 regarding the then
recent Québec election. Surprisingly, he made no mention of the CCF results in the
province.14

Readying for the Federal Election in Québec
Throughout 1939, the pace and desperation to locate electoral candidates for the
CCF in Québec intensified. In June, David Lewis, the party’s National Secretary, wrote
to Bill Sauvé about his efforts to recruit Hubert Desaulniers. After a long chat with
Desaulniers, whom Lewis had disparaged earlier in the year, CCF National Secretary
Sauvé reported that Desaulniers had “definitely decided to run in any constituency where
we decide to place him.”15
As was typical of Lewis, the national CCF secretary had firm opinions about how
the Québec CCF should best use Desaulniers. Lewis noted, “Unless we decide to use him
in Verdun it seems to me that the Rosemont constituency, which has a good Englishspeaking population, should be seriously considered since Hubert speaks English so
fluently.”16 In addition, Lewis urged the Québec CCF to “get to work on this matter
without delay.”17 This letter from Lewis is significant for many reasons. First, this letter

14. Scott, “The Real Vote in Québec,” Canadian Forum, December 1939, 178-80. In his analysis,
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showcases the eagerness of the CCF National Office to help establish a presence in
Québec. It is striking because it was unexpected that Lewis would suggest that one of the
few bonafide francophone candidates for the Québec CCF be promoted to a
predominantly English-speaking district. The party was starved for substantial
francophone candidates and hoped to break through with the French-speaking
demographic. Yet, when plausible francophones appeared, the party opted to run them in
English ridings where electoral hopes were considered more promising. Furthermore, this
missive high-lights the involvement and sway of National CCF Secretary David Lewis.
A second correspondence from that same date adds further proof of the desperate
maneuvers by the CCF to recruit substantial candidates in Québec for the anticipated
federal election. This time, Lewis was writing to convince George Mooney, of the
Montreal-area riding of Verdun, to run as a candidate. In so doing, Lewis asserted to
Mooney, “Since your chance of success in Verdun is very real, I would urge you most
strongly to take the matter seriously into consideration and to decide to run at the present
time.”18 To further entice Mooney, the CCF National Secretary stated that he would make
certain that Mooney received a salary for at least two months during the campaign, thus
freeing Mooney of any financial anxiety.19 Lewis also remarked that the organization was
more closely knit and on better financial footing than it had been in the 1935 election.20
In case Mooney’s fears had not been eased by Lewis, the National Secretary
added that Mooney would find a position with the CCF administration if he was

18. David Lewis to George Mooney, letter, June 21, 1939, CCF Papers – Provinces, General
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unsuccessful as a candidate.21 Lewis suggested that Mooney could become the leader of
the Québec CCF, be offered another position in the National Office, or, possibly, replace
Lewis as National Secretary.22 He exclaimed, “As you see then, there will be undoubtedly
a number of openings for a man like yourself in the work of the movement after the
election, unless we suffer a crushing set-back, which is contrary to all present
indications.”23
Lewis clearly wanted to ensure Mooney’s services to the movement as either an
elected M.P. or as an appointed official to the CCF, probably badly enough to jettison the
party practice of not allowing CCF candidates to run as members of other parties as well.
Lewis declared, “I meant what I said with respect to the possibility of our supporting you
even if you run as an independent. Since you believe the CCF label is a handicap, I
wonder whether the combination label of CCF-Labour or CCF Reform might help your
electoral chances.”24 This stark admission of the negative connotation of the CCF in
Québec, and the suggestion of shading the party label, was not easy for the National
Secretary. He added, “I must make clear that I do not myself like the suggestions I have
just made, and would much prefer you to run as a straight CCF candidate. However, I
realize the situation and agree that in your case since we know exactly where you stand
and since there is no question about your connection with the CCF, it is more important
to get you elected than to keep inflexibly to the party label.”25
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As with the previous letter from Lewis to Desaulniers, one can detect CCF
desperation to establish a beachhead in the predominantly French-speaking province of
Québec. Where this correspondence differs is the more substantial promises made to an
anglophone candidate, George Mooney, compared to those made to his francophone
counterpart, Hubert Desaulniers. It is doubtful that this is clear-cut evidence of bias on
the part of David Lewis. It is more likely that Mooney was viewed more positively
because he had run for the party in the 1935 election, and was thus better known and
more trusted than Desaulniers. It should be noted that Mooney probably received such
preferential treatment due to his strong second place showing during that 1935 federal
campaign in the Verdun riding.26 Indeed, there is no evidence that Lewis made similar
promises to any other candidates, regardless of their background.
It is curious, however, that Lewis would be willing to overlook Mooney’s running
as an independent—or even as a member of another “labour” party—while Lewis and the
party establishment advocated expulsion in the case of Jean Peron who had wanted to run
for the CCF as part of a “united front” in Québec three years earlier. Again, stating this
discrepancy in treatment between an anglophone and francophone candidate as further
evidence of blatant CCF racism against French-Canadian politicians is not convincing.
In this case, the evidence suggests that Lewis was more flexible toward Mooney due to
Mooney’s previous service to the party; he clearly bestowed obvious trust in the Verdun
candidate. This correspondence between Lewis and Mooney also highlights the influence

26. Dean McHenry, The Third Force in Canada: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation,
1932-1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), 172. McHenry further noted that Mooney was
the lone CCF candidate to receive his deposit back. In 1935, for a candidate to win back his deposit, he or
she needed to garner at least fifteen percent of the vote in his or her riding.
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exercised by Lewis. The power to offer patronage positions and to bend established party
practices are clear indicators of Lewis’ reach in all matters of CCF affairs at the time.
The CCF national secretary expected that Prime Minister King was likely to call a
federal election for the fall of 1939 and pressured provincial wings of the party to prepare
for such an eventuality. Indeed, King had been returned to office in 1935 and while
governments had five years to call another election in the parliamentary system, custom
indicated that most sought to go to the voters during their fourth year in power – unless
there was a significant event that favored holding off until year five. The commencement
of war in September 1939 provided King with solid justification for postponing the
election call. Ultimately, King used criticism of his government’s war efforts to trigger a
snap election call early in 1940.27 Meanwhile, in Québec, Lewis asked for and received
an update regarding pre-election candidate selection in Canada’s second most populous
province. In late June 1939, CCF Québec Provincial Secretary Bill Sauvé reported “The
constituencies we are most interested in at the moment are Rosemont-Maisonneuve [sic],
Mont-Royal, Verdun, Westmount, and Cartier.”28 Sauvé added, “I don’t expect that we
will have candidates in all these ridings but they are all under consideration.”29 That the
Québec CCF would target these ridings is of interest on two fronts. The first is that the
decision that the party would only seriously contest five ridings out of sixty-five available

27. J.L. Granatstein, Mackenzie King: His Life and World (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson
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Parliament. After a series of negotiations with Liberal leader Wilfrid Laurier, Borden was granted an
amendment to the British North America Act for a one year extension of the sitting Parliament. See Robert
Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden, A Biography, Volume II: 1914-1937 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada,
1980), 45-48.
28. Bill Sauvé to David Lewis, letter, June 27, 1939, CCF Papers – Provinces, General
Correspondences, 1932-1958, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
29. Sauvé to Lewis, 1.
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in Québec underscored the party’s weakness in the province. The second is that the
districts Sauvé mentioned were all located in greater Montreal, thereby adding credence
to the argument that the CCF in Québec was a Montreal-centric organization.
An example of the top-down decision making in the Québec CCF was on full
display when Sauvé informed Lewis how Sauvé and a couple of leading CCF figures
decided which constituencies would best suit the handful of candidates. It was agreed that
Verdun was the best spot for Calder, and Rosemont-Maisonneuve was equally wellsuited to Desaulnier.30 Sauvé added, “Our friends who run the Verdun organization will
likely object that Calder is not a local man and not acceptable.”31 This “king-maker”
situation brings into the light the curious dichotomy of CCF policy: the belief in being a
grass-roots movement, while at the same time having “centralization” of decision
making. These two objectives did not always align and, in the instance of Verdun, they
proved problematic for the party time and again.
Sauvé also reported to Lewis that strong anti-union sentiment from the current
provincial government under Maurice Duplessis might work to the CCF’s benefit. Sauvé
remarked, “The labour unions who in the past felt impelled to lend their support to the
old line parties to protect their immediate interests may be brought to see the error of
their ways.”32 With the Québec Premier expected to begin another drive against unions,
Sauvé reasoned that trade union people would realize the support they had given the
traditional parties had not brought them the protection they expected. He concluded, “It

30. Sauvé to Lewis, 1.
31. Sauvé to Lewis, 1.
32. Sauvé to Lewis, 1-2.
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should be a simple matter to get them to line up behind a CCF candidate.”33 This last
statement provides the basis for the common belief among CCF leaders that when
workers realize their economic interests are poorly served, they will enthusiastically side
with the CCF. The appalling lack of electoral success in Québec indicates that the
working class did not come to the same conclusion as Sauvé and many other CCF leaders
did.
The first issue that should be considered is the Marxist grand narrative for
working people. Renowned political economist, Joseph Schumpeter, remarked that
socialism is, in many respects, a religion which embodied the meaning of life and the
absolute standards by which to judge events and actions.34 As part of this belief system,
the Marxian message of the terrestrial paradise of socialism meant a new ray of light and
a new meaning of life to millions of people.35 Schumpeter argued that Marxism gave
hope by formulating the feeling of being thwarted and ill-treated and by proclaiming that
socialistic deliverance from those ills was a certainty.36 Marx believed this would occur
when working people fully developed a class consciousness which would allow them to
take collective action against capitalism.37 Certainly, given the background of the Great
Depression, it is understandable for the CCF to emphasize the role the capitalist system
played in hampering the economic well-being of working people. The CCF clearly
believed in this model, but in so doing they overlooked other factors that influenced the
voting behavior of Québeckers. Historical party ties, patronage and other influences (such

33. Sauvé to Lewis, 1-2. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Duplessis was out of office by the
time the federal election campaign took place in early 1940.
34. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Unwin University
Books, 1943), 5.
35. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 6.
36. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 6.
37. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 6-7.
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as that of the Roman Catholic Church) affected voters’ decisions in Québec, and all were
insufficiently addressed by the CCF. The party, however, was not oblivious to these other
elements. Indeed, the party unsuccessfully attempted to get the Roman Catholic Church
to alter its opposition to the CCF throughout the 1930s. Those continued efforts produced
partial, grudging acceptance by the Roman Catholic authorities in Québec in 1943. This
matter will be discussed in more detail later but, for the moment, it is important to
understand that the CCF underestimated the tenacity that history, patronage, and religion
held for many voters in Québec during this period.
When David Lewis responded to Sauvé several days after receiving Sauvé’s
missive, he seemed acutely aware of having upset party workers in Verdun and offered to
help put out any sort of political fire. Lewis instructed Sauvé to “Set up appointment with
some of the Verdun people on Wednesday evening – I think it might be useful if I saw
some of the Verdun people while I am there.”38 Clearly, Lewis understood that the
nomination of an outside candidate (Calder) would upset the local organization.
However, the CCF secretary also had an idea about how to placate disgruntled Verdun
CCF leaders. Lewis stated that due to the CCF’s second-place finish in the previous
federal election, the party was entitled to nominate one enumerator for each polling
division in the constituency.39 This meant that George Mooney would have the authority
to appoint these enumerators for the 176 polling divisions in the Verdun district.40 This
gave the CCF a rare chance to play patronage politics in Québec. As Lewis explained,
“The enumerators are paid seven cents by the government in urban districts for each

38. David Lewis to Bill Sauvé, letter, June 30, 1939, CCF Papers – Provinces, General
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39. Lewis to Sauvé, 2.
40. Lewis to Sauvé, 1.
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name that they procure, so that a number of people will be anxious to get the job for the
money they can make on this.”41
In addition to placating Verdun leaders with providing paid work for CCF
sympathizers, Lewis also saw possible advantages for the party. He maintained, “We
should make certain of choosing people who will be of real value in their work. In fact, as
they go around doing their job of enumerating from door to door, they can carry on CCF
canvassing at the same time.”42 For all the talk of the CCF being different from the
traditional parties, this correspondence and the one with George Mooney show that the
National Secretary was willing to use some of the tactics of the long-established parties,
at least in specific incidences. Unfortunately for Lewis and the CCF, even these attempts
at patronage politics failed to gain traction. In the case of Verdun, for example, Lewis
received word late in July 1939 that local CCF leaders were pessimistic they would locate
people to partake in the patronage positions the National Secretary offered. Bert
Hepworth of the Verdun riding CCF explained to Lewis that “As we stand now – we are
weak at this point – Andy Sim (another Verdun CCF member) says that there are no men,
seasoned and able, who would take over and bear the brunt of the work necessary in an
election, and that it is impossible to get the over two-hundred workers needed in a hurry
and that no immediate action is advisable or possible now because of the hot season and
so many of the people are away.”43 Hepworth added, “If we had even a half dozen men

41. Lewis to Sauvé, 1.
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who could be counted upon to go in and make it a full spare-time work, we would be in a
better position to call their hand. But we have not got that half dozen.”44
Apathy continued to plague the CCF in Verdun—perhaps the strongest party
“fortress” in the province of Québec—as leaders tried to rally the district for the
anticipated federal election. J.W. Dundass, the secretary of the Provincial Council of the
Québec CCF, wrote Lewis to outline the difficulty the riding was having in mustering
enthusiasm for the Verdun CCF. Dundass wrote, “After our August 4th [1939] meeting, I
got in touch with Andy Sim and Mr. McKay and one or two others. They appeared to be
very concerned as to the future of the Verdun CCF.”45 The disdain of the Verdun CCF
was on clear display at a meeting one week later. Dundass reported, “Mr. R.R. McLetchie
opened the meeting on behalf of the Trustees and in a very nice way vented his spleen
upon the Provincial Council for having pushed things in Verdun.”46 This tension between
the local riding’s authorities and the Provincial Council (and, on occasion, the National
Office) was persistent throughout the period and, as will be demonstrated later, after the
1945 federal election. In the summer of 1939, the friction between the two groups
manifested itself by serious indifference to election preparation. “During the election of
officers, everyone nominated for President [of the Verdun CCF] declined the offer and on
the third or fourth effort Mr. McKay accepted the office,” stated Dundas.47 He added,
“We encountered the same trouble with the First Vice-President, and at last, Andy Sim
took the job. Other Offices met with the same result, the whole group being spineless and
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executive positions going to anyone for the asking.”48 Further evidence of the Verdun
CCF’s absence of enthusiasm can be found in Dundass’ next statement: “Mr. McKay
seemed to be the only one to have any spark of life. He endeavored to rouse the crowd
from its lethargy but with very little success.”49
It should be noted that all ten executive positions offered at that meeting were
filled by anglophones.50 Verdun was by no means an English enclave on the Island of
Montreal during the late 1930s, and other political parties regularly nominated
francophones for elected office at this time.51 After a slightly more animated Verdun
CCF meeting on August 18, Dundass told Lewis “There are a lot of people in Verdun
who have heard of the CCF, think it is a good thing, have been members, and will be
members again. That is about all. They may be willing to do a little work but it will take a
good deal of pushing.”52
Dundass claimed a second group existed “of a few people who may work hard
and might again take some office, but they nearly all have some pet hate such as George
Mooney and his election campaign, or the Provincial Council (the uptown crowd) or
certain other active CCFers.”53 Lévesque-Olssen wrote that middle-class intellectuals
from the LSR comprised the original nucleus of the Québec CCF.54 She noted that this
group could be differentiated from spokesmen from the urban working class in British
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Columbia and from farmers in the Prairie Provinces.55 Thus, a distinct class dynamic
existed within the Québec branch of the party that periodically produced tension and
discord between their members and those from other provinces. Dundass explained that
re-gaining the favor of CCF sympathizers in Verdun might prove tricky. He remarked,
“Mooney appears to have secured the resentment of a few soreheads because he joined
the club to be the candidate in 1935 and then went into retirement as soon as the
campaign was over.”56 Dundass also stated that the party had missed an opportunity to
soften the criticism of Mooney by stressing the financial hardships that he accumulated in
his failed electoral bid.57 Dundass informed Lewis there was a third group in Verdun
consisting of “a few people who would be very good key members…..but we shall have
to endeavor to bring pressure to bear on some—and see if they can be goaded into
action.”58
A letter from Bill Dodge of the Québec CCF Provincial Council a few days later
more fully explains the friction between the local, provincial, and federal CCF offices.
Dodge wrote to Lewis on August 25, 1939, that the opportunity for CCF enumerators in
the Verdun riding had been given away by George Mooney. According to Dodge,
Mooney stated that when he possessed the voter list, “the CCF in Verdun was nonexistent.” Mooney, he argued, was at a loss as to what to do with the list.59 Ultimately,
Mooney decided to offer the voter list to “personal friend Dr. C.H. Barr who is also a
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district leader of the Liberal Party in Verdun—with the proviso that Dr. Barr contact
George Smith of the Verdun CCF and arrange a fair division of appointments between
the two parties.”60 Dodge fully understood that the local CCF would not be happy about
this arrangement and wrote to Lewis because Dodge knew the national secretary would
“soon become involved in discussion with our people—and you had better know the
facts.”61 Dodge was clearly upset with Mooney’s actions, and relayed this to Lewis.
Dodge bluntly stated, “I do not hesitate to say that I feel George Mooney let the
movement down in no uncertain manner when he turned the privilege of appointing
enumerators to Dr. Barr.”62 Dodge asserted that these types of privileges were the
property of the party and not of individual candidates.63 Dodge debunked Mooney’s
assertion that the CCF was “non-existent” in Verdun by arguing “If George found the
Verdun CCF in a state of confusion, there was always the Provincial Council [to,
presumably, deliver the voter list].”64
Dodge feared this latest episode would serve to feed standing resentment against
“outsiders” in the Verdun riding. He wrote, “In the past, there has been considerable
prejudice in Verdun against outside intellectuals, of whom Mooney was one, and R.L.
Calder is another [Calder was being touted by the Québec and National CCF as potential
candidate in the Verdun riding].”65 Dodge continued, “If some of the members use this
enumerator business as an illustration of one intellectual’s inability to measure up, we
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may encounter some difficulty [with nominating other outside intellectuals – such as R.L.
Calder].”66
What becomes obvious in these exchanges between Dundass, Dodge, and Lewis
is how the CCF National Office, the Québec CCF, and the Verdun CCF held vastly
different, class-driven opinions regarding the presence of George Mooney in the riding.
Evidence suggests that National Secretary Lewis was willing to offer Mooney significant
incentives to represent the riding once again. However, the local party viewed Mooney as
almost a cancer on the Verdun CCF. Perhaps Lewis understood this divide; it might
explain his suggestion to hire nearly 200 canvassers in Verdun in an effort to placate
disgruntled Verdun CCF leaders. This plan did not work. The entire patronage scheme
failed and further highlighted some of the tension that existed between the local party and
the National Office. The Québec CCF Provincial Council was caught, uncomfortably, in
the middle.
Despite these difficulties in Verdun, both Dundass and Dodge closed with upbeat
assessments of electoral success for the CCF in any forthcoming general election.
Dundass ended his discussion of the state of the Verdun CCF by concluding the situation
was “not very encouraging—but far from hopeless.”67 At the same time, Dodge claimed,
“I think the rank and file are quite keen on putting up an election fight and I think they
will, if the question is presented fairly and accurately, be willing to support someone like
Calder, with some appeal and a chance of winning.”68 By the time Lewis responded to
Dodge regarding the situation in Verdun, World War II had commenced, and the CCF
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National Secretary declared, “In view of the war situation, all election arrangements are
in the air.”69
Throughout the summer of 1939, the CCF and Lewis became more intense in
their desire to shore up the party in Ontario and Québec. In early July, J.W. Dundass of
the Québec CCF’s Provincial Council wrote the National Secretary that the party had
nearly completed the French translation of the pamphlet The CCF Has the Answers, and
that the party hoped to distribute 5,000 copies in Québec later in the summer.70 In
addition, Dundass stated that it was doubtful that the party would be able to conduct
French radio broadcasts until the election campaign had begun.71 In closing, he indicated
that Hubert Desaulniers had consented to run as a candidate in a “suitable French
constituency,” and that the party was eyeing the Maisonneuve riding as a second
francophone district to contest in the anticipated federal election.72
These tepid advances in French-speaking Québec are clear indications of the
difficulty the party was having with recruitment among francophones in the province.
More evidence of anglophone hesitancy to completely open the doors to French
Canadians in Québec was found in a letter from Lewis to Québec CCF Provincial
Councilor Michael Rubenstein. Lewis had received a letter from Québec CCF Secretary
Bill Sauvé and Provincial Council member Miss Madelaine Sheridan about the feasibility
of hiring a Mr. Saint-André as an organizer for the party in the province. In response,
Lewis wrote to Rubenstein, “Damn those Frenchmen anyway! Apparently he [Saint-
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André] is completely crooked. I don’t think we should appoint a man having a reputation
which they [Sauvé and Sheridan] have told me he has.”73
After attacking Saint-André, Lewis turned his attention to the expected election
campaign. Writing to Rubenstein, the CCF National Secretary stated that the entry of
William Herridge’s New Democracy Party of Canada would harm the CCF in the Prairies
and western provinces.74 Herridge served as a special envoy to the United States for the
Bennett government from 1931-1935. During his tenure in Washington, Herridge became
impressed with the American New Deal and in 1935 convinced the Prime Minister to
offer a similar program to the Canadian public.75
Bennett and his New Deal proposals were crushed in the 1935 federal election. In
the ensuing convention to select Bennett’s replacement as Conservative Party leader,
Herridge made an impassioned plea for the party to accept the tenets of the New Deal.
His comments elicited vocal disapproval and his ideas were soundly rejected. The
Conservatives opted to adhere to an orthodox financial policy.76 With his ideas
repudiated by the Conservative Party, Herridge launched the New Democracy Party in
1939.77 The Canadian Forum remarked that the new party was based on the notion that
Progressive parties should have a clear and definite program which the parties can agree
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on, and to not stand in each other’s way.78 The editors argued that Herridge had fallen
well short on both counts by offering no platform and by bringing this vague New
Democracy message to areas where there existed an already strong CCF presence.79
The Canadian Forum stated that Herridge would only help split the vote among
progressive parties and wind up blocking the road for necessary change.80 Herridge
wrote that he intended to unite all progressives under his New Democracy banner.81 The
following month, the magazine took Herridge to task for making personal attacks on CCF
leader J.S. Woodsworth and for denigrating the party as unlikely to “get into power for
100 years.”82 A number of Herridge’s initiatives, such as the right to unionize, public
control of the financial sector and state control of essential public utilities, were quite
similar to CCF policies.83 While the Forum remarked that Herridge had never belonged
to any progressive organization, his economic stance was a slightly watered down version
of what the CCF was offering.84
That reality was upsetting to the Forum editors and to the CCF, who were clearly
rattled about New Democracy’s appearance on the Canadian political stage. Despite the
arrival of the New Democrats, Lewis estimated the CCF had “a superb chance of winning
25-30 seats in the four Western Provinces….and a pretty good chance of winning a few
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seats in Nova Scotia.”85 In addition, Lewis believed the party had a fighting chance in
about half a dozen constituencies in Ontario.86 If these hopes were realized, Lewis
claimed this would mean the establishment of the CCF and the complete defeat of both
New Democracy and Social Credit.87 From this passage, it would appear that Lewis was
not factoring the province of Québec into his electoral strategy.
Given the population and House of Commons seats apportioned to Ontario and
Québec, Lewis asserted “Our national policy must now definitely be to stimulate the
nomination of as many candidates as is humanly possible, no matter what their chances
may be, in order to build the movement for this campaign in such a way as to give our
good constituencies every possible chance.”88 To help achieve this objective, Lewis
reported that the Ontario CCF agreed to nominate at least sixty candidates in that
province.89 With regard to meeting this objective in Ontario, the CCF national secretary
was certain of success. While Lewis was bullish on Ontario meeting these candidacy
goals, he was decidedly pessimistic that Québec would provide a significant number of
nominated persons in the province’s sixty-five ridings.

Modest Expectations for the CCF in Québec
The national secretary did not have great expectations for the CCF in Québec for
the coming federal election. “Obviously, it would be stupid to talk of a similar ambition
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for your province,” David Lewis wrote to Michael Rubenstein, of the Québec CCF
Provincial Council.90 Still, Lewis had a plan to establish a modest campaign objective for
the party in Québec in the coming election. He wrote “We can accomplish the purpose of
giving the CCF campaign a broad national character if we can possibly succeed in
nominating at least three candidates in the province outside of Montreal.”91 As National
Secretary, Lewis was aware of the obstacles to obtaining even this modest objective in
Québec. He pointed out, “I know that we have no organization whatever.”92 Still, Lewis
was determined to build the CCF into a national party, by whatever means necessary. He
asserted, “We have contacts who might be persuaded to run themselves or to nominate a
candidate if the right kind of pressure was brought to bear upon them, and if they were
guaranteed the $200 deposit.”93
Lewis confided that he could raise enough money to guarantee three deposits for
candidates outside of Montreal.94 “It should not be impossible to find three constituencies
where there would be half a dozen people sufficiently interested to do this job when the
financial burden is likely to be very small.”95 Lewis explained to Rubenstein that he was
informing him—and him alone—of this due to Rubenstein’s position with both the
national and provincial CCF councils. In closing, Lewis implored Rubenstein to “Think
this over carefully. It is terribly urgent.”96 This passage provides more evidence of
several previously mentioned issues with the CCF in Québec. Most clearly, it indicates
the absolute and relative weakness of the party in the province. The desperate search for
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even three candidates outside the island of Montreal speaks volumes for the anemic state
of the party in Québec. In addition, the reality that the National Office was seeking to run
so few candidates in Québec compared to Ontario, despite the party’s fringe status in
Canada’s most populous province, was further proof of the CCF’s low profile in Québec.
This letter also highlights the influence of Lewis and the CCF Central Office, and truly
reflects the centralized nature of the party. True, the provincial councils were supposed to
have the final say in terms of candidate recruitment, riding selection, and issues regarding
financing. However, this passage makes clear the influence of the National Office in
general, and David Lewis in particular. Once again, as noted with Lewis’s role in
inducing George Mooney to accept a position with the party, the CCF national secretary
actively participated in “old school” politics by financially assisting the Québec CCF to
run three candidates off the Island of Montreal regardless of who the candidates were,
and whether the riding held any reasonable prospects for party success. Lewis’s objective
was to forward the movement’s cause, even if that required the CCF to indulge in
practices that resembled those of the established political party.
Finally, we can examine the racial remark that Lewis made regarding the
candidacy of Mr. Saint-André, where the national secretary “damned” those French
Canadians and openly stated that Saint-André was a “completely crooked” person who
would harm the party. It is curious that Lewis did not use such frank language to describe
anglophone candidates/party leaders/members in Québec. Lewis refrained from using this
kind of language when writing to inform Saint-André that his services as an organizer
were not presently required by the Québec CCF. Still, there was an air of condescension
in Lewis’s tone. For example, he noted, “Dr. Allen paid you ten dollars on account of the
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translation you made. You realize, of course, that our funds are very limited and I hope,
therefore, your charge for the translation will be within the limits of our treasury.”97 This
condescending tenor did little to make French Canadians feel at ease with the CCF and
only served to undermine the party’s fortunes in Québec.

“Faithful, Persevering, and Incompetent”
The Québec CCF and the 1940 Federal Election
Nineteen-forty promised to be a busy political year as the government of
Mackenzie King was entering the fifth year in office and was constitutionally obligated to
call an election at some point in the coming twelve months. For the CCF, which held
high expectations for the coming campaign, the year got off to an auspicious start when
President William Walsh of the Québec CCF Provincial Council tendered his resignation
to David Lewis. Walsh offered no explanation for this decision. He informed Lewis he
would further explain his rationale when they next met.98 It took Lewis nearly a full
month to respond to Walsh. Lewis wrote, “I apologize for not yet having responded to
your letter of January 11, and also for not being able to write more than a note now.”99
Lewis confided to Walsh that he had been overwhelmed with the forthcoming federal
election, stating “The work is so heavy it is almost a nightmare.”100 This clearly points to
the CCF as being largely a one-person operation at the National Office. Aside from one
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part-time clerk, H.W. Dalton, Lewis was the National Office during this period of time.
Never an easy task, the work multiplied during federal elections. Moreover, this was
Lewis’s first campaign as national secretary. In addition to the responsibilities of that
post, Lewis was a candidate in the Toronto-area riding of York-West. During this hectic
period, Lewis was also receiving campaign updates from Frank Scott and Bill Sauvé on
the political situation of the CCF in Québec. On February 3, Sauvé wrote to Lewis to
provide a brief overview of the electoral outlook in Québec.
In 1940 Québec had sixty-five constituencies. Thus, when Sauvé informed Lewis
that the party had only nominated one candidate, the national secretary could not have
been pleased.101 Additionally, Sauvé highlighted the lack of electoral action by noting
that the Electoral Committee had recently met and reported progress. Still, the group was
unable to complete its agenda, so another meeting needed to be scheduled.102 The hint of
chaos surrounding the Québec CCF election campaign was confirmed in a letter from
Frank Scott to Lewis the following day. He noted, “I have been to one meeting of the
electoral committee here which leaves me discouraged. In six years we have not found
any real organizing ability, nor moved at all beyond the small circle who are faithful,
persevering, and incompetent.”103 That remark was quite critical of the party leadership in
Québec. This organizational problem was a serious indication of a major area where the
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CCF was its own worst enemy. Nonetheless, Scott reasoned that “Things always look bad
at the start, and there are exceptions such as Bill Sauvé.”104
To assist the party’s electoral preparation, Lewis implored the Québec CCF
Election Committee to “send someone down to Sherbrooke to see if it is not somehow
possible to get a candidate for that constituency.”105 As Scott alluded, Lewis was keen on
getting the Québec CCF out of its Montreal Island enclave. Failure to do so would add
substance to the argument of the Québec CCF being an “English” party. In replying to
Scott, Lewis admitted, “I expect that the situation in Montreal will not be very
encouraging.”106 Organizational issues were the Achilles heel for the party in Québec.
Lewis promised, “After this election we shall have to find a general organizer for
Québec, no matter what the cost.”107 Lewis then explained to Scott the difficulties in
arranging travel for CCF Leader J.S. Woodsworth, given his frail health. He noted, “I am
seriously considering sending Woodsworth from Winnipeg to Vancouver by air and then
bringing him back east for his meetings in easy stages.”108 While seldom mentioned in
the records, having an ailing national leader in a geographically large country like Canada
was another element that limited the CCF’s ability to connect with a significant number
of voters. Lewis concluded his note to Scott by offering an analysis of the party’s
prospects in the coming election. He observed, “Things look fairly promising in the West.
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They do not look too bad in Ontario and Nova Scotia. We ought to put up a good
show.”109 Unfortunately for the CCF, Lewis’s predictions would prove overly optimistic.
Preparations continued for the 1940 federal election and a flurry of letters made
apparent the organizational difficulties hampering the CCF. A few days after declaring
the Québec CCF Electoral Committee “incompetent,” Scott wrote Lewis informing him
the committee had met again and that the situation had improved.110 Once more, Scott
pinpointed the party’s weakness in Québec. He noted, “It is just plain organizing ability
that is needed. It could be bought if we had the cash.”111 On the surface, Scott’s lament
seems to validate the impression that the Québec CCF was cash poor. However, that
point seems incongruent with the checks that Scott had been sending to Lewis during a
one-week period in early February 1940—altogether three separate checks totaling
$600.112 Lewis informed Scott that the donations were not being used for Lewis’s
personal campaign or for election expenses in Ontario; rather, he noted, “The money is
all being spent in connection with National Office work.”113 Scott had requested that a
small amount of his donations be used in Québec, but added that he trusted Lewis’s
judgment on the matter.114
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The question of finances was featured in Bill Sauvé’s February 19 letter to Lewis.
The CCF Québec secretary wrote, “As you know, the Provincial Treasury is just about
bare as a result of the last election and a resolution was passed at last night’s Provincial
Council meeting asking that we contact the National Office and find out what can be
expected from them in the way of financial assistance for the campaign.”115 Sauvé
explained to Lewis that the Québec CCF hoped to field a sufficient number of candidates
but that would be dependent on financing.116 Lewis responded to Sauvé’s request for
financial assistance with a monetary appeal to the Québec CCF. He remarked, “I must
ask you to contribute $50.00 in order for me to fly Mr. Coldwell from and to Montreal on
his way to the Maritimes. I am afraid I am obliged to make this a stipulation of his
visiting Montreal.”117
Lewis clearly stated that visits from prominent CCF leaders to Québec came with
a cost and would be limited in terms of appearances. He added, “Montreal is the only city
in which he [Coldwell] will spend two evenings. I am doing this because it is impossible
for me to have Mr. Woodsworth—or any other National speaker—visit Montreal. We are
anxious to give you every possible assistance.”118 Lewis concluded, “I am certain the
comrades will appreciate the situation and will be glad to make the contribution. Please
let me know how these arrangements have been received by your Committee.”119
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Both the National CCF and the Québec branch of the party were claiming poverty
and seeking assistance from each other. This makes Scott’s significant contributions
puzzling. Regardless, in this instance, Sauvé assured Lewis that the Québec CCF would
find the necessary funds for Coldwell’s visit.120
Indeed, it was not only the finance committee that would receive a jolt from the
Québec secretary. In the same missive in which he asked for funds from the National
Office to contest the federal election in Québec, Sauvé reported to Lewis the party was
meeting persistent resistance from the Verdun constituency to run a candidate in the
forthcoming campaign.121 Verdun was a working-class, industrialized area in the southern
section of Montreal Island. This was the type of riding that the CCF believed they should
be contesting and winning. Indeed, Verdun would provide the party with some of its best
showings in the province. While Verdun possessed many attractive traits for CCF
electoral success there was also discord between the Québec Provincial Office, the
National CCF Office, and the cadre of people leading the Verdun group. As had been the
case the previous summer, there was significant tension between the Verdun supporters
and the Provincial and National Offices. As the 1940 election neared, Sauvé observed
that the local group in Verdun was not interested in running a candidate and that he and
Calder were going to find out why.122 Ultimately, Calder would run for the party in the
constituency, but was not wholly supported by the Verdun people. This blasé attitude
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became evident when the riding was visited by M.J. Coldwell the following month.123 As
discussed earlier in this chapter, the local CCF in Verdun was not keen on having
candidates imposed on them by either the provincial or federal branch of the party.
Verdun was not the only constituency proving difficult due to candidate recruitment for
the Québec CCF. Dodge informed Lewis there were also problems in the Laurier riding.
Sauvé noted that “Two French-Canadians, Gerald Desaulnier and Arthur Paquette have
definitely decided they cannot accept nomination. That leaves Rubenstein who is
considering a run in Laurier. This prospect is not very hopeful.”124 No explanation was
mentioned for the declination of Desaulnier or Paquette. The acting Québec CCF
secretary also explained the district of Cartier was causing headaches for the provincial
office. He noted, “Stan [Allen] and I are scheduled to attend a meeting of the Cartier CCF
club tomorrow P.M. and raise hell with them for not putting out a candidate.”125 Sauvé
admitted the gesture would likely be futile for the near term, but could pay dividends
down the road.126 Sauvé provided an electoral update three weeks later that underscored
the party’s lack of preparation for the coming federal election. Sauvé listed the CCF’s
candidates in Québec. He explained, “We have four candidates nominated as follows: Dr.
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J.S. Allen, Montreal-Mount Royal; R.L. Calder, Verdun; Theodore Prézeau, Montreal-St.
Mary’s; and Hector Rochon, Montreal-St. James.”127
In briefly summarizing his party’s chances, Sauvé predicted that “prospects are
excellent in Verdun and fair in St. Mary’s. Poor elsewhere.”128 The fact that the CCF was
contesting just four ridings out of Québec’s sixty-five in 1940 was a testament to the poor
organization operating in the province at that time. With nearly five full years to prepare
for a campaign, this weak candidate recruitment effort was emblematic of the party’s
acting in a counterproductive manner. Moreover, each of the ridings the CCF was
contesting in Québec was located on the Island of Montreal. This is further evidence that
the party had not broken out of its Montreal-centric shell and was nonexistent in the rest
of the province. Candidate recruitment was but one glaring, self-inflicted problem the
party faced; the CCF also had issues with producing and delivering pertinent campaign
literature in French. During the election campaign, the National Office contacted the
Québec CCF to see if they could send French campaign material to party headquarters in
Ottawa for distribution for French districts in Western Canada.129 Sauvé informed Harry
Dalton that the Québec CCF had very little to offer; copies of the CCF Manifesto were
exhausted and the remaining literature was outdated.130 With the election just three weeks
away, Sauvé also told Dalton that the French election literature was just coming off the
presses. Small quantities of the Election Program had been distributed to the four Québec
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CCF candidates that day.131 With the remaining French election propaganda designated
for Québec, Sauvé informed Dalton that he could not part with this new literature.132
Meanwhile, Lewis had been in Montreal the previous weekend and took several
samples of the French version of the Election Program. The next day, he reduced the
number of copies requested from the printer by fifty percent.133 It is interesting that the
CCF had roughly equal amounts of the French version of the Election Program available
in Québec and for the rest of Canada. With roughly 2,500,000 French speakers in
Québec, it seemed insufficient that the Québec CCF decided to print only a few thousand
French language Election Programs for use in the province. Once again, this reinforces
the argument that the Québec CCF was ill-prepared for this election.
Not all the news from Québec was negative. In the person of Theodore Prézeau,
the Québec CCF leadership believed they had located their “Great French Hope.”
Reporting to Lewis on March 10, Scott noted “The new French-Canadian, Prézeau, is
quite a find, I think.”134 Scott added, “He made a good speech in N.D.G. [Notre-Dame-de
Grace] the other night, showing he has read up on the CCF and that he has a good
platform manner.”135 Québec CCF Secretary Sauvé was also impressed with Prézeau. He
stated, “Prézeau has gathered a good bunch of workers around him and there is every
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reason to believe his campaign launch will be a success.”136 Like Scott, Sauvé offered
high praise to Prézeau’s speaking talents. He noted, “Prézeau spoke for about five
minutes at the Coldwell meeting in N.D.G., in French and English and made a fine
impression.”137 Sauvé offered, “I have great hope for him, he seems to know how to get
things done and how to rally workers around him.”138
Despite his public speaking talent, Prezeau was hesitant to participate in radio
broadcasts. Sauvé remarked, “Prézeau is not at all keen about speaking on the radio
which I think is a mistake. Scott and myself all feel that he should take two, 15 minute
French broadcasts.”139 Sauvé stated that Prezeau, reluctantly, agreed to deliver two
French broadcasts during the campaign.140 While Prézeau may have captured the
attention of the Québec CCF hierarchy, this same group was also aware that the party’s
best electoral chance for success likely rested with Calder in Verdun. This helps to
explain the exposure given Prézeau’s candidacy by the party, even though Sauvé had
reported problems in the Verdun constituency. The Québec CCF secretary reported he
was “rather disappointed in the result of the Coldwell meetings in N.D.G. and
Verdun.”141 Sauvé noted that scheduling conflicts had limited the crowd for Coldwell’s
speech to around 100 people in Verdun.142 This weak attendance was repeated with the
gathering in Notre-Dame-de-Grace. There, Coldwell spoke to only 400 people in a half-
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filled hall.143 Sauvé noted that the poorly-attended meetings could have been avoided had
local officials used a degree of foresight with their planning.144
Sauvé’s report makes clear that poor organization did not only rest with the
federal and provincial CCF offices. It is evident that local campaign events failed to be
well-planned affairs. This failure to attract a large number of participants was especially
true in Verdun; this absence of attendees was doubly painful for the party as the Verdun
constituency held the greatest degree of promise for an electoral breakthrough in Québec.
Indifferent organization and insufficient literature were joined by financial constraints to
help delay CCF electoral efforts in the largely French-speaking province. Sauvé
highlighted the party’s financial difficulties, stating, “It looks as though it is going to be a
tight squeeze for funds, so, if it is not too late, the Finance Committee has decided to do
without the recordings of Woodworth’s speeches.”145 He also identified one element of
CCF patronage, the Jewish community. Sauvé remarked, “Our Jewish friends have not
bestirred themselves to any great extent on our behalf so I am getting after Mike
Rubenstein as President of the Cartier CCF Club to call a meeting and have them
organize a finance committee to raise funds among the Jewish people and trade
unions.”146
There are no records to indicate whether Rubenstein was successful in rallying the
sizeable Montreal Jewish community to financially support the CCF in the 1940 election.
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The indication that he was scuffling for election funding two weeks before voting day,
however, provides additional proof that the Québec CCF was wholly unprepared for this
federal campaign. Indeed, the sad reality for the CCF in Québec was that the party had
been plagued by a decade of economic catastrophe, oppressive provincial governance,
and now an unpopular global conflict; consequently, the party had failed to make any
significant inroads in the province. Lewis remained optimistic that a breakthrough would
present itself eventually. However, the break the CCF so desperately needed would not
emerge until the early months of 1942.

The 1940 Federal Election Campaign in Ontario
Despite the fact that the opposition parties knew that a federal election was
constitutionally mandated to take place by the fall of 1940, the election announcement
caught them off guard. Indeed, even Prime Minister King was unsure of the optimum
time to call an election. The uncertainty of whether or not to call an election was
eradicated when reports were made public by Ontario Premier Hepburn, which deplored
the federal government’s war efforts to date.147 Seizing on Hepburn’s criticism, King
dissolved Parliament and a new election was called. As he had done so often throughout
his career, King correctly assessed the sentiment of the Canadian public. He was certain
that the Conservative’s call for total war would not sit well with Canadians, and neither
would the CCF’s lukewarm approach to the conflict.148
A Liberal campaign memorandum stated that, “Liberals should blow both hot and
cold on the subject of preparedness for war” and that the party should maintain its middle
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ground of a moderate war effort without conscription.149 Indeed, the execution of the war
was the main topic along the campaign trail. The underlying argument of the Liberal
Party was that they, alone, possessed the dignity and calmness necessary to carry out this
grim war business.150 As a secondary issue, the King government campaigned on its
peacetime measures and general policies for economic and social improvement.151 The
Conservative Party was determined to fight the election on a campaign of “total war” and
forming a coalition government that would make use of the “best brains” in Canada’s
largest political parties.152 Granatstein argued that this strategy was “foolish” because it
undoubtedly stirred memories of 1917, conscription, and the union government.153
Morton concurred with Granatstein’s assessment, adding that Conservative leader R.B.
Manion’s national government proposal and whole-hearted commitment to the warchilled voters in Québec and aroused little enthusiasm in the rest of Canada.154 The
Liberals were confident of a resounding victory on Election Day. Their main concern was
what would happen if the war in Europe took a sudden and catastrophic turn for the
worse.155 The 1940 CCF federal election campaign in Québec, as noted earlier, was beset
with serious organizational issues. These problems paved the way for diminished
expectations for the party in Québec.
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In neighboring Ontario, electoral prospects were only marginally improved. Lewis
reported to Scott that the CCF campaign in the country was proceeding nicely. He
remarked that “Expectations in Ontario were less optimistic.”156 He added, “The Ontario
situation is both disappointing and encouraging. Disappointing, because we have only
half the number of candidates we had in 1935.”157 Lewis blamed this situation on the
Ontario CCF’s inability to quickly nominate candidates in ridings which might prove
difficult to win.158 While Lewis felt that the CCF was caught off guard by Mackenzie
King’s election call, it should not have been surprised; the party had spent the entirety of
1939 preparing for a federal election. The claim that the CCF was surprised by King’s
election call is incongruous with party activity in the previous year. Still, Lewis told Scott
the CCF had a good chance to emerge victorious in a handful of Ontario
constituencies.159 Lewis did not identify the ridings where the CCF might emerge
triumphant in Ontario, but he did make it clear that his district was not one of them. He
remarked, “Unfortunately, my own [riding] comes in third or fourth on that list mainly
because of the difficulty in organizing it. However, barring accidents, we should poll a
very impressive vote.”160
Once again, we see the specter of insufficient CCF organization rear its head.
Moreover, the Lewis campaign was hampered by a lack of financial resources. Scott had
sent Lewis $600 in early February, which the CCF national secretary directed to National
Office uses. Now, with election-day less than two weeks away, Lewis made a personal
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appeal to Scott. Scott responded by immediately forwarding Lewis a check for $290 to
keep the campaign financially solvent.161 It is unclear if the funds were from a national
account, or if it was Scott’s own money. Regardless, Scott made certain that Lewis was
given every opportunity to make good a showing in York West. Lewis was thankful for
the cash infusion, which he said “will keep us going nicely.”162 Perhaps the money did
keep the campaign functioning; it does not appear it altered the results for the CCF in the
constituency. While Lewis admitted his candidacy was a long-shot, he added it would
poll an impressive vote tally. It did not. In the 1935 federal election, the CCF garnered
just shy of twenty percent of the vote in the York West riding. Unheralded Frederick
Fish, an engineer by trade, carried the CCF banner and finished 3,000 votes behind the
victorious Liberal candidate (J.E.L. Streight) and the Conservative runner-up (Peter
Brown).163 Lewis and the CCF came nowhere near those results in 1940.
In a close race, the Conservative Party re-captured the riding from the Liberal Party,
with candidates Rodney Adamson and Chris Bennett each polling more than 12,000
votes.164 Lewis garnered less than 4,000 votes, which was a net loss of 1,300 votes from
the 1935 election for the party in York West. In terms of percentage, the CCF share of the
vote in the district dropped seven percentage points, to thirteen.165
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This was an underwhelming tally for the CCF and an embarrassment that the
national secretary was so soundly defeated. Unfortunately for Lewis and the party, the
results across the country were equally dismal, especially the final totals from Ontario
and Québec.

A Party Going Nowhere—The 1940 Federal Election Results for the CCF
The 1940 election was another disappointment for the CCF. Once more, the CCF
emerged as a “fringe” party. It elected just eight members to the House of Commons (out
of 245 ridings). This represented a gain of one seat from the 1935 election. As had been
the case in that previous campaign, the CCF won seven seats in the Prairie Provinces.
The lone bright spot for the party had been in capturing its first seat East of Manitoba—
when Claire Gillis emerged victorious in the Nova Scotia riding of Cape Breton. Once
more, the party had been blanked in the populous provinces of Ontario and Québec. The
CCF garnered less than four percent of the vote in Ontario, significantly lower than the
eight percent the party had captured in the 1935 federal election.166 In Québec, the
party’s performance was weaker still, garnering under one percent of the vote. This figure
was nearly identical to the tally for the CCF in 1935.167
Why was the CCF message not finding favor with Canadian voters? Was it the
party’s war stance, or a natural tendency for people to “unite” behind the government
during war time? Were Canadians nervous about the CCF’s economic plans? Sociologist
Seymour Martin Lipset opined that voters tended to become more averse to “radical”
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solutions during periods of economic turmoil. He explained that poor, socially outcast
groups, when they were seriously affected by economic reverses, were likely to be
politically apathetic, rather than rebellious.168 Furthermore, Lipset noted that less
prosperous farmers in Saskatchewan began to support the CCF only after the depression
had ended and economic conditions had improved.169
Gerald Caplan answered each of the above questions with a resounding, “Yes!” He
argued that voters were reluctant to change government in wartime and the efficient
administration of the war was the overriding concern of the electorate.170 Caplan added
that the Liberal government benefited from a return to economic prosperity and rising
incomes, while unemployment levels swiftly shrank.171 Regarding the social issues
brought forth by the CCF and other parties, Caplan maintained that voters had little
interest in issues of this matter.172
Other questions regarding the CCF lingered. Why had the party remained on the
political periphery east of Manitoba? Why had they failed to make inroads with workingclass citizens? Finally, was the CCF viewed as still fighting the Great Depression even
though the economy had, largely, improved with the commencement of the Second
World War? If nothing else, the election results gave the CCF leadership plenty of
questions to answer and solve. In the absence of a solution the party risked withering
away.

168. Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in
Saskatchewan – A Study in Political Sociology, third edition (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1967) 166.
169. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, third edition, 167.
170. Gerald Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 85.
171. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 85.
172. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 85.
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1940 Election Aftermath—Flirting with the Enemy
While CCF results in the 1940 federal election were stagnant—rising to eight seats in
the House of Commons, from 1935’s seven seats—the tally was a devastating one for
supporters of Social Credit. That party lost more than one-half of the seventeen seats they
had captured in the 1935 campaign and, after the election, was located behind the CCF in
Parliament, with just seven seats. Social Credit shared many characteristics with the CCF.
It was an off-shoot of the Progressive Party of the early 1920s and had roots with the
agrarian radicalism during the early Depression years.173 Both the CCF and Social Credit
represented a rejection of the traditional Conservative and Liberal groups and their
attempts to manage the economic crisis. Where the two upstart parties disagreed was the
solution to the Great Depression. Social Credit prepared to repair and modify the free
enterprise system; the CCF proposed to substitute a better system.174
In summer 1940, Saskatchewan CCF Member of Parliament, Tommy Douglas,
stated that Social Credit Members of Parliament had approached him with the idea of
cooperating with the CCF for parliamentary work purposes.175 Angus MacInnis, CCF MP
from British Columbia, reminded his CCF colleagues that “The upcoming CCF
convention would have to decide on any cooperation outside the House.”176 The CCF

173. Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-1961 (Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1969), 13.
174. Young, The Anatomy of a Party, 36. Initially, Social Credit was the more electorally
successful group. Winning more seats in the 1935 federal election and winning government in Alberta in
1936. The party held office in the province for thirty-five years. The CCF won its first government in
neighboring Saskatchewan in 1944. That government had a twenty-year run.
175. CCF Caucus Meeting Notes, Ottawa, November 27, 1940, CCF Papers – David Lewis
papers, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 110, File 5, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 48.
176. CCF Caucus Meeting Notes, 48.
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caucus believed it would be “well to have an informal discussion between the CCF and
Social Credit parliamentary groups before parliament prorogued.”177
There is no evidence that the two parties ever worked together, even on an informal
basis. Still, this suggestion is mildly important because it indicated that due to its failure
to gain ground with Canadian voters in the recent election, the CCF was open to informal
cooperation within the House of Commons with Social Credit. During the United Front
era of the late 1930s there had been some discussion of cooperation between the
progressive parties. The national CCF leadership quickly dismissed such an alliance.
Lewis remarked, “A fusion of the CCF, Communists, and Social Crediters, would create
confusion for voters—and undermine the CCF’s socialist objective.”178 Aside from
having their respective electoral base in the Prairie and Western provinces, and mutual
disdain for the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties, programmatically the CCF
and Social Credit had little in common.

1940 Post-Election Analysis in Ontario
While the National CCF leadership was considering what to do after the March 26,
1940 election, their counterparts at the Ontario CCF were examining what went right for
the party, as well as those actions that fell flat for the CCF in the province. On balance,
the report produced by several members of the Ontario CCF Provincial Council was
severely critical. Comprised of Ted Jolliffe (Vice-President of the Ontario CCF), Charlie

177. CCF Caucus Meeting Notes, 48. Social Credit already had a history of collaborating with
other parties. Indeed, during the 1940 federal election, the party had aligned itself with Herridge’s New
Democracy Party. Herridge’s party captured ten seats in Alberta while Social Credit lost five MP’s from
that province and two more from Saskatchewan. Thus, the attempt to ally Social Credit to a broader
political movement failed. See Alvin Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1989), 65-66.
177. Young, The Anatomy of a Party, 267.
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Millard (President of the Ontario CCF), Frank Madill (Ontario CCF Treasurer), Ernie
Leavens (Secretary of the Ontario CCF), Andrew Brewin (member of the Executive on
the Ontario CCF Provincial Council), and National CCF Secretary David Lewis, this
group represented some of the finest minds of the democratic-socialist movement in
Canada.179 The report started by noting “There is something to be proud of; there is much
of which we can only speak of with shame and sorrow.”180 Next, the committee
conducted a broad analysis of how the party performed during the 1940 federal
campaign. Surprisingly, considering the downbeat tone of the opening paragraphs, the
Ontario Election Committee was buoyant about the results garnered by the CCF. The
report stated “On the national scale, the CCF made what can only be described as a
remarkable showing for a war-time election.”181 The Election Committee boasted
“Ninety-five candidates polled almost nine percent of the total vote, or approximately 23
percent of the total vote in their 95 constituencies.”182 The Election Committee added
“By the same reasoning, each of our members represents 50,000 Canadian voters, while
each Liberal member represents only 13,000.”183
Next, the Election Committee took note of the fact that “We were the only
opposition party that elected its leader and the only opposition party to score a net gain
over the 1935 results.”184 The Elections Committee added, “This was accomplished in
spite of the fact that we had not sufficient candidates for power, in spite of a war situation

179. Report of the 1940 Election Committee, CCF Papers – Ontario Provincial Committees, 1940,
MG 28, IV-1, Volume 59, File 4, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
180. Report, 1.
181. Report, 1.
182. Report, 1.
183. Report, 1.
184. Report, 1. The Conservative Party opposition held at thirty-nine seats, while the CCF was
victorious in just one additional riding from the previous campaign.
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which presented the Liberals with some unexpected support and which was certainly
more advantageous to the Conservatives than to ourselves—and in spite of heavy losses
in the province of Ontario.”185 The committee reached the conclusion that the CCF was
hamstrung by the reality of contesting an election during a war, and by the first-past-thepost electoral system of Canada’s parliamentary democracy. In reviewing the political
landscape, the Election Committee remarked, “In B.C. [British Columbia], we lost a
valued member but our total vote was up by nearly 7,000.”186 The picture was even rosier
in Saskatchewan. The Election Committee noted “We just missed making a sweep; our
total jumped from 73,000 to 106,000—an increase of almost 50 percent.”187 The
committee also noted that the party had held its own in Alberta, Manitoba and Québec.188
In addition, there was the pleasant news from the Maritimes, where the party gained
nearly 30,000 new votes and elected one member to the House of Commons.189
The real problem spot for the CCF in 1940, according to the Election Committee,
was Ontario. With the CCF contesting less than half as many ridings in Canada’s most

185. Report, 1.
186. Report, 1.
187. Report, 1. This is further evidence of the CCF’s strength in BC and especially in
Saskatchewan during the party’s early years. Indeed, even as of 2019 the strongest links for the CCF’s
successor, the NDP, come from those two provinces (and to a lesser degree, Manitoba).
188. Report, 1. The Québec tally was still quite weak for the CCF, nudging from 0.6 percent in
1935 to 0.7 percent in 1940.
189. Report, 1. The election of Clarence Gillis from Cape Breton was a breakthrough for the CCF.
To that point, the party had fared as poorly in the Maritimes as they had in Québec. Gillis was able to hold
the seat for the party until the 1957 Progressive Conservative minority victory. Gillis ran again in the 1958
campaign and was again defeated during the Diefenbaker landslide. Unfortunately, for the CCF, the party
could not make inroads within Nova Scotia or the other Maritime provinces throughout the life of the
movement. Indeed, Gillis’s defeat in 1957 was described in the Cape Breton Post as the end of the CCF.
See G. Gerald Harrop, Clarie: Clarence Gillis, M.P. 1940-1957: A Political Memoir from the Coal Mines
of Cape Breton to the Floor of the House of Commons (Hantsport, Nova Scotia: Lancelot Press, 1987), 5861.
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populous province as it had in 1935, it came as no surprise that the party’s Ontario vote
fell more than fifty percent.190
The Elections Committee did not mask these poor results and sought an immediate
remedy. They stated, “It is our first duty to discover why this happened in Ontario while
the CCF in other provinces held their ground or made great advances.”191 The Election
Committee made note of two areas where the Ontario CCF deserved credit. The first was
an organizational drive in 1939 that re-kindled interest in the party.192 The second was
“a spirit of unity and harmony among our clubs and membership. The controversial
questions of former years have passed into history.”193 While the committee did not
specify what those “controversial questions” were, they were likely referring to the
divisive debate about the party’s position on Canada’s scope and participation in World
War II and the class-divisions that had marked the early years of the CCF in Ontario. The
war was in a “quiet” phase during the first three months of 1940 due to a lack of fighting
in Europe and belief that the belligerents were seeking to deal themselves out of the
conflict.194 This break in the action allowed the party and CCF candidates to focus on
other policies. Indeed, the Elections Committee believed the party was more successful in
educating the Canadian public on CCF social and economic policies than they ever had
been.195

190. Report, 1.
191. Report, 1. Aside from the Gillis triumph in Nova Scotia, it would be more accurate to state
the CCF stagnated throughout much of Canada in the 1940 federal election results. Still, there can be no
discounting how serious the decline was in Ontario. Clearly, the CCF leadership understood it was
imperative for the party to become a major political force in the largest province (in terms of population) if
the CCF hoped to escape third-party status.
192. Report, 1.
193. Report, 1. The question of Canada’s participation in World War II is discussed in the “CCF
and the Question of War” chapter.
194. Report, 1.
195. Report, 1.
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What Went Wrong?
Next, the Election Committee examined the thorny question of what went wrong in
Ontario. As one might expect, that list was quite lengthy. The first problem the Election
Committee noted was a lack of candidates for the CCF in the province. The committee
declared, “It was a bad thing that we did not have more than twenty-four candidates. This
difference from the election previous meant that we had a total of ninety-six candidates
instead of one hundred thirty-two.”196 This dearth of candidates “not only did great harm
in Ontario, but to the entire movement across the Dominion. We are informed, on the best
authority, that it was a discouraging factor in the West where our prospects were so
bright.”197 The Elections Committee stated, “It was certainly a discouraging factor in
Ontario. All of us received from many sources, protests that there was no CCF candidate
in the locality to vote for.”198 The committee lamented, “That is not the way to win their
support, or even to keep their support.”199 In this instance, the Elections Committee found
fault with those who had been active for the party in Ontario. They determined that the
responsibility in nominating too few candidates “falls on those who are active or who
have been active in the CCF.”200
While blame for the poor results was widespread, one group was declared to be
above reproach: the people writing that report. Indeed, the Elections Committee stated
“In some quarters we did not receive the cooperation we were entitled to expect. We did

196. Report, 1. By nominating only ninety-six candidates in 245 ridings, the CCF, mathematically
and virtually, ensured it could not win government. Even a minority victory would have been a remote
possibility had the party won every single constituency it contested, which it most certainly did not come
close to attaining.
197. Report, 1.
198. Report, 1.
199. Report, 1.
200. Report, 1.
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not get it from all members of the Provincial Council.”201 The Election Committee further
cited the Ontario Provincial Council for creating an atmosphere of defeatism that proved
to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.202 In the Election Committee’s view, such a negative
attitude naturally produced poor results.203 Leo Zakuta wrote the Ontario CCF was “more
unpopular than ever, had a shrinking public following and membership, allies were few,
and internal strife remained abundant.”204 He added the movement resembled the classic
radical sect where members only speak to each other.205
Poor organization, long a weakness for the CCF in Québec, was also evident in
neighboring Ontario, according to the Election Committee report. The committee noted
that “Priceless records of the work done in previous elections were lost; former workers
were not brought back to work; time was spent organizing or re-organizing clubs; and
responsible positions had to be filled with inexperienced people.”206 Further, the
committee explained how the province was primed for the democratic-socialism that the
CCF promoted. It noted, “We have more industrial workers and miners than any other
province; we are at the heart and centre of both agriculture and labour.”207 The Elections
Committee continued “We must not allow Ontario to go by default; and in the future, if
we want different results, we shall have to produce a different performance.”208 The
Elections Committee also mentioned two other issues that hampered the Ontario branch

201. Report, 1.
202. Report, 1.
203. Report, 2-3.
204. Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF (Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1964), 57.
205. Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, 57.
206. Report of the 1940 Elections Committee, CCF Papers – Ontario Provincial Committees,
1940, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 59, File 4, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 2-3.
207. Report, 2-3.
208. Report, 2-3.
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in the 1940 campaign. The first was that the practice of selecting candidates too close to
election day was a serious hindrance for the party. The committee was critical of the fact
that a number of Ontario CCF candidates were not announced until the final month of the
campaign.209 The second issue was the problem of finances. The Election Committee
remarked that constituencies waited too late to financially prepare for the election. This
failure meant that candidates lacked adequate resources for publicity, organization, and
meeting constituents.210
Without question, this Ontario group felt its section of the party had let the entire
CCF down, and recognized that it needed to produce more robust results in Ontario for
the party to escape its regional party status and become a truly national movement. To
meet this objective, the Election Committee set out specific numeric targets for the
Ontario CCF. The committee stated the Ontario CCF should have at least seventy
candidates in the next provincial election. In addition, the committee wanted to make
certain the party did not wait too long to nominate candidates and suggested the party
move to have a majority of them declared by the end of 1940.211 The committee also
produced concrete nomination goals. They asserted “The next federal election should be
fought with at least seventy-five candidates in Ontario.”212 In addition, the report wanted

209. Report, 3.
210. Report, 3.
211. Report, 3. The most recent Ontario election had been in 1937 and produced a solid Liberal
Party majority government for Mitchell Hepburn. At the time, three years into his mandate, it would be
expected that Hepburn would call an election for some time in 1941, possibly 1942, which would be the
end of his five years as was the rule for Parliamentary democratic practices. However, the governing
Liberal Party in Ontario and the Conservative opposition had supported the motion of extending the
Legislature’s term for one year – using the war as an excuse - and held off calling an election until 1943,
well into the sixth year of its mandate. See Neil McKenty, Mitch Hepburn (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1967), 242. Still, in late 1940 when this report was issued it was well within reason and common
practice to expect an Ontario provincial election in the near future. The call to ready the Ontario CCF to
contest seventy of the ninety seats in the provincial assembly for an imminent election was sound.
212. Report, 3. At that time, the Province of Ontario was allotted eighty-two seats in Canada’s
House of Commons.

170

to make certain there was no repeat of the 1940 Ontario practice of nominating
candidates in the final months before an election. It recommended that “Prospective
candidates should be chosen as soon as possible and expected to give a great deal of time
building their organization and meeting their constituents.”213 From an administrative
perspective, the Election Committee also recommended that the Ontario CCF Provincial
Council and its committees should prepare financial and organizational efforts far in
advance of the next election.214
Unfortunately, the remainder of the report is missing from the files. Nonetheless,
from the surviving material, it is unequivocal that the Ontario CCF was embarrassed by
the effort it put forth in the 1940 federal election. It recognized its deficiencies and began
plotting a strategy to make amends for this poor showing at subsequent provincial and
federal elections. Caplan concurs with much of the Election Committee’s findings. He
remarked that the King victory was the result of a very real reluctance of voters to change
government during wartime. Furthermore, prosperity was returning, incomes were rising,
and unemployment declining.215 Still, he had several critiques of the Ontario branch of
the party. He noted that by 1939, the number of “true believers” in the inevitability of
socialism was shrinking and those that remained were “disillusioned and
unenthusiastic.”216 In addition, Caplan maintained that mediocre leadership brought the

213. Report, 3. With the 1940 federal election recently completed, and with Mackenzie King
enjoying a huge majority victory, it would be difficult to imagine an election taking place much earlier than
1944. As it turned out, King also held off in returning to the voters until June 1945. In this instance, the
CCF scheme to gather as many candidates as quickly as soon as possible reads a bit premature. However,
given the difficulty the party had in recruiting candidates for the 1940 campaign, it is understandable that
they were keen to recruit, locate, and promote candidates.
214. Report, 3-4.
215. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 85.
216. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 84.
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party to a state of lassitude. The CCF in Ontario was virtually comatose.217 The 1940
federal election results were proof positive that the party had become irrelevant, defeatist,
and that socialism in Ontario appeared to be a lost cause.218
There are no records to indicate that the Québec CCF undertook such a thorough
examination of the party’s anemic showing following the 1940 federal campaign. In the
months following the March 1940 federal election, numerous articles were located in the
Canadian Forum. However, the poor performance by the CCF in Québec was not the
subject of any such in-depth analysis. Only David Lewis repeated his lament of
organizational issues in Québec, but that was the lone mention of CCF difficulties in the
province.219 Furthermore, provincial records do not support that the party conducted a
post-election analysis.
What is clear from these immediate electoral contests after the beginning of the
Second World War was that the CCF remained a protest movement based in Western
Canada. Few voters in Ontario and Québec had registered their support for the party of
Canadian democratic socialism. Indeed, with its static vote and fringe status in Ontario
and Québec, it appeared that unless something major occurred, the CCF might well be
confined to the dustbin of Canadian political history. The party faithful would have to
wait a while but something major did occur less than two years later. That event ushered
in a new era in the social, economic, and political landscapes of Canada.

217. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 84.
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CHAPTER V
THE YEAR THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING

It can be argued that 1942 was among the most important twelve months in
Canadian history because it marked the beginning of the modern welfare state in Canada.
This was in large measure due to the war policies of the Liberal government of
Mackenzie King, which were directly influenced by political pressure and increased
popular support for the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation.
Since Confederation, a series of Liberal and Conservative Party governments had
ruled Canada with a distinct aversion to establishing a welfare state in the Dominion.
Indeed, even when the Great Depression ravaged the lives of millions of Canadians, and
their neighbors to the south had implemented a “New Deal” to counter the economic
calamity, federal governments of both major parties steadfastly refused to actively
intervene in establishing a national strategy to combat the economic malaise.1 Neither
would the Liberal or Conservative governments seriously consider using the mechanisms
of the state to construct a minimal welfare state in Canada. As such, the Great Depression
in Canada only came to an end when the Second World War commenced. This strict
adherence to laissez-faire government involvement in society ran counter to the ideals of
the League of Social Reconstruction. The LSR acted as the intellectual mechanism of the

1. James T. Patterson, “Federalism in Crisis: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United
States in the Depression of the 1930’s,” The Great Depression: Essays and Memoirs from Canada and the
United States, compiled by Victor Hoar, (Vancouver, Copp Clark Publishing, 1969), 7-16. Patterson noted
that at the onset of the Depression, Prime Minister King refused to call for relief spending by the
Dominion. King was defeated and replaced by R.B. Bennett, who advocated higher tariffs and balanced
budgets. Only in the dying months of his mandate, did Bennett propose a modest Canadian “New Deal.”
When King was returned to office in 1935, he placed relief before balanced budgets and increased grants to
the provinces. The Canadian Prime Minister was far from magnanimous in these payments. Patterson wrote
that federal money came, “grudgingly and only when the provinces were on the verge of bankruptcy.”
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CCF. During its initial declaration of principles, the LSR provided a detailed outline of
the establishment of the welfare state in Canada.2
Although the Liberals and Conservatives repeatedly stated that there was no
money to help distressed Canadians during the 1930s, when war commenced there were
sufficient financial resources on hand.3 This reality was a common refrain from the CCF
during the early war years. Indeed, the League for Social Reconstruction, which provided
much of the intellectual framework for the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, had
been making the case for an interventionist central government, committed to the
establishment of the welfare state in Canada since 1930.4 The LSR sought to replace
monopoly capitalism with a new economic order that it called both “socialist” and a “cooperative commonwealth.” While the league did not found the CCF, its association with
the party soon became very close.5
By 1942, the party’s argument began to find a ready audience across Canada.
Desmond Morton noted that Canadian unemployment had dropped from 500,000 in
1939, to 200,000 in 1941, and was virtually zero in 1942.6 Thus, the case was being made
that significant government intervention in the economy was a positive development for

2. F. R. Scott, Leonard Marsh, Graham Spry, J. King Gordon, Eugene Forsey, and J. S. Parkinson,
Social Planning for Canada: The Research Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1935), 39.
3. J. L. Granatstein, Mackenzie King his Life and World (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited,
1977), 142-44. For example, Granatstein noted that Great Britain proposed an air training program in the
first months of the war that would take place in Canada. The cost of the project was six hundred million
dollars, of which Canada was expected to contribute between three hundred and fifty million and three
hundred and seventy-five million dollars. Granatstein asked - but did not answer - the question of where
Canada found the money. Ultimately, the war was financed by robust industrial orders, near full
employment, and new taxes and duties. However, none of this was known in the early months of the
conflict. See Granatstein, Mackenzie King his Life and World, 149.
4. Michiel Horn, The League for Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the Democratic
Left in Canada, 1930-1942 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 11.
5.Horn, League, 11.
6. Desmond Morton, Canada and War: A Military and Political History (Toronto: Butterworth
and Company, 1981), 112.
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Canadians. The wily King realized he and his party had previously been on the “wrong”
side of this argument and took tentative steps to take some of the sting out of the CCF
attack. In the summer of 1940, the King government passed the Unemployment Insurance
Bill, an achievement of which the Prime Minister was supremely proud.7 In June of that
year, King had enacted legislation to thwart egregious war profiteering, and the following
year his government announced a sweeping program of wage and price controls.8 The
cautious King was reluctant to push too many changes onto his country and, notably, onto
the more conservative elements of his caucus. He would, however, find the impetus to
make more significant social welfare initiatives as events unfolded throughout the year.
While the Liberals had been re-elected in 1940 and had enjoyed the stability of
having had one leader over these contentious depression and war years, by 1942 the
Conservatives were in trouble. Since the one-term R.B. Bennett government went down
to an inglorious defeat in 1935, the party had struggled to find both a leader and a
message that resonated with Canadian voters. Believing a new leader might help, the
people elected Robert Manion in July 1938. Manion was chosen as Tory leader because
of his charm and the hope that his French-Canadian wife would placate Québec.9
Manion, however, stepped down as party leader in May 1940 after the Tories had
again been routed by the King Liberals. Richard Hanson served as acting Conservative
Party leader while the party scoured about to locate a permanent leader. That search
ended in November 1941, when the Conservatives chose Arthur Meighen to lead the

7. J. L. Granatstein, Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1990), 253-54.
8. Granatstein, Mackenzie King: His Life and World, 148-52.
9. Morton, Canada and War, 106-07. Manion and the Conservatives were severely beaten in the
1940 federal election. The party captured just thirty-nine of the two hundred forty-five seats available. To
add to the Conservative misery, Manion was defeated in his own riding.
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party once again.10 Meighen had been Conservative leader from 1920-1926, and had been
in office as Prime Minister in 1926 when Prime Minister King asked Governor General
Byng to call a new election after the 1925 results produced a minority for the re-elected
Liberal government.11 The governor-general refused and asked Meighen to form a
government. That government soon fell as it could not hold the confidence of Parliament.
In the subsequent election, Canadian voters gave King a majority victory. Now, more
than fifteen years later, the Conservatives were calling on their former leader to lead them
out of the political wilderness. The desperate Conservatives selected Meighen to be party
leader in December of 1941, and the next step was to get him into the House of
Commons in a by-election scheduled for February 1942. That election proved to be a
watershed moment.
The by-election of Joe Noseworthy in York South directly altered Canadian
politics for decades, and indirectly moved Canadian social welfare policies in new

10. Morton, Canada at War, 205-06.
11. Roger Graham, The King-Byng Affair: A Question of Responsible Government (Toronto: Copp
Clark Publishing Company, 1967), 2-5. This episode was a monumental constitutional crisis in Canadian
history. The results of the 1925 federal election produced a minority government. Liberal leader Mackenzie
King’s group had been reduced to one hundred and one seats, while his Conservative counterpart, Arthur
Meighen, led a group of one hundred and sixteen members. Additionally, twenty-four members were
elected from the Progressive Party and two MP’s each from Labour and Independent parties. King
attempted to seek the confidence of the House by gaining the support from most of the Progressives,
Labourites, and Independents. This shaky coalition held until revelations of corruption in the Department of
Customs and Excise was exposed. A parliamentary committee was established and concurred that the
department in question was guilty of corrupt practices. This conclusion was accepted by all parties.
However, a Conservative member of the committee moved an amendment that would specifically condemn
the current government and the Prime Minister. Independent-Labour MP (and future CCF leader) J.S.
Woodsworth moved an amendment which deleted censure of the government and added a condemnation of
other persons on both sides of politics and in the civil service. As this debate raged, some of the
Progressives withdrew their support for the Liberal government. The Prime Minister requested that the
Governor-General, Lord Byng, dissolve Parliament and order a new election. Byng refused and asked
Meighen to form a government. The Conservative leader agreed to do so. Immediately, the Liberal leader
questioned the legality of the Meighen government and a motion to defeat the new government took place
less than a week after it had assumed office. Now it was Meighen’s turn to request dissolution of
Parliament. This time, the Governor General acquiesced to this advice. In the subsequent election, King
was returned to office with a firm majority. In September 1926, an Imperial Conference was held in
London. At that conference, a report defined the position of the Governor-General of a Dominion.
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directions. Both the Conservative and Liberal parties were forced to liberalize their
platforms and to adopt extensive social welfare policies.12 In addition, this by-election
ended the hegemony of the Liberal and Conservative parties in national campaigns and
propelled the CCF into contention as a force with which to be reckoned. In that regard,
this seemingly mundane affair ultimately became one of the most important moments in
Canadian history.

10:22 – Hands in a Straight Line:
Mackenzie King’s View of South York By-Election
The Ontario CCF leadership understood very well just what was at stake in this
by-election. Ted Jolliffe explained, “This contest will decide—in many people’s minds—
whether the CCF is to displace the Tory party as the second major party.”13 Jolliffe
further underscored the importance when he declared, “There is nothing in the whole
country more important to the CCF during the next three weeks than this by-election, and
we should all govern ourselves accordingly.”14 While the by-election was seen by CCF
leaders as pivotal to their movement, other political figures were also heavily invested in
the outcome of this contest.
“Just exactly 10:22 – hands in straight line.”15 With that observation, Prime
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King began his journal entry regarding the coming byelection in the Toronto area riding of South York. As will become evident, the Prime
12. J. L. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election of February 9, 1942: A Turning Point in
Canadian Politics”, Canadian Historical Review 48, No. 2, (June 1967): 158.
13. Letter from Ted Jolliffe to David Lewis, January 18, 1942, CCF Papers – Federal Elections –
Welland by-election 1942, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 54, File 7, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
14. Jolliffe to Lewis, 1. Six weeks after the York South by-election, Jolliffe was selected to
become the first leader of the Ontario provincial CCF.
15. Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, February 2, 1942, William Lyon
Mackenzie King Papers, MG 26 – J13, item 23790, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
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Minister was particularly keen on the results of this by-election. His Liberal Party
decided not to run a candidate against former Prime Minister and current Conservative
Leader Arthur Meighen. The Liberals were not acting out of deference to Meighen; rather
they were intent on seeing him defeated and did not wish to risk that by running a
candidate of their own. King both loathed and feared Meighen, and the Conservative
leader only added to those sentiments by campaigning for conscription of manpower for
overseas service.16 If Meighen was successful in winning a seat in the House of
Commons, he would have a platform to make the case for the formation of a
conscriptionist national government, a platform which could only be disastrous for the
Liberal government.17 This explains the Liberal Party strategy for not contesting this byelection. Despite making it possible for the CCF to upset the former Prime Minister, a
week before election-day polling, King expressed disbelief that such an event was going
to occur. He noted, “From Toronto reports keep coming in from CCF and Liberals that
Meighen will have a hard fight. That they might beat Meighen. This I do not believe at
all.”18 According to King, York South was “a bitter Orange constituency and one
controlled by boss rule. Hepburn’s [Ontario Liberal Premier] machine will be combined
with the Tory machine and will spare neither liquor nor money for bribes of any kind to
ensure Meighen’s return.”19 King had good reason to fret about the election outcome in
York South. Since its formation in 1904, the riding had always elected the Conservative
Party candidate.20 Several days later, King was in a more optimistic frame, declaring the

16. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 142.
17. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 142.
18. Diaries, February 2, 1942, William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, MG 26 – J13, item 23790,
Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
19. Diaries, item 23790 – 23791, 2.
20. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 144.
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Liberals would likely carry Welland and Québec. He insisted, however, that Meighen
would win the Toronto seat.21 Moreover, King was heartened that a prominent provincial
Liberal had defied Ontario Premier Hepburn regarding the by-election in South York.
“The best thing of the day is Harry Nixon coming out strongly against Meighen, saying it
would be a disaster for him to be re-elected.”22
Nixon was a long-standing member of the Ontario legislature and served as
Provincial Secretary in the Hepburn government. A representative of the progressive
wing of the provincial Liberal Party, he had previously clashed with the Premier over
Hepburn’s criticism of Mackenzie King and the federal government’s war conduct.23
With Hepburn supporting Meighen in the York-South by-election, Nixon again spoke
against his party leader by stating, “I believe it would be a national calamity if Arthur
Meighen were returned to public life.”24 King believed that Nixon’s open disagreement
with the premier would “help get out the vote against Meighen in Toronto and should
help in bringing the farmers out in Welland.”25 The next day, King noted, “My final
guess as to the by-elections is that Meighen will be returned, also the two ministers

21. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 144.
22. Diaries, item 23814, 3.
23. John T. Saywell, “Just Call Me Mitch”: The Life of Mitchell F. Hepburn (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1991), 443-45. Indeed, Nixon was so angered at Hepburn’s hatred of King and criticism
of Canada’s war effort that he attempted to resign from Cabinet following the Premier’s harangue in
January 1940. As discussed earlier, Hepburn’s denunciation compelled King to call a snap federal election.
Nixon was coerced into staying with the Liberal government and would replace Hepburn as Liberal leader
in the near future.
24. Saywell, Just Call Me Mitch, 475.
25. Saywell, Just Call Me Mitch, 475. Harry Nixon would go on to become Premier of Ontario
from May 1943-August 1943. Ironically, the CCF, he had supported against Meighen, would come back to
push his Liberal Party to third place in the August 1943 provincial election. Indeed, the Liberal’s would
remain out of power in the province until 1985 when a minority Liberal government led by David Peterson
would vault into power with the assistance of the New Democratic Party (the successor to the CCF).
Nixon’s son, Robert, was the Treasurer in that Liberal government (1985-1990) and would also serve as
Ontario Liberal Provincial Party leader from 1967-1975 and 1990-1991.
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[Mitchell in Welland and St. Laurent in Québec]. It is now about 38 minutes past one—a
straight line.”26
On February 9, election day, King remained unconvinced the CCF would emerge
victorious against Meighen in York South. He declared, “Howe said they were betting
three-to-two against Meighen winning in Toronto. That, I think, is sheer nonsense.”27
Granatstein argued that King underestimated both the CCF and Joseph Noseworthy in
this campaign. He noted that the CCF program of social welfare was becoming more
attractive to Canadian voters.28 With Nosewothy, Granatstein claimed the CCF had the
ideal candidate. Having been a well-known school administrator in the riding,
Noseworthy had run for the seat previously, and lost. Now Noseworthy had a number of
youthful supporters, former students, and many parents ready to work for him.29
That group of voters contrasted with the Committee for Total War that organized
on Meighen’s behalf. More popularly know as the “Toronto 200,” this outfit was headed
by prominent businessmen. Furthermore, lurking in the background was C. George

26. Diaries, item 23817, February 7, 1942, 3. For those unfamiliar with Canada’s longest-serving
Prime Minister, Mackenzie King was a follower of numerology and dabbled in the occult. These
discoveries eluded public knowledge until the publication of his “very double life” biography by C.P.
Stacey in the mid-1970s. Stacey’s work exposed a far different private persona, as demonstrated by King’s
many eccentricities, than the one who ruled Canada for more than two decades.
27. Diaries, item 23825, 2. Howe was C.D. Howe, “Minister of Everything” under both
Mackenzie King and his successor, Louis St. Laurent. In February 1942, Howe was Minister of Munitions
and Supplies as well as Transport Minister. During Howe’s twenty-two year political career, he held the
following portfolios: Minister of Railways, Minister of Munitions, Minister of Transport, Minister of
Defense Production, Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Minister of Marine. An engineer by trade, he
was a colorful character noted for his blunt talk and for his ability to get the job done, even if he stepped on
a considerable number of toes to do so. His biographers noted that Howe “loved the company of the rich
and powerful and tended to accept many of their social views. Time brought out the bully in him and made
it harder for him to rein in his explosive temper.” See Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C.D. Howe:
A Biography (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1979), 354. At the same time, Howe was credited
by Winston Churchill for saving Great Britain from annihilation by Hitler’s military forces and helping to
build Canada’s post-war economy. See Bothwell and Kilbourn, C. D. Howe, 13.
28. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 145.
29. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 145.

180

McCullagh, publisher of the Toronto Globe and Mail.30 As the name of the Committee
for Total War might suggest, the main issue of Meighen’s campaign was the winning of
the war, and for him that meant conscription and National Government.31 The
Conservative leader largely ignored Noseworthy, failed to recognize the CCF campaign
for social welfare issues and indicated no understanding for local concerns.32
In a very real sense, this campaign boiled down to concern with both the war and
the post-war. Meighen was focused on the current conflict, while Noseworthy and the
CCF were working on the present and the future. Still, the CCF needed a little help in this
endeavor and it received assistance from Prime Minister King. King had won a massive
majority in the 1940 election, in large part due to his declaration that he would not
conscript troops into service. Of course, that was in early 1940, before the German
Blitzkrieg and the fall of France. By 1942, there was increasing pressure for King to
maneuver out of his election promise. On January 22, 1942, King announced that his
government would conduct a plebiscite releasing him from his no-conscription pledge.
Granatstein stated that the Prime Minister’s plebiscite had destroyed Meighen’s main
issue.33

Results of the York South By-Election – King’s Impression
King was quite nervous about the by-election results, especially in terms of
keeping his cabinet members (St. Laurent and Mitchell), and making certain that
Meighen failed to add a Conservative seat so that he might champion full conscription in

30. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 145.
31. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 148.
32. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 150.
33. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 152-53.
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the House of Commons. To that end, King fretted about anything that might alter the
desired outcomes for his party and government. The prime minister remarked, “It would
be rather remarkable, if, after the kind of campaign which has taken place, we should
now lose both ministerial by-elections and Meighen win in Toronto. Such a result would
be an appalling blow to Canada’s war effort.”34 As the initial returns came in, they
indicated that Meighen was considerably trailing the CCF candidate. Still, King refused
to relax completely.35
In the end, Noseworthy captured more than 16,000 votes, to less than 12,000 for
the Conservative leader. The CCF had scored a stunning upset and the attractiveness of
social welfare as an election issue had been effectively demonstrated.36 A bitter Meighen
attributed his defeat to the cooperation of the CCF, Liberals and Communist leadership.37
Later that day, King returned to the House of Commons where he was “met at the side
door by members of our party—cheering and shouting and all wishing to shake my hand.
When I went in I was given a tremendous ovation, which kept up for a considerable
time.”38 Without question, the results were rolling just as King had hoped, but doubted.
34. Diaries, February 9, 1942, William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, MG 26 – J13, item 23824 23825, February 9, 1942, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1-2. While there was an undeniable
personal disdain between King and Meighen, it is also true that the Prime Minister believed that Meighen
would prove to be a divisive figure. This was especially true as King was gearing up for a planned
conscription plebiscite scheduled for later that year. Conscription was a polarizing issue during the First
World War; with English Canada overwhelmingly in favor of such a move and French Canadians fervently
opposed to conscripting of troops. King was fully aware of the explosive nature of such a topic; and the
notion of having an unapologetic Meighen demanding all-out conscription would severely divide English
and French Canada once more. King would, ultimately, win this conscription plebiscite, but delay as long
as possible, in implementing it. In this sense, he must be given credit for placating both sides in this chasm
and prevented outright hostility between the two groups. In addition, Meighen was absolutely clear in his
desire to push the King government to “total war.” Indeed, the former Conservative leader had been
publicly calling for conscription in the war effort six months before he was elevated to the party leadership
for a second time. See Granatstein, Canada’s War, 204-06.
35. Diaries, item 23827, 4.
36. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 158.
37. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 157.
38. Diaries, February 9, 1942, William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, MG 26 – J13, item 23827 23828, February 9, 1942, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 4-5.
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As the applause died down, King “looked straight across at the Tories—Hanson,
Diefenbaker, and a few others—as much as to say, “You have now got pretty well what
you deserve.”39 Clearly, the Prime Minister relished the thumping his main political rivals
had absorbed.
The CCF breakthrough did not elicit a similar response from King. He noted,
“When Coldwell [the CCF leader] came into the House, I nodded him congratulations
across the floor. He too looked supremely happy.”40 Indeed, King viewed the CCF
triumph in South York as a personal triumph for both him and his Liberal Party. In his
official remarks, King thanked the electors of York South for “making clear to all Canada
the determination of the people to maintain their rights against high-pressure methods and
high-financed publicity in matters of government.”41 Curiously, King never mentioned
the CCF in his official statement, yet it is evident that he believed the triumph of the
socialist party was also a victory for both him and his Liberal government. It is
interesting that King referred to Meighen’s political defeat as something “we” had
accomplished. Indeed, King can be given credit for acting as the “unseen hand” that
guided the CCF to victory.
While the CCF and its candidate Joseph Noseworthy successfully scored a
dramatic upset victory in the constituency, it did have assistance from the King
government. The Liberals had helped by stepping aside to allow the CCF to take on

39. Diaries, item 23829, 6.
40. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election,” 157. Major James Coldwell was the
parliamentary leader of the CCF at this time. He had been appointed to the position shortly after CCF
leader J.S. Woodsworth suffered a serious stroke just after the March 1940 federal election. Coldwell was
officially elected as the CCF leader at the party’s 1942 convention in Toronto. Coldwell would remain in
that position until 1960, making him the longest-serving CCF/NDP leader in history to date. See Walter
Stewart, M. J.: The Life and Times of M. J. Coldwell (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Company Limited,
2000), 142-46.
41. Diaries, item 23829, 6.
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Meighen without any Liberal candidate in the riding, and by ridding Meighen of his main
objective by committing to a plebiscite on conscription. In addition, Granatstein asserted
that the Liberals aided the CCF by-election effort by providing small financial assistance
to the party and publicly denouncing Meighen.42

CCF/Liberal Détente in South York?
In 1967, David Lewis wrote that he “did not recall any offer of financial
assistance from [Liberal] Senator Norman Lambert…although I do remember strong
statements by him to the effect that he and King and others considered it very important
that Arthur Meighen be defeated.”43 Lewis said, “There is no doubt that this was the
reason why the Liberals did not run a candidate in the by-election.”44 He added, “There
were rumours at the time that Liberals in York South were urged from Ottawa to throw
their support behind Joe Noseworthy.”45 One could question the Liberal rationale for
supporting the CCF. For Lewis, the reasoning was clear: “I never had much doubt that
there was some such support in Noseworthy’s direction, not because of love for the CCF,
but because of King’s psychotic dislike or fear of Meighen.”46 While it remains unclear
just how much the federal Liberal Party affected the York South by-election results, one
thing is certain: the Noseworthy victory over the Conservative Party leader provided the
struggling CCF with a national legitimacy that it previously had not had.

42. J. L. Granatstein, Canada’s War, 220-21.
43. David Lewis to Professor John Wilson, letter, August 2, 1967, CCF Papers – York South
1942, MG 28, IV – 1, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
44. Lewis to Wilson, 1.
45. Lewis to Wilson, 1.
46. Lewis to Wilson, 1.
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In a very short period of time, Prime Minister King came to realize that in
boosting the CCF he had perhaps inadvertently provided the Liberal Party with a new and
growing political rival. Regardless, when King awoke the morning following the four byelections, his first journal entries concerned the defeat of the Conservative leader in York
South the previous night. The prime minister wrote, “Nothing can describe the relief of
the thought of being rid of Meighen, and also the blow dealt Hepburn. Both of them are a
national menace.”47

The CCF, Trade Unions, and That Other Ontario By-Election
While the York South by-election was the most noteworthy one in February 1942,
there were others held on the same date. The Welland riding in Ontario was another
instance of the CCF competing with another political party, which was, this time, the
federal Liberal Party. As had been the case during the Ontario provincial campaign four
years earlier, the CCF and National Secretary David Lewis attempted to balance the need
to strengthen the party while keeping leaders of the trade union movement appeased.
In late December 1941, Lewis received a letter from Joseph Corbett, general
chairman of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America. In this missive, Corbett
made clear his union’s position with regard to CCF participation in the upcoming
Welland by-election; it was most definitely not appreciated. He did not mince words
about CCF intentions to oppose Liberal candidate Humphrey Mitchell in this by-election.

47. Diaries, February 10, 1942, William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, MG 26 – J13, item 23834,
Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1. Mitch Hepburn, Premier of Ontario and the leader of the
provincial Liberal Party, was held in low regard by King. Despite being members of the “same” party (at
least nominally), King and Hepburn had a long-standing mutual disdain; and Hepburn’s open support for
Meighen, King’s federal rival, in the York South by-election, only added to the animosity between the two.
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Corbett wrote, “In my opinion, based on wide experience with the International Trade
Unions and the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, it would simply be suicidal to
make any such attempt.”48 He added, “The CCF would certainly get in wrong with by far
the largest group of organized workers in Canada and unorganized workers in general.”49
Corbett then warned Lewis “Win or lose in the by-election, it would have a very serious
effect on the future of the CCF so I very sincerely urge that no action be taken to oppose
Mr. Mitchell.”50 Corbett stated that Mitchell “is not liked by some CIO and CCL officers,
also that he will be required to fall in line with the Labour policies of the present
government to a considerable extent.”51 Despite these misgivings, Corbett declared, “I am
convinced that he will go to the full extent of his authority to give all organized and
unorganized groups of workers a fair deal.”52
In urging CCF non-participation in the Welland by-election, Corbett explained
that the trade unions were willing to give Mitchell a “fair trial.”53 The message was clear
to Lewis; the CCF should back off in the coming Welland by-election or face the wrath
of trade union leaders. Lewis agreed with Corbett’s assessment on the issue. He
immediately wrote to colleagues with the Ontario CCF Provincial council and urged them
48. Joseph Corbett to David Lewis, letter, December 22, 1941, CCF Papers – Ontario Elections –
Welland by-election 1942, MG 28, IV-1, Volume 57, File 7, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
Humphrey Mitchell was designated to become the Labor Minister in the King government. While
organized labor leaders (Corbett included) had reservations about Mitchell, they, nonetheless, wanted to
clear the path for his election to Canadian Parliament. No doubt, they were presuming that such a move
would help them curry favor within the King government; especially in the realm of labor legislation.
Earlier in his career, Mitchell was elected as an Independent Labour Party Member of Parliament from
Hamilton East and was a member of the “Ginger Group” in Parliament led by J.S. Woodsworth. Never
comfortable in that group, the CCF ran a candidate against Mitchell in Hamilton East during the 1935
election and wound up splitting the labor vote and resulted in the election of a Conservative candidate. By
1942, his trade union background and previous Labor Party experience provided Mitchell with sufficient
credentials to still be considered a “labor man.” See Morton, Canada and War, 123.
49. Corbett to Lewis, 1.
50. Corbett to Lewis, 1.
51. Corbett to Lewis, 1.
52. Corbett to Lewis, 1.
53. Corbett to Lewis, 1.
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to reconsider running a candidate against the Liberal Party Labour Minister. While
acknowledging that the final decision would rest with the CCF Provincial Executive and
the members of the Welland constituency, Lewis wrote, “While they [the trade union
leaders] are very critical of what Mitchell has done at times, they still look upon him as a
labour man and feel he should be given a chance to show what he can do as Minister of
Labour in view of the war situation.”54 The CCF national secretary claimed the rationale
by the trade union leaderships were “the obvious ones: Our opposing Meighen is a
service to the country and would be appreciated us such by every liberal person. But
opposing Mitchell would be resented by most people.”55 Lewis then noted, “His antilabor acts are known to only the few who are intimately acquainted with the trade-unions’
struggles, but by the vast majority of the people, Mitchell would be considered a labor
man in view of his history and they would, therefore, be inclined to regard our contesting
the seat as stubborn partisanship.”56 Lewis informed the Ontario CCF Provincial
members, “Mr. Coldwell [acting CCF national leader] and I are both of the opinion that
in the long run we stand to gain much more by withdrawing even under the
difficulties.”57 Lewis suggested that the party could withdraw from the race with a degree
of dignity by issuing a statement declaring that the CCF strongly disapproved of
Mitchell’s record, but would be willing to give him the benefit of the doubt due to the
war situation.58 Lewis then clearly contrasted the differing CCF rationale in the two byelections. He argued, “In Mitchell’s case, here is a man appointed as a war minister to a

54. Letter from David Lewis to B. E. Leavens and Berti Street, December 22, 1941, Ontario
Elections, Welland by-election, 1942, MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 54, File 7, Library and Archives Canada, 1.
55. Lewis to Leavens and Street, 1-2.
56. Lewis to Leavens and Street, 2.
57. Lewis to Leavens and Street, 2.
58. Lewis to Leavens and Street, 2.
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war government because of his labor connections, who declares his loyalty to labor, to
the need for a new world, and is the best person available under the circumstances.”59
Meighen, on the other hand, was seen by Lewis as someone intimately connected
with the “old world,” thus, Lewis asserted that the difference between the CCF and the
Conservatives were much sharper in South York.60 The national secretary closed his
correspondence by stating, “The opinion expressed here is our [Coldwell’s and Lewis’]
personal one; however, the National Office will support whatever decision is reached.”61
As a matter of note, the local CCF in Welland defied Lewis, Coldwell and the national
office by running a candidate in the by-election. Mark Kriluk ran under the CCF banner,
and made a surprisingly strong showing by polling just under twenty-two percent in a
three-way contest.62 That number must have startled the CCF national office, especially
because the party had garnered less than eight percent just two years previously.63
While the CCF contestation did not cost Mitchell the seat, it certainly made his
margin of victory much thinner than had been expected. Mitchell won the riding with
slightly more than forty-two percent of the tally. Independent candidate J. Douglas Watt
pulled thirty-six percent of the vote, but fell about 1,800 votes shy of upsetting the
Labour Minister.64
Indeed, two important elements were exposed in the Welland results. The first
pointed to the new-found strength of the CCF in Ontario. That Krulik had nearly tripled
CCF support from the previous federal campaign was a harbinger (along with

59. Lewis to Leavens and Street, 2.
60. Lewis to Leavens and Street, 2.
61. Lewis to Leavens and Street, 3.
62. Frank Feigart, Canada Votes, 1935-1988 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), Table
2-56, Federal By-Elections, 1935-1988, 60-61.
63. Frank Feigart, Canada Votes, 60-61.
64. Frank Feigart, Canada Votes, 60-61.
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Noseworthy’s triumph in York South) that the party was finally making inroads in
Ontario. From that day forward, the CCF, and later the NDP, would be significant players
on the political stage in the province. The second element was that the result highlighted
the democratic nature of the CCF. The party’s national office truly did not want to run a
candidate against Mitchell. The decision to do so was made at the local level. Lewis and
the organization held considerable sway across the country, but still, the CCF was at its
core a democratic organization. As was often the case, the well-meaning advice of the
national office was at once rejected and resented at the constituency level.

The Immediate Results of the Noseworthy Triumph in Québec
The CCF Québec Provincial council session of January 20, 1942, was a rather
pedestrian affair. Five people (including the recording secretary) convened to discuss the
matters of the day. Of note, all five members were anglophones. No French Canadians
were present.65 This provided a snapshot of the English, Montreal-centric nature of the
party at that time. The Québec CCF discussed four upcoming provincial by-elections
where, according to Council Chair Dr. J.S. Allen, the party was in “dire need for
organization work in St. Lawrence-St. George and in the Westmount-St. Antoine
constituencies.”66 The lament was a common refrain in the notes of the Québec CCF
during the 1930s and 1940s.
The meeting also included discussion of the federal by-election being held in the
Toronto riding of York South. Dr. Allen reported that “An appeal letter had been sent out

65. Québec Provincial council Meeting notes, January 20, 1942, Québec CCF Papers, Michael
Oliver Papers, MS 396, Box 1, Folder 1A, McGill University Special Collections, 1.
66. Québec Provincial council Meeting notes, January 20, 1942, 3.
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to Trade Unions in the province of Québec on behalf of the Defeat Meighen Fund.”67
Allen noted, “The response, as yet, was small, and the Secretary was authorized to have
500 more letters printed in readiness for further distribution.”68 From Allen’s comments,
two realities emerge. The first is that one gets a sense of how widespread the CCF effort
was to topple the Conservative Party leader in the coming by-election; this was not
simply a “local” campaign as far the CCF hierarchy was concerned. The second is that
one gets a glimpse of the clearly tepid response of Québec trade unions in the effort
against Meighen. Four weeks after this meeting, the Québec CCF Provincial council
convened once again and the proceedings were far more enthusiastic, probably because
the Noseworthy victory over former Prime Minister Arthur Meighen had occurred just
eight days earlier. Attendance at the Provincial council meeting increased from five
members to fourteen, and included one francophone, Joseph Lamoureux, of the French
Organizing Committee.69
While the CCF was still a Montreal-centered, anglophone organization, there was
little question that enthusiasm within Québec CCF ranks was higher than it had been in
the previous month. First on the February meeting agenda was the defeat of Meighen.
Chairman Dr. Allen “reported the response to the provincial council’s appeal on behalf of
the Defeat Meighen Fund had not been large but, nevertheless, its educational value was
important.”70 Allen backed his assertion of tepid trade union support by stating, “The
total collection amounted to approximately $80 dollars and the expenses incurred in

67. Québec Provincial council Meeting notes, January 20, 1942, 1.
68. Québec Provincial council Meeting notes, January 20, 1942, 1.
69. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, Québec CCF Papers, Michael
Oliver Papers, MS 396, Box 1, Folder 1A, McGill University Special Collections, 1.
70. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, 1.
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circularizing trade unions and distributing “The New Commonwealth” was $30.”71 This
was Allen’s polite way of claiming that trade unions in Québec were virtually nonexistent in the provincial CCF effort to bring down Meighen. Council members called on
Professor Frank Scott to furnish details of the situation in South York. Scott remarked
that the campaign’s total expenses would probably amount to less than $4,500.72 In short,
the trade unions of Québec contributed less than two percent of the CCF expenses in this
pivotal by-election for the party.
The next order of business for the provincial council was to get the newest CCF
Member of Parliament in front of people in Québec. After much discussion, the council
decided to arrange two meetings. One would feature speeches by Harold Winch and T. C.
Douglas; the other would showcase J.W. Noseworthy and David Lewis.73 Given the
prominence of the other speakers, it was noteworthy that the Québec CCF “hoped that
Mr. Noseworthy’s meeting be held first.”74 Hoping to strike while the proverbial iron was
hot, the Québec CCF set up arrangements for the speeches to take place on March 9 and
again on March 23 at the Mount Royal Hotel.75

71. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, 1.
72. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, 1.
73. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, 2.
74. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, 1. In February 1942, Winch was
the most successful politician in the CCF’s stable, taking the British Columbia CCF to Official Opposition
status the year previous. Winch was Opposition leader in B.C. from 1941-1953, and on several occasions,
the provincial CCF garnered the most votes in British Columbia elections, only to be foiled from office do
to the vagaries of various electoral systems. Douglas was a twice-elected CCF M.P. who was due to
become the leader of the Saskatchewan CCF. Indeed, two years later, Douglas became the first socialist
government elected in North America. Further, Douglas helped bring about the first single-payer health
care system in his province; this later served as the model for the health care system that Canada is noted
for today. In 2004, eighteen years after his death, Douglas was named “The Greatest Canadian” in a CBC
(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) viewer survey program. Lewis was the heart and soul of the CCF
and, later, the New Democratic Party. That these three party giants would be gently passed over in favor of
Noseworthy is indicative of the “superstar” status his win against former Prime Minister Meighen
immediately placed on the shoulders of this new M.P.
75. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, 1.
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Despite the upbeat tone of the Provincial council meeting, a series of persistent
problems with the Quebec CCF were also addressed. French Organizing Committee Head
Joseph Lamoureux stated that he “[was] anxious to secure lists of prospective contacts in
the Trade Union movement, but due to Mr. Sauvé’s absence from the City, the
information could not be obtained.”76 Dr. Allen assured Lamoureaux that arrangements
would be made to have additional persons carry on active work in this Committee.77 This
called into question the link between the CCF French Organizing Committee and trade
unions in Québec. Allen’s response indicates that more work was needed to bolster ties
between these groups. In addition, this reflected the urgency of the Québec CCF to use
Noseworthy’s celebrity to strengthen the bonds between the party and trade unions in the
province. Moreover, council member R.L. Calder announced the translation of the
French pamphlet was “practically completed.”78 Given the fact the Québec CCF had been
in existence for nearly nine years at this juncture, a “practically complete” French
pamphlet of the party’s policies was a long-overdue and dubious achievement.
The final segment of this council meeting addressed the forthcoming provincial
by-elections. There were four seats being contested, and the Québec CCF was scrambling
to locate a candidate to run in any of the ridings.79 Once again, the party demonstrated its
organizational weaknesses by being unprepared for elections, unable to locate candidates,
and unable to locate the means to support them. This organizational chaos hindered the
Québec branch’s ability to take immediate advantage of the momentum generated from
Noseworthy’s triumph in South York.
76. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, 4.
77. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, 4.
78. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, 4.
79. Québec Provincial council Meeting Notes, February 17, 1942, 5.
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The Death of J.S. Woodsworth
On March 21, 1942, the founder and leader of the CCF, J.S. Woodsworth, passed
away. While still, technically, the leader of the party, in reality Woodsworth had been in
ill-health since suffering a severe stroke in September 1940. From that point forward, M.
J. Coldwell operated as the CCF interim leader in the final eighteen months of
Woodsworth’s life. With Woodsworth’s passing, an outpouring of sadness and praise
emerged across Canada and in the halls of the House of Commons. Chief among those
showering the socialist leader with praise was Prime Minister Mackenzie King. He wrote,
“There was a large number of tributes, all praising Woodsworth’s sincerity and
evidencing the very real regard [in which] he was held.”80 The Prime Minister, no doubt
influenced by the growing public support for the CCF, then stated, “His real purpose
seems to have come out more strongly of late.”81 The Liberal Party leader concluded
somewhat surprisingly, “I should not be surprised to see the party he has founded and has
led some day in office in Canada. It might well be after the next general election.”82 This
pronouncement by King, taking place six weeks after the Noseworthy triumph over
Meighen, was a clear indication of the boost the CCF received from the by-election. It is
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also a sign that King recognized that he had helped to create a new, immediate political
rival to his Liberal Party.

The CCF and the Conscription Plebiscite
During the 1940 election campaign, King assuaged voters in Québec by stating
that there would be no conscription of soldiers into the military. Mindful of the negative
reaction of French Canadians to the use of a draft in the last years of the First World War,
King was hoping to avoid a similar fate for his government and party during this current
global conflict. Unfortunately, by early 1942, even with the recent entries into the war by
the Soviet Union and the United States, Canada was coming under great pressure to
increase its war efforts in terms of military manpower. Granatstein argued that U.S.
involvement in the conflict was a double-edged sword. On one hand, American
participation meant “eventual victory for the Allies.” However, he also noted that due to
the heavy losses suffered by the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Canada faced
growing demands from its Allied partners to expand and re-focus its war effort.83
83. Granatstein, Canada’s War, 211. Ultimately, the participation of the USSR and the US were
deciding factors in achieving military victory for the Allied nations. I am not certain this result was a
foregone conclusion in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor as Granatstein stated. Furthermore, it is
worth mention that the commencement of hostilities between Japan and Canada induced one of the more
dubious moments of Canadian governance; the internment of Japanese Canadians living in British
Columbia (more specifically the evacuation from the defense area, a strip along the coast about 100 miles
wide). Professor F. LaViolette wrote that the decision to remove Japanese Canadians from the coast was
the culmination of a long-standing hatred and suspicion of that group by the remainder of the population in
British Columbia. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, fears were heightened of a Japanese attack on Canada’s
west coast and that Japanese Canadians might be part of this projected military campaign. In addition,
LaViolette stated that the Japanese attack provided groups and individuals with an opportunity to “get rid
of the Japanese” forever. This resulted in a program of complete evacuation, permanent resettlement, and a
confused attempt at repatriation. These operations were carried out by the federal government and roundly
supported by the Canadian public and by most political leaders from British Columbia. See F. LaViolette,
The Canadian Japanese and Word War II (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1948), 3-4. Ken Adachi
confirms much of LaViolette’s findings. He added that the federal government was ambivalent about the
need to evacuate Japanese-Canadians. In the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack, Canadian
government officials had the RCMP arrest about three dozen Japanese Canadians on the grounds they
presented a danger to national security. In addition, Ottawa required Japanese nationals to register with the
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Ever the wily politician, King was in a quandary over how to proceed,
specifically, how to extract himself from the promise he had made just two years
previously to not implement conscription. Granatstein claimed that King was aware that
the conscription issue was a powerful one and the sole question that could destroy King’s
majority and the government with it.84 Ultimately, King and his advisors put the question
to the public in the form of a plebiscite asking the public’s permission to release King
from his election promise. For the Prime Minister, the danger was that he risked
alienating the French-Canadian voters in Québec who had responded so vigorously to the
conscription during World War I, and who were not enthusiastic supporters of the present
conflict. The Conservative Party was overwhelmingly in favor of King’s conscription
notion and generally held the opinion that the Liberal government was not doing enough
to aid the Allied cause.
It is interesting to note the CCF’s response to this important issue. Fresh off its
victory in York-South, the party was gaining interest and public support quite quickly. It
is noteworthy that the party’s somewhat nuanced attitude toward the beginning of the war
won them few converts. Indeed, the CCF was seen by one war commitment group as
Registry of Enemy Aliens (this was also required of German and Italian aliens after the European war
began in 1939). These measures were deemed insufficient by newspaper columnists and politicians at all
levels in British Columbia. After negotiations between the federal and provincial governments a policy was
announced on January 14, 1942 for a partial evacuation of Japanese Canadians residing along Canada’s
west coast. This new policy required all male, Japanese aliens to be removed from the coast by April 1,
1942. That policy was also deemed as inadequate and an assortment of local labor unions, farm groups,
business associations, and other civic organizations urged the complete removal of the Japanese. These
factions were bolstered by municipal politicians from Vancouver and Victoria. Adachi asserts that on
February 26, 1942, the federal government capitulated racist pressure and announced a policy of complete
evacuation of Japanese Canadians from the British Columbia coast. See Ken Adachi, The Enemy That
Never Was: A History of Japanese Canadians (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 199 – 215.
Ultimately, 24,000 Japanese Canadians were relocated, most to the interior region of British Columbia. The
lone political group that opposed these measures was the British Columbia and federal CCF. See
Laviolette, The Canadian Japanese, 13, 96, 110, 190, 282. The Canadian government officially apologized
and announced a $300 million compensation package to the Japanese Canadian community on September
22, 1988. See Brian Mulroney, Memoirs: 1939 – 1993 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 2007), 619.
84. Granatstein, Canada’s War, 207.
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deserving of harsh criticism for its less than all-out support. While the CCF national
executive was unenthusiastically suggesting people vote in favor of the plebiscite, not all
the leading lights of the party were in agreement with this position. A second group
inside the party felt the CCF was offering too much support to the King government and
this threatened the unity of the party.85 Frank Scott declared that support for conscription
would prove “fatal for both Canada and the CCF.”86 No doubt, Scott was seeing the issue
through how it would be perceived and received in Québec. James Naylor remarked that
the policy did little to promote the CCF in Québec, where the war had been seen as a
golden opportunity to finally make inroads.87
During the first two years of the war, the CCF altered its war position to strongly
support the government to do whatever was necessary to achieve victory. This support
came with the caveat that the government should make certain that the conflict meant
sacrifices for everyone, including businesses; the CCF believed that businesses should
not be profiting greatly from the war.88 Desmond Morton asserted that during the debate
on the National Resources Mobilization Act, the CCF wandered between motions to
conscript wealth, and to take advantage of the occasion to appeal to Québec’s anticonscription mood.89
As had been the case before September 1939, the CCF policy toward the
conscription debate was nuanced and threatened to divide the party, especially in Québec.
The conscription division in that province was severe among both the general population

85. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 288. Naylor noted that the CCF executive sided with
the “yes” side in order to press for the conscription of wealth.
86. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 288.
87. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 288.
88. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 287-88.
89. Morton, Canada and War, 118.

196

and within the Québec branch of the CCF. At the February Québec CCF Provincial
council meeting, Scott explained that the CCF National Council would soon meet “to
decide the question [the conscription plebiscite] being held in the near future.”90 The CCF
attempt to finesse a conscription stance that would appease both sides of the conscription
argument was evident from the meeting notes. The group examined the subject of the
plebiscite from various angles and opted to wait until a future meeting to take action.91
While the CCF hoped to stall for time in search of an elusive compromise solution to this
conscription issue, the matter came to a head in a special meeting of the Québec
Provincial council on March 19, 1942. After a lengthy discussion, three main points of
agreement emerged. The first was that the party placed precedence for winning the war
and preserving national unity over all other considerations.92 In this sense, this
declaration reflected the stated objective of Prime Minister King. How such objectives
would be attained given the diametrically opposed opinions on conscription by
anglophones and francophones were not detailed. The second point touched on the lack
of consensus from the Québec council. Instead, the provincial group decided to let the
National Executive make the decision for them.93 Finally, the Québec CCF was anxious
to avoid any split on the conscription issue within the CCF ranks.94 The vote at the end of
the discussion, however, revealed that the Québec branch was already divided. Just two
members of the Provincial council voted in favor of the National Executive issuing a
statement instructing its members to vote “yes,” while six members wanted the National
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Executive to instruct its members to vote “no.” Another nine provincial council members
opted to ask the National Executive to instruct members to leave the vote to their own
judgment.95
While unity of country and party were expressed objectives of the Québec CCF, the
provincial council tally on conscription indicates that consensus on such a sharply
defined topic was virtually impossible. Other internal divisions were evident in the
correspondences flowing from CCF leaders during the run-up to the April 27, 1942,
conscription plebiscite. A fine example of this division was an exchange between the proplebiscite CCF National Secretary Lewis and anti-plebiscite CCF sympathizer Dr.
Gordon Rothney. At the time, Rothney was living in Montreal and teaching history at Sir
George Williams College.96 Rothney was deeply concerned how a national “yes” vote
freeing King from his promise to not implement conscription would be received in
Québec. Lewis responded, “I fully appreciate your difficulties regarding the plebiscite
and your general attitude towards war. I also fully appreciate your, and so did, I think,
most of the National Council, difficulties regarding the French-Canadian problem.”97
From his carefully chosen words, and the implied sentiments of the CCF National
Council, it is apparent that Lewis and the party were attempting to navigate another
compromise on this issue as they had done at the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Lewis
emphasized that the party was only offering advice, not instructions, on how to vote in
the plebiscite. The CCF policy would allow members and supporters to be free to follow
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their own conscience.98 Rothney wrote to Lewis that his group might make a public
statement repudiating the stance taken by the CCF National Council’s qualified support
of the plebiscite. Lewis responded that such a move would be unwise for the party.99
In regard to the “French-Canadian problem,” Lewis explained, “I believe we would
be more correct in the long run point of view to try and influence the French-Canadians
toward a greater appreciation of what is at stake in the war than to pander to their anticonscriptionist prejudices.”100 Lewis stated these French-Canadian prejudices were “in
part due to the reactionary influences in Québec which really do not care very much
about the outcome of the war.”101 Lewis added that if Rothney’s group decided to
publicly reject the CCF National Council on the plebiscite issue, they should emphasize a
declaration of support against the Axis and highlight the group’s determination to assist
in every way toward victory.102 Lewis also suggested that Rothney’s group should
reiterate that the basic policy of the CCF was still conscription of wealth and industry,
and downplay the matter of the plebiscite.103 Lewis's final recommendation was to “avoid
any direct opposition toward the National Council on the plebiscite, but simply point out
that members and supporters of the CCF can feel free to follow their conscience on the
matter.”104
In closing, Lewis stated that he had discussed Rothney’s letter with the National
Council and they were hopeful that Rothney’s group would refrain from publishing their
dissenting view. The CCF leadership was concerned that any discord in the party would
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be used against them in the press.105 Whether or not Rothney followed through, this
exchange highlights several important issues. The first significant consideration is that
the CCF realized the conscription issue was a delicate political subject and attempted to
have a firm position while still allowing supporters to vote against the party’s
recommendations. In this respect, the party was borrowing a page from Mackenzie
King’s playbook with the “soft sell” of support for the plebiscite.
The correspondence between Lewis and Rothney revealed the importance and
influence of Lewis as CCF national secretary. Before Lewis’s appointment to the
position, the CCF really had no organizational center capable of intervening in daily party
matters.106 Lewis’s office was the conduit through which decisions, large and small, were
made and passed on. As a result, nearly every CCF proclamation from 1936-1950 had
Lewis’s mark. Morton wrote that in the CCF the word was “clear it with David.”107
Finally, all of these cited letters pertaining to the conscription debate provide greater
evidence that the CCF was morphing from a movement into a political party. The merits
of this development can be debated, however there is virtually no argument that the CCF
was becoming a more mature political entity.
Regarding the plebiscite, the party leadership at both the federal and Québec
provincial level hoped that the party’s demand of both a conscription of wealth and of
men would be sufficient to separate them from King’s Liberal Party. To help publicize
this important difference between the Liberal Party and the CCF in support of the
plebiscite, a communication was read from the national secretary at the following Québec
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CCF Provincial council meeting.108 Lewis suggested that an advertisement coupon be
inserted in the daily newspapers of Saturday, April 25. The coupon was to be clipped and
forwarded to local members of Parliament, linking the sender’s “yes” vote on the
plebiscite to the CCF demand for conscription of wealth.109 Lewis’s suggestion was
approved by the Provincial council and the advertisement was placed in one English and
two French papers. In addition, the council promoted an idea that party members
circulate a statement on the CCF position of conscription of wealth and industry and have
it signed by as many people as possible to be presented to the Members of Parliament in
various districts.110
The CCF push for the conscription of wealth plank continued well after the results
of the April 27 plebiscite exposed the stark divisions on the subject between French and
English Canadians. Morton wrote that only in non-Anglo-Saxon constituencies was there
much “No” support.111 Outside of Québec, support to release King from his conscription
pledge ranged from sixty-nine percent in New Brunswick, to eighty-three percent in
Prince Edward Island.112 In Québec, the outcome was almost precisely reversed, with
seventy-three percent refusing to release King from his pledge.113 All the parties
scrambled after the vote in an effort to frame the debate in a manner that would present
each party in the best light. The Conservatives wanted conscription of men to begin at
once, while King attempted to buy time from the various factions of his Liberal caucus.
For its part, the CCF hammered home the conscription of wealth issue. At the first
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Québec CCF Provincial council gathering after the plebiscite, the meeting began with the
reading of another letter from Lewis. The national secretary asked that provincial
councils assist in carrying on a “Conscript Resources for Victory” campaign through a
series of public meetings and labor conferences to endorse a draft resolution by the
National Office.114
Scott said such a campaign might prove “detrimental in this province unless the
emphasis was placed strongly on conscription of wealth.”115 After considerable debate,
the Québec CCF Provincial council agreed to formulate a resolution to be sent to the CCF
federal members as indicative of Québec sentiment.116 The Québec CCF then adopted a
resolution that stated the party would not support conscription of men for overseas duty
unless the government had also conscripted wealth.117 Clearly, the Québec CCF was keen
to push the federal branch of the party into a heightened awareness of the view of
possible conscription in Québec, while still being conditionally supportive of the military
aspects of conscription. With this shaded approach, the Québec CCF was hoping to curry
favor in Québec without scuttling the party’s prospects in the rest of Canada. While King
was “borrowing” this CCF policy plank, the notion was a tough sell with the more
conservative elements of his caucus. The CCF stand on conscription was an attempt to
heal the internal rift caused by the qualified support the party gave to the plebiscite the
previous month. It was also a “wedge issue,” where the CCF wanted to separate itself
from the other federal parties. Indeed, the CCF would be criticized by the Conservative
Party and the press for this nuanced, conditional support of conscription of manpower.
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Internally, the Québec CCF effort to educate citizens regarding the mechanics of
conscripting wealth and industry was hampered due to lack of funds.118 This is a classic
and somewhat ironic example of the party inflicting wounds on itself. In this instance, the
Québec CCF Ways and Means Committee could not complete its tasks because it did not
have the ways or means to do so. In response, the Québec Provincial council decided that
a special committee be appointed to arrange a series of meetings in line with the
“Conscript Resources for Victory” campaign letter sent out by Lewis.119 Council notes
indicate that this special committee did follow through on the plans to publicize this
campaign.
At the June Provincial council gathering, Norman Hillyer, chairman of the Special
Committee, reported that “Meetings had been held in Cartier, Maisonneuve-Rosemont
and St. Lawrence-St. George constituencies at which resolutions in support of this policy
were endorsed.”120 Hillyer added, “Further work with Trade Union locals was
planned.”121 This is another piece of evidence that the party was generating more interest
in the trade union groups following Noseworthy’s triumph earlier in the year.

The Liberal Party, the Plebiscite and Québec
The plebiscite issue was also creating havoc for the Prime Minister, as he had
feared. In the first caucus meeting following the February 9 by-elections, King told his
Liberal cabinet the plebiscite “was not conscription or no conscription, but simply a free
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hand.”122 At that gathering, King spoke of the plebiscite situation in Parliament. The
Conservatives had moved an amendment regretting the holding of the plebiscite and
calling for total mobilization, and the CCF moved a sub-amendment calling for the
conscription of wealth. On both of these motions, King advised his caucus to vote against
these amendments.123
Despite his rejection of the CCF motion, the Prime Minister’s diary reflected his
desire to use the CCF position but only if conscription of troops had to be implemented.
King wrote, “If conscription for manpower became necessary for overseas, I would see to
it that it was accompanied by conscription of wealth at the same time; that I did not
propose to see human life conscripted and wealth escape.”124 King explained to his
Liberal Party colleagues, “If a man gave his life, he gave his all; the millionaires would
have to do their share.”125 The Prime Minister, sounding very much like Coldwell, Lewis,
or any other leading CCF figure, stated, “I would advocate conscription of wealth by
taking wealth itself—not having to resort to voluntary drives, which would enable men to
keep their wealth secure by the State.”126 Just two days after the CCF upset victory in the
South York by-election, we see a fine example of Mackenzie King both denouncing and
proposing CCF policy.
Indeed, King was facing attacks from two fronts: the conservative Liberal MPs
who supported conscription, and Québec MPs, who were adamantly opposed. When the
King government tabled its plebiscite bill, eleven Québec MP’s voted against the
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government and their own party. King noted it was, “a pity for the Province of Québec
that all the men who voted in this way were from the one province. It is the first real
break we have had in our ranks since the war started.”127 At this juncture, the Liberal hold
on Québec was loosening, the Conservatives were on the “wrong” side of the
conscription debate as far as French Canadians were concerned and the CCF’s nuanced
position was not finding much traction in that province. In spring 1942, Québec remained
a large political and national unity mystery with the countdown to referendum drawing
closer. King believed that his party was poorly positioned given the recent deaths of two
long-standing Liberal Party stalwarts from the largely French-speaking province.
On November 26, 1941, sixty-five year-old Ernest Lapointe passed away.
Lapointe had been a member of King’s cabinet since 1921, serving as Canada’s Minister
of Justice since 1924. More importantly, Lapointe acted as King’s “Québec lieutenant”
during that entire time period. A week before Lapointe died, King told him that had it not
been for the services of his Québec Lieutenant, King would never have been Prime
Minister.128 These were no hollow words. King was dependent on Québec and he was
repeatedly elected because the province voted as a bloc for him. According to Lita-Rose
Betcherman, King received overwhelming support from the predominantly Frenchspeaking province, even though he understood neither the people nor its language.129 She
added that King was able to preserve national unity and stay in power so long due to
Lapointe’s ability to deliver Québec. French Canadians trusted him more than any federal
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politician.130 The importance of the Québec lieutenant was significant; in Lapointe, King
had an extremely revered figure in the province. With a national referendum set to take
place regarding the highly controversial motion of possible conscription in the early part
of 1942, the King government had lost its most important soldier in terms of “selling”
this unpopular proposal to French Canadians, who were adamantly opposed to any such
action.
In March 1942, King was dealt another personal and political setback in Québec
with the passing of Senator Raoul Dandurand. A lawyer and faculty member at Laval
University, Dandurand, then thirty-seven, was chosen in 1898 by Prime Minister Sir
Wilfrid Laurier to become a member of the Canadian Senate. He spent the next four
decades in Canada’s Upper Chamber and serving as Leader of the Government in the
Canadian Senate when King first won office in 1921. On March 11, 1942, King received
word that Dandurand was quite ill and the Prime Minister immediately went to the
Château Laurier for a final visit.131 Hours later, King received word that Dandurand had
passed away.
King later wrote about the political implications of Dandurand’s passing. “I feel
particularly concerned about the province of Québec. In Lapointe’s and Dandurand’s
passing it has lost two of the best friends—if not the two best friends—next to Laurier,
which the Province had had and this at a time when leadership is more needed than
ever.”132 King added, “It is going to be difficult to find a leader for Québec.”133
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Indeed, the Liberal Party would continue to rely on King’s good, if English, name
in Québec, while the CCF would be labeled an “English party” and never be granted the
same treatment in the province. This is noteworthy because it demonstrates that the
policy of the plebiscite for the Liberal Party and the CCF were virtually the same;
especially after King pronounced his consideration of conscripting wealth, a firmly held
CCF position.

The State of the CCF in Québec in June and September 1942 (Post-Plebiscite)
Despite the “bounce” provided to the CCF after the unexpected victory of Joe
Noseworthy in February 1942, the political terrain continued to prove tricky ground for
the party in Québec. One lengthy correspondence in particular highlighted the problems
for the provincial section of the CCF, especially outside of Montreal. On June 24, 1942,
Douglas Barlow wrote an extensive letter to Lewis that, in part, attempted to explain why
French Canadians outside of the city of Montreal were slow to warm to the party.
Barlow, who, like Lewis, was an Oxford-educated Rhodes Scholar, was working in a
position as general counsel for a Québec City insurance firm.134 Earlier that week,
Barlow had met with Frank Scott and discussed his observations with the president of the
Québec Provincial council. Barlow advised Scott and Lewis that “For now, it is not in the
best interest of the CCF Party or programme to form a group in the Québec City area.”135
Barlow explained, “The party is not yet well enough known here; and in the minds of
Québeckers it has associations with Socialism (as the system so frequently condemned by
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the Church), and with centralization of government at Ottawa (to the loss of Provincial
rights or powers).”136
Barlow urged greater restraint on the part of the party, especially in its dealings
with the Catholic Church. He wrote, “By this, I mean that formal action on the part of
Québec members or sympathizers should be avoided. A little tactful reticence on the part
of the CCF would be appreciated.”137 Without doubt, Barlow was recommending that the
CCF leaders in Ottawa and Montreal tread carefully in francophone Canada and give the
people and the Church a chance to come to terms with what the party had to offer. He
suggested the party focus on educating residents of the Québec City area about the
objectives and policies of the CCF.138 Barlow’s principal mode of educating leading
citizens of the region relied heavily on the involvement of Frank Scott.139 He stated that
this was important because “French Canadians attach much importance to persons
involved and personal acquaintance gives a personal guarantee and dissolves
suspicion.”140 Barlow further explained that Scott was the ideal person for this task as
“He understands Québec and, as author of the article in the Canadian Forum on the
plebiscite in Québec, is persona grata.”141 This statement indicates that Scott was the de
facto leader of the CCF in Québec. Given Scott’s bilingual abilities and his deep
understanding of Québec, a case could be made that the party continually searched for a
French-Canadian “Frank Scott” to make the party acceptable and accessible to
francophone voters in the province. Barlow’s words indicate that there was some positive
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reaction among the Québec population regarding the CCF’s position during this difficult
episode.
In addition to Scott’s participation with developing the party outside of Montreal
Island, Barlow sought to involve National CCF leader M.J. Coldwell. Barlow envisioned
a far different role for Coldwell than for Scott. Barlow stated a private reception for
Coldwell would be helpful “because of the publicity and because of the opportunity of
making personal acquaintance, just as in the case of Frank [Scott].”142 Barlow remarked
that Coldwell’s greatest contribution to the CCF effort in Québec could best be made
from Ottawa. He recommended the party leader make a speech in the House of Commons
that outlined the principles of the CCF and the benefits for the province of Québec.143 To
help, Barlow wanted the party to provide copies of the speech in English and French and
he also urged the party to immediately “broadcast a French version of the speech on the
radio delivered by a prominent French-Canadian member of the party.”144 Barlow was
convinced that such a broadcast by the CCF, on the heels of the vote of the conscription
bill, would win many converts to the party.145
While these words provided the CCF with reasons for optimism, Barlow quickly
tempered those ideas by offering the notion that people in Québec were quite content
with the job done by Prime Minister King.146 He cautioned, “There is a feeling that
Mackenzie King has been acting all along for the good of the ordinary Canadian, that
people will ultimately realize that he did the very best he could in the face of great
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difficulty and very powerful anti-social pressure.”147 Barlow suggested the CCF tread
lightly when attacking King and the Liberals in Parliament. He warned the party against
provoking an election, arguing that the campaign would be a disaster for the CCF in
Québec because the people there just were not yet ready to accept them.148
Barlow then laid out the two main obstacles facing the party in Québec. The first
was that the Québec electorate was “ignorant” of the CCF program, and the second, that
the Québec voters held a natural loyalty to the Liberal party.149 Barlow also made some
interesting observations regarding the growing nationalist movement taking place at that
time. He noted that the Nationalist movement had taken on a racist element, which was of
some concern because “Racial pride is a political force that can be used.”150 This, Barlow
flatly stated, was “morally wrong, but it is justified in the leaders’ minds by the fact that
they have given up hope of understanding between the two races.”151 Barlow also stated
that the CCF tact in dealing with the Nationalist movement in Québec was based on the
“assumed premise that the English members of the party are willing to admit French
Canadians to equal rights as Canadians.”152 That there might be any question of the CCF
accepting French Canadians as equals would be disturbing to the leadership in Ottawa.
However, as we have seen in the dealings with French Canadians, the CCF, particularly
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the Québec branch of the party, experienced moments where French-speaking Canadians
were viewed with suspicion.
The specter of Québec nationalism was not a recent phenomenon, but it had
become an increasingly evident element in political life since the end of the First World
War.153 Michael Oliver asserted that two paradoxical thoughts ran through FrenchCanadian nationalism. He stated that nationalism provided both the avenue of protest for
the disconsolate youth of the province, while also building a quiet road of
traditionalism.154 By the fall of 1939, the most recent strand of French-Canadian
nationalism was driven by the opposition to the war and to conscription, and a desire to
strengthen provincial autonomy.155 The results of the April 1942 plebiscite to free
Mackenzie King from his no-conscription pledge emboldened Québec nationalists to
more formally and forcefully oppose conscription. This is hardly surprising given the vast
disparity in the plebiscite results. Québec had voted overwhelmingly against the
plebiscite, while the measure had been endorsed by a wide margin in the rest of
Canada.156 In the months that followed, the Ligue pour la défense du Canada was
organized by Dr. J.B. Prince and André Laurendeau. The result of these meetings was the
formation of the Bloc populaire canadien in October 1942. The primary objective of the
Bloc was the avoidance of the conscription policy, which seemed imminent.157
Still, Barlow closed with his thoughts on how the CCF could eventually steal the
hearts and votes of French Canadians from the emerging Nationalist groups. He argued
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the Nationalist movement was “economic in origin and that French-Canadians are human
beings with the same hopes, desires and oppressions as their brother Canadians. There is
favorable soil for the growth of the CCF principles.”158 Barlow claimed, “The leaders and
the supporters [of Nationalism] will realize, if the policy is explained to them, that their
real hope lies in a common social programme with English-Canadians, and not in an antiEnglish struggle.”159 Barlow reflected the opinions of other CCF leaders that French
Canadians would eventually place class interests above racial concerns. From that
perspective, the CCF leadership was convinced that economic determinism would win
out and unite English and French-Canadian working people. This line of reasoning
exposed the CCF to charges that the party did not understand that other, non-economic,
issues were of significant importance to the electorate in Québec. Less than six weeks
later, Barlow provided another report to Lewis. In this brief dispatch, Barlow began by
suggesting a resolution for the upcoming CCF national convention. This resolution would
formally confirm the party’s recognition of the equality of French Canadians.160 If the
CCF had failed to make overtures to French Canadians prior to this point, Barlow thought
it was time for it to do so. “The party has many sympathizers in Québec and they are
watching newspaper reports with interest,” Barlow wrote.161
Next, Barlow turned his attention to matters that continued to adversely affect the
CCF in Québec. He explained to Lewis that the CCF in rural Québec remained an
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unknown entity and needed a prominent figure to gain attention for the party. 162 The
ignorance of CCF policies was dwarfed, in Barlow’s opinion, by a more daunting issue:
the Catholic Church. He stressed, “The most important thing in the minds of all
sympathizers is the rapprochement with the Church—a sine qua non.” Barlow stated that
this bridge could be crossed by the CCF if “the party adopts the right procedure.”163 As
discussed earlier, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Québec was uncomfortable with any
socialist party. A modest rapprochement did occur between the Roman Catholic Church
and the CCF the following year. For the most part, the party leadership in Ottawa
attempted what Barlow would consider the correct procedure, however the results were
disappointing to the CCF.
Less than two months later, Scott wrote Lewis an optimistic report regarding CCF
progress and prospects in Québec. Scott expressed that on a recent trip to Québec City he
met with a large number of people who could be persuaded to support the CCF.164 In
Scott’s opinion, only two obstacles stood in the way of the party breaking through with
this new group: “One, the need for a new relationship with the Catholic hierarchy; and
two, the fear that our notions of planning will practically obliterate the provinces and
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hence tend to destroy the base for their cultural autonomy.”165 Scott was confident that
these barriers could be removed. Regarding the antagonism of the Catholic hierarchy
toward the CCF, Scott was confident the party could remove the stigma attached to it
without changing the CCF’s program. He added that the matter would be cleared up
when he and Coldwell met with Archbishop Charbonneau.166 Once that meeting was
scheduled, Scott was firm that “The party shall not go begging, but rather to say that as
we are now making great strides all over the country and are organizing in Québec. We
think his Eminence ought to be informed of the situation, and we trust there will be no
misunderstanding of the character of the CCF movement.”167 Scott expected that the
bishops would be instructed not to take a stand against the CCF. He added, “We don’t
want clerical blessing; merely the cessation of open opposition.”168
Regarding the barrier of the CCF’s centralization policy, Scott stipulated to
Lewis, “We must get some literature on the subject. My pamphlet on Reconstruction and
the B.N.A. [British North America] Act needs to be brought up to date.”169 Scott added
that his written review on the Sirois Report and provincial rights would help assuage the
fears of increased centralization for French Canada.170 Scott also updated Lewis about the
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progress the CCF was making in Québec; especially in the Québec City region. He stated
that Barlow was performing excellent work in the area and that he had surrounded
himself with an impressive group of French Canadians in building the party.171 Scott’s
report from Québec City mirrors the ones written by Barlow to Lewis earlier in the
summer of 1942. Without question, there was new enthusiasm for the CCF in Québec;
the real question was whether the party would be able to bring converts to its cause.
With the federal parties all agreeing on the desirability of conscription there was a
political vacuum in anti-conscription Québec. It was this situation that brought about the
birth of a party that sought to stand up for Québec’s interests. As mentioned earlier, the
Bloc populaire was formed in October 1942 and it operated on both the provincial and
federal levels. From the outset, there were immense differences between the federal and
provincial wings of the Bloc.172 The national leader was Maxime Raymond, an MP from
the Beauharnois riding since 1925. Raymond was a member of the Liberal Party, but left
it when the plebiscite was announced.173 Oliver stated that Raymond held a view of
Québec as a simple, rural society who despised the increasing urbanization and
secularization taking place. His nationalism was thus extremely conservative in nature.174
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This view contrasted with the leader of the provincial Bloc populaire canadien,
André Laurendeau. As Secretary-General of the Bloc populaire canadien, Laurendeau
was given the task of organizing the party’s structure and campaign.175 Early in 1943, he
was named the leader of the provincial Bloc populaire. Laurendeau had studied at the
Université de Montréal and then continued his work in social philosophy at the Sorbonne.
From these experiences, Laurendeau believed that French-Canadian Catholicism and
politics were extremely reactionary and conservative. He returned from Europe
determined that social and economic reforms were necessary to promote FrenchCanadian nationalism.176
It is clear that Raymond and Laurendeau held vastly different views regarding the
role of the state and the way forward for Québec nationalism. When Laurendeau and the
Bloc populaire announced its economic program, they presented a politically inconsistent
list of proposals. Conservative in nature and aimed at the re-establishment of a
hierarchical society, the Bloc’s platform encouraged small and medium-sized private
enterprise, yet also promoted the establishment of rural and urban cooperatives, increased
wages and improved working conditions, and cartel and trust busting.177 In short, the
Bloc populaire presented policies that contained both conservative and progressive
elements.
In his letter to Lewis, Scott warned that the CCF should be careful about being
overly critical of this upstart party. He noted, “These men are all ready to take our
economic [program] in its entirety; hence we must choose our grounds of criticism of

175. Cook and Behiels, Laurendeau, 12.
176. Cook and Behiels, Laurendeau, 8-9.
177. Cook and Behiels, Laurendeau, 13.

216

their movement carefully.”178 Scott recommended, “The best attack is not to call them
Fascist, which none of them feel they are, but to show how their narrow racialism simply
plays into the hands of the trusts by dividing the common people of Canada at a time
when they should unite for emancipation.”179 With the federal Liberals on their heels
after the conscription plebiscite, Scott saw an opportunity for a new political
configuration emerging in Québec. He explained to the CCF secretary, “As I see the
Québec situation, it is a race between the Nationalists and the CCF as to who gets there
first. At the start, the Nationalists will make much headway and things may get
unpleasant. But, I will bank on the common sense of enough Québecers to call a halt to
racialism before it goes too far.”180 The CCF Provincial council leader added, “The CCF
has a great responsibility to show Québec that there is another road for collaboration open
to her, which she will be wise to follow.”181
Scott relayed to Lewis a conversation he had with René Chaloult, one of the
leading nationalist and anti-conscription figures. He stated, “Chaloult is going down a
blind alley at best. In private conversation, however, he is much more reasonable than
you would ever imagine from his speeches.”182 Scott remarked that the anti-conscription
Chaloult actually confided that conscription was the proper course for the government.
His fierce public anti-conscription speeches were made for political reasons.183
Concluding his remarks on the developing political situation in Québec, Scott
said, “We must look below the surface at the stirrings in Québec. The world revolution is
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at last reaching into the backwoods, and it is up to us to understand and direct it.”184 All
of these comments—the interest in the CCF, the possibility of the CCF winning office at
the national level and Mackenzie King’s conversion to the positive attributes of a modern
welfare state for Canada—would have been inconceivable prior to the Noseworthy
victory over Meighen in February. The letters from Barlow and Scott were further
indications of the flurry of activity surrounding the CCF in Québec. The increased
interest in the CCF in Québec was also amply reflected in the meeting notes of the
provincial party’s leadership that summer.
Further evidence of increased labor interest in the Québec CCF came from the
provincial secretary’s report of a recent organizing trip to Sherbrooke. Bill Sauvé
remarked that the trip was an encouraging one. He added that the majority of the
Sherbrooke contingent was trade union leaders who were forming an organizing
committee.185 This development was important for two reasons. It emphasized heightened
interest in the CCF in the province of Québec among the trade unions (particularly among
the labor leadership), and it showed that the reports from Scott and Barlow on the CCF
activity in the Québec City and Sherbrooke regions provided solid proof that the
provincial CCF was finally becoming more than a Montreal-centric group.
This positive news was followed by confounding organizational issues among the
members of the Québec branch, as was often the case. Sauvé reported that, despite the
enthusiasm for the party in Sherbrooke, desperately-needed French literature was in short
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supply.186 To be fair, perhaps this was the result of unexpected demand for French
literature, given the abrupt surge in CCF popularity during 1942. The Québec Provincial
council notes, however, are riddled with references to publishing and French-translation
delays of CCF material. To help alleviate that problem, council member Paul Malles
volunteered to produce a monthly newsletter in both English and French.187
During the summer months, positive indications of a party on the move emerged
from Provincial council notes. Compared to just a mere five council members at the
January 1942 meeting, the attendance for the July gathering was nearly twenty. This was
an outstanding turnout considering the time of the year.188 Still, the make-up of the
Québec CCF remained largely anglophone, with just three francophones among the
nineteen members and invited guests that evening.189 The first item of business was
publicizing the CCF’s stance on the issue of conscription and its attempts to reach out to
the province’s trade unions. Norman Hillyer, chairman of the special committee for the
Conscript Resources for Victory Campaign, requested the provincial council overturn a
previous decision to restrict the distribution of letters to a selected list of trade unions.
After discussion, the provincial council agreed that the letters be sent to all the trade
unions in Québec.190
To make the public more aware of its nuanced plebiscite and conscription
position, the Québec CCF also wanted to make clear the position of the other parties. The
provincial council decided to take immediate steps to distribute French literature and the

186. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 1.
187. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 3.
188. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, Box 1, Folder 1A, Provincial council
Meeting notes, July 22, 1942, 1.
189. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 1.
190. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 1.

219

recent pamphlet “Who Voted for Total War?”191 Provincial records do not indicate how
many pamphlets were requested or sent out. Council notes do indicate that the Québec
CCF was expanding. Council Chair J.S. Allen reported that the room on the opposite side
of the hall was vacant and that it was available for $15 a month. With an eye on
“probable” expansion, the provincial council agreed to rent the additional space.192
Further evidence exists that the Québec CCF was optimistic. To facilitate
expected growth, the council discussed a recommendation from the provincial executive
regarding the reduction of fees during a special membership campaign. To that end, a
motion was passed that reduced the membership fee to one dollar for the remainder of the
year.193 Clearly, the party was proactively seeking to expand its membership base while
the political winds were at its back.
Party expansion was again on the agenda at the following month’s provincial
council meeting. Québec CCF provincial council member Paul Malles drew attention to
“the need of a training speaker to meet the demands of an expanding organization.”194 To
that end, a new committee was established to prepare short speeches on CCF topics and
to design material on how to answer frequently-asked questions about the CCF
program.195 In addition, the council tried to secure a professional public speaking teacher
to help spread the CCF word.196 Significantly, this “special” provincial council meeting
was the second in one week. On August 19, less than one week earlier, the Québec CCF
Council had gathered to consider “organization.” Chief among the weapons in the CCF

191. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 3.
192. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 3.
193. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 3.
194. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, Box 1, Folder 1A, Provincial council
Special Meeting notes, August 25, 1942, 1.
195. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 1.
196. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 1.

220

arsenal was the use of popular CCF members such as Claire Gillis and Joseph
Noseworthy to assist with organizational efforts in the province.197 A clear indication of
the Québec CCF's high regard for Noseworthy can be found in the motion by the
provincial council that “Mr. Noseworthy be invited to spend at least a month in the
Eastern Townships.”198 There are no records to indicate that the newest CCF MP did
spend that amount of time there. However, it was a vivid signal of how much
Noseworthy was in demand following his triumph over Meighen.
While most of the business at these two August meetings suggested the party was
making strides in Québec, there were red flags cautioning that significant challenges
remained. Neither meeting was well-attended, especially in comparison to the meetings
held in June, and July of 1942; both of these August affairs were still overwhelmingly
attended by anglophones. To add to the low attendance, there was still tension between
the provincial CCF Council and the people running the Verdun CCF. Verdun represented
the party’s best opportunity for electoral success. The means to achieve that breakthrough
was cause for near-constant friction between the leadership of the two groups. By 1942
the Québec provincial council had stripped the local CCF of its candidate and reorganized the district. To help with this latest restructuring of the riding, provincial
council Chairman Allen moved that William Gillespie (of the South Shore CCF) and Bill
Dodge be appointed a committee of two with power to proceed as they saw fit to reorganize the Verdun CCF.199
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At the September Provincial council meeting, Acting Secretary of the Québec
CCF Hal Rugge reported that “Contact work was being carried on in Verdun and that an
organizing committee had been arranged for September 22nd.”200 In theory, local ridings
were supposed to function as democratic grass-roots movements for the CCF. In Verdun,
the provincial and federal CCF frequently became involved in the activities at the local
level. Since the Verdun riding had results that were far superior compared to the other
CCF constituencies in the province, the local leadership group did not feel compelled to
automatically accept advice or suggestions from the provincial and federal councils.

The Founding of Make This Your Canada – September 1942
After Scott wrote Lewis about the improving CCF prospects in Québec in early
September 1942, Lewis responded thanking Scott for his optimistic interpretation, and
also suggested a book idea to his colleague. Lewis wrote, “I think I have talked a little to
you about the need for an inexpensive booklet dealing directly with the philosophy and
program of the CCF on a rather broader plain than little pamphlets do.” Lewis then
proposed that a book that was authoritative, comprehensive, and easily read needed to be
written.201 The federal CCF secretary added that the authors of such a book “should
show an imaginative grasp of socialist philosophy, a dynamic awareness of the
revolutionary period we are passing and, above all, a real, almost bubbling enthusiasm for
the great potentiality which our country holds for our people.”202 Lewis believed that
while the CCF program was solid, party efforts to promote its agenda had failed to appeal
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to the Canadian public. To capture the popular imagination, Lewis was convinced that it
was necessary that the author(s) explain CCF policies in an understanding and optimistic
manner. Lewis conceded that he and Scott were the persons best suited for this
formidable task.203 Thus, the groundwork was established for what would become the
CCF’s “bible” during the ensuing years. Make This Your Canada would be used to
explain CCF policies and programs, and also act as a recruitment tool. Conversely, the
book was also used by opponents of the party to scare away potential voters, usually with
creatively edited phrases drawn from the publication. The imperative need for such a
book is further evidence of the rapid growth the CCF was enjoying. The fact that Lewis
had been trying to produce this work but simply could not due to time constraints also
indicates the heavy workload placed on his shoulders. In turn, this provided a powerful
example of the lack of resources funds to hire additional party staff.
Lewis and Scott completed their book in late 1943 and it met with interesting
reviews. Caplan wrote that the book sold an astounding 25,000 copies and outlined an
“irrefutable thesis” that if national planning had brought so much economic prosperity in
wartime, why should it not do the same in peacetime?204 The Ottawa Journal offered a
far different perspective on Make This Your Canada. The editorial review stated that a
planned economy offered only “magical” things that would never work. The paper added
that the CCF program promoted by Lewis and Scott would “level society so that the
intelligent, energetic, and industrious would receive less, and the lazy, the idle, and the
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223

unintelligent would get more.”205 The Globe and Mail was also critical of the book. In an
anti-CCF series written by William S. Gibson, the paper argued that the party’s economic
policies were based on a misunderstanding of basic economic facts, and warned readers
of the CCF’s “dangerous” intentions for the country.206

The CCF in Québec – Fall 1942
As the summer of 1942 wound down, the CCF in Québec was faced with a new,
familiar opponent in the provincial political scene. During the 1930s, the Québec CCF
faced fierce opposition from both the Communist Party and from an earlier version of a
Québec Labor Party. While the competition between the CCF and Communist Party was
intense, relations between the CCF and the Québec Labor Party had been more tolerant.
One example of that cooperation and tolerance is Jean Peron, who acted as a leader for
both parties for a brief period of time during the mid 1930s.207
The difference in late 1942 from earlier was that the CCF now saw itself as a
political force with momentum and believed a breakthrough in Québec was possible,
especially after the Noseworthy win earlier in the year. In late September, Lewis wrote to
Scott that “Our Ottawa papers have carried a short story regarding this projected Québec
Labor Party.”208 He added that the reports indicated this new party planned to operate

205. John Boyko, Into the Hurricane: Attacking Socialism and the CCF (Winnipeg: J. Gordon
Shillingford Publishing, 2006) 46.
206. Boyko, Into the Hurricane, 49. Eugene Forsey, the director of research for the Canadian
Congress of Labour, responded to Gibson pointing out that it was, in fact, Gibson who had difficulties with
basic economic facts.
207. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 96-97.
208. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 104, File 2, F.R. Scott, 1940-1944 (correspondences), letter from
David Lewis to F.R. Scott, September 29, 1942, 2. There was an earlier Labour Party in Québec, le Parti
ouvrier, which operated from 1890 to 1931. The party’s program was reformist in nature. Special emphasis
was on legislation to protect workers from exploitation and to improve the lives of the working class. To
that end, the party promoted compulsory and free education, a ban on child labor, workers’ compensation,
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solely on the provincial level and would not participate in federal politics.209 Lewis
quickly assessed the potential damage such a political organization could cause. He was
concerned that a Québec Labor Party would point out the continued weakness of the CCF
in Québec and that it would fashion a labor party without the socialist connotations
attached to the CCF.210 Lewis realized that if a labor party – one not grounded in
socialism – was developed in Quebec, it would be difficult for the CCF to combat.
However, he contended, there was one major flaw to this argument: this Québec Labor
Party was either controlled by communists, or would be shortly.211 Lewis remarked that
the Québec CCF should move quickly to gain a handle on the situation. To aid in that
task, he provided Scott with a list of labor leaders to contact in Québec.212
This exchange indicates the CCF “solution” to combat other parties on the
political left was to seek out the leadership of the larger unions and to gain their
perspective and reassurances. While this proposed Québec Labor Party never fully
materialized, it sheds light on the continued perceived weakness of the CCF in Québec by
the federal branch of the party. Finally, this correspondence is yet another indication of
the finely tuned political antennae of Lewis, as well as his concern for the well-being of
the party and the Democratic-Socialist movement.

old age pensions, and health insurance. It elected a handful of representatives to the Québec legislature;
enjoying its greatest success in the 1920’s when it elected five representatives to Québec City. Federally,
the party elected one representative, Alphonse Verville, to the House of Commons from the Montreal
riding of Maisonneuve. Verville was the leader of the plumbers’ union local 144 and President of the
Trades and Labor Congress. He was originally elected as a labour candidate in 1906 and won subsequent
elections through to his retirement in 1921. In Ottawa, Verville worked closely with the Liberals who
decided to not run candidates against him in his constituency after his initial victory. See Leo Roback,
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eds. W. J. C. Cherwinski and G. S. Kealey (Kitchener, ON: New Hogtown Press, 1985), 170.
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As Lewis was keeping an eye out for the possibility of a divisive factor in the
form of a “labor” party in Québec, September 1942 also saw Scott return to Montreal and
assume the chair of the Québec CCF provincial council. Again, there was proof that the
party was shedding its Montreal-centric stance. The head of the French organizing
committee, Mr. Langis, reported that his committee was “in favour of issuing a series of
circulars, to be printed monthly if possible,” and suggested that “the first should deal with
the subject of taxation.”213 While the CCF had spent much of the summer months
promoting its conscription of wealth campaign as a means to differentiate itself from the
other major parties, the provincial council agreed with Langis’s request.214
Also under the realm of outreach to francophone voters in Québec, Scott reported
that arrangements had been made in Québec City to have the CCF’s New Policy
Statement from its 1942 National Convention translated into French.215 In addition, Scott
made mention of a letter from national secretary David Lewis requesting a French
speaker to address a meeting in Plantagenet, Ontario on September 27.216 Although
Plantagenet was not within the borders of Québec, it was one of the heavily Frenchspeaking communities of Eastern Ontario.
Another example of Québec CCF activity outside of Montreal came in the form of
a report from Scott on his most recent visit to the Québec City area. In it, Scott stated the
trip was successful and that the party was winning converts in that region.217 During the
council meeting, Scott also warned his colleagues of the growth of Québec nationalism as
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evidenced by the increase in support for the Bloc populaire canadien in the Québec City
area. He added that the Bloc populaire would soon be releasing its policies. Once this
information became public, Scott suggested that the Québec CCF should immediately
respond. On that issue, the Provincial council concurred.218
One additional piece of evidence that the Québec CCF sought to expand beyond
Montreal was the motion to have federal CCF Leader M.J. Coldwell visit the province.
Scott’s suggestion that it would be desirable to have Mr. Coldwell visit Québec City and
other points in the province in the future was supported by council.219 The notes from this
council meeting reinforce the point that Scott was acutely aware of both the party’s weak
presence outside of Montreal and the momentum the party was then enjoying, which
were directly linked to Joe Noseworthy’s upset triumph earlier in the year. Looking to
take advantage of Noseworthy’s popularity, Scott reported that the York South Member
of Parliament would be available before the opening of the parliamentary session. The
council moved and carried a motion that Noseworthy be invited to spend a week in
Montreal.220 Teas, meetings, speeches, and other activities were quickly arranged to take
advantage of the CCF’s newest and most popular parliamentarian.221
The following month, the Québec CCF provincial council meeting continued with
its efforts to connect with francophone voters. At the October 1942 gathering, the council
decided to institute a French training school by the end of the month.222 The council
members agreed that “Mr. Langis [head of the French Organizing Committee] convene
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the committee and the following were suggested to assist in arranging the syllabus:
Messrs. Gagnon, Prezeau, Lamoureaux, Langis, Scott, and Sauvé.”223 This again
demonstrated the growing influence of French Canadians among the upper ranks of the
Québec CCF; moreover, it is a signal that the party was taking concrete steps in order to
pass along its message to French-speaking Canadians.
In another political decision made at this meeting, the council broached how to
respond to the policy pronouncements of the Bloc populaire canadien. The council
decided the CCF should emphasize policy differences between the two parties, rather
than simply attack the Bloc populaire.224
While these discussions point to the maturation of a political movement, there
were also painful reminders of severe issues that plagued the Québec CCF. The first
problem was the party’s financial status. Two separate campaigns seeking funds were
brought before the council. Contributions were sought for the striking Mine and Mill
Union workers in Kirkland Lake, Eastern Ontario, and the second project was the
attribution of funds in support of the Winnipeg North Centre by-election campaign.225 In
both cases, the Québec CCF Council decided to contribute $10 to assist with these out-ofprovince matters. Even in 1942 dollars, this level of support was a mere pittance
compared to the amount of funding actually needed. Despite the modest advances the
party believed it was making, this meek level of assistance indicates that fund raising had
failed to keep pace with expectations.
A second issue involved unstable leadership within the ranks of the Québec CCF.
Provincial Secretary Hal Rugge placed his resignation before the council, stating that he
223. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 2.
224. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 1.
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needed to step down for “business reasons.”226 The council refused to accept Rugge’s
resignation. Instead, it decided to retain Rugge in the position, but moved to seek a
temporary substitute. The council also considered appointing a full-time secretary.227
There was no positive way for the Québec CCF to spin this development. It highlighted
the difficulty the party had in retaining important members. This was doubly true in
Québec, where no CCF leader position existed. Thus, the provincial secretary was the de
facto leader of the party in the province.
The notion of seeking a temporary substitute for this integral responsibility,
especially when the party was attempting to ride the momentum granted to the National
CCF, was redolent with amateurism. No doubt, this contributed to the provincial
council’s refusal of Rugge’s resignation. Still, this refusal indicated that the party was
poorly positioned to identify qualified persons to fill such an important role for the
movement. Rugge, in fact, continued to serve as Québec CCF secretary and attended
council meetings at least into early 1943. CCF Provincial council meeting notes show
that the November session was decidedly light in terms of agenda items. Despite having
twenty-one council members in attendance, of whom nearly forty percent were
francophones, there was not much in the way of substantive issues for the group to
discuss, save for the coming Montreal municipal elections and the appointment of a fulltime organizing secretary. Council member Michael Rubenstein did submit a draft
program for the coming municipal campaign.228 No details of this program were
mentioned in the meeting notes. Given the approaching election season, the lack of
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discussion regarding candidate endorsements seems irregular. Of some import was the
provincial council decision to accept the appointment of G.O. Gagnon as full-time
organizing secretary.229 This decision adds to the evidence that the Québec CCF was
attempting to continue its outreach among the francophone community of the province.
Considering the flurry of activity that had been the hallmark of previous council meetings
since February 1942, this brief and lackluster gathering in November was strikingly
subdued.
The final session for the Québec CCF provincial council, however, was anything
but quiet. The first order of business was to examine the disappointing results of the
municipal election campaign. Council discussion stated that failure was attributed to
lateness in starting organization activity.230 The council moved and carried a motion that
in the next municipal election campaign candidates be nominated by the first of October
(presuming a December election was held in 1944).231 Little evidence suggested the
Québec CCF was caught off guard regarding the timing of the 1942 municipal elections.
Rather, this issue more accurately highlights the party’s organizational and leadership
void.
Another significant topic was debated at this December meeting: how to get the
Roman Catholic Church to alter its socialist CCF stance. Tired of pleading for
acceptance, another option was discussed: public humiliation of the Church. A motion
was presented that issue be taken with leaders of the Roman Catholic Church for their
229. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 1.
230. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, Box 1, Folder 1A, Provincial council
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attitude toward the CCF. Meeting notes state this motion did not meet with general
approval.232 Steps which the provincial executive considered more likely to be effective
to modify or change the existing official stand had already been taken.233 This, no doubt,
was a reference to the work of Murray Ballantyne to set up meetings between Coldwell,
Scott, and the Archbishop of Montreal. These meetings would take place in 1943, but the
anti-clerical element among some CCF leading members would linger and lead to
embarrassing moments for the provincial and federal party.
Still another important discussion topic was the need for tighter bonds between
the party and the trade union movement. Scott pointed out the desirability of
strengthening the CCF labor connection through a more efficient organized CCF-Labour
Committee.234 To assist, the council approved a motion to have the Committee for the
CCF-Labour Political Action be granted direct representation on the Provincial
council.235 This move for representation indicated that the party in Québec felt the time
was ripe to more formally align with labor. CCF leaders thought that it was also more
favorably disposed to consider such a notion, given the momentum the party had gained
throughout the year. Typical of the Québec CCF, this final meeting ended on a low note.
The last item up for discussion was the always unpleasant subject of party finances. Dr.
Allen reported on finances, stating that the provincial council was in arrears by $333.50
on its national quota.236 Despite 1942 having been a relatively robust year for the CCF,
the Québec branch still lagged behind in the important realm of finances.

232. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 2.
233. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 2.
234. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 2.
235. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 2.
236. Québec CCF Papers, Michael Oliver Papers, MS 396, 4.

231

The CCF and the Beveridge Report
As the year drew to a close, governments around the world were contemplating
just what kind of society they wanted to see emerge in the aftermath of the Second World
War. Memories of economic and political chaos following the end of the First World War
were still fresh in the minds of many government leaders. By 1942, Canadian
government officials were already expecting a repetition of events from 1919-1921. That
was a period of great social unrest including the Winnipeg General Strike.237 To make
matters worse, the Great War had not taken place after a decade-long economic
depression, as was the case with this current global conflict.238 With a strong desire to
avoid social, economic, and political chaos this time, eyes turned to Great Britain as the
long-anticipated Beveridge Report was released late in 1942. The CCF in Canada,
particularly its leaders, always closely examined events unfolding in Great Britain.
Certainly, there are many comparisons between the CCF in Canada and the
Labour Party in Britain. Both came from solid, intellectual backgrounds; the Fabians’
role in creating the Labour Party in early Twentieth-century Britain correlates with the
League of Social Reconstruction in helping to give structure and policies for the
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation during the early years of the Great
Depression.239 The Fabian Society was the most obvious model for the LSR. Both groups
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were comprised of highly educated, progressive minds and each rose during economic
depressions in their respective country.240
A number of leading CCF figures had spent considerable time studying in Britain
and brought back information and ideals that helped create and build the CCF. Thus, it
makes sense that the CCF was keen on the release of the Beveridge Report. A result of
the coalition government operating in England, the Beveridge Report highlighted the
failure of the pre-war British state to address the “five evils” of disease, ignorance,
squalor, idleness, and want.241 The recommendations put forth in the report called for an
expansion of national insurance and the creation of the National Health Service. In a very
real sense, Beveridge inaugurated the British welfare state.242 Quite naturally, the CCF
leadership was in ready agreement with many of its proposals.
Lewis highlighted the key components of the Beveridge Report almost
immediately after its release at a speech in Winnipeg. In his address, the CCF secretary
noted both the report’s contributions and its limitations. Lewis wrote that, while speaking
at the Victory Banquet in Winnipeg on December 2, he was quoted by the Winnipeg Free
Press as stating “The one thing the Beveridge Report will not solve are the problems of
peace and trade cycles. The only solution for this lies in the democratic, socialist control
of industry.”243 While Lewis acknowledged that the Winnipeg Tribune and the Winnipeg
Free Press fully reported his speech, he pointed out that those words were not his and
Frank Underhill and Frank Scott in 1931, Underhill asserted the need for a “sort of Fabian group” of
Canadian intellectuals to provide a new political party with a coherent platform.
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241. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 293-94.
242. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 294.
243. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 43, File 1, Ontario General Correspondence, October – December
1942, letter from David Lewis to Mr. R.F. Hardy, December 12, 1942, 1.

233

that they had come directly from the Beveridge Report. Lewis noted, “I quoted from the
Beveridge report itself where it admitted that the plan cannot solve the above problem
which would have to be faced by a post-war government.”244 Lewis went on to “analyze
the capitalist economic system and the inevitability of recurring crises.” He cited
examples from Britain, France and the U.S.A. to show “how the best socialist legislation
is helpless when capitalism breakdown comes.”245 Lewis concluded by claiming, “The
socialist program is the only basic post-war objective which must be won.”246
Lewis’s words are strong reminders that the CCF was, indeed, a socialist party.
Returning to the Beveridge Report, after acknowledging the shortcomings the report
outlined, Lewis also praised the social welfare aspects of the paper. He argued, “I have no
shadow of doubt that while making this analysis, it was also right and proper to express
endorsation of the Social Security Program contained in the Beveridge report. Such a
comprehensive program of social security would be part of a Socialist government’s early
work and is the feature in New Zealand which we have consistently stressed.”247
The CCF had a breakthrough year in 1942. After starting the year on the fringe of
political relevance, the party could rightly claim to be a serious force across much of
Canada by the year’s end. Domestically, opinion polls indicated significant support for
CCF policies. Likewise, on the international front, the Beveridge Report highlighted key
tenets of the CCF platform. The primary objective for the party in the year ahead was to
consolidate and expand upon its new-found gains. The next twelve months would help
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determine whether the sudden popularity of the CCF’s brand of democratic socialism was
a mere fluke, or a harbinger of substantial changes to come in the Canadian political
landscape.
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CHAPTER VI
THE CCF ATTEMPTS TO BUILD ON NEWFOUND MOMENTUM
1942 Synopsis – It Was a Bloody Good Year
Early in 1943, CCF National Secretary David Lewis reported to Frank Underhill
on the progress the party had experienced in the previous year. Underhill and Frank Scott
were the masterminds of the League of Social Reconstruction, which provided the
intellectual framework from which the CCF was founded.1 In early 1943, Underhill, a
university professor who had been involved in a series of controversies while teaching
history at the University of Toronto, was taking a sabbatical leave in New York. From
there, he reported that there was interest in the CCF, which delighted Lewis.2 Regarding
the CCF’s performance in 1942, Lewis informed Underhill, “We now have
representatives in the Provincial Legislatures of Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
Alberta and British Columbia.”3 He further noted that the CCF was the official opposition
in Saskatchewan and British Columbia.4 Lewis then cited the results of the Gallup
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could only do so by voting CCF. See S. M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation in Saskatchewan: A Study in Political Sociology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1950), 160-61.

236

Survey, which indicated CCF support had risen from ten percent in January, to twentythree percent in December.5 Much of these gains were attributed to the party’s strong
Gallup showing in the prairie provinces and British Columbia. Lewis informed Underhill
“In the three Prairie provinces our support according to the Gallup Poll is 36%, as
compared with 33% for the Liberals and 14% for the Conservatives.”6 The polling data
was even more buoyant in the province of British Columbia. There, the Gallup survey
had the party running well ahead of its Liberal and Conservative Party rivals.7
Among all this good news, there was a glaring issue for the CCF. The party still
was not represented in the provincial legislatures of Ontario and Québec. Despite this,
there was little doubt that the party was making progress in Ontario. “The most
remarkable growth has been in the province of Ontario, where we went from four percent
to 27 percent,” Lewis proudly reported.8 With the provincial Liberals and Conservatives
polling in the thirty percent range, the CCF was nearly on equal footing with the two
established parties.9 During 1942, the party had extended its strength beyond western
Canada and the prairies into the industrial heartland of Ontario. The CCF was now
competitive with the Liberals and Conservatives from the Québec border to the West
Coast.
A second poll was conducted by Gallup in late March of 1943, and those results
echoed the previous month’s figures but also forecast a CCF weakness – female voters.10
Party officials drafted a strategy paper on these findings that consistently showed the
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CCF counted far more men than women among its supporters. The officials stated, “The
party had to make better efforts to interest women in our program.”11 Robinson noted that
while CCF press and its advertising occasionally formulated specific appeals for women
voters, the party never followed through with opinion surveys or other marketing
techniques.12 Despite this troubling sign, the poll numbers had vastly improved in Ontario
from just a year earlier. It almost marked the point where Ontario was clearly separate
from its eastern neighbor in terms of CCF support, although the news out of Québec was
not all bad. Lewis expressed to Underhill, “Even in the province of Québec our support
has grown from one percent, to nine percent.”13 While the poll numbers improved in
Québec, the party still failed to connect with the public in that province. After the
explosion of support for the CCF in Ontario, the main objectives for the party leadership
(Lewis, Coldwell, and Scott) in Ottawa and Montreal for 1943 were to build on the
momentum of the previous twelve months, and to establish the CCF as a viable political
option in Québec.
Moving Toward a Peaceful Coexistence –
The CCF and the Roman Catholic Church in Québec
The Roman Catholic Church never warmed to the CCF, though it did slightly
come to terms with the party in the early 1940s. Murray Ballantyne, editor of the
Montreal Beacon, had long believed that the position of condemnation of the CCF was an
“injustice to the CCF.”14 That criticism of the party occurred in early 1934 when
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Archbishop Gauthier of Montreal stated in a pastoral letter that one could not be both a
Catholic and support the party of Canadian socialism.15 CCF leaders periodically
attempted to get Church authorities to soften their stance, but were thwarted at every
advance. For Catholics like Ballantyne, the church’s condemnation was unfair to the CCF
as well as a strategically ill-advised stance by Roman Catholic authorities in Québec.16
Ballantyne claimed that the CCF upset victory of Joe Noseworthy over Arthur Meighen
in the February 1942 York-South by-election was the tipping point where he decided it
was time to push Catholic leaders to reconsider their approach toward the CCF.17
Once more, we see the concrete, dramatic impact of Noseworthy’s upset win, one that
extended far beyond his York-South riding. In addition, when the public opinion polls
showed greater support for the CCF than for the Conservative Party, Ballantyne
concluded it was time for the church to take a stand one way or another on this important
point.18 To that end, in October 1942, Ballantyne wrote to Archbishop Joseph
Charbonneau (who had replaced Archbishop Gauthier after Gauthier’s death) seeking to
have the diocese form a committee to re-examine the church’s official position
concerning the CCF.19 In that letter, Ballantyne, who was not a CCF supporter, explained
that “The practical proposals of the CCF party as they now stand are generally acceptable
to Catholics. Many of them, indeed, are more consistent with Catholic teaching than the
policies of the traditional parties.” Ballantyne argued that the criticisms formulated in
Archbishop Gauthier’s pastoral letter were no longer applicable.20 Regarding the concern
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that all socialist parties will, ultimately, evolve into totalitarian communist regimes,
Ballantyne suggested, “The “socialist” CCF party is perhaps even capable of being our
strongest defense against Communism, for nothing more strongly fosters Communism
than intransigent and reactionary opposition to it.”21 Ballantyne told Archbishop
Charbonneau that the leaders of the CCF had changed significantly since the time of
Archbishop Gauthier’s letter. He argued that the leadership of the CCF was “not littered
with doctrinaire socialist philosophers. In political practice it is always pragmatical. I do
not think we need fear the CCF party.”22 Archbishop Charbonneau then acquiesced to
Ballantyne’s suggestion to form a group to review the policies and programs of the
CCF.23
After that group quickly reached an impasse, the Archbishop became personally
involved and asked Ballayntyne to set up a meeting with CCF leader M. J. Coldwell.
Ballantyne hosted the Archbishop, Coldwell, Lewis, and Scott (the national chairman of
the CCF) for an informal luncheon. According to Ballantyne, the discussion was frank
and friendly and no major disagreements emerged.24 It seemed clear that, “Insofar as the
Leader (Coldwell) and National Secretary Lewis were concerned, Catholic participation

21. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 35.
22. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 35.
23. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 35. According to Ballantyne, that committee quickly reached an
impasse at the first meeting when it became apparent that at least some of those present were convinced
that the spirit and programme of the CCF was incompatible with French-Canadian survivance. Ballantyne
discovered that the people he met with “knew of plans to launch the Bloc populaire, and that they were not
interested in anything else. Recall the philosophy of Maxime Raymond, the leader of the federal Bloc
populaire canadien. He wanted to preserve a rural, familial tranquility in Québec. Furthermore, he despised
secularized and anti-clerical elements in modern society. See Michael Oliver, The Passionate Debate: The
Social and Political Ideas of Quebec Nationalism, 1920 – 1935 (Montreal: Vehicle Press, 1991), 201. Once
Ballantyne uncovered that truth he reasoned that clearing the CCF would merely injure the chances of the
new party on which they were building such hopes. With the Montreal Committee at an immediate
impasse, Ballantyne again wrote Archbishop Charbonneau explaining how the group was “off target” in
terms of objectives. While not denying the importance of preserving “the French-Canadian way of life”
Ballantyne wanted to bring the discussion back to the church’s stance on the CCF.
24. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 35.
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in the CCF would be welcomed, and there was nothing fundamentally irreconcilable in
the two points of view.”25
That Catholic participation in the CCF would be welcomed is significant. By this
time, the party had been toiling unsuccessfully for nearly a decade trying to break
through in Québec. For that same period of time, CCF leaders had painstakingly
attempted to clear the party’s name among Catholics in the province. Now, for the first
time, it appeared that Coldwell, Scott, and Lewis might be on the cusp of being
accepted—if not outright embraced—by the Catholic hierarchy in Québec. A plenary
meeting of the Bishops of Canada was held on October 13, 1943, and, immediately upon
his return to Montreal, Archbishop Charbonneau summoned Ballantyne to show him a
draft statement which the Archbishop hoped to release in the name of all the Bishops.26
Charbonneau explained that, “After considerable discussion, the Bishops had agreed to
declare the CCF to be ‘indifferent,’ and that they had named a sub-committee to prepare a
declaration to that effect.”27
Had that been the end of the story, perhaps Ballantyne and certainly the CCF
leadership would have considered the church’s new stance towards the party a success.
However, the draft was not entirely clear about the church’s view of either the CCF, or of
socialism. On one hand, the bishops declared that the faithful were free to support any
political party that upheld the basic Christian traditions of Canada and that also favored
needed reforms in the social and economic order. While pleased that the church had
“freed up” Catholics to vote for any party they chose, Ballantyne was troubled that the
statement did not specifically name the CCF. He noted, “The CCF had been condemned
25. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 38-39.
26. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 38-39.
27. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 38-39.
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by name but it had not been cleared by name.” When queried on the subject, the
Archbishop responded that he did not name the CCF so that the church could avoid
appearing to endorse the socialist party.28 Ballantyne, working with the editors of two
other Catholic newspapers, ran commentaries saying that the CCF had been granted a
degree of acceptance from the Church.29 On the morning of October 20, 1943, The
Montreal Beacon, The Canadian Register, and Le Devoir released the Declaration of the
Bishops and all three accompanied the declaration with statements affirming that
Catholics in Québec were free to support the CCF as they were free to support any other
legitimate political party.30 Ballantyne reported that reaction to the Declaration of the
Bishops and to the newspaper commentaries was “vigorous and immediate.”31
The political and economic elites were not pleased by this announcement. Many
members of the established parties were shocked by the timing of the declaration as well
as of its contents.32 In addition, reports from Québec and Toronto indicated that Cardinal
Villeneuve and Archbishop McGuigan were visited by important representatives of
politics and business, who argued that the bishops had made a “disastrous, ill-timed, and
naïve mistake.”33 Ballantyne asserted that these powerful interests “maintained that the
bishops had, in effect, given a hand to revolutionary forces at the very moment when the

28. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 38-39.
29. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 38-39. Recall that when the CCF was first being attacked in the
House of Commons following Monsignor Gauthier’s Pastoral Letter condemning the party, one of its few
defenders in the House of Commons was the founder and editor of Le Devoir, Henri Bourassa. See Oliver,
The Passionate Debate, 54-56.
30. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 41.
31. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 41.
32. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 41.
33. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 41.
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citadel of free enterprise was in danger.”34 Despite these highly negative responses to the
bishops’ declaration, there was also reason for the rich and powerful to find some solace.
While Catholic voters were emancipated to vote for candidates of their choosing, the
Bishops' Declaration contained language that made some quite damning remarks about
socialism. It reiterated the Church’s condemnation of socialism, which the church
insisted was another name for communism. Communism, in turn, was tied to the denial
of private property and totalitarian governance.35
While Ballantyne remarked that this section provided slight comfort for anti-CCF
elements, evidence suggests it was a much more powerful sentiment. He reported that
many Catholic newspapers, both English and French, jumped on this pronouncement and
stated the declaration was not so much a “clearing” of the CCF, as it was a statement of
principles which the party needed to meet if it wished to show it merited “clearance.”36
Far from clarifying the church’s position toward the CCF, the declaration worked to
muddy the waters. Despite the clarification attempt by the Catholic authorities,
Ballantyne reported “Once again we are hearing much of the argument that the Church
condemns socialism, but the CCF is socialist, therefore, the Church condemns the
CCF.”37

34. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 41.
35. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 40.
36. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 40.
37. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 42-43. Ballantyne made one final attempt to get the Catholic
Church to clarify its position regarding the CCF. This time, he attempted to circumvent the authorities in
Québec by writing an article in The Commonwealth a leading American-Catholic review. With the
publication of this article, Ballanytne concluded he had done all he could to have his church lift the ban
against supporting the CCF in Québec. See Ballantyne, “The Catholic Church and the CCF,” Canadian
Catholic Historical Association, Report 30, 43-44.
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“With Friends Like This” – Harold Winch
Harold Winch was one of the CCF’s leading lights, as well as one of its more
controversial personalities during the period covered in this work. As the British
Columbia CCF leader, he had led the party to its greatest electoral heights when he
brought the party to Official Opposition status in British Columbia in 1941, a position it
would never relinquish, or improve upon.38 In the early 1940s, the British Columbia CCF
appeared to be closer to forming a government than any other provincial group was. As
such, Winch possessed a great deal of prestige in the CCF movement. While few can
doubt Winch’s success as a political figure, there is also substantial evidence that his
words seriously wounded the party across Canada, especially in Québec. Winch had been
with the party since the Regina Manifesto and he was firmly ensconced in the doctrinaire
socialist wing of the CCF.39 According to Walter Young, Winch was given to strong
revolutionary pronouncements and he typified the party for middle class Canadians.40
During the release and the subsequent debate regarding the Declaration of the
Bishops, Winch weighed in with his thoughts. Ballantyne stated that the British Columbia
CCF leader “made our work immensely more difficult by a series of inflammatory, and

38. Summaries of Provincial Elections and By-Elections, British Columbia, 1928-1969, British
Columbia Chief Electoral Officer (1969), McMaster University Government Publications. Indeed, during
that 1941 election the CCF amassed the most votes of any party in British Columbia. This exposes another
element that hindered the CCF’s ability to garner elected office: the vagaries of the first-past-the-post
electoral system. In addition, throughout the remainder of the 1940s and the early 1950s, the Liberal and
Progressive Conservative Parties worked in tandem to keep the CCF out of government in that province.
Again in 1952, the BC CCF won the popular vote in the provincial election, only to watch the Social Credit
Party emerge as the government. The party, finally, after decades as the almost “permanent” Official
Opposition in British Columbia, escaped runner-up status role in 1972, when, under the guidance of Dave
Barrett, the CCF’s successor, the New Democratic Party, ascended to government in British Columbia.
Desmond Morton asserted that Barrett was able to break through because voters admired his flamboyant
style and were seeking to replace a Social Credit government that had been in place for over two decades.
See Desmond Morton, NDP: The Dream of Power (Toronto: A. M. Hakkert, 1974), 139-40.
39. Walter Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-1961 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1969), 57.
40. Young, The Anatomy of a Party, 187.
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even revolutionary, speeches that were incompatible with the teachings and spirit of the
Church.”41 The situation was made worse when the CCF News of Vancouver, a
publication of the provincial party, used its March 9 edition to publish what L’Action
Catholique called an “Odious Calumny against the Primate of the Canadian Church.”42
Ballantyne claimed that it had been “long recognized that the CCF harboured a few
irreconcilably doctrinaire socialist and anti-clerical members; it was further recognized
that Mr. Winch was the spokesman of this group.”43 Ballantyne believed that National
CCF leaders were not pleased with Winch’s statements, “but they, privately, reprimanded
Winch, and did nothing to counteract the serious consequences of his acts.” He concluded
that there was very little in the way of leeway for the CCF regarding winning Catholic
support, and that the anti-clerical element of the party should keep quiet in its strong
beliefs.44 He also cited the words of the Archbishop Duke of Vancouver, who answered
Winch from the pulpit with a sermon in 1943 on the Feast of All Saints: “All parties at
the present time are disposed to make reforms, for which they are to be commended. As
worthy of high approval also is to be noted the stand of the CCF against Communism.”45
However, the Archbishop was not going to let Winch avoid penalty for what he
considered were intemperate remarks against the Catholic Church. He noted, “It is
difficult, however, to make a statement about the policy of the CCF. This is so because it
has not sufficiently declared its national platform….The party has also permitted its
leaders in various provinces to make divergent statements of policy.”46
41. Murray Ballantyne Papers, “The Catholic Church and the CCF,” Canadian Catholic Historical
Association, Report 30, (1963), 42.
42. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 42.
43. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 42.
44. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 42.
45. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 42.
46. Murray Ballantyne Papers, 42.
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It is difficult to conclude that the CCF had failed to deliver a national program.
From its founding in 1932, and at subsequent conventions, the party had set out a detailed
plan to change Canadian society and improve life for ordinary Canadians. It is harder to
dispute the Archbishop’s sharp words for the British Columbia Provincial CCF leader.
Whether or not it was Winch’s intention, his strong assertions produced serious
difficulties for the federal branch of the party, as well as the provincial branches in
Ontario and Québec.

CCF Status in Québec—February 1943
In early 1943, Québec CCF Treasurer Hubert Pearson wrote to David Lewis to
offer suggestions on how to make best use of the party’s newly-hired National Research
Director, Lloyd Shaw, as well as to provide an overview of the party’s status and
prospects in Québec. Pearson was concerned that, among the tasks identified by the
national CCF, there was no mention of “research into propaganda methods and
organizational problems.”47 Pearson argued that no amount of popular sentiment would
be of use unless party propaganda was used to take advantage of the talents and
enthusiasm of new recruits to the Québec CCF cause.48
Next, Pearson wove the issues of organizational shortcoming into the difficulty
the party continued to experience in Québec. He noted that the Québec branch had
received very little organizational assistance from the National Office.49 Pearson added,

47. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec Miscellaneous Correspondences, 1942-1944, letter
from Hubert Pearson to David Lewis, February 14, 1943, 1.
48. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec Miscellaneous Correspondences, 1.
49. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec Miscellaneous Correspondences, 1.
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“The great majority of CCFers here do not seem to be even conscious of our lack of
knowledge or ideas on the subject.”50 He conceded that the CCF in Québec was spending
too much time appealing to their own group. “We cannot build a Socialist Canada merely
by making speeches to ourselves, which is all most of our clubs here have done except
for a very few months before election dates.”51 He suggested the party needed regularly
scheduled activities to promote the CCF in the province. Pearson was straightforward as
to who should provide the framework for these activities: “I think it is the responsibility
of the National Office to offer to the Provinces such programmes as well as helpful hints
on the type of organizational set up to carry out such programmes.”52
Despite the improving conditions for the CCF, the provincial CCF treasurer
recognized that organizational deficiencies were hampering the provincial wing of the
party and he wanted the National Office to provide guidelines how the Québec branch
could overcome this issue. As will be discussed below, efforts were made to address
Pearson’s concerns with varying degrees of success.
Despite the Noseworthy victory in February 1942 and the subsequent boost in
CCF support across Canada, the party continued to search for a breakthrough in Québec.
While Provincial Council notes claimed greater public interest, especially among French
Canadians, the party hierarchy remained a largely English-speaking and male-dominated
domain at the beginning of 1943. The roster of Dr. Stanley Allen (president), Pearson
(treasurer), and Hal Rugge (provincial secretary) filled the top slots on the Québec CCF

50. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec Miscellaneous Correspondences, 1.
51. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec Miscellaneous Correspondences, 1.
52. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec Miscellaneous Correspondences, 1.
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Provincial Council.53 Other council positions were filled by anglophones: R.L. Calder,
Michael Rubenstein, Professor Frank Scott, and Eileen Williams (assistant secretary).54
The lone francophones on the Québec CCF Provincial Council at the beginning of 1943
were William Sauvé and Theodore Prézeau.55 Though the party would experience some
greater success in its outreach to French Canadians in the year ahead, the thin
representation on the council was telling. So, too, was the residence of these council
executives: nearly all of them lived in Montreal. Only Pearson (Lachine) and Rugge
(Dorval) did not live in Montreal proper.56 In addition, both Lachine and Dorval were on
the Island of Montreal. This meant that the CCF continued to have a very Montrealcentric view of Québec. As Rothney and Barlow had explained to Lewis a few months
earlier, the CCF was not well-known in the Québec City region and had almost zero
recognition in the province’s rural sections. While the party attempted to alter the public
perception that it was an English party centered in Montreal, the construction of the party
leadership made that accusation more difficult to counter. In addition, everyone on the
executive roster were highly-educated professionals. This begs several questions. Where
were the labor leaders, or the rank and file workers? How much interaction did these
executives have with the working-class voters the CCF was feverishly trying to win over?
Finally, who among them was the charismatic leader that would appeal to FrenchCanadian voters? In those vital areas, this leadership group was sorely lacking.

53. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec Miscellaneous Correspondences, 1942-1944, (roster)
Provincial Council Executives, January 1943.
54. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec Miscellaneous Correspondences, 1942-1944.
55. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec Miscellaneous Correspondences, 1942-1944.
56. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec Miscellaneous Correspondences, 1942-1944.
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Breakthrough in Ontario for the CCF
While this work has described the dogged attempts of the CCF to make headway
in Québec, 1943 was important for the movement due to the unexpected performance of
the party in Ontario. Long a contentious and under-achieving wing of the CCF, the
Ontario branch made a serious push for power in the August 1943 provincial election.
Prior to this election, the party had under-performed almost as spectacularly as its
counterpart to the East. While both the Ontario and Québec CCF shared a penchant for
disorganization, in-fighting and a lack of leadership, the Ontario branch began to move
beyond these problems in 1942.
The first major, positive event for the CCF in Ontario was the Noseworthy
triumph over Meighen in the federal by-election in February of that year. The next
change for the Ontario CCF was the selection of a leader, and an effective one at that.
Prior to April 1942, there was no designated leader for the Ontario CCF. Caplan wrote
that this leadership vacuum was one of the two major internal weaknesses for the Ontario
wing.57 At the Ontario CCF provincial convention, delegates selected a young man who
had considerable history with the party. Ted Jolliffe was thirty-three years old at the time
of his election and had already been active in the CCF hierarchy for seven years.58 In
addition, he had an impressive list of credentials as a lawyer, former journalist and
Rhodes Scholar. While some in the party were concerned about his youth and aloof
personality, this group was in the minority.59

57. Gerald Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 94. He added the second weakness was the lack of grass-roots
organizations. As discussed earlier, Agnes Macphail and Elmore Philpott had leadership positions in the
early days of the Ontario CCF. With Philpott’s return to the Liberal Party and the withdrawal of the United
Farmer’s of Ontario (which claimed Macphail), the party had been without a leader since 1934.
58. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 94.
59. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 94.
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The overwhelming majority of delegates were won over by Jolliffe’s experience,
eloquence, confidence, and devotion to the CCF cause. Facing no serious competition,
the buoyant delegates quickly positioned themselves behind Jolliffe.60 At the first
provincial executive meeting following the convention, Jolliffe described his duties as
provincial leader as those of a “candidate at-large.”61 The new Ontario leader followed
through on that promise by visiting forty-five ridings in the first four months on the job.62
More importantly, Jolliffe reported significant interest in the CCF. After a trip to
the province’s north, he noted that there was strong sentiment for the party in Kirkland
Lake and Timmins. Furthermore, Jolliffe remarked that there was a swing to the CCF
from French Canadians in Ontario’s northern ridings.63 Indeed, the party was
experiencing such rapid growth that Jolliffe was concerned the party was organizationally
ill-equipped to handle all the new members.64
While the Ontario CCF was making substantial in-roads throughout the province,
there remained one area where the party message did not appear to be getting through:
Toronto. Jolliffe noted that increases in CCF membership in Ontario’s most populated
city was negligible, compared to membership in the rest of the province.65 No
explanation for these underwhelming membership numbers in Toronto was presented.

60. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 94.
61. MG 28, IV - 1, Volume 50, File 1, Ontario Council and Executive Meeting Notes, 1940-1944,
April 17, 1942, 1.
62. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 50, File 1, Ontario Council and Executive Meeting Notes, 1940-1944,
August 21, 1942, 1. By March 1943, Jolliffe produced a list of 104 meetings he had addressed since
becoming leader in April 1942. See MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 50, File 1, Ontario Council and Executive
Meeting Notes, 1940-1944, March 21, 1943, 1.
63. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 50, File 1, Ontario Council and Executive Meeting Notes, 1940-1944,
September 4, 1942, 1.
64. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 50, File 1, Ontario Council and Executive Meeting Notes, 1940-1944,
August 21, 1942, 1.
65. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 50, File 1, Ontario Council and Executive Meeting Notes, 1940-1944,
September 4, 1942, 1.
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Regardless, Jolliffe’s visits convinced him that the CCF would elect at least twenty-five
members to the provincial legislature in the next election.66
Subsequent polling data confirmed that the CCF was no longer a fringe element in
Ontario politics. A March 1943 Gallup survey indicated the party was supported by
twenty-six percent of Ontarians. This compared to the provincial Conservatives (thirtysix percent) and the Liberals (thirty-five percent).67 The memo added that in forty ridings
CCF support averaged forty percent. The survey concluded the party was in strong
command of twenty-five to thirty-five ridings.68 The poll did have some troubling news
for the CCF; the party was failing to connect with female voters. While the Ontario
hierarchy remarked they needed to make better efforts to interest women in their
program, there is no evidence that the party followed through with additional surveys to
determine the effectiveness of its appeal to women voters.69
The previous Ontario election had been held in October 1937. By parliamentary
convention, the next one should have occurred no later than October 1942, but that did
not happen. Instead, the provincial Liberal government used the war as an excuse to
postpone the election for up to one year.70 Certainly, the last quarter of 1942 and the first
months of 1943 were chaotic for the Ontario government as the province had had three

66. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 50, File 1, Ontario Council and Executive Meeting Notes, 1940-1944,
August 21, 1942, 2.
67. Robinson, The Measure of Democracy, 132.
68. Robinson, The Measure of Democracy, 132. At this time, there were ninety provincial ridings
represented at the Ontario legislature.
69. Robinson, The Measure of Democracy, 132.
70. Neil McKenty, Mitch Hepburn (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), 252-53. McKenty
stated that Hepburn decided to not call an election due to his concern of conducting a campaign when “the
actual blood-bath is about to take place.” He also informed Conservative Party leaders that Mackenzie King
had tried to force an election on the Ontario government to preserve the Prime Minister’s support among
French Canadians. McKenty argued this rationale was a product of a “diseased imagination” on Hepburn’s
part. He conceded that there probably was a degree of pressure asserted by the federal and provincial
Liberals for the Hepburn government to call an election rather extending its term in office which these
groups feared would be politically fatal. See McKenty, Mitch Hepburn, 251-55.
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premiers in the span of just over six months.71 Without notice, Premier Hepburn resigned
in late October and he then selected Attorney-General Gordon Conant to replace him. Six
months later, Conant stepped down and Harry Nixon was chosen as the new Liberal
leader and premier.
Ontario Liberals opted for Nixon because he embodied the antithesis of
Hepburn’s mercurial and controversial style.72 Almost immediately, Nixon called for an
election to seek a fresh mandate from the voters of Ontario. The main thrust of the
Ontario Liberals’ campaign was to create fear of a CCF government. Campaign literature
warned that people could lose their home, business and insurance, and be forced to live
under a regimented system with democratic socialism.73 The Liberals produced a
brochure entitled, “Chaos in New Zealand: A Warning for Ontario.” In it, the party
described the “misery” suffered by the people of New Zealand under a socialist
government and urged voters in Ontario to vote Liberal.74 For the re-named ProgressiveConservatives under George Drew, the party promised a left-wing platform that promised
“cradle to grave security, fair labour laws, improved housing conditions, increased
mothers’ allowances and old age pensions, and guaranteed large-scale employment.”75
This laundry list of progressive policies was indicative of the sudden change in Canadian
politics since the dramatic increase in support of the CCF. While borrowing heavily from

71. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 99. While Caplan wrote that Hepburn’s
resignation had no basis in any rationale explanation, he also noted that the Liberal premier had heavily
backed Arthur Meighen during the South York by-election in February 1942 and lost considerable political
standing when Meighen was defeated. Furthermore, Caplan alluded to continuing clashed between
Hepburn and Mackenzie King
72. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 99-100. Nixon had once been Hepburn’s
“closest colleague” but had thrown his support in the South York by-election against Meighen. See Caplan,
The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 93.
73. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 100.
74. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 59, File 2, Ontario Politics, 1943, undated 1943, 1.
75. Maclean’s Magazine, August 1, 1943, 48.
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the CCF, Drew had little problem indulging in “venomous” anti-CCF diatribes.76 The
Progressive-Conservatives published a pamphlet entitled, “What the CCF Plans to Do
with Canada.” They warned people in Ontario that if the CCF came to power, this
“authoritarian” party would destroy their savings, business and freedom of the press.77
The CCF platform was produced at the annual Ontario CCF Convention in April.
Delegates approved a government-funded healthcare system, rural electrification,
significant expansion of education services, and funding to build and upgrade the Ontario
highway system.78 Like the Progressive-Conservatives, the CCF also pledged to build
more housing, boost mothers’ allowances and old age pensions, and strengthen existing
trade union statutes.79 In a confidential report, the party estimated it would have to “find
an additional $25 million dollars to finance this first-term program.”80
Due to the significant increase in both members and finances over the previous
year, the CCF was able to mount a formidable province-wide campaign.81 The party
conducted it in two stages. The first task was to remind voters of the “inevitable” Great
Depression of the 1930s and assert that citizens should be able to enjoy employment and
security in peacetime, as they had during the war.82 The second was to fight off the

76. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 101.
77. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 59, File 2, Ontario Politics, 1943, July 13, 1943, 3. The ProgressiveConservatives added that the CCF attempt at leveling out of society was against God’s plan. They argued,
“The good Lord, in putting this world together, did not make all the trees of a single uniform height. By the
same token, every individual differs in stature – morally and materially.”
78. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 59, File 1, Ontario Policy and Research, 1942-1947, Ontario CCF
Convention, April 23-24, 1943, 1-3.
79. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 59, File 1, Ontario Policy and Research, 1-3.
80. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 59, File 1, Ontario Policy and Research, 3.
81. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 102. Caplan noted that party membership had
risen from two thousand to eight thousand over the preceding twelve months and that the CCF had $20,000
dollars for a central campaign fund.
82. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 103.
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Liberal and Progressive-Conservative charges that supporting the CCF would lead to
totalitarian government that would bankrupt the citizens of Ontario.83
Even before voting results were reported, there were strong indications that a
substantial number of Ontarians were willing to reject the fear of a totalitarian CCF
government. A Gallup Poll released on election day had the CCF in front with thirty-six
percent support of those surveyed. The Progressive-Conservatives and Liberals were
virtually tied for second place with thirty-three and thirty-one percent. Caplan claimed
that this poll came out too late to affect the election result in favor of the CCF.84 It could
also be argued that the poll may have affected the outcome by scaring enough voters
away from the socialists to Drew’s PC’s at the very last minute. Indeed, the final tally had
the CCF and PC results of the election reversed from that morning’s Gallup Poll. The
Progressive-Conservatives won a minority government by winning thirty-eight seats on
the strength of just under thirty-seven percent support. The CCF bolted from zero seats to
thirty-four, with almost thirty-three percent of the votes.85
Furthermore, the geographic and demographic breakdown of CCF support proved
most interesting. The party’s strongest showings were in northern ridings that were
dominated by lumber and mining workers. The CCF won eleven of the twelve northern
districts. In addition, in nine of those ridings, the party won at least fifty percent of the
vote.86

83. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 103-04.
84. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 104.
85. Caplan. The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 104.The governing Liberals won just fifteen of
the ninety seats in the legislature even though they captured thirty-one percent of the votes. As is typical in
the first-past-the post electoral system, the third-place party is almost always under-represented in terms of
seats compared to their share of the popular vote.
86. MG 28, IV - 1, Volume 55, File 1, Ontario 1943 Election, 1. The CCF captured over sixty
percent of the vote in both Fort William and Sudbury ridings. The party also captured almost fifty-five
percent of the votes in the riding of Temiskaming which is located along the Ontario-Québec border.

254

The party also made significant gains with French-speaking Catholic voters in
these northern ridings. This was especially true in Sudbury, Cochrane North and South,
and Temiskaming.87 That last riding is noteworthy in that it is located on the OntarioQuébec border. The CCF also performed well in industrial centers, such as Hamilton,
Windsor and the Niagara peninsula. In Toronto, the party roughly split the ridings with
the Progressive-Conservatives.88 This allowed the CCF to become the Official
Opposition in the Ontario legislature.
Amid all this good news, there also existed regions where the CCF performed
poorly. The most noteworthy was Eastern Ontario, where CCF candidates struggled to
reach double-digits in terms of vote percentage.89 Many of these ridings also lay adjacent
to the Québec border. Whereas the CCF was able to win over French-Canadian Catholics
in northern reaches of Ontario, it was unable to do likewise with francophone Catholics
further south. One possible explanation would be the difference in vocations for these
regions. In the north, extractive industries with unionized workers provided the bulwark
of employment. The population in south-eastern Ontario was involved more deeply in
dairy farming.90
Despite the disappointment of coming so close to winning, the CCF was still
elated with its results. The party was the Official Opposition at Queen’s Park and had
broken through in Canada’s most populous province. Such a result could scarcely have
been conceivable before the South York by-election eighteen months earlier. The Toronto
87. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 105. It is not a coincidence that the lone Québec
CCF triumph would occur in Rouyn-Noranda. That riding was adjacent to Temiskaming.
88. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 105.
89. MG 28, IV - 1, Volume 55, File 1, Ontario 1943 Election, 3. Eastern Ontario would remain a
weak area for the Ontario CCF and the Ontario NDP in the decades to come. See Dan Azoulay, Keeping
the Dream: The Survival of the Ontario CCF/NDP, 1950-1963 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1997), 19-20, 26.
90. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 104-05.
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Star wrote that the CCF success was proof that the party was moving in the right
direction. This contrasted to the “older parties who are looking back wistfully to a social
order which is no longer acceptable.”91
Now that the CCF was a significant and serious political presence in Ontario, ongoing efforts to bolster the party in Québec took on a greater sense of urgency.

The CCF Makes a Concerted Effort to Break Through in Québec
By the time Hubert Pearson had written to David Lewis, the CCF national
secretary had already gotten personally involved with attempting to improve the party’s
fortunes in Québec. Somewhat reluctantly, Lewis had accepted the CCF nomination for
the Montreal riding of Cartier for an upcoming by-election. Left to his own preference,
Lewis would have opted to run in the Toronto riding of West York. He explained to the
West York riding association that he opted to run in the Cartier district because he had
grown up in that section of Montreal and his family still resided there.92
In spite of the familial ties to Cartier, Lewis had serious reservations about
seeking office there.93 He reasoned, “I gave the matter a great deal of thought and
consulted with the National Executive. All of us came to the conclusion that since it is
important for the CCF to do as well as possible in these by-elections and since I seem to
be the unanimous choice of all our supporters in the constituency, I could not,
conscientiously, refuse the request.”94

91. Toronto Star, editorial, August 5, 1943.
92. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 43, File 2, Ontario General Correspondences, January-March, 1943,
letter from David Lewis to Ernie Evans, February 1, 1943, 1.
93. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 43, File 2, Ontario General Correspondences, 1.
94. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 43, File 2, Ontario General Correspondences, 1.
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Three factors “forced” Lewis into this reluctant decision. The first of these factors
was the immediate need in Cartier. The by-election specter only came into being when
Liberal Member of Parliament Peter Bercovitch passed away in late December 1942. 95
The second element was that Lewis was certain that the CCF needed a breakthrough in
Québec, much the same way that Noseworthy’s victory in York South righted the party’s
ship in Ontario a year earlier. The third aspect which motivated Lewis to seek office in
Cartier was that this constituency was a working-class Jewish district, which the CCF
National Secretary believed was his natural constituency. In time, it became evident why
Lewis had not wanted to run in Cartier.

The Cartier Campaign
The Cartier riding was atypical for Québec electoral districts. This riding was
located on the east side of Mont Royal and was a working-class area notable for its high
concentration of Jewish residents—from fifty-five to sixty percent.96 Francophones
comprised about one-third of the population in the riding, while the other ten percent
were described as “mixed nationalities.”97 Also noteworthy was the fact that this riding
had bucked the trend of opposing conscription in Québec during the plebiscite which was
held in April 1942 when seventy percent of Cartier voters supported the measure to draft
people into the military if necessary.98 Unlike a majority of Québec electoral districts,

95. David Lewis, The Good Fight: A Political Biography, 1909-1958 (Macmillan of Canada,
Toronto, 1981), 225. Bercovitch had won the riding in a by-election in 1938 by acclaim. Two years later,
he received one of the most lopsided victories in the 1940 federal election when he polled over 18,000
votes, compared to his National Union opponent’s 2,300. Indeed, since the creation of the Cartier riding in
1925, the district had been a Liberal strong-hold.
96. Canadian Forum, “The Cartier By-Election,” September 1943, Volume 23, Number 272, 126.
97. Canadian Forum, “The Cartier By-Election,” 126. It is interesting to note that the newly renamed Progressive-Conservative Party decided against running a candidate in this by-election.
98. Montreal Gazette, August 10, 1943, 14.
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candidates supporting the war effort would be seen in a positive light by many of the
voters in Cartier. Lazarus Phillips of the Liberal Party, Fred Rose of the LabourProgressive Party, and the CCF’s Lewis all backed strong Canadian involvement in the
military conflict. In addition, these three candidates were Jewish, which was another
characteristic that separated them from the Bloc Populaire’s Paul Masse. However, Rose,
Phillips, and Lewis offered different rationales for seeking voter support for their
particular candidacy. Phillips, as the “establishment” candidate, urged voters to stay the
course regarding the war and the small social policy advances put forth by the King
government. Tying himself to King also meant that Phillips was saddled with the
consequences of some of the unpopular war policies adopted by the government, such as
the wage ceiling policy and severe restrictions on numerous consumer items like butter,
sugar, and gasoline.99 Rose, the Labour-Progressive candidate, was well known in the
riding for several reasons. First, unlike the other candidates, he actually lived in the
Cartier district. Also, he had been a candidate for federal Parliament in 1935, when he ran
under the name Fred Rosenberg for the then-legal Communist Party. A communist
candidate seeking elected office at this point in history had a small window of
opportunity in Canada that he had not previously enjoyed and would not enjoy for very
long. In 1943, there was a degree of sympathy for Soviet forces that had been fighting
Hitler’s troops on the eastern front for two years with limited allied assistance.100 Perhaps
most importantly, Rose was a union official in the riding where an aircraft strike was

99. J. W. Pickersgill. The Mackenzie King Record: Volume I, 1939 – 1944 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1960), 569. The Communist Party was outlawed by the King government early in the war.
In June 1943 the communists reorganized under the legal auspices of the Labour - Progressive Party. See
Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 134.
100. David Lewis, The Good Fight, 231.
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presently taking place.101 No other candidate in Cartier had that amount of rank-and-file
contact and credibility with the working class in the district.
Lewis, of the CCF, also had impressive credentials to offer the citizenry of the
district. He had grown up in Cartier and his parents still lived there. However, by 1943, in
his capacity as national secretary of the CCF, Lewis had lived in Ottawa for the past
seven years. Still, it would be inaccurate to cast him as an outsider. Lewis had visited his
parents and attended the Québec CCF council meetings frequently during his tenure as
national secretary. Another factor weighing in Lewis's favor was the fact that none of his
competitors could match his educational gravitas. He was a McGill University graduate
and a Rhodes Scholar from Oxford. Like Rose, Lewis also had an economic and social
agenda, however, it was more broad-based in scope that that of his Communist opponent.
Lewis was looking beyond the war years to a society where a “new and worthwhile era”
would be created in which Canadians would “throw off the power of private interests to
allow for the concrete planning for a happy tomorrow.”102

The CCF Campaign in Cartier
Chief among the reasons Lewis was not sure he wanted to become a candidate in Cartier
was the riding’s notoriously crooked election history. In little time, Lewis had fresh
evidence that little had changed from the years of his living in that part of Montreal. In a
memorandum to CCF Members of Parliament, Lewis listed a number of irregularities his
campaign team had been able to discover in a quick survey of the voting list provided to
101. Montreal Gazette, August 9, 1943, 13.
102. Montreal Gazette , 13-14. Cartier resident, Louis Lang, attended a Lewis speech during this
by-election campaign. Lang described Lewis as “a spell-binding speaker. It was amazing. He spoke six
languages and was clearly, a brilliant man. I found him terribly left-wing, though.” Interview with Louis
Lang, December 14, 2014.
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the district CCF.103 Lewis stated that since his team had just received the voters list, his
team had only conducted a random survey of fifteen out of the one-hundred twelve polls
in his Cartier riding; there was “no doubt and every reason to believe that our present
information is merely representative and the same story would repeat itself in the case of
every poll.”104 Lewis reported that nearly 2,000 names were checked and about 650 of
these were found to be false. Roughly one-third of the voters located on the examined
lists were there erroneously.105 The CCF national secretary listed “the more striking and
humorous findings about which it would be worthwhile to inform the House and the
press.”106 The CCF canvassers had found a seven-week-old baby listed as a bookkeeper,
a five-year-old girl listed as a retired spinster, a number of non-existent addresses (which
meant those voters resided over an intersection) a total of eleven voters listed in a barber
shop, and a total of six voters, listed at a restaurant. When questioned, the waiter at the
restaurant laughingly told the CCF canvasser that the enumerator had taken the names of
the people sitting at the counter.107 Lewis lamented, “There were names of people who
were dead, people who had moved away a year or more before, fictitious names,
fictitious addresses and people not citizens.”108 The most common occurrence was the
enumeration of all members of a family without regard to age. Lewis estimated, “Of the
approximately 42,000 names on the lists, at least 10,000 would be found false, in our
opinion.”109 The CCF checkers also observed that hundreds of names had been left off
the list. Lewis concluded, “The lists are entirely useless, at best. At worst, and in
103. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, Québec Elections, Cartier by-election 1943, memorandum
from David Lewis to CCF Members of Parliament, July 19, 1943, 1.
104. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 1.
105. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 1.
106. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 1.
107. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 1.
108. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 1.
109. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 1.
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Montreal it’s always the worst, they are a “telegrapher’s” heaven.”110 Lewis and the CCF
wrote to the press and authorities in Montreal to bring public attention to these numerous
irregularities, and hoped to get a second, accurate enumeration completed.111 The
Returning Officer responded in writing that “padding had occurred and that two polls
were being re-numerated.”112 Lewis was only partially pleased with this development. He
conceded that the two polls being re-enumerated were “among the worst, but others are
almost as bad.”113
That elections in Montreal were corrupt was a surprise to no one, and Lewis had a
firm grasp of the shady history of voting in the city. The CCF secretary implored the
party MP’s to “tell the stories, current in Montreal, of past elections where more ballots
were counted than there were voters on the list for the poll; of gangs fighting in the
streets, of committee rooms being broken up, records stolen, candidate’s agents beaten
up.”114 Lewis wanted the federal government to step in and at least attempt to make
election practices in the district fairer. “The responsibility is entirely on the government
to take appropriate action. It is King’s duty to cleanse the record of democracy in
Canada,” Lewis tartly stated.115 Lewis presented a list of suggestions to his House of
Commons colleagues to assist the federal government to right the situation in Cartier.
Among them was the appointment of a new returning officer, a complete re-enumeration
of the constituency, and instructions requiring voters to show their registration card at the
poll.116

110. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 2.
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While the CCF failed to get all of Lewis’s suggestions implemented, the King
government did order an immediate re-enumeration of the entire district, an achievement
that Lewis broadcast in a radio address on July 21, 1943.117 He claimed there were two
lessons the constituents in Cartier could take away from the government’s decision to reenumerate the district. The first lesson, Lewis claimed, was that “There is no limit, to
what we, the people, can accomplish if we unite together for a common end and exercise
our rights and duties as citizens with courage and with determination.”118 The second was
that the CCF was an honest and viable political entity capable of bringing about needed
change. Lewis stated, “I promised you that we would do everything possible to ensure an
honest election this time. I have kept my promise.”119 The CCF national secretary was
quick to share credit with his CCF comrades in Ottawa. By stating that he would be part
of a national party, he attempted to create a contrast to the solitary figure Fred Rose
would be in the House of Commons.120
Lewis viewed his Liberal Party opponent, Lazarus Phillips, as his chief rival in
the by-election. Certainly, in his radio address, Lewis attempted to frame that the election
was between Phillips and himself. “The contest is between the Liberal Party and the
CCF,” Lewis flatly declared.121 The question for voters, he said, was whether they were
satisfied to support the current administration and its reactionary record, or whether they
117. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, Québec Elections, Cartier by-election 1943, David Lewis
radio address, July 21, 1943, 1. That the King government would demand a new voter list is somewhat of a
surprise. As always, it is an interesting exercise to understand the mind of Prime Minister King. His diaries
state that he expected Lewis to win this by-election; and perhaps King was fine with that development.
Certainly, if Lewis was elected as a Member of Parliament, the CCF would, almost undoubtedly, need to
find someone to replace Lewis as National Secretary. King understood that it would be very difficult for the
CCF to find a person as competent or as dedicated as Lewis, and that would likely prove harmful to the
longer-range objectives of that party – and beneficial to King’s Liberal Party.
118. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 1.
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had the vision to unite with the working people across the country for a new and better
Canada.122
To demonstrate his familiarity with the district, Lewis took the King
government’s tax and housing policies to task. He declared, “Everybody in Cartier has
known the unfairness of a taxation policy which hits people whose income is as low as 13
dollars a week. In parts of Cartier you see the disgraceful state of housing in Canada
exposed in all its ugliness; unsanitary and uninhabitable shacks, crowded homes, and
people living in stores without ventilation.”123 The CCF secretary then reached out to the
senior citizens in the riding when he chided the Liberal government for forcing “old
people to live on the present miserable old-age pension, particularly at a time of rising
prices…Voting Liberal was voting against your best interests,” he said, whereas voting
CCF meant you would be voting for programs people desperately needed.124
While focusing most of his speech on the Liberal Party and its candidate in the
Cartier by-election, Lewis also mentioned his Communist opponent in the riding. In a
condescending tone, Lewis mocked Fred Rose, the Labor-Progressive candidate. Lewis
remarked, “His promises about what he would do are merely empty boasts. To give the
so-called “labor-progressive” candidate your vote is to waste it.”125 The case Lewis was
putting to Cartier voters had two tenets. The first was that the election was between the
status quo government of the Liberal Party—the party representing the “old” world—and
the CCF, the party that embodied the “new” one. The second aspect indicated that if

122. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 2.
123. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 3-4.
124. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 4-5.
125. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, 2. Ironically, Lewis warned voters not to “waste” their vote
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for the CCF (and later NDP).

263

voters were thinking of supporting a working-class vehicle, their best option was to
choose Lewis and the CCF, because that movement was established and growing. This
strategy also helped to isolate Rose and the Labor-Progressives. Lewis argued that a vote
for the Labor-Progressives Rose was a wasted ballot because that candidate would be
alone, with no help in Ottawa and no support system in place. To underscore this point,
the CCF National Office dispatched party leader M.J. Coldwell to the Cartier and
Stanstead by-elections for four days at the end of July.126 Lloyd Shaw informed Lewis
that the party was also sending Noseworthy, Claire Gillis, and Grace MacInnis to these
ridings in the week prior to the by-election.127 This highlighted the importance that the
CCF placed on gaining a foothold in the province of Québec, while showcasing the team
he would be joining in parliament.
Just five days before the voters went to the polls in Cartier and three other ridings,
the Canadian political world was turned upside down. The Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation exploded on to the national scene by nearly winning office during the Ontario
provincial election. The question was asked as to whether any party would be able to
capitalize on the momentum generated by the Ontario election, or if the electoral results
would really fail to influence the outcome of the by-elections. Certainly, the Montreal
newspaper Le Devoir devoted more attention to the CCF showing in the province of
Ontario and to Cartier riding candidate Lewis after that province’s campaign.128 Prior to
the startling results for the CCF in Ontario, this nationalist publication concentrated its

126. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, Québec-Elections; Cartier By-Election, 1943, letter from Lloyd
Shaw to David Lewis, July 7, 1943, 1-2. It is interesting that Coldwell invested four days on, decidedly,
difficult electoral terrain in Québec. Coldwell also visited the other two promising ridings where byelections were being held: Selkirk (Manitoba) and Humboldt (Saskatchewan). The CCF was victorious in
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coverage on the candidacy of Bloc populaire candidate Paul Massé. Nearly every edition
of Le Devoir during the last two weeks of the by-election campaign promoted Massé and
provided detailed highlights of his speeches and upcoming events in the Cartier
district.129
The Bloc populaire was a newly-formed nationalist political party founded by
André Laurendeau, who later worked as chief editor of Le Devoir.130 In this particular
campaign, Massé and the Bloc spent a good deal of energy emphasizing the role of
Québec during the war, particularly their opposition to conscription and for excessive
financial outlays for the war effort.131 As the lone candidate in Cartier who opposed total
involvement of resources and personnel into the war effort, Massé clearly separated
himself from the other major candidates. As such, he concentrated on reaching the onethird of Cartier voters who were of French-Canadian heritage.132

Cartier Results
On the eve of the August 9, 1943 by-elections, King predicted that his Liberal
Party would fail to hold any of the four seats being contested. He was correct.133 King
accurately claimed that the CCF would win the two western seats: the Selkirk riding in
Manitoba and the Humboldt riding in Saskatchewan. Moreover, the Prime Minister
surmised that the Bloc populaire would emerge victorious in the eastern Québec riding of
Stanstead.134 Indeed, the only place where King’s political instincts failed was the contest
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130. Lewis, The Good Fight, 230.
131. Lewis, The Good Fight, 230.
132. Lewis, The Good Fight, 230.
133. Pickersgill, Mackenzie King Record, 570.
134. Pickersgill, Mackenzie King Record, 570.

265

in Cartier riding. Here, the Liberal leader expected that Lewis and the CCF would capture
the district and establish a Socialist “beachhead” in the province.135 King remarked, “I
felt satisfied that the strike of the aircraft workers would play into the hands of the
CCF.”136 The Prime Minister also speculated that the CCF was receiving ample funding
from the CIO and that would aide the party’s Cartier campaign.137 Instead, to almost
everyone’s surprise, Fred Rose of the Labour-Progressive Party squeezed by the other
three parties to win the first parliamentary seat for the Communists in Canadian history.
Rose was elected to the House of Commons with thirty percent of the votes cast. Next
was Massé of the Bloc populaire, who garnered twenty-nine percent of the ballots, then
the Liberals’ Phillips at twenty-two percent, and finally Lewis and the CCF, with
nineteen percent.138
Why did the CCF fall short in Cartier? In hindsight, Lewis argued that the voting
pattern showed that the French-speaking vote went mainly to the Bloc-populaire, the nonJewish ethnic vote was divided between the Communist and the Liberal parties, and the
Jewish vote was split three ways.139 Canadian Forum stated that the Cartier results for
the CCF were not disappointing, but discouraging. The editors claimed that Rose
captured the district because he was well-established in the riding and he had a lavish
amount of money to spend.140 Phillips, the defeated Liberal candidate, told King “The
reason for Rose’s victory [and the Liberals defeat] was the strike at the aircraft factory
135. MG 26, J -13, Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, August 9, 1943, Library and
Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1.
136. MG 26, J -13, Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1.
137. MG 26, J -13, Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1.
138. Editorial, “The Cartier By-Election,” Canadian Forum 23, no. 262, (September 1943): 126.
Rose was elected to the House of Commons with thirty percent of the votes cast; Massé of the Bloc
populaire garnered twenty-nine percent of the ballots, with Liberal Phillips amassed twenty-two percent of
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which released a lot of men not only feeling against the government on account of the
strike, but released men, many of whom were foreigners. Many of these men were not
only angry with the government but were foreigners as well.”141 The Montreal Gazette
also alluded to the existence of a “strong-armed” machine operating on the ground for
both the Labour-Progressives and Liberal campaigns.142 In the aftermath of the campaign,
Lewis remained adamant that the election night tally was suspect. To that end, Lewis
wrote to the King government endorsing “the action of the Government and the Chief
Electoral Officer in pursuing further the investigation of the padding of the electoral
lists.”143 In addition to a review of the voter lists, Lewis demanded that the scope of the
inquiry be extended to investigating election day voting irregularities.144 There is no
evidence to indicate that such an investigation was conducted.
Despite the setback for Lewis and the CCF movement, the CCF Secretary exuded
optimism about the party’s immediate future. With little time to reflect on his electoral
defeat, Lewis remarked that the CCF as a movement continued to grow strong. Lewis
added that the CCF had finally reached the stage of seriously challenging for power.145
Notwithstanding the loss in Cartier, Lewis assessed the party’s position in late 1943 and
declared, “Those of us in charge of the direction of this movement at the present time are
fully aware not only of the opportunities which lie before us, but also of the
responsibilities upon us.”146 He closed his correspondence by claiming that the CCF was
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“planning for the day when the people of Canada will call upon us to direct the destinies
and future for our country.”147 While Lewis was optimistic regarding the CCF’s future,
Prime Minister King was nervous about the prospects for his Liberal Party. He hoped the
by-election defeats would help force “some of our people to realize that labour has to be
dealt with in a considerate way.”148 He added, “In my heart, I am not sorry to see the
mass of the people coming into their own, but I do regret that it is not a Liberal party that
is winning that position for them.”149 Clearly, King was lamenting that his government
had been slow to provide better conditions for the working people of Canada. He still
believed that his party could become the party of working Canadians, but there was no
guarantee that his colleagues would rise to the challenge. He observed, “It can still be that
our people will learn their lesson this time.”150 He feared that if lessons were not learned
that members of his Liberal caucus could well defect to the CCF.151

Improving Prospects in Québec
As events unfolded in 1943, it was evident the CCF was making great strides
across Canada. In August, the CCF went from zero seats to official opposition status in
Ontario. Later that month, Lewis amassed nearly twenty percent of the vote in a byelection held in the Montreal riding of Cartier. That result was the best the federal CCF
had ever achieved in any riding in Québec, and throughout the province there was
renewed interest in the CCF. From Chicoutimi to Québec City to Hull, requests for party
materials and suggestions on how to best break through to French-Canadian voters
147. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 38, File 4, Québec Elections, 1.
148. MG 26, J -13, Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, August 9, 1943, 5.
149. MG 26, J -13, Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, 5.
150. MG 26, J -13, Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, 5.
151. Pickersgill, Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 1, 1939-1944, 570-71.

268

arrived at national and provincial CCF offices. One of those letters came from Hull shoe
store owner Armand Ducharme. He wrote to the National CCF Office asking for party
literature to assist him in establishing the CCF in the region.152 Ducharme pointed out the
“Bloc populaire” was in favor in Québec because its leaders played on French Canadians’
“inferiority.”153 He added, “I think that if we could show the French-Canadians that their
real interest is not with superficial movements but with honest, real national parties like
the CCF, that they would gladly support a CCF government even in their own
province.”154 While Ducharme may have been guilty of wishful thinking, his opinions
were not far removed from the thoughts of the CCF leadership as to why the party had
failed to take root in Québec. However, by late summer 1943, certain events supported
the argument that the CCF was making significant headway in the province. To bolster
the party’s prospects in Québec, the CCF leadership heeded the words of Hubert Pearson
and provided funding for the provincial wing to hire a full-time organizer, Jacques
Casgrain.
Initially, the CCF—especially Lewis—was ecstatic with Casgrain’s work. The
national secretary wrote Casgrain in November 1943 to express his gratitude. Lewis
remarked, “Your taking on the work at this time is giving me new hope and inspiration
about the future of the CCF in Québec.”155 He was also positive about Casgrain’s grasp
of CCF policies, strong administrative skills and dedication to the CCF cause.156 Lewis
acknowledged that Casgrain’s work was difficult because of long hours, endless
152. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces – Québec, General Correspondences, 1932-1958,
letter from Armand Ducharme to CCF National Office, October 13, 1943, 1.
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administrative demands, and working with those who were not as committed to socialist
ideals.157 The national secretary added, “The most important attribute for our work is
patience with those who are learning, and firmness with those who are in the work for
reasons other than their devotion to the cause of the CCF.”158
This description would also fit Lewis quite neatly, and it is clear from this
correspondence that he viewed Casgrain as a French-Canadian version of himself. Thus,
Lewis’s disappointment was doubly great when Casgrain was fired the following year.
Still, in November 1943, Lewis believed Casgrain was the strong, French-Canadian
leader the party had lacked and had been seeking. Lewis offered his professional and
personal assistance to Casgrain, and added, “I hope to discuss with you, Frank and the
others the various problems of establishing an effective organization in Québec.”159
The federal CCF recognized that organizational issues persisted in Québec, and it
continued to search for answers to the problem. In Casgrain, the CCF hierarchy believed
it had the right person to tackle this vital issue. A plan was hatched that would bring
Lewis and Scott to the Québec City area for a series of meetings later in the month.
Casgrain took this opportunity to inform Lewis that he did not wish to see Harold Winch
on the speaker’s platform. Casgrain wrote, “Although I heartily agree with him, as I
understand what he means, he has done us immense harm in Québec.”160
The new Québec CCF organizer had other suggestions for Lewis and the others at
the National Office. He noted, “The trouble is that Socialism in the French language has a
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discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
160. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces – Québec, General Correspondences, 1932-1958,
letter from Jacques Casgrain to David Lewis, November 16, 1943, 1.
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suspicious meaning for Pope Pius XI, who said that a good Catholic can’t be a Socialist,
so that any reference to a Socialist state is ill-advised.”161 Casgrain also warned the
National Office that work needed to be done to clarify the party’s positions regarding
farm ownership, and controlling the means of production. He opined, “Socialization of
the means of production is too wide a sentence and also seems to go against small trade
and modest businesses.”162 Unless the party clarified its position on farm ownership and
allowed a degree of private enterprise, Casgrain feared, the centralization element of CCF
policy would frighten Québec voters.163
During their public speeches in Québec City, Lewis, Scott, and Casgrain tackled
each of these problem areas for the party in Québec. The November 28 public meeting
received extensive coverage from two French-language newspapers, Le Soleil and
L’Evenement, and one English publication, The Québec Chronicle-Telegraph, all of
which reported that this public meeting was the first of its kind for the CCF in Québec
City.164 That it took a decade from the party’s birth to hold a mass rally in the second
largest city in Québec is indicative of the slow pace of acceptance the CCF faced in
Québec and the party’s difficulty in organizing outside the Island of Montreal.
The French newspapers headlined the first meeting in Québec City and the CCF
call for the “equality and not domination of Québec.”165 The anglophone newspaper

161. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces, 1.
162. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces, 1.
163. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces, 1.
164. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces – Québec, General Correspondences, 1932-1958,
newspaper clipping from Le Soleil, 3, L’Évènement, 3, and The Québec Chronicle-Telegraph, 3,
November 29, 1943.
165. MG 28, IV -1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces – Quebec, General Correspondences, 1932 –
1958, newspaper clipping from Le Soleil, 3, L’Évènement 3, November 29, 1943.
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headline read, “Scott Predicts Happier Canada under CCF Rule.”166 Each Québec City
paper reported that the eight speakers on hand delivered the message that Canada would
be a “more just, happier and prosperous country when the CCF party comes into power,
which they foresaw would be after the next elections.”167 It appears that Scott, now
serving as the National CCF President, and Lewis read Casgrain’s recommendations and
addressed the issues the new Québec organizer had broached two weeks earlier. Scott,
speaking in French, explained that the CCF represented “the best form of Democratic
Socialism, embodying true Christian principles with human welfare being one of its
primary considerations.”168 He added that the CCF would attain power by constitutional
and legitimate methods and then establish “a new and better economic order.”169 Next,
Scott discussed private ownership by warning those in attendance “not to allow
themselves to be frightened by senseless “confiscation talk” of political adversaries.”170
Lewis, “speaking excellent French,” further clarified CCF intentions by stating “among
the many things we want and plan is state control of all natural resources and of large,
monopolistic industrial organizations.”171
Both men also broached the subject of centralization. Casgrain recommended
“MM Scott et Lewis ont declaré que leur parti est contre la centralization des pouvoirs à
Ottawa, tout en admettant que les choses qui s’avèreront d’intéret national devront être
administrées par le government fédéral.” [Messrs. Scott and Lewis have declared that
166. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces – Québec, General Correspondences, 1932-1958,
newspaper clipping from The Québec Chronicle-Telegraph, 3, November 29, 1943.
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newspaper clipping from Le Soleil, 3, L’Évènement, 3, and The Québec Chronicle-Telegraph, 3, November
29, 1943.
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their party is against the centralization of powers in Ottawa, while admitting that things
that are of national interest must be administered by the national government].172 Lewis
shed further light on CCF policies aimed at easing suspicion of the party from religious
and nationalist perspectives. “We will retain forever the bilingualism of our country and
full religious and individual liberty.”173
All three papers also referenced the question of anti-clerical remarks made by
Harold Winch. According to reports, each of the speakers accused the Canadian press of
deliberately distorting and misinterpreting the remarks of the party’s speakers, especially
the recent ones by Winch.174 Casgrain also explained, “Our party is not a Socialistic
movement in the sense understood in the Encyclical of Pope Pius XI.”175 He added that
the CCF brand of socialism was exempt from the Encyclical because “with regard to
class warfare, the abolition of the right of property, and the negation of the dignity of the
human person…the CCF does not adhere to any of these three mistaken ideas.”176 The
Chronicle-Telegraph concluded by noting that the speakers were well-received and that
the orderly crowd of 500 included a handful of women.177 The small female presence in
172. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces – Québec, General Correspondences, 1932-1958,
newspaper clipping from L’Évènement, 3, November 29, 1943.
173. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces – Québec, General Correspondences, 1932-1958,
newspaper clipping from The Québec Chronicle-Telegraph, 4, November 29, 1943.
174. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Provinces – Québec, General Correspondences, 1932-1958,
newspaper clipping from Le Soleil, 3, L’Évènement, 3, and The Québec Chronicle-Telegraph, 3, November
29, 1943.
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this measure but backed down when Godbout threatened to resign as premier and informed Cardinal
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strong anti-clerical views. Villeneuve and the Catholic Church immediately ceased their objections to the
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the crowd was emblematic of two realities: the male-dominated nature of Québec politics
of that era, and the CCF’s difficulties attracting women voters. These problems would
become more evident in subsequent elections.
Further proof of CCF advancement in Québec and the valuable work of Casgrain
surfaced in a letter to him from David Lewis in early December 1943. The CCF national
secretary wrote about how recent events were inspiring and a source of hope for the party
in Québec.178 Lewis exclaimed, “You have a right to feel great satisfaction with your first
accomplishments.” The CCF secretary was hopeful that this event helped prove to the
people of Québec how serious the CCF was regarding the concerns of French
Canadians.179 At long last, the leadership of the CCF believed that real headway was
being made in Québec. To that end, Lewis requested of Casgrain, “I should be very
grateful if you could from time to time find a few minutes to drop me a line on
progress.”180 Evidence that the party was making that progress in the province came in
December from Québec CCF Secretary Philippe Vaillancourt. Responding to
Vaillancourt, Lewis wrote, “I don’t know either what group is responsible for the little
pamphlet (“Gauche ou droite”), which you sent me. So far as I can see, it is part of the
general anti-CCF propaganda which is being put out across the country. This is just
another sign of the fact that the progress of the CCF has scared our opponents pretty
thoroughly.”181 Lewis optimistically closed by adding, “you have a very excellent group
of people and I have confidence that with the leadership of this group the CCF in Québec
bill. The motion passed Québec’s legislative chamber by a sixty-seven to nine vote. See Thérèse Casgrain,
Woman in a Man’s World (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), 88-94.
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and the district will make satisfactory progress.”182 Indeed, with the party making inroads in Québec, as well as the rapid expansion of the Ontario branch of the CCF, it
appeared that the CCF was clearing some of the barriers in the two provinces.

Powerful Forces Align Against the CCF
With the Ontario CCF’s breakthrough in Ontario in that province’s election, the
party was now a serious political force to be reckoned with across Canada. Gone were the
days when the CCF could be dismissed as a western and agricultural protest movement. It
had nearly won office in the Dominion’s most populous and most industrialized province
and gained legitimacy on the national political stage that it had not possessed previously.
It also garnered the attention of people adamantly opposed to the CCF and its brand of
Canadian socialism.
In December 1943, Harold Winch, leader of the British Columbia CCF, wrote to
Lewis about the “trap” enemies of the party were setting. Winch warned, “Things are
getting hot in the political arena and will undoubtedly get hotter in the next few months. I
am convinced in my own mind that the powers that be have decided on a major attack on
the CCF and its leadership.”183 He added, “Our opponents undoubtedly hope to catch us
in a crossfire from reaction on one side and Labor-Progressives on the other with the
wishful thought in view that they will be able to frighten away the weak support on one
hand and labor support on the other.”184 The “opponents” Winch was referring to were
media and business interests. He cited newspaper editorials that were written with the
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purpose of creating a divide among the CCF leadership.185 Winch asked Lewis to set up a
meeting with the prominent CCF figures to make certain the party leadership was in
agreement with strategies and policies.186
Such a conference was critical in Winch’s estimation. He was “convinced that we
have reached that stage of development and power which now causes governments,
finance and industry to really fear us and bring them to a determination that they will
fight us with every weapon they can lay their hands to.”187 Winch was absolutely correct
in this analysis. In a passage that would return to haunt the party, Winch cautioned, “there
is no need to emphasize that men occupying positions such as I do must watch what they
say because no matter what we say nor how we say it the opposing press and parties will
twist it to suit themselves.”188 Indeed, just one month later, Winch would land himself
and the CCF in political trouble with his public words. After the CCF surge in Ontario
during the 1943 provincial election, those elements opposed to the party unleashed an allout offensive, just as Winch had predicted. The British Columbia leader had made their
job a little bit easier.
In the fall of 1943, the very interests that Winch suspected would attack the CCF
began to organize in earnest.189 Of all the groups and individuals that openly opposed the
CCF, none had the gravitas and support to attack the party as fiercely as did Gladstone
Murray. Murray had been the head of the British Broadcasting Corporation during the
early years of that institution. When the Bennett government established a public radio
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network in Canada in 1934, it turned to Murray to repeat his success. While Murray was
instrumental in the development of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), he
also angered some for his heavy hand regarding political broadcasting.190 While private
media outlets were staunchly opposed to the CCF, party leaders had hoped to gain some
more positive airings with the recently established public broadcaster.
From the beginning, there was evidence that Murray and the CCF leadership had
conflicting views regarding the political role of the CBC.191 By 1940, the party felt the
CBC was being used as an instrument to maintain the political status quo, and that
Murray was the person driving that philosophy. In late 1940s, the CCF became upset
when several of Murray’s underlings at the CBC resigned because of political
interference on Murray’s part. One such case was Donald Buchanan’s resignation, which
became grist for the CCF caucus meeting of November 1940. At that meeting, David
Lewis stated, “The sole reason for Buchanan’s resignation was Mr. Murray’s reactionary
attitude in regards to some programs. Mr. Buchanan had been side-tracked at the time
because of his liberal attitude.”192
Lewis noted that the Liberal and Conservative Party leaders were given air time to
explain their parties’ war policies. Buchanan had asked the CCF to use the public
airwaves to explain their war positions, but Murray refused to grant the party an
opportunity to do so.193 The Caucus discussed bringing the issue to the House of
Commons, but Lewis rejected such a move because it would constitute interference with

190. Editorial, “C.B.C.”, The Canadian Forum 17, no. 196, (May 1937): 41.
191. Mary Vipond, The Mass Media in Canada, third edition (Toronto: James Lorimer and
Company, 2000), 140.
192. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 110, File 5, CCF Caucus Meeting Notes, 1937-1942, caucus meeting
of November 27, 1940, 17.
193. MG 28, IV-1, CCF Caucus Meeting Notes, 17.

277

the neutrality of the CBC. The CCF Caucus agreed that Coldwell would deal with the
matter in his forthcoming speech and urged a parliamentary committee to investigate.194
In addition to the Buchanan matter, the CCF also helped establish a parliamentary
committee to examine reports of Murray’s expense overcharges. Lewis noted these
investigations caused Murray to resign from the CBC and partially accounted for his
“violent anti-CCF rage.”195 Clearly, Murray was not keen on CCF efforts to shed light on
the activities at the CBC, and he would get revenge on his tormentors in the years to
follow.
As the party began to enjoy increasing popularity in 1942-1943, Gladstone
Murray would emerge as one of the chief architects of the anti-CCF campaign. In his
autobiography, Lewis further explained the motivation behind Murray’s CCF crusade: “I
had known Murray when he was general manager of the CBC, and had met him socially
a number of times. He was an imaginative and resourceful smoothie, with a wide
experience in the art of packaging ideas in words to suit any occasion. At one point, he
had posed as a friend of labour and as sympathetic to the aims of the CCF; yet, the better
I knew him, the less I trusted him.”196 After leaving the public broadcaster, Murray
offered his considerable public-relations skills to those who could pay for them, and he
soon emerged as the head of an organization that he called Responsible Enterprise.197
Lewis contended Murray’s operation was “supported by contributions from the country’s
corporate elite and devoted to the lucrative practice of CCF-bashing.”198 With the
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political fortunes of the CCF rising dramatically, it was time for Murray to inflict some
damage on Canada’s Socialist party.

Labor Aligns Behind the CCF
While the CCF’s list of enemies expanded rapidly after the Ontario election, so
too did its list of allies. After years of dithering about officially sanctioning any political
party, the Canadian Congress of Labour recommended the CCF be the political arm of
the union:
Whereas it is becoming increasingly apparent that organized Labour, if it is to
play its part in improving the welfare and economic status of the workers, must
take political as well as economic action, due to the inevitable and ever enlarging
control that governments are exercising over all aspects of economic life and
industry in this country; and
Whereas in the opinion of this Congress, the policy and program of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation more adequately expresses the viewpoint of
organized labour than any other party;
Therefore, Be It Resolved that this convention of the Canadian Congress of
Labour endorses the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation as the political arm
of labour in Canada, and recommends to all affiliated and chartered unions that
they affiliate with the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.199
That such a strong pronouncement came one month following the CCF’s stunning results
in Ontario, the largest and most industrial province, was not a coincidence. As such, an
important relationship was brought closer together. Despite the CCL’s endorsement of
the CCF, organized labor was not fully in the party’s camp. However, this announcement
indicated some trade union leaders felt their political objectives would be better served by
operating alongside the CCF.

199. MG 28, IV – 1, Volume 35, Québec General Correspondence, File 13-3, letter from David
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Socialism, 114.
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From this point forward, a number of leading trade unionists began to hold key
positions with the CCF.200 Charles Millard was one such leader. In the early 1940s,
Millard was the national director of the United Steelworkers and the most important
figure in the CIO in Canada.201 Unlike Gompers, Millard was a staunch believer that the
trade union movement should support a political party devoted to aiding working people.
Furthermore, he ran and was elected as a CCF Member of Provincial Parliament from
1943-1945, and again from 1948-1951.202
To help solidify the links between labor and the party, Ontario CCF leader Jolliffe
acted as counsel for both the Steelworkers and for other unions.203 This bond represents
only one part of the picture between the CCF and the trade union writ large. The mass
union support the party expected after the Canadian Congress of Labour affiliation
declaration never materialized. Caplan noted that Gomperites, Communists, Liberals, and
Conservatives all attempted to sabotage the CCL’s decision.204 Another obstacle was the
fact that even when trade union leaders did support the party, the rank and file
consistently followed more traditional voting patterns.205 The more conservative Trades
and Labour Congress stopped well short of endorsing the CCF at its 1943 convention.
Rather, it called upon unions to create political action committees. The following year,
the TLC emphasized its political neutrality, and stated it would support no political party.
Caplan noted that this stance was a great blow to the CCF.206
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Despite this mixed response from the labor movement, there can be no denying
that 1943 had produced many positive results for the CCF. It had built on the momentum
from the previous year in Ontario and Québec. The evidence was even more concrete in
Ontario, given the CCF’s strong showing in the provincial election that August. In
Québec, the improved state of the party was evident in David Lewis’s respectable
showing in the Cartier by-election, and in increased organizational efforts across the
province. The party, however, was still searching for its political breakthrough in the
province. With an election slated for 1944, the CCF would have another opportunity to
make its mark on the Québec stage.
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CHAPTER VII
THE CCF SITUATION IN QUEBEC: GROWING AND OTHER “PAINS,” 1944

Despite a number of events that had aided the CCF cause in 1943, several
stubborn problems persisted for the party in Québec in 1944. Differences had developed
between the provincial CCF organizer and the Cooperative Commonwealth Youth
Movement (CCYM) of the Québec Provincial Council, and National Secretary David
Lewis was not pleased.1 Lewis bluntly told CCYM's Harry Kraschinsky, “I hope that this
information will cause you to behave more responsibly at the next meeting of the
Provincial Council than you threaten to do. The situation in Québec is serious. Our
organization is small and is not yet being run in an effective way.”2 Lewis added that the
provincial organizer, Jacques Casgrain, had the complete confidence of the National
Executive and that the CCYM should give him the opportunity to do his job.3 He
remarked that, during the recent CCF convention, Casgrain “made a very profound
impression on all the delegates from coast to coast. It is no exaggeration to say that he
(Casgrain) represented the Québec section so as to bring credit on the CCF in that
province.”4 On the subject of a power struggle between Casgrain and the CCYM, Lewis
made his opinion clear to Kraschinsky: give the provincial organizer full support and
“desist immediately and entirely from any attitude of suspicion and antagonism.”5 One
might wonder if the Québec CCF was going through growing pains typical of any group
that is quickly gaining a political presence, or if this attitude of antagonism was brought
1. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 37, File 2, Québec General Correspondences, 1942-1944, letter from
David Lewis to Harry Kraschinsky, January 22, 1944, 1-2.
2. Lewis to Kraschinsky, 2.
3. Lewis to Kraschinsky, 2.
4. Lewis to Kraschinsky, 2.
5. Lewis to Kraschinsky, 2.
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on by another matter altogether. As events unfolded in 1944, it became abundantly clear
that this attitude was not a simple matter of growing pains and that the negative attitude
of the CCYM regarding Casgrain held strong elements of truth.
Early in the new year, Lewis wrote to Casgrain to seek his assistance in helping
the CCF candidate in Rouyn in the provincial election slated for later in 1944. David Côté
was planning on running for the CCF in the riding and he had written to the national
office for assistance. Côté was confident that a little help would wield positive results for
the party.6 Four years earlier, Côté had been involved in the federal election campaign
and by early 1944, the National Office was eyeing him as a possible candidate to become
the long-sought French-Canadian personality for the party in Québec. To aide in Côté’s
electoral efforts, Lewis dispatched Casgrain to Rouyn to provide needed support.7 Lewis
told Casgrain, “I shall contact Toronto immediately about having (Omar) Chartrand
spend a few weeks in Northern Québec and will let you know of the results.”8
Clearly, the results of the 1943 Ontario election were foremost in Lewis’s mind.
While the CCF in that province went from occupying no seats to being the Official
Opposition, it was in the northern sections (with extensive extractive workers) that the
party had achieved its most impressive victories. Lewis was hoping to replicate those
results in Québec and looked to the similar geographic and demographic regions to help
produce substantial gains for the Québec CCF.

6. MG 28, IV – 1, Québec General Correspondences, 1944-1947, letter from David Lewis to
Jacques Casgrain, February 26, 1944, 1. David Coté was mentioned earlier for his role in the 1940 federal
election campaign. At that time, Coté acted as the campaign manager for Theodore Prézeau in the
Montreal-St. Mary’s riding.
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While this dissertation has repeatedly criticized the CCF for questionable political
moves that helped undermine the party, Lewis, Casgrain, and the CCF leadership
deserved full credit this time for attempting to move beyond the Montreal-centric region
to gain a foothold in the province. Unfortunately, this letter to Casgrain also began the
downward slide in the relationship between the National Secretary and the Québec CCF
provincial organizer. In it, Lewis reminded Casgrain that the National Executive was
paying his salary, and was insistent that he begin to submit regular reports on his
activities and the general state of the party in Québec.9 The implication was quite clear:
the CCF National Office wanted to know what Casgrain was doing in Québec. Despite
the written assurances from Lewis that the CCF was extremely pleased with Casgrain’s
work in the province, there was a measured inference that they had to keep a close eye on
him. Did this wariness stem from an element of English-Canadian racism toward the
work habits of French Canadians? It is also possible that Lewis and the other Ottawabased leaders were keen on keeping a tight grip on what was taking place in Québec and
thus felt a need to know every move being made by Casgrain.
Evidence of the control Lewis desired can be found with the anticipated launch of
a French-language periodical, Le Canada Nouveau, by the CCF in Québec. Lewis wrote
to Casgrain in February 1944, asking for all the details of the content of the first issue.10
As was often the case, Lewis offered unsolicited advice. He suggested that the first issue
contain a “pretty full analysis of the Bloc in light of their recent convention and the

9. Lewis to Casgrain, 1. Note some of the earlier comments by Squire Blackwell and Lewis about
French-Canadians as being untrustworthy—especially in the realm of finances.
10. MG 28, IV – 1, Québec General Correspondences, 1944-1947, letter from David Lewis to
Jacques Casgrain, February 9, 1944, 1.
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publicity which it received. It is important that we show it up for what it is in clear and
strong terms.”11
There is no doubt that Lewis had only the best interest of the party in mind during
every speech, in his correspondence, or in every action he took as party secretary. There
is also almost no question that Lewis’s tone left his audience with the impression that he
did not entirely expect others to always do the “right” thing. In this instance, Casgrain
responded to Lewis, “I have already written the Provincial Offices of the CCF regarding
Le Canada Nouveau and expect their answer soon. I have also written a strong article
about “Le Bloc” for the next edition of Le Canada Nouveau.”12 The following month
brought more evidence of Lewis’s involvement with this publication. He wrote that he
would read the contents and send further recommendations to Casgrain.13 If Casgrain
harbored any resentment regarding Lewis’s suggestions for the paper or the desire for the
National Office to produce an in-depth report of his organizing activities, it failed to
emerge in any of his correspondences with Lewis or any other national office staff
member. On March 1, 1944, Casgrain wrote of his travels across Québec during the
previous month. Here, the provincial organizer wrote of his many meetings on the Island
of Montreal, Québec City, Sherbrooke, Rouyn, and Val d’Or.14
Of these visits, Casgrain was most enthusiastic about the time spent in Rouyn,
where he witnessed “la plus grande assemblée’ CCF à date et j’y ai fondé un Club de 40

11. Lewis to Casgrain, February 9, 1944. Lewis understood that his suggestion came across as
paternalistic intervention. He added, “Probably the idea has already occurred to you. In this case, forgive
me for writing about it.”
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285

membres.”15 In addition, Casgrain reported of his media outreach efforts, producing Le
Canada Nouveau, and representing the party on five radio broadcasts.16 By all accounts,
Casgrain was doing all that the members of the CCF leaders in Ottawa and Montreal
could expect of him. However, the relationship between Casgrain and the party soon
soured and the CCF in Québec was harmed as a result.
Given the party’s precarious financial position, employees of the CCF were not
well compensated for their labor. Jacques Casgrain was no exception. When he was hired
in November 1943, Casgrain asked for an advance to help him get situated. Each month,
the National Office would deduct part of that advance from his check. In March 1944,
Casgrain wrote to the CCF leadership in Ottawa asking them to suspend these
deductions.17 The Québec CCF organizer explained to CCF Assistant Treasurer Harry
Dalton, “I had this month to move to a new apartment, buy some furniture, pay a heavy
boarding school bill for my little daughter which will mean that it will take me at least
three more months to get even and balance my budget.”18 Casgrain’s salary was $200 a
month, with another $50 added for expenses. Beginning in January 1944, Casgrain
started to pay back the advance paid to him on December 1, 1943.19 He added that this
deduction in salary was compounded because of the high cost of living in Montreal. As a
result, Casgrain requested the party “postpone until further notice the reimbursement of
said advance and I shall expect my pay cheque as usual on April 1st.”20 To emphasize
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how financially stressed he was, Casgrain closed by stating, “otherwise, my family and
myself will starve for we are living hand to mouth.”21 Perhaps it was merely coincidental
that Casgrain highlighted his dire fiscal situation after receiving several condescending
letters from David Lewis. Regardless, it was clear that some tension was emerging
between the National Office and its Québec organizer. From this point until Casgrain’s
termination, relations between the two parties remained professional, but lacked the
warmth of the Québec organizer’s early months with the CCF.
Despite this cooling, evidence suggests that Casgrain’s efforts were paying
dividends in Québec. The Québec organizer informed Lewis that the French-language
newspaper had done very well in its first month. He noted, “Regards to Le Canada
Nouveau, you will be delighted to know that we sold 885 copies over the Island of
Montreal—March issue—on the news stands without any publicity whatsoever.”22 For
further proof of increased interest in the CCF, Casgrain requested 500 copies of
Democratic Socialism, by Dr. Carlyle King from the National Office.23 It took Lewis
nearly one week to reply to Casgrain. In that correspondence, the National Secretary
promptly replied that 500 copies of Democratic Socialism had been shipped to Casgrain.
He added that he was “tickled that you sold 885 copies of Le Nouveau Canada on the
news stands. That is really an excellent start.”24 While pleased with these results, Lewis
did not shower praise on Casgrain as he had after previous achievements by the Québec
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organizer. In addition, Lewis took Casgrain to task for failing to understand that English
CCF party membership cards existed that provided for monthly club dues.25
Lewis also addressed two issues that Casgrain had identified in the Frenchlanguage press that had put the CCF in a bad light in Québec. Both occurred at the
Ontario CCF Convention the weekend of April 8-10, 1944. The first issue occurred when
a member of the Ontario CCF delegation, M.J. Allen, accused French Canadians of
taking war-time industrial jobs in the Niagara Peninsula, while avoiding active military
service. The second, when there was motion for cooperation with the Labor-Progressive
Party, which was defeated by a narrow 529-470 margin at the Ontario CCF Convention.26
Both were sore points for the CCF in Québec. Casgrain asserted they “create a
bad impression” of the party and sought Lewis’s advice on how best to deal with these
issues.27 Lewis responded that “My own judgment would be that the matters had better be
left alone. The unfortunate incident regarding the remark of Allen of Niagara Falls about
French-Canadians must be left to be forgotten as soon as possible.”28 Regarding the
cooperation proposal, Lewis said the motion was intended to weaken the CCF by
associating it with the communists. He added that such a ploy was destined to fail
because Canadian voters clearly understood the differences between the two parties.29
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In this instance, Casgrain’s political acumen regarding the negative consequences of
these reports (especially in Québec) may have been more correct than Lewis’s assertion
that people would easily see through these events. Casgrain deferred to the National
Office and he did not respond to either of these articles to explain the CCF’s positions.
Very shortly after this exchange of letters, Casgrain and the Québec CCF parted ways.30
Another example of the Québec branch of the CCF inflicting injury upon itself
took place in January 1944. Just one month previous, the leader of the British Columbia
CCF, Harold Winch, had written to David Lewis stressing the need for people to be
careful of their public pronouncements. Yet, it was Winch who quickly landed himself
and the party in political trouble by making derogatory remarks toward Catholics, who
constituted a significant majority in the province of Québec as well as a substantial group
in the rest of Canada. Lewis quickly admonished Winch for such poor judgment. “In my
view it is wrong both in fact and theory to lump the “Church of Rome” into one
reactionary block,” Lewis wrote.31 He continued: “There is no doubt that the Church as
an institution has a pretty dark record, and there is also no doubt that as an institution it is
for certain to be on the side of reaction for some time. However, we should not lose sight
of the genuine divisions which are discernible in the Church itself.”32
The National Secretary offered examples of the divide that emerged among
Catholics due to the Spanish Civil War and the “unequivocal condemnation of Father
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Coughlin and that section of the Catholic Church in the United States.”33 Returning to
Canadian political life, Lewis remarked, “In view of the inescapable fact that almost half
of our people in Canada belong to that church it is surely our strategic duty to encourage
the small progressive group in the church rather than doing anything which might agitate
potential supporters.”34 Winch’s remarks came on the heels of an article in the CCF
News, headquartered in Vancouver, that highlighted some of the anti-clerical elements
within the party. It stated that despite the Bishop’s declaration the previous year, the CCF
was still condemned in Québec.35
Hilary Brown also took the Catholic leaders to task for their collaboration with
fascism before and during the war. She highlighted papal support of Mussolini’s Italy,
Franco’s Spain, and the “Padlock Laws” instituted by the Duplessis government in the
late 1930s. Furthermore, the article criticized the Church for being “overly active” in the
political and social beliefs of its members.36 While there was a great deal of truth behind
these basic tenets, they were not politically wise declarations to make. This was just
another issue where a degree of anti-clerical attitude among some of the Western CCF
leaders placed the National Office in a difficult political spot. It is worth noting that
Winch had placed himself and the CCF in a difficult position just one month before. He
was asked a hypothetical question of what a CCF government would do to groups who
refused to accept the change to socialism. Winch replied that those who defied laws put
in place by the CCF would be treated as “criminals and would be handled by the police
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and military.”37 Comments of this nature did not help the party and provided ample
ammunition to those entities opposed to the CCF.

External Pain: The Anti-CCF Campaign
As 1944 commenced, there was evidence that the written campaign against the
CCF had gathered a great deal of momentum due to the party’s electoral success in
Ontario in August 1943. The following January, David Lewis received a letter from the
Reverend Edis Fairburn of Windermere, Ontario. The letter from the United Church of
Canada minister stated he had been receiving pamphlets written by “Edward Highe” and
that these informational brochures were “written in Dickensian style, appealing to the
unthinking, and obviously designed to head off any public interest in social security and
the change requisite therefore.”38 The Reverend reported to Lewis that he had contacted
the company that distributed these pamphlets and asked to speak with “Mr. Highe,” only
to discover it was merely a pen name, although the company attempted to assure
Reverend Fairburn that it was “reputable.”39 Fairburn said that the pamphlets were part of
a well-funded campaign to attack movements promoting progressive social change. He
added that these brochures were making an impact among “certain types of people.”40
Fairburn also urged the CCF to counter with clearly and attractively written material by
reputable persons or groups.41
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Lewis responded less than a week later and confirmed that the CCF was well
aware of the organized attacks on the party. “There are several across Canada whose
special and sole purpose is to put out propaganda against the CCF and for so-called “free
enterprise,” the CCF Secretary remarked.42 Lewis stated that one of the propaganda
organizations was being operated by the former manager of the CBC, Gladstone
Murray.43 He added that Murray was not alone in assaulting the party of Canadian
socialism. Though he did not mention these other parties by name, Lewis confirmed that
“There are two or three special funds in Toronto which are used not only by Mr. Murray
but by other people and organizations for the same purpose.” He further asserted that
these groups were financially supported by banking institutions and other large Canadian
corporations.44 Lewis informed Fairburn that the CCF was “seeking to do what we can to
counteract this campaign and hope shortly to issue a number of pieces of literature,
simply written, to set forth the CCF program as clearly and directly as we can.”45 While
Fairburn had expressed hope the CCF would answer these charges with an effective
campaign of its own, Lewis, understanding the party’s limited resources, offered only
vague promises of a straight-forward charge that would be easily understood by Canadian
voters.
In short, Lewis knew he could not match the onslaught of corporate Canada and
had little choice but have the CCF state its case. He hoped that citizens could correctly
understand who was telling the “truth” and which political and economic group upheld
the best interests of Canadian society. One thing is certain: the fact that numerous
42. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 43, File 4, Ontario General Correspondence, January-December 1944,
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corporate entities were now attacking the CCF clearly indicated the level of discomfort
the party’s growing public support was creating in Canadian board rooms. To add
substance to this claim, Boyko wrote that the Canadian business community was active in
attacking socialism in general, and the CCF in particular. In doing so, they created the
discursive terrain for the debate and played fast and loose with facts. He asserted that this
helped to instigate fear and confusion among voters and hindered the CCF’s ability to
sufficiently respond to the fabrications.46

Attacking the Attackers—The CCF Strikes Back
Despite Lewis’s contention that voter education was the best way for the CCF to
beat back the slanderous charges brought against the party by opponents, the party was
not averse to another method to quash the disinformation campaign: instigate legal
action. In a letter to James Carey of the CIO, Lewis explained the battle the CCF had
been facing since late 1943. “About a year ago a group of reactionaries in Toronto,
financed by a shyster business man, ran a series of vicious advertisements against a
number of CCF people in that city who were at the time running for civic office,” Lewis
stated.47 He argued that these unscrupulous advertisements attempted to brand the CCF,
and the people associated with the party, as communists in disguise. Lewis remarked,
“The campaign became so bad that our people in Toronto decided to sue the guy for libel,
which they promptly did.”48 In the short-term, Lewis remarked that this strategy stemmed
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the tide of attacks. He noted that the immediate result was that all the advertisements
stopped and that this partial objective was achieved without loss of time.49
James Carey served as Secretary-Treasurer for the CIO and there was a reason for
Lewis corresponding with him: his organization was likely to become involved in the
case against the CCF. Lewis informed Carey that one of the defendants, Mr. Sanderson
“intends in his defense to not only drag in the CCF but also the CIO and smear the latter
as heavily as us.”50 In writing Carey, Lewis asked for his help to answer Sanderson’s
accusations. Lewis was keen on going on the offensive to protect his party and his trade
union allies. He argued, “I think it important not to let him get away with his smear of the
CIO any more than his attacks on the CCF.”51

The CCF Gains a Toehold in Québec
The 1944 election in the province of Québec offered the CCF another chance to
capture a seat in the provincial legislature. While much of this work has been focused on
what the party did to alienate voters across Central Canada and especially in Québec, in
this instance, the CCF hierarchy in Ottawa and Montreal diligently worked to bring about
that elusive Québec CCF triumph.
For the provincial campaign, Rouyn-Noranda was targeted by the CCF leadership
as one of the ridings where the party could emerge victorious.52 Located in the northwest
corner of Québec, this district represented a new electoral configuration for the 1944
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vote. Indeed, the area itself had only developed in the previous two decades with the
discovery of copper in the region. Thus, not only was Rouyn-Noranda “new” politically,
it was also a riding with a heavy concentration of industrialized workers, which the CCF
saw as an element that worked to its advantage.53 All industrial elements, including the
copper, nickel, and uranium mines of Northern Ontario and Québec, materially benefited
during war time. This was especially true after the fall of France in June 1940 and the
establishment of the Department of Munitions and Supply.54 Lewis noted that RouynNoranda was unlike other constituencies in Québec because there was a larger proportion
of English-speaking workers in the mines and the dominant union was the United Steel
Workers of America, as opposed to the more conservative Canadian and Catholic
Confederation of Labour (CCCL).55 Both of these factors improved the chances for the
CCF in the district.
The largest advantage, however, came in the form of its candidate for office,
David Coté. Born in Montreal, Coté had only moved to Rouyn less than a year earlier.56
Despite being new to the community, Coté had earned high marks for his ability to
organize workers and came to Rouyn to perform just such tasks for the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1943.57 Just twenty-nine years old, Coté was driven and
hard-working. During the election campaign, he would need these acquired skills and,
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like most politicians, a little luck. The first break for Coté was the large number of
candidates seeking to represent the people of Rouyn-Noranda in the provincial
legislature. At one point, there were nine candidates for the district. In total, eight
candidates received votes on Election Day.58 Moreover, Coté was aided by evenly
divided opponents. There were three liberal candidates: one was from the Liberal Party
and the other two operated as independent liberal candidates. Other parties contesting the
seat included the Bloc populaire, the Union Nationale, Social Credit, and one write-in
candidate.59
The region’s largest newspaper, La Frontiere, was in a quandary when it came
time to endorse a candidate. The paper’s editor, Julien Morrissette, normally a supporter
of the provincial Liberal Party, was unhappy with Premier Adelard Godbout’s
willingness to surrender provincial powers to Ottawa during the war. Nor was Morrissette
enthusiastic with the other major party in Québec, the Union Nationale.60 During the
election campaign, Godbout attempted to keep the focus on strictly provincial issues. His
government had granted women the right to vote in Québec and had created Hydro
Québec (for Montreal only).61 Duplessis, on the other hand, was keen to highlight the
Godbout government’s supportive relationship with a federal Liberal Party that had
promised no conscription (1940) and then sought a plebiscite (1942) to extract the King
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government from that very pledge.62 Ultimately, Morrissette and La Frontiere opted to
remain neutral on the issue of endorsement in Rouyn-Noranda. In its election editorial,
the paper stated it encouraged people to vote in this important election, but chose to
abstain from selecting a candidate due to the number of parties contesting the election.
Furthermore, the paper remarked that “whoever is elected would receive a small plurality
of votes.”63
As Lewis had experienced in the Cartier by-election the year before, political
operatives were at work against the CCF during the homestretch of the provincial
election in Rouyn-Noranda. Three weeks before the election, one of the other campaigns
started a rumor that Coté was planning to pull out of the race. The CCF standard-bearer
quickly and categorically denied such talk.64 As noted above, the party leadership
recognized that the district offered the party one of its best opportunities for victory. To
that end, the Québec CCF Provincial Council voted in late April 1944 to lend as much
assistance as possible to all candidates, especially those in industrial ridings.65 In the case
of Rouyn-Noranda, the council followed up these words with action. CCF luminaries
Frank Scott, David Lewis, (MP) Grace McInnis, and national leader M.J. Coldwell all
campaigned in the riding on Coté’s behalf.66 Lewis, in particular, took an active role in
assisting Coté’s efforts. The CCF National Secretary stated that he “spent considerable
time helping the two-month- old party organize for the election. The most important task
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was the need to persuade the local priests that we were not Communists or antiChurch.”67
On this score, Coté and Lewis were successful. Lewis declared, “Most of the local
clergy accepted our explanations and did nothing to discourage their flock from working
and voting for the CCF.”68 This time, the CCF was rewarded for their efforts in the
riding. On August 8, 1944, the party officially broke into the “winners” column in the
province of Québec when David Coté was narrowly elected as a member of the
Provincial Assembly with twenty-one percent of the vote. The CCF candidate squeaked
by Bloc populaire candidate Maurice Caoutte by less than 300 votes.69 Although the win
was narrow, Lewis was jubilant the party had finally “made a start in Québec.”70 Coté’s
victory was the lone highlight of the 1944 Québec provincial election for the CCF. The
party contested twenty-four of the ninety-one districts and captured less than three
percent of the popular vote.71 Despite the Coté breakthrough, it was still an
underwhelming evening for the CCF and its followers in Québec. The party had also held
out hope of winning the Verdun riding. Lewis claimed the CCF efforts had been
hamstrung by political slight-of-hand practiced by rival politicians: “Our opposition
played a trick which was not uncommon in those days; they persuaded a former mayor of
Verdun, who had absolutely no connection with us, to run as ‘Independent CCF.’
Although he was not elected, he polled enough votes to defeat the official CCF standardbearer, or so we believed.”72 At the election post-mortem on August 20, 1944, the
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Provincial Council admitted that the results were “extremely disappointing for the CCF
and that the results would set the party back years in the province.” Despite this gloomy
forecast, the council resolved to keep fighting and to place a greater emphasis on
developing the organization of the party in Québec.73
Not all members of the Québec CCF were discouraged by the results. Frank Scott
offered a four-page summary of the 1944 Québec election and declared the glass half-full
for the CCF. Scott urged CCF partisans to “look at the deeper implications of the vote. It
is clear that there was a swing away from the Liberals, although they still polled 45,000
more votes than the victorious Union Nationale.”74 Scott claimed that Liberal Premier
Adelard Godbout had “given the kind of mildly progressive government we are
accustomed to see from Liberals, spotted with a reactionary move directed particularly
toward labour.”75 He maintained that the Union Nationale was the chief beneficiary of a
campaign that was based on “the issue of provincial autonomy, coupled of course with an
anti-conscription drive.”76 This allowed incoming Premier Maurice Duplessis to “capture
a great deal of the vague protest against wartime controls as well as the more anticonscription feeling.”77 Scott also discussed the poor showing of the Bloc populaire and
how this would benefit the CCF in the future. He noted how the anti-conscription Bloc
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populaire had managed to claim victory in just four of eighty ridings it contested. Scott
explained, “Their setback was a positive result of the campaign.”78
Looking at the Bloc’s result through the lens of economic determinism, Scott said,
“There is a good deal of anti-capitalist sentiment in the Bloc. Much of their rank and file
is not cast in favour of isolation as against the present economic system and the old
parties who support it. The canalizing of this sentiment into a constructive democratic
channel, and away from the blind alley of the Bloc, can only be accomplished by the
CCF.”79 Turning his analysis to his own party, Scott reported the CCF results were not
discouraging. He declared, “There is no use expecting quick results in Québec, and
certainly no use expecting victories until a great deal more time and money is spent on
education and organization than has yet been the case.”80 Scott also argued that fear was a
motivating factor in this election. He maintained that “in English-speaking districts a fear
of worse things made many people vote Liberal, whose sympathies were with the
CCF.”81 Likewise, Scott wrote that in the rest of Québec, voters were uncomfortable with
the CCF and that the party’s socialist policies were too new to be readily accepted.82 That
unpleasant reality led Scott to the conclusion that “Clearly a good programme is no
substitute for organization, and on that the Québec CCF must now concentrate.”83
On the point of woeful organization, Scott and the Provincial Council marched in
locked step. Surprisingly, David Coté’s name was not mentioned at the Provincial
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Council’s electoral review session, although it certainly was brought up a few months
later. In December 1944, the Québec Executive Council met with the CCF Member of
Legislative Assembly (MLA). At that time, the MLA discussed how it wanted to work
with Coté and have him act as the face and the voice of the party in Québec.84 Coté
accepted this responsibility, and the CCF hierarchy believed they had finally located a
credible French-Canadian figure to lead the party in Québec. Only time would tell if the
CCF MLA was up to the challenge.

The CCF and the Future of Canadian Socialism in the Post-War Period
In September 1944, Mackenzie King delivered a speech to a closed meeting of the
Reform Club in Québec City, where he declared that the war was going well and that it
seemed evident that the conflict would soon be over.85 Granatstein noted that major shifts
had occurred within Canadian society during the war years. He wrote that public
confidence was markedly improved from the pre-war era and that much of that
confidence sprang from a feeling that Canada had the resources and ability to provide a
good life for all.86 Furthermore, the war years produced a populace which believed their
government was a positive factor and trusted them to operate key industries, establish
state health insurance, family allowances, and other social-welfare measures.87
At the same time that King was quietly announcing that the war was near
completion, Lewis was travelling to Great Britain to address representatives from labor
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parties from the British Commonwealth. The meeting was the brainchild of Lewis and
CCF leader M.J. Coldwell. The pair felt it would be useful for the “labour” parties of the
British Commonwealth, especially the Labour Party governments elected in New Zealand
and Australia, and the Labour Party partnership with the government in Britain.88 Lewis
pressed the British Labour Party to initiate a conference of all the Commonwealth labor
parties to discuss the peace negotiations and the post-war world. He argued, “It is a
matter of the utmost importance that the Labour Parties of the Commonwealth meet and
arrive at some common policy regarding the peace negotiations and international order
which will follow the defeat of the Nazis in Europe.”89 Lewis provided delegates with a
brief history of Canadian socialism during his speech and predicted short-term electoral
events in Canada. Lewis offered both praise and severe criticism of Canadian governance
during the war years. He remarked that the King government had done a “splendid job”
in terms of overcoming vested interests in terms of military production.90
Lewis’s kind words for the Canadian government ended there. “We have the same
story as you [in Britain] have. We have our controls in the hands on the people who need
to be controlled,” he said, referring to the Liberal government’s policy of allowing
Canadian business leaders a large degree of influence in the war effort.91 He sharply
noted, “Our government has been particularly reactionary and particularly stupid in its
labor policy during the war—it has given the organized Labor Movement as little voice
as possible in the running of the show.”92
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After critiquing the war record of the King administration, Lewis described how
the CCF came into being. He told delegates that Canada shared a “Horatio Alger attitude”
with the United States. Lewis claimed that this mentality was so strong in Canada that “It
guaranteed that no large-scale socialist movement was possible in our country until
1930.”93 Lewis took time to differentiate the development of Canadian Socialism from
Commonwealth Labour Parties. “All other [labour] parties in the Commonwealth are
based mainly on Trade Unions,” he argued. “The formation of the CCF was actually
initiated by the farmers of Western Canada.”94 While acknowledging the recent affiliation
of the Mineworkers Union and other small trade union groups, Lewis lamented that the
larger unions (AFL and CIO) did not join with the CCF as corporate bodies, despite
repeated party invitations.95
The recent election of the first CCF government in the province of Saskatchewan
permitted the National Secretary to crow about the agrarian socialism that was unique to
Canada. Lewis pointed out that many prairie farmers came from Northern Europe and
had “the traditions of the Scandinavian countries in co-operative and Socialist thought
and experience of independent political action.”96 Lewis added that these Western
farmers were dependent on foreign trade which, in turn, led to the development of
cooperatives for marketing of farm products.97 All these factors contributed to the
“political awakening of the Western farmers of Canada on a wider scale and in a deeper

93. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 27.
94. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 28-29.
95. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 28.
96. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 29.
97. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 29.
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way than with the industrial workers of Canada. As a single group, the Western farmers
took progressive political action before the industrial workers.”98
Despite the CCL resolution to align with the CCF as its political arm in 1943, the
mass union support the party expected never materialized. While some educational work
was performed and leaflets were printed, these meager efforts were a disappointment to
CCF leaders who expected the political action committees to raise funds and field
organizers for the party.99 Lewis next touched on one of the consequences of laggard
response from the larger trade unions: financial difficulties for the party of Canadian
socialism. He noted, “We are suffering very greatly from lack of funds in the CCF and,
therefore, [have] a lack of adequate organization and adequate work by our
movement.”100 While not calling out the AFL or CIO by name, Lewis was clear where
the blame for the sorry state of the CCF’s finances existed. This situation was all the
more frustrating for the CCF due to the explosion in the size of union membership; its
ranks swelled to 831,000 by the end of the war, compared to 359,000 in 1939.101
Furthermore, dismayed with the underwhelming records of the Liberals and
Conservatives, organized labor viewed the CCF as the potential vehicle developments in
labor relations. Labor and the CCF were in agreement in regards to advancing labor
98. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 29. This progressive action led to the election
of the first CCF government in June 1944. Tommy Douglas led the CCF to a landslide victory in the
Saskatchewan election, thus becoming the first socialist government elected in North America. The CCF
captured fifty-three percent of the vote to win fifty-two seats in the fifty-seven member Saskatchewan
legislature. The previous year, Liberal Premier W. J. Patterson extended the life of his government for an
additional year. Patterson explained that holding an election in the fifth year of its mandate would “make a
heavy drain on gasoline and tires, upset business, and would cause dissension when unity should be the first
concern.” The CCF responded the extension was not reasonable. They argued that to be fighting for
democracy abroad while casting off the forms of democracy at home was hypocritical. See “Saskatchewan
House Extends Life Another Year,” The Federationist, April 22, 1943.
99. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 116. Caplan also noted that while the CCL
offered unenthusiastic support much of the labor movement did not bother to assist the party at all.
100. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 30.
101. James Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
and the Dream of a Working-Class Future (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 297.
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issues, yet the TLC and CCL were less enthusiastic about much of the rest of the CCF
program.102 Without the financial support provided to other labor parties in the
Commonwealth, Lewis explained that the CCF was funded entirely by membership dues
and from small contributions from workers and farmers. As a result, the party had only
two full-time staff positions, secretary and research director, and an annual budget of
$35,000 for a country of 11.5 million people.103

Lewis’s Short-Term Predictions for the CCF
After explaining the genesis of Canadian Socialism, as it was promoted and
developed through the CCF, Lewis then offered his predictions for the party in the
immediate future. He pronounced, “I think it could be said without any exaggeration that
the CCF is now a major political force in Canada, and that there is every likelihood that
after the next Federal Election the CCF will be either the first or second party in the
Federal Parliament. It is quite possible that after the next Federal Election no party will
have a majority in Federal Parliament and the CCF may possibly be the largest single
group.”104 The CCF National Secretary also created a scenario in which “The CCF could
likely be the second largest party in the Canadian Parliament and will be the alternative to
the old-line parties in our country.”105 Early in 1944, Time magazine predicted a division
of political power that could witness the CCF forming a minority government. In
addition, in August, a Financial Post reporter expected the CCF to win one hundred to
one-hundred ten seats, the Liberals eighty to ninety seats, and the rest scattered among

102. Naylor, The Fate of Labour Socialism, 298-99.
103. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 30.
104. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 30.
105. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 30.
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other parties. A Maclean’s editorial in November was entitled, “Split Vote May Bring
Socialism.”106
To achieve this breakthrough, Lewis explained the party’s main planks in the
upcoming federal campaign: “We are trying to get the Canadian people to learn the
lessons which this war should teach them. That is to say, in order to have full
employment and a programme of social security, it will be necessary to have a national
plan for peace as well as war.”107 To achieve that end, Lewis insisted that the Canadian
government would have to commit to an ever-expanding role through social ownership
and greater control of the Canadian economy.108 Lewis recognized that the degree of
federal “ownership” of the Canadian economy would run into constitutional issues
because of the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments.
However, he went on record as saying “The CCF has always been in favour of amending
the Canadian Constitution to give the Federal Parliament power to deal with problems in
the forefront of our policy. The political situation in Canada is that the Liberal Party will
likely become the major Capitalist party and the Conservative Party in Canada will take a
similar place to that of the Liberal Party in Great Britain, because our Liberal Party is as
conservative as your Conservative Party.”109 Lewis concluded with two observations. The
first was that he and other party members were “convinced that the Canadian people are
increasingly ready for the Socialist programme of the CCF.”110 He was certain that voters
were ready for fundamental and economic change; even if they might not understand the
106. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 142-43. Despite these predictions of a possible
CCF government, Caplan notes that the party’s support had declined to twenty-four percent in the
September 1944 Gallup Poll. That same poll indicated Conservative support had slumped to twenty-nine
percent, and that the Liberals had gone from thirty percent to thirty-six percent in the previous six months.
107. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 30.
108. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 31.
109. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 31.
110. David Lewis papers, “The Situation in Canada,” 31.

306

technical issues involved.111 The second was that the CCF should not dilute its policies.
He asserted that Canadians were seeking “imaginative, courageous and determined
leadership” to pursue an “imaginative, courageous and radical policy.” To accomplish
this, Lewis stated the CCF must maintain its principles and not sacrifice them for political
expediency.112
In the follow up to his report, Lewis was questioned on topics ranging from CCF
farm mortgage policy, to trade union affiliation and cooperation, to the situation in
Québec. On the last topic, Lewis said, “The Québec people have a strong nationalist
feeling that is pro French-Canadian.”113 Expanding on that issue, Lewis discussed the
emergence of André Laurendeau’s Bloc populaire party in Québec, saying, “The party
sprang up on the conscription issue. They call themselves anti-imperialist, their argument
being that Canada was in the war because of her imperial connections.”114 Lewis stated
that the Bloc populaire was “heavily defeated in the last provincial election, which
indicates that a purely nationalist party is not accepted by the French-Canadian
people.”115 Lewis concluded his remarks about the political situation in Québec by
claiming, “The organization of the trade union movement in Québec has made it possible
for the CCF to make great progress there.”116
Clearly, Lewis’s assessment of the fates of the Bloc populaire and the CCF in the
1944 Québec election was viewed through highly partisan glasses. True, the CCF did
break through in the province; still, the party captured only one seat (Rouyn-Noranda) in
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the Provincial Assembly and garnered only two-and-a-half percent of the vote. Indeed,
the party contested just one-quarter of the ninety-one provincial ridings. While the
election results were quite disappointing for the Bloc populaire, they were vastly superior
to the tally produced by the CCF. The Bloc won four seats in the provincial legislature
and ran candidates in eighty of the ninety-one districts. Furthermore, the Bloc amassed
nearly fifteen percent of the votes cast. For Lewis to proclaim that French-Canadians had
rejected the nationalism of the Bloc populaire and to state the CCF was making “great
progress” in Québec was dubious. If anything was being rejected in the province, it
would appear it was socialism of the Canadian variety.

Feeding the Perception
Part of the common French-Canadian complaint against the CCF in Québec was
the foreign nature of the party. In this case, “foreign” was code for “English.” The CCF’s
participation in a conference of Commonwealth Labour parties certainly did nothing to
take the sting out of those accusations. Nor did it help when the party representatives the
CCF sent to this conference were all anglophones. Aside from Lewis, they included
Coldwell (national leader), and fellow members of Parliament Percy Wright
(Saskatchewan), and Angus McInnis (British Columbia). The lone Québecker in the
group was Frank Scott. Despite his fluency in French, Scott was deemed a typical English
Québec CCF figure: he was a well-educated university professor from an upper middleclass background, living in Montreal. In short, he was not representative of French
Canadians.
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The records do not indicate that efforts were made to locate a suitable FrenchCanadian leader to attend the conference of Commonwealth Labour parties. Evidence
does not exist, however, that French Canadians were outraged that the CCF had attended
a Commonwealth conference without a bona fide French-Canadian. The point to be made
is that when the party was tagged with the English/foreign label in French-Canada, it had
a difficult time countering otherwise. As Young stated, the CCF in Québec had English
Canadians who were ignorant of French-Canadian rights and spoke to voters in the
province with an English accent.117
This “English” issue had long dogged the party in Québec. At the CCF founding
convention in Calgary in 1932, the province was not even represented.118 Furthermore,
the first three people selected to sit on the CCF National Council from Québec (1933)
were anglophone Québeckers Lloyd Almond, Joseph Schubert, and J.L. Whitty.119
Almond also acted as the CCF Provincial Council President, while, at the same time,
Whitty was the President of the Québec section on the Labour Party of Canada.120 Frank
Scott was noted as being an “additional name” with the Québec CCF, while the only
francophone present was Jean Peron, then acting as the secretary of the Québec Section
of the Labour Party of Canada.121 While more francophones would find their way to the
CCF councils in Québec over time, records clearly show the party was an anglophone
enclave in the early days of the early 1930s. The Commonwealth conference in late 1944
is another example of how French Canadians struggled to have a place at the CCF table.

117. Walter Young, Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-1961 (Toronto: University of
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Separating Socialism from Communism
The question of explaining how its socialist policies differed from the tenets of
communism was another issue that plagued the CCF before 1945. This demarcation was
more complicated in late 1944 with the faux “Socialism” of Nazi Germany and the rigid
“Communism” of Canada’s ally, the Soviet Union. Caplan explained that these labels had
been frequently used by opponents of the CCF. By late 1944, due to the Russian war
contribution, it was necessary to downplay the CCF with Soviet Communism and
identify the party with German Nazism.122 Propagandists further warned that a CCF
government would mean absolute regimentation, totalitarianism and an end to individual
freedom and choice. Thus, it was hoped by their opponents that the CCF would be linked
to some of the worst traits associated with both Nazi Germany and Soviet
Communism.123 Efforts to distinguish between the socialist CCF and communist LabourProgressive Party were made more difficult in late 1943 by the LPP’s application for
affiliation with the CCF. The CCF National Council swiftly and unanimously rejected
this proposal.124 Spurned by the CCF, the Labour-Progressives turned their attention and
energies to supporting federal and provincial Liberal and Conservative governments, and
worked to hinder CCF growth.125 For his part, Lewis explained that educating voters as
much as possible was the best weapon to explain the differences between socialism and
communism.

122. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 123.
123. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 123.
124. McHenry, The Third Force, 121-22. The Labour-Progressive Party was formed in 1943 in
response to the outlawing of the Communist Party in Canada. The Communist Party was declared
subversive by the King government in November 1939. See Young, The Anatomy of a Party, 269.
125. McHenry, The Third Force, 122-23.
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Throughout the duration of the war, the CCF worked diligently to win the support
of people serving in the Canadian Armed Forces. The party paid particular attention to
promoting a “better” Canada to those soldiers returning from this conflict. The CCF
sought to assure these people that there would not be a return to the economic chaos of
the Great Depression that preceded the Second World War; neither would there be a
repeat of the economic and political turmoil that veterans from the First World War faced
after the guns fell silent. Throughout the duration of the war, the CCF worked diligently
to win the support of the people serving in the Canadian Armed Forces. The CCF paid
particular attention to promoting a “better” Canada to those returning after the war –
unlike the Great Depression that preceded this conflict and the economic turmoil that
World War One veterans returned to in 1918.
To illustrate this practice, Lewis responded to a letter from Mr. J. Hotrum, a
member of the Canadian military, in November 1944. Lewis noted, “We were
particularly pleased with the way in which you are helping to keep the thoughts of your
fellow soldiers on the important issues in our country and on the contributions which the
CCF can and will make.”126 When asked how to explain the differences between
communism and socialism of the CCF variety, Lewis remarked “It would require a book
to describe the differences in detail.”127 Nonetheless, Lewis did provide a ready response
to Hotrum and wrote that there were significant differences between the two. Lewis
explained, “The CCF believes passionately in democracy and in the democratic method.

126. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 142, File 2, CCF Armed Services Correspondences, 1942-1944, letter
from David Lewis to Mr. J. Hotrum, November 13, 1944, 1.
127. Lewis to Hotrum, 1. Even recent internet comments indicate a number of Canadian voters
equate the CCF’s successor, the New Democratic Party, and its social-democratic stance as “Communist”.
On the second anniversary of NDP leader Jack Layton’s death (August 22, 2011) some of the comments
labeled Layton and his party as communistic and adherents of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao.
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It is opposed to every form of dictatorship. It is determined to achieve power by peaceful
and constitutional means, and to maintain Parliament and all the other democratic
processes after it comes to power.”128 He added, “The CCF believes only its programme
can make democracy a living thing for all the people. Any party which is based on these
principles cannot possibly be called Communist by any stretch of the imagination.”129
To underscore the anti-Communism position of the CCF, Lewis then explained
the history of non-cooperation the party had had with the Communist Party of Canada.
He said this vehement opposition by the CCF toward the Communist Party was on full
display at the Regina Conference in 1933. At that gathering, the party rejected a
Communist bid to cooperate with the CCF in fighting for specific objectives.130
In August of that year, a leading CCF figure from Ontario, Elmore Philpott, was
more direct. He stated, “The Communists are trying to disrupt the CCF and ruin it.”131
Caplan noted that the distinguishing feature of communism beyond the Soviet Union of
the time was its designation of democratic socialism, not capitalism or even fascism, as
the main enemy.132
While the communists’ approaches to the CCF shifted over the next decade, they
did not waver in their objective of destroying the CCF. In December 1944, a leading
spokesman for the Labor-Progressive Party stated their main objective was a “resounding

128. Lewis to Hotrum, 1. Lewis’s remarks were echoed in the British Columbia CCF News. In
November 1943, the CCF News presented a full two-page spread comparing the policies and programs of
the CCF and the Labour-Progressive Party. They highlighted both the free, democratic nature of the CCF
socialism against the “dictatorial” and oppressive stance of the LPP. While undoubtedly biased, the need
for a detailed explanation of the many differences between the two parties was indicative of the confusion
that existed in the public arena. It was an effort by the CCF to distance and demarcate its brand of socialism
with that of the LPP. See “The CCF and Labour-Progressives,” CCF News, November 11, 1943, 3-4.
129. Lewis to Hotrum, 1.
130. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 40-41.
131. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 41.
132. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 41.
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defeat of the CCF at the polls.”133 Lewis noted to Hotrum that the CCF had never
cooperated with the communists and that in the coming election the Communist Party
was determined to run candidates in every one of the constituencies in which the CCF has
the best chance of winning.134 Lewis was being less than forthright with Hotrum. On at
least one occasion, Lewis suggested that the CCF “stand down” in constituencies in
which the Labor Progressive Party (Communist Party) was better positioned to win a
labor constituency. As noted above, in the 1937 Ontario Provincial election Lewis
recommended that the party not oppose Joe Salzberg in Toronto, for which he then
received a verbal rebuke from then CCF National Leader J.S. Woodsworth. Perhaps the
inconsistency in Lewis’s attitude toward the LPP was shaded by his own recent electoral
defeat in the Cartier riding at the hands of Fred Rose of the Labor-Progressive Party.
In spite of the former, and occasional, cooperation with the LPP, Lewis
confidently remarked “Both in practice and in theory, the CCF was not only not
Communist but defiantly opposed to the past record and present policies of the
Communist Party of Canada.”135 Lewis concluded, “I only hope that the Canadian people
in general and the CCF in particular will repay the debt which our country owes you by
building a country of peace, freedom, and security.”136
In this exchange, we see the CCF’s plan to repel the label of being “communist”
several ways. First, the CCF was adamant in stating that the party was not communist in
any sense of the word, by emphasizing the quest for social change through peaceful,
parliamentary methods. It was also argued that the organization had consistently opposed
133. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 135.
134. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 142, File 2, CCF Armed Services Correspondences, 1942-1944, letter
from David Lewis to Mr. J. Hotrum, November 13, 1944, 1.
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the Communist Party of Canada in both its practices and policies. This correspondence
also reveals the theme the CCF planned to adopt in the coming federal election: to build a
better Canada, especially in terms of improved economic and social policies for the mass
of Canadian citizens in the post-war era.
Talk of a federal election for the fall of 1944 was rampant until early July. At that
time, the Liberal organization was concerned about its election readiness in Québec.
Mackenzie King resolved to postpone voting until the fighting in the European theatre
had neared completion.137 Since the latter months of the previous year, CCF public
support had slowly eroded. This decline was due, in part, to the persistent anti-CCF
campaign waged against the party. Also, Liberal Party fortunes had brightened due to the
impressive war-time economy and the implementation of welfare state practices by the
King government. Heading into 1945, however, the CCF was still at a formidable twentyfour percent, and observers were still predicting seventy to one-hundred seats for the
party.138 With a federal election expected in the first half of 1945, the year ahead was
poised to be a watershed moment in Canadian political history.
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CHAPTER VIII
ARRIVING AT THE WATERSHED

Late in 1944, as the global conflict continued, attention became more focused on
what the post-war world would look like.1 Foremost on the minds of all political leaders
in Canada were recollections of the economic, political and social chaos that had taken
place immediately after the previous global conflict. Also fresh in their memory was the
wretched state of the economy in the decade that had preceded the outbreak of military
conflict in late summer 1939. This was especially true in Canada because the various
governments of the 1930s were loathe to address the economic damage done by the Great
Depression. Attitudes regarding governmental involvement and control had changed
dramatically during the war years to the point that all parties embraced the concept of the
welfare state in Canada. This preference was reflected by polling data that indicated a
significant percentage of Canadians were hungry for more assistance from the federal
government.2 The questions being publicly discussed were how extensive should this
government be, and what party was deemed most deserving of the opportunity to build
this new Canada.
There is no question that the emergence of the CCF across much of Canada
greatly influenced this debate, and both its Liberal Party and their ProgressiveConservative rivals were keen to present themselves as the group to establish this new

1. Desmond Morton and J. L. Granatstein, Victory 1945: Canadians from War to Peace (Toronto:
Harper Collins Publishers Limited, 1995), 31-32. Despite Mackenzie King’s assertion in late 1944 that the
war was almost over, the authors point out that some of the most intense fighting took place in 1945.
Indeed, the German generals had launched an offensive in the Ardennes in the final days of 1944 and early
1945. Allied divisions reeled back from the thrust. By the time the fighting stopped in the European theater
in May, an additional eight thousand Canadian soldiers would die in combat.
2. Wilfred Sanders, Jack & Jacques: A Scientific Approach to the Study of French and non-French
thought in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1943), 37-39.
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Canada. Since the last federal election was held in 1940, Prime Minister King would have
to call an election some time during 1945. With that federal election drawing near, all the
parties jockeyed for position ahead of the formal election call.

The CCF in Québec—Division in the Ranks
While 1944 witnessed the CCF breakthrough in the province of Québec by the
party capturing its first (and only) seat in the Provincial Assembly, the CCF was also
experiencing serious divisions behind the scenes. This divide became obvious with the
exchange of letters between CCF National Secretary David Lewis and Frank Watson, a
member of the Québec CCF Provincial Council, as well a member of the party’s National
Council.
In January 1945, Lewis wrote to Watson to express his disapproval of Watson’s
actions. He noted, “It is my own personal opinion, from carefully observing your
statement and your actions, that you are not basically in sympathy with the Democratic
Socialism of a movement like the CCF. I have had occasion to notice and to hear about
the way in which you constantly belittle many of the national and other officers of the
movement.”3 Lewis asserted that he was not personally offended by Watson’s remarks or
by Watson’s right to express his opinion. What angered Lewis was the corrosive effect
Watson’s criticism would have on the movement. The National Secretary then took
Watson to task for the possible negative consequences of his activities. “In the Québec
situation this is very important, and is the only reason I have not made any secret of my
attitude. We have in Québec a very small organization working against terrific obstacles

3. MG 28, IV – 1, Québec General Correspondences, 1944-1947, letter from David Lewis to
Frank Watson, January 16, 1945, 1.
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with relatively little success to date,” Lewis said. He added, “If that small group is to
continue progressing and growing it must not only accept the movement and its
philosophy and program, but accept it with enthusiasm and with confidence in the
personnel which is charged with directing it.”4 He noted that anything that undermined
the confidence of the Québec supporters of the movement (or its leadership) caused
serious harm to the group in Québec.5
The CCF National Executive cited a specific instance of what he believed was an
example of Watson’s subversive activities. “This was perfectly evident at the last Québec
provincial convention where you took advantage of a number of new, inexperienced and
untried people to create an atmosphere of division and suspicion which is absent from all
other sections of the movement, and which is deadly as far as progress in Québec is
concerned,” Lewis remarked, identifying Watson as the main culprit.6 He argued,
“Frankly, I do not think that such conduct is a service to the movement.”7 In closing,
Lewis stated his bedrock belief in the goals and the people within the CCF: “I have such
complete confidence in the correctness, subject to occasional mistakes of course, of the
CCF policy and general line that I have no fears about it winning and holding the support
of the vast majority of the Québec people who are now members and who will in future
become members of the CCF.”8 This remark is a testament to Lewis’s unyielding
conviction that the party’s objectives were so meritorious that eventually everyone (even
people in Québec) would accept these truths as self-evident. Along with many other CCF

4. Lewis to Watson, 1.
5. Lewis to Watson, 1-2.
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leaders, Lewis held firm that the CCF would win the day when the common sense of the
average person saw the wisdom of the new Canada this movement was trying to create.
Not surprisingly, Watson saw things differently and informed the National
Secretary in emphatic terms that serious problems existed within the CCF. First, Watson
defended his belief in democracy, something he felt was the party’s most attractive
element. However, Watson informed Lewis that a wide gap existed between the theory
and the practice of democracy in the Québec CCF. He explained, “Unfortunately,
democracy in our party is purely relative; relative to low standards generally prevailing.
If you really imagine the practices of the officials of the Québec CCF are democratic then
I have gravely misjudged your abilities.”9 Next, Watson accused the Québec CCF of
overt racism toward French Canadians by claiming there “is an anti-French, anti-Catholic
atmosphere that prevails among the English sections of the province. Of this you are fully
aware.”10 Watson both credited and condemned Frank Scott’s efforts to alert the party of
its hostility toward French Canadians. Watson wrote, “Scott has made many courageous,
but, in my opinion, extremely ill-judged attempts to overcome this. Unfortunately, it
seems to me that he has the customary contempt of the academic mind for the rank and
file.”11 Watson then addressed the issue of French-Canadian delegates flocking to him at
the last Provincial Convention. He pointedly remarked to Lewis, “If the FrenchCanadians around me looked like flies around a honey pot you should take that as an
indication of the rarity of an English-Canadian who is not anti-French.”12 Watson ended
with a swipe at the National Secretary: “It is worth noting, I think, that the French9. MG 28, IV – 1, Québec General Correspondences, 1944-1947, letter from Frank Watson to
David Lewis, January 18, 1945, 2.
10. Watson to Lewis, 3.
11. Watson to Lewis, 3.
12. Watson to Lewis, 3. Referring to French Canadians as “flies” does not sound overly endearing.
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Canadians are not as language-chauvinist as the English think. I do not speak French,
whereas the best-hated Englishman in the Québec CCF speaks it on every occasion
possible.”13 Despite the discord in these exchanges, Watson was exposing the deep
divisions on display as the CCF in Québec prepared for the coming federal election.
The question of the treatment of French Canadians by the party leadership was
fundamental in this divide. For Watson, the provincial and national leaders were fooling
themselves if they were under the illusion that French Canadians were welcomed by the
English in the Québec wing of the party, as elements of anti-French sentiment clearly
continued to linger in the Québec CCF. Though Scott and Lewis did not hold racist
positions toward French Canadians, Watson’s contention that neither leader had a firm
grasp on issues of this group (or an effective means to clearly address them) rings true.
The necessity of approaching French Canadians made it expedient for the CCF to find a
charismatic French-Canadian to deliver its message in a language that would be
understood by francophone elements of society. Thus, this strain of racism and the
divisions it created provides further evidence of the party damaging its own interests in
Québec. Into this void, the Québec CCF leadership propelled David Coté, its lone elected
representative in the province.
Early in 1945, Coté was considered a star for the Québec CCF, especially by the
National Office. In January, David Lewis informed CCF Member of Parliament A.M.
“Sandy” Nicholson of his decision to hire Coté for an organizing position within the
Québec branch of the party. The National Secretary reported that Coté had ended his
13. Watson to Lewis, 3. While he did not mention Lewis by name, it is highly probable Watson
was referring to the CCF National Secretary in this final salvo, although there is a remote possibility he was
aiming his criticism toward Frank Scott. In his dealings and correspondences, Lewis was frequently
brusque with party members, whereas there is scant evidence that Scott operated in a similar, cantankerous
manner.
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work with his union, was on break from the provincial legislature, and was available to
work for the party until the next legislative session began.14 Lewis noted that Coté had
financial constraints and could not afford to work for free. The National Secretary
arranged to pay him a salary and expenses until the Québec legislature opened its spring
sitting.15 Lewis added, “Coté has had considerable success in stimulating the organization
of unions and is a very good speaker. He ought to be able to do quite a bit toward
stimulating interest in the CCF in the backward sections of Québec.”16 This
correspondence is important because it signifies the high esteem that David Coté held
with the National Office of the CCF in the early months of 1945. That would change
abruptly in early summer and expose another serious divide regarding the CCF in
Québec.
In spite of the discord that surfaced in 1945, there was some reason for optimism
because of a confident declaration from the Verdun CCF. In early April, Edward Wilson,
the CCF mayor of Verdun, won his fourth consecutive election.17 Wilson retained his
position despite the fact that his opponent, Gérard Tétrault, had the support of four
parties.18 The New Commonwealth attributed Wilson's easy re-election to his adroit
handling of city finances and the expansion of public facilities in Verdun.19 The paper
also mentioned that Wilson planned to seek a seat in the House of Commons in the
14. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 103, File 1, Correspondences with A.M. Nicholson, 1940-1947, letter
from David Lewis to A.M. Nicholson, January 10, 1945, 3.
15. Lewis to Nicholson, 3.
16. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 103, File 1, Correspondences with A.M. Nicholson, 1940-1947, letter
from David Lewis to A.M. Nicholson, January 10, 1945, 3. Perhaps Lewis’s choice of the word
“backward” is a reflection of the prevailing attitude of leading CCF persons in regards to French
Canadians, particularly those residing outside of Montreal.
17. “Verdun Re-elects CCF-er as Mayor,” The New Commonwealth, Volume 11, Number 18,
April 12, 1945, 1.
18. The New Commonwealth, 1. Tétrault was backed by the electoral machines of the Union
Nationale, the Progressive-Conservatives, the Liberals, and the Labour Progressive Party.
19. The New Commonwealth, 1.
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coming federal election.20 The New Commonwealth crowed that Wilson was such a
formidable candidate that, “the old parties are virtually conceding this seat.”21 Several
days later, the Verdun group nominated the mayor of that municipality to seek a seat in
the federal parliament. That presented both a problem and a rare moment of cooperation
between this local CCF branch and the National Office.
Campaign Manager George Tomkins wrote David Lewis seeking advice on a
thorny question: could an elected official run for another office, and keep both if elected?
Tomkins wrote, “As you know, our candidate is Mayor Wilson, who less than two weeks
ago was re-elected with the largest majority he has ever received. Naturally, we are
confident of taking this seat, and there is no doubt we shall, given sufficient money and
workers.”22 According to Tomkins, the only possible obstacle for the CCF might be
charges that it would be “unwise and improper” for Wilson to hold two public offices.
Tomkins asked the National Office to provide clarity and a list of other persons who were
currently holding more than one position.23 In closing, the Verdun campaign manager
said, “I assure you that you can depend on a seat from Québec, at last.”24 CCF Research
Director Stuart Jamieson wrote Tomkins that the National Office did not possess such a
list, but referred him to the Canadian Association for Mayors and Municipalities and to
the Secretary of British Columbia CCF.25 Unfortunately, Tomkins’s bold predictions

20. The New Commonwealth, 1.
21. The New Commonwealth, 1. Unfortunately for the CCF, the old parties did not concede this
seat.
22. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 104, Elections – Federal Election 1945, letter from George Tomkins to
David Lewis, April 14, 1945, 1.
23. Tomkins to Lewis, 1.
24. Tomkins to Lewis, 2.
25. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 104, Elections – Federal Election 1945, letter from Stuart Jamieson to
George Tomkins, April 19, 1945, 1. Jamieson remarked that he believed the mayor of Vancouver was also
an elected member of the British Columbia assembly; but that Tompkins should check with the provincial
Secretary on the matter.
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were incorrect and the warm relations between the Verdun CCF and the National Office
would crumble in the ensuing months.

Pre-Election Financial Issues for the CCF in Central Canada
In late January, Lewis again wrote Sandy Nicholson to discuss the issue of
election finances for the party in Ontario and Québec. “The situation in Montreal is not
good. Stanley (Allen) set out on preparing a campaign along the lines of B.C. or similar
provinces,” Lewis reported. He cautioned, “However, this kind of campaign is entirely
unsuitable to the Montreal and Québec situation, because you simply have not got the
members to carry it out.”26 Lewis informed Nicholson that the money available in
Montreal was mainly in the hands of 500 to 600 contributors, most of whom were
generous donors to the CCF.27 Lewis remarked that Allen should have focused his fundraising efforts on this particular group. By attempting a more broad-based fund drive, the
National Secretary contended that Allen had wasted both time and money that the party
could ill-afford.28
Lewis wrote that both he and Nicholson would have to speak with Allen to
“advise him to the proper procedure to be followed.”29 He then criticized the lack of
assistance Allen had received from the leadership of the Québec branch of the party.
“The Québec Provincial Executive has not been able to give Stan the cooperation
necessary. There just isn’t the machinery at their office to follow up pledges,” said Lewis.

26. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 103, File 1, Correspondences with A.M. Nicholson, 1940-1947, letter
from David Lewis to A.M. Nicholson, January 24, 1945, 2.
27. Lewis to Nicholson, 2.
28. Lewis to Nicholson, 2.
29. Lewis to Nicholson, 2.
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He added, “All this work has to fall on Stan, and he has resented it somewhat.”30 Lewis
explained to Nicholson that the Québec CCF still had a significant deficit from the last
provincial election, and that the branch “has been and is very considerably in debt.”31
With a federal election swiftly approaching, the CCF in Québec was in no financial
position to conduct a competitive campaign. This provides additional evidence of the lack
of organization and leadership within the Québec CCF.
The fiscal reality in Ontario was also not on entirely solid footing. This is
somewhat surprising given the higher profile that provincial branch of the party had
attained in Canada’s most populous province during the 1943 provincial election. Lewis
remarked to Nicholson that he had spoken with Ontario CCF leader Ted Joliffe the
previous week. He informed Joliffe, “If the election is called suddenly and we have not
received their quota or anywhere near it, we would carry out our full plans with regard to
the campaign, but not carry them into effect as far as Ontario is concerned.”32 In case the
Ontario CCF leader was not certain how this might affect their election campaigns, Lewis
offered precise examples: “I illustrated by saying that we would outline, for example, our
newspaper advertising across the country. The central committee would then place the
advertising with the newspapers in those provinces which have fulfilled their quota, and
take the responsibility of paying for them. As far as Ontario is concerned, we would
simply hand them the plans and say, ‘Go ahead, place the ads and pay for them.’”33
Lewis was confident that once the election was called a good deal of money
would be forthcoming from Ontario. He intended to motivate the Ontario branch to meet

30. Lewis to Nicholson, 2.
31. Lewis to Nicholson, 2-3.
32. Lewis to Nicholson, 3.
33. Lewis to Nicholson, 3.
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its financial obligations before the election writ was dropped by the King government.
Lewis expressed to Nicholson, “I have a feeling that if we exert the necessary pressure to
have all advertising and radio time channeled through Bill Orr, he will still reach pretty
close to the total of $130,000 to enable him to carry out the share of the work he had
planned. I hope that this procedure will not be necessary, but should King call an election
at any time within the next two months I cannot see any other alternative.”34 Clearly,
Lewis expected that the Ontario branch would eventually have the necessary cash, but
that it would arrive too late to be put to optimal use. Still, the party’s fiscal realities in
Ontario were vastly sounder than they were in neighboring Québec. As Lewis remarked,
the timing of the election would be a critical factor.

The Timing of the 1945 Elections
In the middle of January 1945, Mackenzie King learned that it was likely that the
Canadian army overseas would face at least six more weeks of heavy combat. This reality
forced him to conclude that it was best to avoid an election campaign until the fighting
was over and victory won.35 In anticipation of an Allied triumph, preparations were being
made in Toronto and Ottawa to call an election at the earliest and most politically
advantageous opportunity. Thus began a frantic battle between Ontario Premier George
Drew and Prime Minister King to see who would go to the polls first. Each leader
believed it imperative to capture voters during the glow of military victory and before the
anticipated economic recession dampened the citizenry’s mood.

34. Lewis to Nicholson, 3.
35. J. L. Granatstein, Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 382.
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David Lewis understood the importance of the timing of the elections and the
impact this timing would have on his party. In a letter to A.O. Smith, the secretary of the
Saskatchewan CCF, Lewis stated, “The point is simply that if the Ontario provincial
election comes before the federal (which is most likely), then the result of that election
will be absolutely decisive as far as the federal results are concerned. And it will be
decisive, not only for Ontario, but also for the rest of Canada.”36 With this predicted
scenario—which proved correct—Lewis declared, “Hence, it is the conviction that all of
us here must throw everything possible into the contest in Ontario to ensure that we go
forward if possible, but that we at least hold our own.”37 In Lewis’s mind, it was vitally
important that the Ontario CCF at least come close to achieving what the party had
gained in the 1943 provincial election. His concern was quite clear: should the Ontario
party fall short of this mark, the effects would be widespread and negative for the federal
CCF in a subsequent national campaign. To make certain the Ontario election went well
for the CCF, Lewis requested to Smith that he “give the entire matter your consideration,
and inform me what people [from Saskatchewan] will be available for organizing work in
this province [Ontario] as soon as possible.”38 During the late 1930s and early 1940s,
Lewis recognized the organizational difficulties that the Ontario CCF had endured.
Despite the party’s breakthrough in the 1943 provincial campaign, this dispatch indicates
that Lewis still had misgivings about their ability to sufficiently organize in Canada’s
most populous province.

36. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 55, File 2, Ontario Elections 1945: provincial, letter from David Lewis
to A.O. Smith, March 29, 1945, 1.
37. Lewis to Smith, 1.
38. Lewis to Smith, 1.
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Another element that operated against the CCF was evident in Lewis’s letter to
Smith: money. More precisely, the problem was lack of sufficient funds for the coming
election in Ontario. Lewis conceded, “It will not be possible to pay salaries to anyone.
Everyone, therefore, who agrees to come must do so without expecting any salary
whatever.”39 This dearth of salaries was a result of the expected Ontario election funding
arriving too late for the National CCF. Lewis informed Smith that the federal party would
cover the cost of transportation, living and traveling expenses for the Saskatchewan
volunteers while they were in Ontario.40 Lewis asserted, “This will involve a considerable
outlay of funds, and can only be justified if the person is willing to spend at least three
weeks in Ontario.”41 Thus, despite having had five full years to prepare for a federal
election, and with the Ontario CCF in a minority parliament situation (which meant that
an election could be called at almost any time), the federal and provincial parties were
financially unprepared for the looming twin campaigns. As Lewis predicted, the timing of
the elections was of vital importance to the CCF. Perhaps, he felt, the CCF could avoid
electoral disappointment if the federal vote occurred either before, or on the same date as,
the Ontario election.

The Elections on June 4 and June 11, 1945: Setting the Date
As World War II was now into its sixth year, observers were certain that 1945
would be the year when the military conflict would finally come to a close. American
President Franklin Roosevelt shared that information with Prime Minister Mackenzie

39. Lewis to Smith, 1.
40. Lewis to Smith, 1.
41. Lewis to Smith, 1. Unfortunately, the CCF files and secondary sources do not indicate how
many volunteers from Saskatchewan worked in the Ontario election campaign.
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King during their meeting in early March. King wrote that the President remarked that
the war in Europe was expected to be completed by the end of April.42 The Prime
Minister recalled, “This, in some ways, is the most important information he [Roosevelt]
has given me thus far.”43 Without question, King was looking for insight as to when the
war would conclude for two reasons. The first was that he was anxious to see the drawnout military conflict come to a successful close. Second, King was searching for the best
opportunity to go to the voters. This information, if accurate, was invaluable.
Shortly after returning to Ottawa, King began laying the groundwork for the
coming peace conference in San Francisco for a general election campaign. Regarding
this conference, King stated the opposition Progressive-Conservatives “were anxious to
have me subjected to a sort of cross-examination as another means of creating
embarrassment.”44 With the assistance of CCF Leader M.J. Coldwell, King was able to
thwart the Progressive-Conservative effort. He noted, “I was able to fence out of the
situation and Coldwell helped very much and scored completely for his own party as he
was the one really to immediately follow the government.”45 After King concluded his
remarks, the PC House leader referred to it as, “a noble speech. Coldwell was distinctly
helpful in his remarks. He endorsed all that I had said and did not cover much new
ground.”46 King was coming to see the CCF leader as a useful ally, especially in the
realm of a peace conference. When King selected delegates to accompany him to San

42. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28107, March 9,
1945, 3. Roosevelt also informed King that the war against Japan would likely conclude three months after
that.
43. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28111, March 10,
1945, 2.
44. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28144, March 20,
1945, 1.
45. Diaries, March 20, 1.
46. Diaries, March 20, 1.

327

Francisco, Coldwell was included; however, John Bracken, the leader of the ProgressiveConservatives, was not invited. While Coldwell accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation
to be a part of the Canadian delegation at the San Francisco gathering, this created
logistical problems for the CCF. With the peace conference taking place during the
Canadian election campaign, neither King nor Coldwell could devote much time to
making personal appearances during most of the contest.
After completing arrangements for the peace conference, King met with his
Liberal caucus to discuss the coming election campaign. He started by admitting that he
had waited to call the election until the war was practically over. King wrote, “I pointed
out how tactics had been based on avoiding a general election in war time; now I thought
we were going to reach the time when the war would be over.”47 Chief among his
accomplishments during the conflict was avoiding the divisive implementation of
conscription of troops. King stated to his Liberal Party colleagues, “It [conscription] was
not something that was permanent. It was now past. I then said something of the
significance of the election as making clear that conscription had not carried.”48

47. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28146, March 21,
1945, 1.
48. Diaries, March 21, 1. There was a second conscription crisis during the late months of 1944. In
October 1944, the Minister of National Defence, J. L. Ralston, returned from a visit from the war front in
Belgium. While allowing that troops had not been dispersed wisely by the military, Ralston believed that
additional troops needed to be conscripted, immediately, to spell those already serving overseas. Having
already gone back on his pledge not to bring in conscription with the plebiscite on the issue in 1942, King
had held off calls from the Conservative opposition, virtually every newspaper, and from elements within
his Liberal caucus to actually implement conscription. King stated that conscription was not needed
because the war was almost over and that enacting such a policy would badly divide his government and
the nation. Ultimately, Ralston resigned over the matter. However, his replacement, General A.G.L.
McNaughton, informed King that volunteer efforts were not sufficient to meet the needed demand for
Canadian troops. When that happened, the Prime Minister reluctantly agreed to bring in conscription. He
feared that he would lose his French-Canadian ministers but he skillfully held on to all of them. Unlike the
riots that erupted when conscription was brought in during the First World War, this time the reaction was
decidedly less vigorous. Granatstein wrote that “Québec was unhappy, but not implacably hostile. English
Canada fumed but it had got its way.” See Granatstein, Canada’s War, 334-73.
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Next, the Prime Minister explained the planks on which his party would run; they
would fight the election with peace and social issues.49 Certainly for much of the last two
years, the Liberal government acted far differently in terms of social issues, compared to
the way they had performed for the nearly two decades Mackenzie King had been in
power. It is no coincidence that King only acted on these initiatives when the CCF began
to gather serious momentum in the 1942-1944 period. Still, the Liberal leader deserves
full marks for convincing the many resistant factions of his Liberal caucus to accept the
reality of the welfare state. The Prime Minister then gave his Liberal MP’s their marching
orders. He told them “they would have to get busy on the preparation of the campaign
themselves and would have to work out handling it in advance of my leaving, but pointed
out how little time there would be before leaving.”50
Further muddying the political waters for the Canadian Prime Minister was his
precarious standing in his Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, riding. On the evening of March
21, King met with Dr. Humphries of his Prince Albert riding association. The news was
not rosy for the sitting Prime Minister. King lamented, “Humphries felt that the outlook
in P.A. [Prince Albert] was brighter for me but admitted that there were real possibilities
of defeat. The town of P.A. is against us and some of the former leading Liberals have
gone over to the CCF camp.”51 King also made note of the large number of new
industrial workers in Prince Albert and added how they would likely form a block of
support for the CCF. 52 Fatalistically, King pronounced, “Whatever the outcome either
way I would be content. One thing I was determined on if defeated in the general

49. Diaries, March 21, 1.
50. Diaries, March 21, 2.
51. Diaries, March 21, 3.
52. Diaries, March 21, 3.
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election, I would no longer continue in public life.”53 That is a declaration worth
remembering for later in this chapter. The following day the minority ProgressiveConservative government in Ontario fell.
Minority governments are inherently unstable, especially when the governing
party is confident of winning a larger mandate. That was precisely the situation that
Ontario Premier George Drew found himself in during March 1945. The Ontario Throne
speech highlighted the changes enacted by the Progressive-Conservatives during their
sixteen months in power. The CCF responded by stating that the Drew government had
delivered more promises than concrete action, especially in the areas of education, health,
labor, and agriculture.54 The Ontario Liberal Party was once again under the leadership of
Mitch Hepburn and he was poised to introduce a sub-amendment that opposed
compulsory religious education across the province. Even though they were painfully
aware that such a move would likely trigger an election, the CCF believed it had to take
the initiative on this matter as it did not wish to have the Liberals appear to be the real
opposition.55 When the Drew government proposed a program of compulsory religious
education, Jolliffe introduced an amendment protesting such legislation. Drew declared
the motion a matter of confidence and his government fell by a count of fifty-one to
thirty-six votes. Two days later, Drew announced that an election would be held.56

53. Diaries, March 21, 4.
54. Gerald L. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario (Toronto,
McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 150.
55. Caplan wrote that Hepburn’s intentions to terminate the Conservative government were
obvious when he invited Joliffe to join with the Liberals to vote out the Drew regime. Hepburn promised
that he would support Jolliffe’s demand to form the government and he was open to accept any portfolio in
a coalition government. Jolliffe refused this offer because as Caplan explained, “No CCF-er would tolerate
a coalition with the Liberals.” See Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 151.
56. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 151.
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When he heard of the defeat of the Ontario Progressive-Conservative
government, Prime Minister King thought the notion of a provincial election taking place
in Ontario before a federal election would be to the federal Liberal Party’s advantage.57
King also believed that Ontario Liberal leader Mitchell Hepburn had been “too
impetuous. He has not yet got the following in the province needed to let him get to the
head of the Government again. The fact that the motion which carried was won by the
CCF would seem to make it clear to the public that the CCF has got the lead.”58 King was
fearful that “The CCF and Liberals will cut each other’s throats and Drew will come back
with a larger majority. This might serve as a warning to the Liberals and the CCF alike in
the Federal field.”59
At one level, the Liberal leader worried that his federal party could suffer if the
provincial Liberals struggled in an Ontario election. Indeed, King believed that this
outcome was a distinct possibility. He wrote, “The chances are that the numbers of the
CCF will be much larger than the Liberals. Indeed, the Liberals may lose even the small
numbers they have at present.”60 Despite harboring the possibility the Ontario Liberals
could be wiped out in the coming provincial election, King stated that having the
provincial election precede the federal campaign could work to the benefit of his federal
Liberal Party. He felt the Ontario election might cause voters to appreciate the steady
leadership he and his government had exhibited through the period of war, contrasted to
“endless elections” of minority governments.61 King’s “no election during wartime”

57. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28152, March 23,
1945, 1.
58. Diaries, March 23, 1.
59. Diaries, March 23, 1. Indeed, this was also the belief of the Drew government.
60. Diaries, March 23, 1.
61. Diaries, March 23, 1. Here, King omits that he went to the voters a mere six months after the
conflict began. The primary reason he had not gone to the polls earlier was quite clear: he was afraid he
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argument was dubious; he went to the polls just six months after the war commenced.
However, a combination of political acumen and a healthy dose of good fortune did allow
King to legitimately claim that he kept the nation united during the war’s entirety. This
was in stark contrast to the deep division the country experienced during the conscription
crisis of World War I. As mentioned earlier, the imposition of conscription in 1917
exposed serious differences along linguistic lines in Canada. With the legislative defeat
of the Drew government, the Prime Minister wrote that an Ontario election justified his
decision to further delay a federal election.62

Before the Federal Campaign—CCF Attacked by Friendly Fire
As has been noted above, the CCF was an inviting target for various political
parties, business groups and individuals who feared and loathed the party’s platform and
beliefs. Indeed, the party and David Lewis had anticipated such attacks, and attempted to
combat (with limited resources) the more outrageous of the allegations against the CCF.
However, mere weeks before the election call came down from Ottawa and Toronto, the
party was broadsided from an unexpected source—newspapers sympathetic to the CCF
cause. Lewis was angry with the editors of both News Comment and The New

would lose. His reversal on his conscription pledge had harmed his party in Québec, or so he believed, and
the CCF was making significant progress across much of the country.
62. Diaries, March 23, 1. King’s approach to maintain national unity was by slowly bringing in
conscription through a referendum and by establishing benchmarks that needed to be met to fully
implement drafting of troops. This was in stark contrast to events in World War I. In that conflict, the
Borden government brought in the Military Service Act in 1917. Opposition leader, Wilfrid Laurier argued
that there should be a national referendum. Without this public consultation, Laurier warned a wedge would
develop along linguistic lines across Canada. See Jack Granatstein and Desmond Morton, Canada and the
Two World Wars (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2003), 91-94. The enforcement of conscription led to
recurring riots in Montreal and Québec City in 1917 and early 1918. The most well-known violence took
place in Québec City during Easter weekend, 1918. Rioters and federal soldiers exchanged gun fire. Five
people were killed and an estimated one-hundred fifty persons were injured. See Martin F. Auger, “On the
Brink of Civil War. The Canadian Government and the Suppression of the 1918 Easter Riots,” Canadian
Historical Review 89, Number 4, December 2008, 503-40.

332

Commonwealth for allowing a book review to be published that was quite negative to the
CCF. “Let me tell you a story,” an exasperated Lewis began in his letter of complaint to
New Commonwealth Editor Carroll Coburn. He continued, “Two months ago a review
written by the book reviewer of the News Comment got into the latter paper without
having been seen by the committee. When the issue appeared, every member of the
committee and everyone else around here tore his or her hair out about the review, and
foretold editorials harmful to the CCF on the basis of it.”63 Lewis’s prophecies were
confirmed as unflattering editorials (using material from the aforementioned critical book
review) appeared in The Winnipeg Free Press and in other papers.64 The News Comment
committee solemnly discussed the wisdom of writing a note in a later issue to dissociate
the paper and the movement from the implications of the review. The editorial committee
then decided that the matter would be better left alone in the hope that it would die out
and be forgotten, and that the book review or any reference to it would never appear
again.65
Two months later The New Commonwealth reprinted the book review which had
appeared in News Comment by mistake, and which had caused so much fear and
trembling on its appearance.66 Lewis was deeply upset by this perceived error in
judgment. He wrote, “Of all the darn fool things to do; of all the irresponsible stupidities,
this certainly takes the cake.”67 The National Secretary expressed confidence that Coburn
was unaware of the book review’s appearance. However, he was certain that this repeated

63. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 58, File 4, Ontario Newspapers – Ontario CCF News, 1944-1957, letter
from David Lewis to Carroll Coburn, March 23, 1945, 1.
64. Lewis to Coburn, 1.
65. Lewis to Coburn, 1.
66. Lewis to Coburn, 1.
67. Lewis to Coburn, 1.
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error would not be helpful to the CCF cause. Lewis lamented, “I assure you that no more
useful weapon could have been placed in the hands of the L.P.P. [Labour Progressive
Party] in Ontario.”68 Lewis told Coburn that maintaining damage control during this
second go-around would prove particularly difficult. “The News Comment has a national
circulation of about 1,700 and can get away with a lot more than can The New
Commonwealth, which has a circulation of 25,000 in Ontario alone,” he said. “Whoever
is responsible for the reprinting of the review ought to get a terrific bawling out from you
and the Provincial Executive.”69 The National Secretary pleaded with Coburn to “make
sure that this sort of slip does not happen again. Confound it; there are difficulties and
obstacles enough without careless and thoughtless actions creating more.”70
This episode provides further proof that, while the CCF had to battle detractors
and foes from many fronts, there were times when the party and its leaders hindered the
movement of Democratic Socialism in Canada.

Attacks from Unfriendly Fire
In early 1945, there was ample evidence that the anti-CCF campaign was
beginning to pay dividends for those opposed to the party of Canadian Socialism. The
most polished practitioner of the crusade against the CCF was Gladstone Murray.
Operating an organization named “Responsible Enterprises,” Murray worked tirelessly to
punish the party that helped push him out of his position with the Canadian Broadcasting

68. Lewis to Coburn, 2.
69. Lewis to Coburn, 2.
70. Lewis to Coburn, 2.
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Company, even while he was being handsomely compensated along the way. 71 The
Canadian Forum reported that Murray announced in August 1943 that he expected to
raise $100,000 “from a relatively few leaders in industry and finance representing a
cross-section of business throughout Canada.”72 Among the twenty-nine men Murray
named as references, and presumably backers, were former Conservative Prime Minister
Arthur Meighen and a former Liberal minister of finance, C.A. Dunning.73 Business was
also well-represented with the presidents of Imperial Oil Limited, International Nickel
Co., Noranda Mines Limited, National Breweries Limited, Massey-Harris Limited,
Continental Life Insurance Company and Consumers Gas Company of Toronto.74 In
addition, The Canadian Forum stated that Murray was receiving financial assistance from
beyond Canada’s borders. Murray’s references included United States Steel Corporation,
Chase National Bank of New York, American Bank Note Company and International
General Electric Company.75 Clearly, Murray had found a ready audience for his antiCCF and anti-Socialist materials in the upper reaches of North American boardrooms.
The Canadian Forum provided a recent example of Murray’s handiwork by
reporting on a speech that he had given on Valentine’s Day, 1944. Speaking in Toronto’s
Grace-Church-on-the-Hill, Murray pronounced, “CCF leaders emit streams of personal
abuse and innuendo, anything to distract attention, anything to stir up class and sectional
prejudice.”76 “Just as the ethics of their creed are found to be those of the hopeful
burglar, so their manners in public controversy are those of the gutter; tiresome

71. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 104, CCF Files, Articles of W.E.G. Murray, Canadian Forum article,
‘Gladstone Murray as a Point of Reference,” March 1944, 271.
72. Canadian Forum, “Gladstone Murray as a Point of Reference,” 271.
73. Canadian Forum, “Gladstone Murray as a Point of Reference,” 271.
74. Canadian Forum, “Gladstone Murray as a Point of Reference,” 271.
75. Canadian Forum, “Gladstone Murray as a Point of Reference,” 271.
76. Canadian Forum, “Gladstone Murray as a Point of Reference,” 271-72.
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vituperation, the distorted product of diseased imaginations,” he continued.77 Murray
closed his remarks by utilizing one of his favorite ploys, linking the CCF to Adolf Hitler:
“The [CCF] authors have not studied in vain the products of the champion lie factory—
the Nazi National Socialist propaganda machine.”78
From the time of the CCF explosion on the national scene with its strong showing
in the August 1943 Ontario election, right up until the Ontario and federal elections of
June 1945, Murray gave his corporate clients their money’s worth by conducting an
expansive, cross-country campaign against the CCF.79 Given his connections and
prominent stature as former director of the CBC, a Murray address was a newsworthy
event. In January 1945, Murray found favorable publicity from the conservative Toronto
Globe and Mail for a speech warning against the establishment of a “slave state” in
Canada should the CCF be elected.80 In his speech to the Ontario Retail Furniture
Dealers’ Association, Murray quipped it was “strange that while Canadians fight against
the attempt of a gang of German collectivists to force on the world a ruthless tyranny
masquerading as Socialist State worship, there should be among us at home those intent
upon deluding and doping us into acquiescence proposals whose result would be hardly
distinguishable from it.”81 Two months later, Murray stated to the Montreal Star,
“Socialism means the abdication of democracy. To attempt the Socialist solution would
be to turn Canada into a testing ground for Marxist experiment with its accustomed

77. Canadian Forum, “Gladstone Murray as a Point of Reference,” 272.
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paraphernalia of secret police, periodic purges and internment camps.”82 Thus, we see
Murray using the heavy hand of fear to influence Canadian popular opinion, and to bear
witness to the mechanization of the media in assisting him to deliver his message. John
Boyko wrote that Murray’s well-prepared and articulate speeches were supposed to
support the role that capitalism and liberal democracy played in the development of
Canada’s culture and economy. However, in these same addresses, Murray examined
CCF policies in detail but twisted them beyond recognition.83
Murray’s public relations exploits were lauded by political opponents of the CCF.
In February 1945, Murray received a note of thanks from Conservative Member of
Parliament John Diefenbaker.84 Diefenbaker had requested and received a pamphlet
entitled, “Things to Know About the CCF.” He wrote “I think these pamphlets are
remarkably effective and would appreciate it if you would forward me 200 copies. The
CCF has received a blow which I think will be felt all over Canada.”85 Murray responded,
“I am glad you like them. There is a good deal of gnashing of teeth at CCF
headquarters.”86 Murray described how the CCF set up a special committee to concern
itself solely with counteracting the arguments put forth by “Responsible Enterprise.” 87
Murray also quipped, “The fact that participants are nearly equally divided between

82. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 104, CCF Files, Clippings of W.E.G. Murray, 1944-1956, clipping
from Montreal Star, March 10, 1945. No page listed.
83. John Boyko, Into the Hurricane: Attacking Socialism and the CCF, (Winnipeg, J. Gordon
Shillingford Publishing, 2006) 60-63. Boyko noted that Murray’s “Responsible Enterprise” was wellfunded as his salary, expenses, offices, secretarial assistance, postage, printing, travel, accommodation, and
research were all covered. The author noted that Murray undertook an ambitious schedule of speaking
engagements and he was always able to waive his speaker’s fees.
84. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 104, CCF Files, J.G. Diefenbaker, letter from John Diefenbaker to
Gladstone Murray, February 6, 1945, 1.
85. Diefenbaker to Murray, 1.
86. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 104, CCF Files, J.G. Diefenbaker, letter from Gladstone Murray to John
Diefenbaker, February 10, 1945, 1.
87. Murray to Diefenbaker, 1.
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Liberals and Progressive Conservatives makes me all the happier.”88 Evidently, both of
the old guard parties were making use of Murray’s anti-CCF materials. Also on Murray’s
mailing list was Prime Minister King. A series of correspondences between the two men
can be found in the CCF files. Of particular interest is one from 1943 where King
remarks, “I am grateful for you drawing my attention to the interesting debate between
Mr. Coldwell and yourself enclosed in your letter.”89 At the same time, Murray had also
invited Ontario Progressive Conservative leader, and later Premier George Drew, to join
him in his anti-CCF campaign.90
These passages provide insight into the access and familiarity Murray had with
the leading political figures of this era and how he used these connections to promote his
anti-socialist agenda. As effective as Murray was at scaring Canadian voters away from
the CCF in early 1945, a new figure also arrived on the scene who wounded the party just
as severely: B.A Trestrail. Trestrail was an American who had moved to Canada during
the First World War. He claimed to have made and lost a fortune in the 1920s and 1930s.
He bounced back from financial ruin in the sphere of advertising in Toronto as part of the
successful Victory Bonds drive at the beginning of World War Two.91 In late 1943,
Trestrail was asked by the Toronto Board of Trade to lead a campaign against CCF
candidates at the municipal level. From these efforts, Trestrail broadened his mission and
formed an organization entitled Public Information Association. It was here that Trestrail

88. Murray to Diefenbaker, 1.
89. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 104, CCF Files, Right Honorable W.L.M. King, letter from Mackenzie
King to Gladstone Murray, July 29, 1943, 1. The ties between the two men become more evident when
Murray successfully lobbied for his cousin George Murray to receive a Senate seat as Prime Minister King
was preparing to retire in 1948.
90. Boyko, Into the Hurricane, 59. Murray’s connection to Drew was central to a political scandal
entitled “The Gestapo Affair.”
91. Boyko, Into the Hurricane, 70.
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would make his most significant impact.92 Like Gladstone Murray, Trestrail was
“entrusted with hundreds of thousands of dollars by industrial and financial leaders to do
a job on the CCF,” according to Lewis.93 With financial backing from some of Canada's
largest corporations, Trestrail undertook a sizeable public opinion survey in the spring
and summer of 1944. From information gleaned from those responses, he predicted that
between twenty-five to forty percent of CCF supporters could be dissuaded from voting
for that party.94 Trestrail followed the survey with a short book entitled Stand Up and Be
Counted, which attacked the CCF using “out-of-context and false quotes, false
assumptions and extrapolations from party policies, and libelous slurs directed at party
leaders and members.”95 In the weeks before the Ontario and federal elections were
announced, Trestrail oversaw a massive media campaign that included newspaper and
radio advertisements and the production and distribution of a twenty-five page pamphlet
called Social Suicide.96
In his memoirs, David Lewis claimed that Trestrail’s contribution “was very
damaging to the CCF. I learned to detest his name, partly because of his anti-Semitism,
partly because of his intellectual crudity, and partly because of his methods of persuasion.
The unqualified and unsupported assertion of a lie— as if it had come directly from the
Sermon on the Mount—made his stuff all the more effective.”97 Lewis added that there
was nothing new in Trestrail’s propaganda, yet his attacks were “more vicious and more

92. Boyko, Into the Hurricane, 71.
93. David Lewis, The Good Fight, Political Memoirs, 1909-1958 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada,
1981) 315.
94. Boyko, Into the Hurricane, 71.
95. Boyko, Into the Hurricane, 71.
96. Boyko, Into the Hurricane, 72-73.
97. Lewis, The Good Fight, 314. Lewis added that Trestrail did not make any public appearances,
except at meetings of his benefactors. The impression that formed was of a tough, shrewd, calculating
individual with a flair for propaganda uninhibited by conscience or scruple.
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effective, although that was not our perception at the time.”98 Indeed, Social Suicide was
merely a condensed version of Stand Up and Be Counted. Caplan wrote that both works
were propaganda masterpieces. The writing style was simple, sensational, and
memorable.99 In mid-May 1945, in the middle of the federal election campaign, Trestrail
had the pamphlet mailed to every English-speaking address in Canada.100
In Social Suicide, Lewis contended, “Trestrail threw all the usual poisoned darts
at the CCF: regimentation, bureaucracy, dictatorship, communism, Nazism, loss of
freedom, and loss of savings; these were all there in blood-curdling detail.”101 Lewis
stated, “My colleagues and I hoped that Trestrail’s inflammatory accusations might
finally exhaust the patience of Canadians; we hoped that the exaggerations and
distortions in which he indulged would turn people away from the entire anti-CCF
game.”102 However, in this case, relying on the common sense of the “average man”
failed the CCF. “We were too naïve,” Lewis lamented.103 Social Suicide was mailed to
every address in English Canada, some three million households. The CCF calculated the
cost of shipping this tabloid ran to about $300,000.104 Lewis acknowledged, “The effect
of Social Suicide was immediately noticeable; from plants and the streets we had people
turning away as they were no longer willing to support us.”105 Partly because the
publication itself was very effective and partly because its appearance was the

98. Lewis, The Good Fight, 315.
99. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 162.
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culmination of two years of an intensive and extensive campaign, Social Suicide acted as
the final roll of the anti-CCF drum.
The party attempted to counter the effects of Social Suicide in two ways. It
attempted to prevent the mailing of the pamphlet, which failed, and it also sought to
address the damage the pamphlet had caused by creating its own crude response to it.106
Lewis explained the latter: “We planned an advertising campaign of three small
newspaper ads, featuring an octopus to represent capitalism. A number of newspapers
refused to publish our advertisement, finding it too coarse.”107 Lewis tartly added, “No ad
was too crude if it attacked the CCF, yet, it was only the CCF ad which offended the
sensibilities of the sales managers.”108 These tribulations provide a shining example of
more obstacles the CCF faced: a double standard, as well as hostility from the
mainstream media. Lewis declared, “In any case, our attempt was simply too puny to be
of value, whatever its quality.”109 Thus, the CCF endured effectively devastating, external
attacks that hampered its efforts as the 1945 federal election approached.

Notes on the CCF Federal Campaign
As the election call neared, the CCF was left in the quandary of determining what
elements to put forward to the Canadian public. Lewis was acutely aware that there was
little room for political maneuvering in the upcoming campaign, and that the CCF would
106. Boyko, Into the Hurricane, 76. Boyko wrote that Lewis attempted to stop the distribution of
Social Suicide by citing that the document did not contain the name and address of the publisher. The
assistant postmaster stated the document appeared to contravene the Defense of Canada Act and the
Dominion Elections Act. He promised to refer the matter to the deputy minister of justice. Lewis’s request
went as far as the minister of justice which is where the trail ends. No action was ever taken. On the second
point, Boyko explained that Lewis hired an Ontario party organizer, Dudley Bristow, to create a formal
response. It was not ready until three months after the election.
107. Lewis, The Good Fight, 319.
108. Lewis, The Good Fight, 319.
109. Lewis, The Good Fight, 319.
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unwisely be placing too much emphasis on the anticipated return to the economic misery
of the 1930s. “I am afraid that the most active and experienced people in our movement
are inclined to think that the harping on the pre-war depression years is of primary
importance,”110 said Lewis. “Every political party in this campaign will make progressive
promises. It is now fashionable to talk on the various items of social security and of the
need of full employment and maximum production.”111 The CCF secretary then stated
what the party could place before Canadian voters: “Except for the parts of our program
which are specifically Socialist and which are necessarily too technical for the average
voter, our program of intentions cannot differ much from the promises of the other
parties.”112
In considering what the CCF was going to offer voters in the 1945 campaign, the
party decided to “go negative.” Lewis said, “The principle way in which we can get
across [to the voters] is to arouse the justifiable fear of the people that if the other boys
continue in the saddle they will get the same kind of thing they got before [economic
chaos].”113 He bluntly emphasized the importance of frightening voters, adding,
“Psychologically, this is undoubtedly sound, for people act more out of fear—which, of
course, is a negative thing—than out of positive conviction.”114 In closing, Lewis warned
the forthcoming, negative CCF campaign might be, “very unfortunate, but necessary
nonetheless.”115 This admission from one of the chief architects of CCF political action
indicates that Lewis was no dreamer who harbored ill-founded optimism in appealing to
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the better character of the “average man.” Clearly, the CCF National Secretary was a
pragmatic individual who hoped for the best, but who also understood the need to instill
fear in voters in order to assist the CCF to win their support.

Peace and Politics: The King Government Prepares to Go to the Polls
As Mackenzie King tinkered with the end of the Parliamentary session and the
ensuing election, he was also concerned with the completion of the war in Europe, the
issue of conscription for the Pacific theatre and the upcoming peace conference in San
Francisco.116 On April 4, King announced in the House of Commons his government’s
decision to forego conscription of troops to Japan. “I could feel that the House was
receiving [it] well and that there was a tendency to applaud the latter portion of it but I
saw equally clearly that the Conservatives were in a quandary as to what they should say.
We have cut the ground completely from underneath their feet,”117 King said. He
continued, “I think today’s statement is perhaps the most effective thing that has been
said this year and will go further than all else to win us the next general election.”118 King
was referring to the no conscription policy as something that would help Liberal Party
fortunes in Québec, the province where conscription was opposed most vehemently. He
predicted that, “This should bring our Québec friends completely into line.”119
The day following this pronouncement saw the Liberal Party caucus meet to
discuss the coming peace, election, and the fate of their long-standing leader. Prime
116. MG 26- J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28184, April 3,
1945, 5.
117. MG 26- J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28190, April 4,
1945, 3.
118. Diaries, April 4, 1945, 3.
119. Diaries, April 4, 1945, 3-4. He added that “Any question of conscription was passed and gone
and that our position was stated correctly now in a way which should secure us all the seats that we should
obtain in Québec.”
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Minister King expressed his concern that the federal election would produce a minority
parliament. 120 Later, he wrote, “That was a vital consideration because it might mean
either the Conservatives or the CCF would have the arrangements of affairs which would
possibly determine the parliament of the next five years and the complexion of it.”121
Indeed, King was uncertain what the Canadian electorate would select, including the
possibility of the election of a CCF government. The Liberal leader attempted to boost
caucus morale by stating the party was in fair shape in Ontario and was poised to do very
well in Québec.122
As the parliamentary session came to a close, King began to feel more optimistic
about his government’s record and position as it headed toward an election campaign.123
King’s buoyant attitude was given a jolt when he learned that Ontario Premier George
Drew had decided the Ontario election date would be June 11.124 While King had
previously stated that having the Ontario election precede the federal one might be
beneficial to his federal Liberal Party, the Prime Minister was having serious doubts now
that the actual date had been set. He wrote, “Should the Liberals run second or last in
Ontario—last seems in every way most probable—the effect on the Federal campaign

120. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28196, April 5,
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122. Diaries, April 5, 1945, 4. King’s reading of the situation in Québec was based on the previous
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which would come later would be disastrous—indeed not only in Ontario, but a defeat
which might hurt us in all the provinces.”125
With this fresh piece of political news, King interrupted a cabinet meeting to tell
those assembled that Drew had set the election date for Canada’s most populous
province. The discussion swiftly shifted, with the intense focus being on setting a date for
a federal election.126 One group of King’s cabinet argued the party should stick with
King’s June 25 option. A second group of ministers, led by C.D. Howe, pressured King
to call the election for the same day as the June 11 Ontario election.127 Howe used the
argument that, should the Liberals wait to hold the vote, he was “fearful of what might
happen in the transition period of unemployment.”128 This was strong evidence that the
Liberals—and all parties—expected a severe economic downturn once the war was
finished. Indeed, that event had been the unpleasant experience after the First World War;
With the Great Depression only ending in Canada because of the outbreak of this latest
worldwide conflict, all parties firmly believed a return to those economic hard times was
a likely event. After learning of the likely Ontario provincial election date, two days of
frantic discussions took place among King and his cabinet colleagues. King made the
case that holding the federal and Ontario elections on the same date was a matter of
fairness. He wrote, “This seemed in every way the fairest thing to the public to get an
unprejudiced verdict.”129 Perhaps, on some level, King was concerned with voters not

125. Diaries, April 12, 1945, 1. King’s thoughts extended beyond his Liberal Party because
whoever was perceived as the “loser” in Ontario would likely hamper that party’s fortunes in any
forthcoming federal campaign.
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being unduly influenced by the Ontario vote. He was almost certainly worried of the
negative fallout that his party would face. As talks continued into the second night, King
became more certain of the June 11 election date.130 Ultimately, King and his ministers
did opt to hold the federal election on the same day as the Ontario provincial vote.
While King was concerned about the advances of the CCF during the period after
early 1942, his primary focus in terms of chief rivalry returned to the ProgressiveConservatives by spring 1945. By fixing the federal campaign to coincide with the one in
Ontario, King believed he had out-maneuvered the main threat to his Liberal Party. With
federal and provincial voting taking place on the same day, there would be no lag
between elections and thus no negative fall-out upon the federal Liberals. Based on the
expressionless faces sitting in the Official Opposition benches after the announcement,
King concluded he had pulled the rug out from under his prime opponent. He was
incorrect.
Premier Drew was determined to hold the Ontario contest first, and was outraged
when he discovered that King had scheduled the federal elections for the same date as the
Ontario vote.131 Drew’s government went to work to schedule an earlier election date.
Three days after announcing the federal election date, Mackenzie King discovered that
his plans to have the election the same date as the provincial election in Ontario had been
thwarted. He exclaimed, “Before we finished the revision, word came that Drew had
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hanged the date of the issue of the writs to June 4.”132 The Ontario premier had finally
outmaneuvered King and this election arrangement remained final.

The Ontario Election Campaign
Once the date for the election was set and the Ontario campaign began, Premier
Drew hit the trail with a simple but pointed platform. He would emphasize the
progressive aspects of his Progressive-Conservative government, particularly in the field
of labor relations. The other major talking point to voters reinforced the CCF as a
communist, fascist party that needed to be destroyed.133
The Liberal Party under the leadership of former premier Mitchell Hepburn ran an
under-staffed and under-funded campaign that Caplan described as “pathetic.”134 One of
Hepburn’s chief assets was the assistance provided by the Labour-Progressive Party. The
only conclusion that can be drawn from this arrangement was that the communists were
attempting to return Drew to office by defeating as many CCF candidates as possible.
Caplan explained that the LPP contested thirty-seven seats, twenty-seven of which were
held by the CCF. Furthermore, only five CCF Members of the Provincial Parliament did
not face Communist opposition; this contrasts with only five of the thirty-eight
Conservative incumbents who did have an LPP opponent.135

132. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28262, April 16,
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Despite facing opposition from all sides, the CCF had reason to be hopeful during
the campaign, a degree of optimism that it had not possessed during its first decade of
operation. The Ontario CCF was also far better financed and had a much larger
membership than it had had at any time in the party’s brief history. During the campaign,
federal leader Coldwell, Saskatchewan Premier Tommy Douglas, and British Columbia
leader Harold Winch went on speaking tours across Ontario. Additional support came
from selected Labor Councils in Toronto, London and Hamilton.136
With a little over a week remaining in the Ontario contest, party leaders started to
become aware of the devastating effects produced by the campaigns against the CCF, and
how they were now taking a serious toll on its supporters. At the provincial level, the
party decided to attack the Drew government. On May 24, Ontario CCF leader Ted
Jolliffe made his controversial “Gestapo Speech.” In his radio broadcast that day, Jolliffe
announced he had received information from a constable working within a small branch
of the Ontario Provincial Police which was supposedly monitoring political activity,
particularly from the left.137 Jolliffe further alleged that this secret police force was
supported and maintained by Premier Drew, who used this information to create political
“blacklists.”138 The CCF leader intended to cause a sensation, and he did. Drew and
Attorney-General Leslie Blackwell immediately and vigorously denied the Jolliffe
accusations, while the CCF, Liberals and the Toronto Star denounced Drew and his
“Gestapo” without restraint.139 Four days after the broadcast, Drew appointed a Royal
Commission to investigate the CCF charges. The CCF and Liberals attempted to have the
136. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 164.
137. J. T. Morley, Secular Socialists: The CCF/NDP in Ontario: A Biography (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1984), 50.
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348

election postponed until after the Commission had concluded its deliberations. This
notion was firmly rejected by the premier.140 While there has been much debate around
the damage Jolliffe’s speech had on the Ontario and federal election results, there is
unanimous agreement that the CCF leader’s statement did not help the Democratic
Socialist cause.141

The Federal Election Campaign
With the election date debate complete, King turned his attention to the province
of Québec. He addressed a small group of federal Québec politicians in mid-April,
declaring, “If individual leaders in the party were afraid to stand up for me I might decide
to go and speak in Québec myself. I would find out if at the end of 25 years of leadership
of the party and all I had done to keep the country united this was all I had gained of
confidence and would like to find out where the province stood.”142 The Prime Minister’s
diaries indicated there were a couple of pitfalls King fell into by going directly to the
people of Québec. He admitted, “The one handicap is that I have not the use of the
French language; also that I have so little time for the campaign.”143 Indeed, none of the

140. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 170.
141. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 170-71. Caplan claimed that it became
commonplace to see a simple causal relationship between Jolliffe’s accusations and his party’s humiliating
loss. He wrote that such criticism seemed unjustified. He cited a Gallup poll taken just before Jolliffe’s
broadcast that pegged federal CCF support at twenty-one percent. The Ontario CCF received twenty-two
percent on June 4. While he acknowledges that the federal numbers dropped dramatically a week later, he
attributes those results to a mass defection of many fringe supporters and the demoralization of many
others. Professor R.E.K. Pemberton, a classicist at the University of Western Ontario had a different
opinion on the matter. He wrote that Jolliffe’s speech helped to substantiate the negative tone of Trestrail’s
Social Suicide. Pemberton added “There is no shadow of a doubt that the Gestapo business did do us (CCF)
harm, and plenty, and rightly.” See Morley, Secular Socialists, 52.
142. MG 26 – J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, April 16, 1945, 5.
143. Diaries, April 16, 1945, 5-6. Unlike in recent decades, in the 1940s it was not imperative that
Canadian federal party leaders have a firm grasp of English and French. Indeed, none of the major party
(Liberals, CCF, Progressive-Conservatives, or Social Credit) had a leader with a working knowledge of
French. One major difference in this instance is that only the CCF was labeled as an “English” party in

349

national party leaders (Liberals, Progressive-Conservatives, CCF, nor Social Credit)
possessed a working knowledge of the language of Moliere. Still, the perception that only
the CCF was the “Party of the English” persisted in Québec.
On May 7, word arrived that the German army had surrendered and that the war
in the European theatre would cease almost immediately. The following day was V-E
Day, the official end of the war in Europe. A national holiday had been declared in
Canada by Parliament, and King was fully prepared to deliver his victory speech. After
listening to President Truman’s broadcast formally announcing the end of the war, King
rested a bit and then took to the airwaves. “From a political point of view, a broadcast of
the kind is worth more than two weeks campaigning on party matters,” he said. King
remarked, “Certainly, all things are working together for good so far as the campaign
itself is concerned. This victory in Europe is going to help immensely in the campaign. I
am entitled to some credit for the timing.”144
While in San Francisco, King was receiving increasingly optimistic election
reports. According to the Canadian Prime Minister, even his chief rivals acknowledged
the Liberal Party was gaining momentum. He mentioned, “Turnbull told me that
Coldwell had mentioned that the stock of the Liberal Party was going up steadily.”145 For
the moment, King surmised that his main opponents were fading. “I think there is no
doubt that Bracken’s stock has gone steadily down,” he noted, “also, that the CCF is not
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what it was.”146 King held firm that the military triumph in Europe was the main element
assisting his election campaign. “Without question, the victory and the broadcast from
here will have helped very materially.”147
While on the campaign trail in Winnipeg and with an eye toward wooing CCF
voters, King also brought forth the notion of establishing a true Canadian flag. He
asserted that this proposed replacement for the Canadian Ensign would “continue to
honour the Union Jack as a symbol of the British Empire and Commonwealth.”148 The
crowd response was underwhelming, but the announcement served a political purpose.
King noted, “I should not be surprised if it caused a good many Conservatives
who may have been thinking of supporting us to refrain from doing so on June the 11th.”
He continued, “On the other hand, it may cause some who would otherwise support the
CCF to give us their support.”149 No doubt, the Liberal leader realized that the
continuation of a symbol of British domination would not be well received in the largely
French-speaking province. It is amazing, however, that King did not receive any negative
response from the media or voters of Québec on issues such as his position reversal on
conscription, or about creating a Canadian flag that continued to pay homage to Great
Britain. Yet, as the Liberal campaign made its way into Québec, it was clear to the Prime
Minister that Québec was still Liberal territory. At a campaign rally in Montreal on June
2, King remarked, “I was amazed at the size of the audience. Every seat of the vast
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building was filled. I do not recall ever having been greeted by a finer audience. The
impression from all sides is that the Province of Québec is pretty solidly behind me.”150
In addition to this reception, King received word from Liberal boss Chubby
Power that “There were 48 seats sure [out of 65] in Québec.”151 Indeed, King had adroitly
dodged serious bullets in the forms of the conscription plebiscite, limited conscription
and the stated desire to maintain a symbol of British domination over largely francophone
Québec. While the outcome of the federal election was not yet clear, King was confident
that Québec had returned to the Liberal fold. The questions at this point would be the
results of the Ontario provincial election, and how that would impact the federal vote a
week later.

Ontario Provincial Election Results
June 4 was Election Day in Ontario, the results of which would prove pivotal for
the federal vote seven days later. As such, it was a day of great importance in Canadian
political history. While the Conservative government of George Drew was expected to
triumph, the race was more critical for the CCF and the Liberal Party. If any party
performed below predictions, crucial momentum for the June 11 federal election would
be lost. Prime Minister King offered a gloomy prediction for the provincial Liberals. The
Prime Minister expected that George Drew would likely emerge with a majority
government. He also believed that the CCF would place second, with Ontario Liberals in
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third.152 When the election results came in, King had a mixture of good and bad news. It
was no surprise that Drew had won a handsome majority. King was disappointed that so
few Liberals had been elected, but pleased that they had outpolled the CCF.153
King quickly put the blame at the feet of the provincial Liberal and CCF leaders.
He wrote, “While I truly dislike Drew, I think the results show that people were sick of
tactics and the likes of Joliffe and Hepburn.”154 King cited two areas where the
opposition leaders handed victory to the despised Conservative Premier. The Prime
Minister chided Jolliffe and Hepburn for “bringing on the election when they did and for
conducting the kind of fool campaign—talk of secret police and the like.”155 The Prime
Minister understood immediately that this underwhelming CCF showing would hurt that
party, and thereby provide a boost to the federal Liberals. “The result in Ontario should
ensure us the election in the Federal field,” King noted, and “it has demonstrated that the
CCF have lost their power in Ontario.”156
While his provincial counterparts had not done well, winning just eleven seats in
the ninety-seat chamber at Queen’s Park, the CCF had suffered a far more serious defeat.
The party lost twenty-six of the thirty-four seats it had captured less than two years
earlier. Furthermore, the CCF vote share fell from thirty-two percent in 1943, to twenty-
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154. Diaries, June 4, 1945, 3.
155. Diaries, June 4, 1945, 3. Indeed, the CCF and leader Jolliffe were chastised in the media for
making such wild accusations against the Drew government and the press was gleeful of the CCF’s poor
showing and Jolliffe’s personal defeat. When these accusations were later proven to have been true, the
media was silent on the subject. Clearly, the Prime Minister believed the “Gestapo Speech” was a
politically foolish maneuver.
156. Diaries, June 4, 1945, 3.
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two percent.157 Thus, the Liberals were elevated to Official Opposition in Ontario, while
the CCF was relegated to third-party status. King realized this electoral thumping would
severely hamstring the Democratic Socialists. “A Tory victory in Ontario will not help
the Tories that much. It may help them a little in Manitoba,” he noted. King predicted,
“They will win where the CCF will lose. In Ontario, the Tories will be strengthened and
the CCF will be less.” King also predicted that he would be very surprised if his party did
not obtain a significant majority victory in the immediate federal election.158 The day
after the Ontario election, King expressed just how serious a blow the Ontario election
results would be for the CCF in the federal field, and how this would boost his Liberal
Party.159 “In the light of further reports, Hepburn’s Liberals are about where they were in
the last Legislature. CCF very much behind,” he said. King reasoned, “This should help
us tremendously. It means no hope for a CCF government.”160 His assertion that the
possibility of a CCF government had died with the Ontario election results indicates that
such a triumph for the party was plausible up to that point. Having determined the CCF
not to be a serious rival, King turned his focus to the Progressive-Conservatives. He
pronounced, “The Tories will not hold to their idea of voting Drew for the Provincial and
King in the Federal. They will now think they have a chance of winning both. However,
the CCF, I think, will come our way.”161 King expected it was likely that CCF voters
would shift to his Liberal Party in order to make certain the Conservatives and its leader,

157. Frank Feigart, Canada Votes: 1935-1988, Ontario Provincial Elections, 1937-1987 (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 246. The party attracted 27,000 fewer votes than the 1943 election.
However, voter turnout was much larger in 1945. Thus, the precipitous decrease in vote share for the CCF.
158. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28452, June 4,
1945, 4. Indeed, King expected his Liberal Party to have a majority of between twenty and forty seats.
159. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28453, June 5,
1945, 1.
160. Diaries, June 5, 1945, 1.
161. Diaries, June 5, 1945, 4-5.
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John Bracken, were denied victory. This was an early example of “strategic voting” in
Canadian political history; this strategy almost always meant that the CCF (and later, the
New Democratic Party) would lose votes at the end of a campaign to the less offensive of
the other major parties, usually to the Liberal Party.
It is debatable how productive this strategic voting was. Unquestionably, since it
started in 1945, it had been a serious problem for the CCF/NDP. In that election cycle,
King pointed out just how important the timing and the results of the Ontario election
would likely be for the federal results. As he noted, “There is no doubt, the Ontario
election being the great sweep it was will have a prejudicial effect on our final result.”162
Indeed, after June 4, King’s diary entries are riddled with anxiety caused by a
Conservative Party boosted by its dominant victory in Ontario. Scant mention is paid to
the CCF from that point forward. This illustrates just how injurious the Ontario election
results were for the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. The results from Ontario
had convinced the Liberal leader that the situation was rosier than his Liberal colleagues
thought. During a speech the following evening, King sounded very much like a leader of
the CCF: “I got into the social reform programme; my interest in industrial questions;
family allowances and the need for a Government to put these reforms through.” He said,
“The opportunities today were so great I would like to throw myself heart and soul into
the completion of a programme of social reform, leading to the establishment of a
national minimum of health care and social welfare for all.”163 In so doing, King was

162. Diaries, June 5, 1945, 5.
163. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28461, June 6,
1945, 4. Despite his contention of implementing a national health care system, King failed to deliver on
this promise. Canadian National Health care would have to wait two full decades when a minority Liberal
government—prodded by the CCF’s successor, the NDP—would establish such a medical system. If
anything, this pledge was typical of King (and subsequent Liberal leaders) of campaigning from the Left
while being decidedly less bold after the election was over.
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carrying out a reformation both of himself and his party. This change had occurred during
the war years and accelerated after the 1943 Ontario provincial election results. The
Prime Minister realized that the winds of change for a measure of a welfare state would
play an integral part in the post-war world, and he acted accordingly.164 Indeed, this 1945
version of Mackenzie King as reform champion is a far cry from earlier incarnations of
the man during his first two decades as Canadian Prime Minister. This was the same
Prime Minister who first characterized the Great Depression as a “seasonal slump,” and,
after he was returned to office five years later, made only grudging allowances to
alleviate the economic chaos in Canada. Only the Second World War lifted Canada from
the economic morass. During the war years, King wisely realized that reform proposals
from the CCF were gaining traction with the public. Only then did he don the cloak of a
“reformer.”
Two days before the federal election, King expected his Liberal Party would “get
about fifty seats out of Québec, and around thirty in Ontario. We will carry seats in all the
provinces. I feel we should win a majority, with about 130 seats.” He also noted, “The
latest Gallup Poll indicates [we are] certainly in the lead of the Conservatives. There
seems little doubt from any source about our having the largest group.”165

The Tide Drains Out for the CCF: Federal Election Day 1945
As events unfolded on June 11, it was evident that the election was going as King
and the pollsters had predicted. Unfortunately, there are virtually no accounts from the
party’s leading figures of Election Day for the CCF. A fair amount of material, however,

164. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 145-46.
165. Diaries, June 6, 1945, 5.
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is available in reference to the aftermath of the federal election. Those discussions are
noted in the following chapter. Secondary sources strongly argued that the outcome of the
federal election was cast in the Ontario election held the previous week. Caplan declared
that, after June 4, CCF supporters were shattered, though they probably should not have
been.166 Despite winning only twelve percent of the rural vote, the party did garner a
respectable twenty-seven percent of the urban tally. Those relatively robust totals in the
urban regions, however, failed to translate into any seats in the provincial legislature.
Indeed, the eight CCF victorious MPP’s all came from industrialized ridings: one from
Hamilton, and the remainder from Northern Ontario.167 While these results demoralized
the CCF and its supporters, Caplan argued that, given the fierce campaign waged against
the party by its political and media foes, the twenty-two percent figure was a remarkable
tally.168
The effect of an alliance by the provincial Liberal and Labour-Progressive parties
was another factor that hindered the Ontario CCF’s seat total. An analysis of the Ontario
election by Walter Young concluded that the CCF lost five ridings due to the LPP
working against it and with the Liberal Party.169 In fact, political scientist Norman Penner
believed the Liberal-LPP cooperation cost the CCF eight seats.170 If either of these
figures were accurate, it meant that the Liberal-LPP agreement helped prevent the CCF
from finishing second in the provincial election. Had the Ontario CCF maintained its
official opposition status in the Ontario legislature, one can only wonder if this would

166. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 191.
167. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 191-92.
168. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 191.
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University of Toronto Press, 1969) 276-77.
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have changed the perception of this party heading into the federal vote. It can only be
surmised that it could not have hurt CCF prospects.
The importance of the timing of the two elections can now be established. Perhaps
if there had been more than one week between the two elections, the CCF could have
formulated a case that the Ontario results were not as bad as they appeared. However, as
Lewis and King both stated, the Ontario elections would have a serious effect on
whichever party appeared to be the loser in the Ontario campaign. In the week leading up
to the federal contest, the perception was that the CCF was severely wounded. One week
later, the direct consequence of the Ontario election proved to be an even greater disaster.
The CCF party out-polled and elected as many members as the old parties combined in
the western provinces, however in Ontario the party was devastated. The CCF vote fell
from 390,000 in the provincial contest to 260,000 in the federal election. Caplan stated
that was because a large number of CCF bandwagon supporters, discouraged by the
losses in the provincial election, had deserted the sinking ship.171
One ship that was not sinking was the Liberal Party. With a significantly reduced
majority, the government had survived the bulk of the war and the ensuing election
campaign. King was also satisfied with the results from Ontario. “Ontario did not do
badly, but there were several seats that we should not have lost which had been formerly
held by our own men,” said King.172 He crowed, “The complete wiping out of the CCF in
Ontario was a splendid result. These fellows are so treacherous that I would rather see us

171. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 192. The CCF share of the vote in Ontario
dipped from twenty-two percent in the provincial election to just fourteen percent in the federal one. In
addition, the party elected no members to the Canadian House of Commons from Ontario. Its sole MP, Joe
Noseworthy, was defeated.
172. MG 26-J13, Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, item 28484, June 11,
1945, 4.
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go back to the old two-Party system.”173 Perhaps King found the CCF to be an
untrustworthy group. However, it is interesting that in the two months before the election,
there is evidence that King had sent an emissary, Grant Dexter, to meet with CCF leader
M.J. Coldwell to discuss the possibility of forming a post-election coalition government.
Coldwell replied that such an arrangement was impossible. Dexter returned a few days
later with a new offer: support a coalition and King would recommend Coldwell as his
successor when he retired. Again, Coldwell declined King’s proposal.174
King’s disdain for the CCF was reciprocated by leading figures within that party.
Eugene Forsey wrote, “Mr. King is the most formidable antagonist the CCF has. King’s
greatest triumph is his success in fooling well-meaning people into thinking he is
indispensable and relatively progressive.”175

The Day After
When the dust started to settle on June 12, the election results became more
evident. The Liberal government was returned to power with 125 seats, a narrow majority
in a 245 seat House of Commons. Nearly one half of those seats (fifty-nine) came from
Québec.176 These figures align with what the Liberal leader had predicted days before the

173. Diaries, June 11, 1945, 4.
174. M.J. Coldwell Papers, Volume 42, file 27, 4. This coalition offer is not mentioned in the King
diaries. Neither is it located in the biography of M.J. Coldwell. From the notes in King’s diary, the Prime
Minister did have a degree of respect for the CCF leader. Also, if one wanted to return to the two-party
system, co-opting the leader of the third party would be good place to start.
175. Eugene Forsey, Letter to the Editor, Canadian Forum 25, no. 295 (August 1945): 114-15.
The electors in the riding of Prince Albert found King dispensable. The Prime Minister lost his seat to the
CCF candidate in the House of Commons in the June 1945 election. Despite promising to retire if defeated
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176. Feigart, Canada Votes, “1945 – Summary of Votes and Seats Won, by Party and Province,”
28. Technically, the Liberals captured fifty-three seats in Québec, but another six candidates were elected
in the province under the banner, “Independent Liberals”. They all quickly joined the Liberal caucus in
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vote. The Progressive-Conservatives improved on their 1940 results, and elected sixtyseven members, though only one from Québec, to the House of Commons.177
As mentioned earlier, the election results were viewed as extremely disappointing
for the CCF. The party had won twenty-eight seats, up from eight in 1940, but all were in
the Prairie Provinces and British Columbia, save for Claire Gillis’s seat in Nova
Scotia.178 Based on the party’s strong performances in 1943 and 1944, this total was seen
as underwhelming. Most distressing for the CCF hierarchy was the reality that, once
again, the party was shut out in vote- and seat-rich Central Canada. Joe Noseworthy lost
the party’s lone Ontario seat, and in Québec the party garnered only two-and-a-half
percent of the popular vote.179 In one sense, the CCF in Ontario and Québec was almost
back to where it started when the war began: on the fringes of the political stage in the
two provinces. Still, the Ontario branch of the party was relatively healthy, compared to
the bleak days of the late 1930s. The party had suffered two harsh setbacks just one week
apart. Yet the party captured more than twenty-two percent during the Ontario provincial
election, and nearly fifteen percent during the federal vote one week later.180 While these
results may have been seen as disappointing, the CCF was still on the map in Ontario,
and in a markedly better position than it had been in 1939. A similar claim is difficult to
make for the Québec wing of the party. During the 1945 federal election, the Québec
CCF managed to locate only twenty-six candidates for the sixty-five constituencies in the
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province. The two-and-one-half percent vote share was the highest for the party to date,
highlighting the abysmal position of the CCF in Québec.181
The immediate question being asked in CCF circles after the campaign was,
“What went wrong?” Another daunting question facing the party was whether, and how,
it could recapture the momentum it had enjoyed in the period right up to the eve of the
1945 elections. As the following chapter suggests, the CCF leadership moved quickly to
put the 1945 campaign behind them without delving deeply into the root causes for the
party’s soft showing in Central Canada.

181. Feigart, Canada Votes, 28.
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CHAPTER IX
POST-MORTEM OF THE 1945 ONTARIO PROVINCIAL ELECTION

The twin electoral debacles for the CCF in June 1945 devastated the party
leadership and its supporters. While print media gleefully reveled in the CCF’s misery,
the party in Ontario scrambled to polish its tarnished reputation. In Québec, the defeats
exacerbated long-standing issues that led to a further weakening of the party in that
province.
The ballots had just begun to be counted on the night of June 4, 1945, but the
editorial staff of the Toronto Globe and Mail was already predicting a convincing
majority victory for Conservative Premier George Drew. Indeed, the electorate, likely
influenced by outlets like George McCullagh’s Globe and Mail, went out and voted en
masse to maintain the political status quo. That newspaper’s editorial proclaimed, “The
results of yesterday’s provincial balloting were a tribute to the soundness of the electorate
in no ordinary sense of the word. No more determined effort to defeat the Government
could be imagined, as Premier Drew and his Ministry were mercilessly harpooned.”1 The
editorial also took much pleasure in the “collapse of the CCF” and took that party’s
leader to task for forcing an unnecessary election and for leveling “unprecedented” spy
accusations at the Ontario premier in the campaign’s final days.2 Indeed, a Royal
Commission into the “Gestapo Affair” had been called by Premier Drew in the last week
of the election campaign. On the question of political espionage, The Globe and Mail
1. MG 28, IV-1, CCF Papers, Volume 58, File 3, Ontario Newspaper Clippings, 1943-1949, The
Globe and Mail, 1.
2. The Globe and Mail, 1. As discussed in the previous chapter, it was Mr. Drew who was angling
for an early election, contesting with Mackenzie King to go to the voters as soon as possible with the
European war winding down. The notion that any minority government bears no responsibility for its own
defeat in the legislature was disingenuous on the part of The Globe and Mail.
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declared that the people had evidently made up their minds that the charge was
ridiculous.3 Clearly, The Globe and Mail editorial pinned the Conservative win on the
dramatic “Gestapo Affair.” The paper concluded that this serious accusation backfired on
the CCF and catapulted the Conservative Party to victory. As one of the leading
mouthpieces for the conservative cause in Ontario and Canada, it is no surprise that The
Globe and Mail reached this verdict. This also presents a classic example of the antisocialist bias faced by the CCF from Canada’s contemporary media. It was a hurdle that
the party failed to overcome.
Other voices would offer different rationales explaining the underwhelming
performance of the CCF in that June 4 provincial election. The CCF did not perform as
well as hoped, and, as feared, this setback negatively affected the federal CCF’s election
results the following week.

The LeBel Commission—Ontario’s Watergate?
The “Gestapo Speech” was singled out by The Globe and Mail as the contributing
factor that rallied Ontario voters to George Drew and the Conservative Party, and
punished the CCF and its leader, Ted Jolliffe. Others, such as Gerald Caplan, argued that
the CCF was going to suffer losses in the 1945 election due to Drew’s handling of a
minority situation, some modest social programs and the positive feeling for the end of
the European theatre in World War II.4 Regardless of which interpretation is correct, the
charge of political spying by the CCF had sullied both Jolliffe’s and the party’s
reputation. The first step to rehabilitating the reputations of both came at the LeBel Royal
3. The Globe and Mail editorial added that Drew’s vow to resign as premier if the Royal
Commission found him guilty of the charges leveled by Jolliffe factored in voter’s decision to support him
on Election Day, 1.
4. Interview with Gerald Caplan, February 5, 2014.
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Commission. Early in the proceedings, the CCF case was bolstered by the testimony of
Captain William Osborne-Dempster, the alleged head of the Ontario “Secret Political
Police.”5 Osborne-Dempster testified that he had “personally assured” six different
persons that he would “take the rap” at any inquiry into activities of the special branch of
the Provincial Police.6 Constable John Rowe quoted Dempster as stating, “The six
persons to whom Osborne-Dempster claimed he had given assurance to were Toronto
insecticide dealer M.A. Sanderson, Toronto policy counsel Gladstone Murray,
Commissioner W.H. Stringer of the Provincial Police, Deputy Commissioner H.S.
McCready, Premier Drew, and Attorney-General Blackwell.”7
On June 22, Constable Rowe was questioned by Mr. Sedgwick, counsel for the
Crown, regarding a letter M.A. Sanderson allegedly said was written to him by Drew.8
Rowe said Sanderson read him a letter shortly after January 1, 1944, at the special branch
office of the Provincial Police in the company of Captain Osborne-Dempster.9 Rowe
stated that he had not read the letter, but had “seen what he believed to be the Ontario
House letterhead, the salutation, and the signature which was either George Drew, or
George A. Drew.”10 Rowe asserted that, “The letter as read assured Sanderson that his
expenses in a libel suit would be taken care of.”11 In another statement, Rowe indicated
that the Attorney-General of Ontario was involved in political espionage. He contended
that Blackwell had knowledge of the special branch activities. To bolster his claim, Rowe
remarked, “It was significant to me that in connection with a Labour bill the CCF was
5. MG 28, IV-1, CCF Papers, File 56, Volume 3, Ontario Gestapo Newspaper Clippings, 1945,
Montreal Gazette, June 23, 1945, 1.
6. Montreal Gazette, 1.
7. Montreal Gazette, 1.
8. Montreal Gazette, 1.
9. Montreal Gazette, 1.
10. Montreal Gazette, 1.
11. Montreal Gazette, 1.
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supposed to introduce in the legislature, Dempster said that the attorney-general
[Blackwell] had asked, ‘Can you get me a copy?’” Rowe continued, “Osborne-Dempster
replied, I think I can.’”12
Next, Rowe was questioned by CCF leader Jolliffe, regarding the nature of this
“special branch office.” Rowe replied, “Files compiled by the anti-sabotage office there
[18 Surrey Place], closed in June 1943, included no reports on CCF members of the
legislature. Such reports were added when the office was reopened for use as the special
branch. Likewise, a list of names of union personnel had been compiled in the fall of
1943. Dempster had never said anything about sabotage or subversive activities in
connection with these names.”13 From Rowe’s and Dempster’s remarks, it was obvious
that the nature of the anti-sabotage office changed significantly following the election of
the Conservatives and George Drew in August 1943. It would seem that the raison d’etre
for this new “special branch” could only be to combat sabotage.
Several weeks later, some light on the true function of this new office was
brought into the open by CCF counsel Andrew Brewin. At the LeBel Commission,
Brewin stated, “The facts revealed or indicated an illegal conspiracy to which Dempster
and the others [McCready, Stringer, Rowe, Blackwell, and Drew] were parties.”14 Given
the testimony presented, Brewin concluded that “The common purpose underlying the
whole thing was the defeat and discomfiture of a legal political party, the CCF and other
elements of opposition to the government of Ontario.”15 He added that the objective of
this special branch was to produce “Red Smear” propaganda that would link the CCF and
12. Montreal Gazette, 1.
13. Montreal Gazette, 1.
14. MG 28, IV 1, CCF Papers, Volume 56, File 3, Ontario Gestapo Hearings Newspaper
Clippings, 1945, Toronto Star, July 18, 1945, 1.
15. Toronto Star, 1.
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its members with the banned Communist Party of Canada.16 While acknowledging that
Dempster’s report was unreliable, Brewin added, “The evidence revealed not merely that
they were unreliable, but that they were deliberately and intentionally fabricated so as to
convey the false impression that the CCF was in some way linked up with disloyal and
illegal activities.17 The anti-sabotage unit, closed in June 1943, was re-opened in
November 1943. Dempster’s task was to prepare material on the CCF.”18
Brewin then focused on the role played by Sanderson and Murray. “The purpose
of Mr. Sanderson’s advertisements was to put the CCF on the skids,” Brewin started.19
He lamented that Sanderson was “an effective and clever propagandist. It would be the
greatest mistake to imagine that the material, while erroneous, was not effective. The
purpose was falsely to suggest a tie-up between CCF candidates and Communists.”20
Brewin then explained the role that Gladstone Murray played in this anti-CCF movement.
He explained, “Gladstone Murray not only received information from Sanderson, but
introduced Sanderson to Dempster as a useful outlet.”21 In order to solidify the case for
linkage between Murray, Dempster and Sanderson, Brewin said, “Constable Rowe’s
evidence revealed that Gladstone Murray was “constantly in touch with Dempster on the
telephone.”22 To explain the relationship between Murray and Sanderson, Brewin
contended, “Other proof of collaboration was given in testimony which showed that

16. Toronto Star, 1.
17. Toronto Star, 1.
18. Toronto Star, 1.
19. Toronto Star, 1.
20. Toronto Star, 1.
21. Toronto Star, 1.
22. Toronto Star, 1.
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Murray had restrained Sanderson in connection with an advertisement he had prepared
regarding Mr. Jolliffe and Agnes Macphail [another CCF MPP].”23
During the inquiry, both Murray and Drew testified that they had no connection
with the “special political branch” and never received reports from Osborne-Dempster.24
Drew stated under oath that he had never had any conversation with Murray regarding the
latter’s propagandist activities.25 Both John Boyko and David Lewis, however, found a
telling correspondence between Drew and Murray that indicated that a direct connection
existed between the two, and they had clear knowledge of a political office operation.
That letter, from Premier Drew to Murray, was dated November 2, 1943. Drew wrote, “I
am hoping that before too long we may get something a little more definite about the
activities of the CCF in relation to the CIO and the Communist Party.”26 From viewing
the public papers of both men, Boyko concluded, “George Drew lied. Murray lied too.
The Royal Commission exonerated Drew and Murray and let the others off the hook.”27
While conducting research on his autobiography in the late 1970s, David Lewis
learned about the misstatements made by Drew and Murray at the LeBel Commission.
This discovery made Lewis livid. “When I think of the pose of hurt innocence which
Drew and Murray assumed throughout the LeBel hearing, I feel anger even as I write
these words,” he said. “Jolliffe did the people of Ontario a great service by exposing the
“special branch” and its entire works; it was closed up immediately after the broadcast.”28

23. Toronto Star, 1.
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Still, the damage had been done, and Lewis lamented that “By prevarication and
possible perjury, Drew and Murray used the incident to the former’s political advantage.
The perpetrator of Ontario’s ‘Watergate’ got away with it.”29 While Drew was cleared of
any wrong-doing, the defense of the CCF seemed to provide the public with the notion
that Jolliffe and the CCF were not merely delusional. In the next provincial election, the
CCF would rebound and became the Official Opposition once again. In short, the party
was able to reform its image and maintain its political viability.

Post-Mortem of the 1945 Canadian Federal Election
The first assessment of what went wrong for the federal CCF in June 1945 came
from Stan Allen of the Québec CCF. Writing to CCF National Leader M.J. Coldwell one
week after the federal election, Allen remarked, “We are all sorry the results were not
better, especially in the two elections in Ontario. I suppose we just haven’t yet been able
to develop the organization to withstand the type of attacks we have received.”30 Nearly
one month after Allen’s brief statement on the CCF failure, party leaders were still
attempting to figure out just what went wrong. In a letter to British Labour Party
Secretary Morgan Phillips, David Lewis offered a litany of reasons why the CCF had not
experienced the breakthrough the party had expected. “Our elections did not go quite as
successfully as we had hoped, although we did make very considerable progress
federally,” he said.31 Lewis argued, “The main reason for our failure to achieve greater

29. Lewis, The Good Fight, 287.
30. MG 27 – III-C-12, CCF Papers, M. J. Coldwell, Vol. 1, letter from Stanley Allen to M.J.
Coldwell, June 19, 1945, 2.
31. MG 32 – C 23, David Lewis papers, Volume 132, File 7, British Labour Party, 1940-1947,
letter from D. Lewis to Morgan Phillips, July 11, 1945, 1.
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success was because our movement is still young and its roots are not as deep here as the
Labour Party’s have reached in your country.”
Lewis also cited that politics in Canada is “carried on a rather lower plane and
Capitalist parties are much more openly vicious, the opposition to us succeeded in
persuading tens-of-thousands of Canadians—and, more particularly the women—that the
CCF intends to confiscate people’s savings, insurance policies, war bonds, homes, farms,
and every little corner store.”32 Moreover, Lewis lamented that the anti-CCF campaign
had convinced large numbers of Canadians that the party would, “institute a regime of
regimentation, Gestapo, and the rest.”33 Lewis wrote that such attacks were not likely
new to Phillips but “The effectiveness of this appeal is.”34 With national elections just a
little over two weeks away in Britain, Lewis closed by stating that he hoped that attacks
of this nature were “something that you in Britain no longer have to fear—and what a
great thing for people of the world if July 26 announces a Labour Government with a
clear majority.”35
Three months later in a letter to Phillips, Lewis expounded on his earlier
explanations for the CCF’s shortfall in the 1945 federal election. “We were not
disappointed with the federal election results—although we were not pleased with them
either,” he stated.36 With four months now having passed since the election, Lewis
offered slightly different rationales for the CCF’s underwhelming performance. He
remarked, “The fact is we over-estimated the extent of our popular support and under-

32. David Lewis Papers, 1.
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estimated the damage which our opposition could still do through campaigns of
falsehoods.”37
Lewis compared the campaign Churchill waged against the Labour Party in its
recent election (July 26, 1945), to the ones the CCF had fought against numerous parties.
He told Phillips, “The CCF was still a young movement—and none of our leaders had
been in positions of authority such as some of yours in the war cabinet.”38 He added that
the CCF had been subjected to the same campaign of vilification which Churchill tried on
Labour. The difference between the experience of the British and that of the CCF was
that the British people had been through six years of devastating struggle against Nazism.
Churchill’s accusations against dictatorship and socialism “fell on deaf ears, in fact, it
seemed to have angered some people.”39 It should be noted that the Labour Party had
served in a coalition government during the war and received a good deal of political
capital along the way. Kenneth Morgan asserted that Labour ministers were “uniquely
associated with triumphs on the home front.”40 He pointed out that the presence and
programs of Ernest Bevin as Labour Minister had won over people both within and
outside the union movement to an active, interventionist government.41 In addition,
Morgan asserted that war years showcased the Labour Party as the party of ideas and
flexibility. In contrast, the Conservative Party was perceived to have failed to make
forward strides for the post-war world.42

37. David Lewis Papers, 2.
38. David Lewis Papers, 2.
39. David Lewis Papers, 2.
40. Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984),
23.
41. Morgan, Labour in Power, 23-29.
42. Morgan, Labour in Power, 29-30.

370

Lewis highlighted the staggering differences experienced by Great Britain and
Canada during the war. He pointed out that Canada had been spared from direct military
attacks and that the war years had brought about a considerable degree of economic
prosperity.43 Lewis noted, “In these circumstances, there was a tendency to support
things as they were and an inclination to believe the false accusations of big business
against the CCF. Our Canadian people are politically not terribly literate.”44 Also, it is
quite evident that Lewis felt the 1945 election results were largely influenced by the antiCCF campaign that was waged and the willingness of most voters to believe the
accusations leveled by opponents of the party.
In July 1945, Lewis also expounded on the CCF’s poor electoral showing to a
supporter from Nova Scotia. He stated, “On the whole, we probably did in the election as
well as we should have expected, if we had not been slightly deluded by previous
successes.”45 Here, Lewis believed the party fell short in terms of voter education by
failing to deliver the party’s message to a large segment of the Canadian population. He
argued, “Only if we succeed in putting our philosophy and program into every home will
we establish that confidence and allegiance which will be able to withstand campaigns of
distortion.”46 He added that the upcoming CCF National Council meeting would address
this topic, and that “it [voter education] will have to be carefully gone into and our
educational work increased and modernized.”47 Lewis also broached the crucial role
played in the timing of the Ontario and federal elections, and the negative consequences
43. MG 32 – C 23, David Lewis papers, Volume 132, File 7, British Labour Party, 1940-1947,
letter from David Lewis to Morgan Phillips, October 23, 1945, 2.
44. David Lewis Papers, 2.
45. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 43, CCF Papers, File 5, Ontario General Correspondence, 1945, letter
from David Lewis to Ronald Grantham, July 12, 1945, 1.
46. Lewis to Grantham, 1.
47. Lewis to Grantham, 1.
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suffered by the CCF. He claimed that the serious setback for the CCF in Ontario on June
4 had a negative effect on federal CCF candidates across Canada the following week.48
Indeed, the election timing indicates that the ramifications of the battle between George
Drew and Mackenzie King to poll the electorate first were disastrous for the Ontario and
federal CCF. Certainly, this was the commonly held belief by the party hierarchy. Lewis
also admitted there were weaknesses in the campaign the CCF conducted. He noted that
poor organization and political immaturity in the campaign were partially responsible for
the party’s failure to make greater progress.49 Despite the disappointing results, Lewis
claimed that the CCF had made real gains: “We were not and are not at all discouraged.
Under very bad circumstances we received about 20 percent of the popular vote [it was
actually 15.6%] and trebled our representation in Parliament.”50 He stated that the party
was numerically stronger and would spend the next few years educating the public and
preparing for the next campaign.51 Unknown to Lewis at that time, this disappointing
election would prove to be the high-water mark for the CCF. Indeed, in his political
memoirs written three decades later, Lewis remarked that the 1945 election results were
devastating to the CCF. He noted that the party was hampered by the anti-CCF campaign,
Mackenzie King’s “programmatic larceny,” general war weariness, and a desire for
tranquility rather than change.52 The “CCF advance was not only arrested, it was pushed
back,” he concluded, “and the party never regained the momentum it enjoyed in the early
war years.”53
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The Issue of Women Voting “Wrong”
As early as 1940, there were calls for the CCF to enter the modern world of
promotion by embracing market surveys and advertising in order to help fashion and sell
party policy and wage elections.54 In two articles appearing in the Canadian Forum, the
CCF was taken to task for failing to effectively convince Canadian voters of the merits of
socialism. The articles, written under the pen-name of Philip Spencer, opined that people
were irrational and malleable beings who preferred emotion-centered materials to those
that appealed to reason or intellect.55 As Walter Young noted, this notion of selling the
virtues of socialism ran counter to one of the party’s cherished beliefs: that the party
could win by rational conversion and organization.56 The party’s intransigence and
refusal to take into account changing social norms would come back to haunt it during
these 1945 elections.
Another issue which had started to change the voting landscape and which should
have received more attention is that of gender differences in the 1945 Ontario and federal
campaigns. There were earlier indications that the CCF was failing to connect with
female voters. A March 1943 Gallup survey highlighted that far more men than women
supported the party.57 Though the CCF press and its advertising arm occasionally
formulated specific appeals for women voters, they never followed through with opinion
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55. Robinson, The Measure of Democracy, 127-32.
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of Toronto Press, 1969), 50.
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surveys.58 Furthermore, feminist historian, Joan Sangster, indicated that there was a wide
chasm between CCF egalitarian rhetoric and the secondary role women played in party
affairs.59 During the 1945 election, the CCF believed it had addressed women’s issues in
virtually all of its campaign literature. Clearly, this work produced few results. Three
months after the two elections, Ontario MPP (Member of Provincial Parliament) W.J.
Grummett wrote to David Lewis to explain why the CCF did not connect with female
voters during either campaign. “One occurrence that struck me forcibly was that a
considerable number of CCF voters all across my riding reported to me that their wives
had killed their vote,” Grummett wrote.60 “Apparently, the men had found out within a
day or two just what had happened, and a considerable number came to me and wanted to
know what really was the cause of their wives taking this step. They also knew that many
other women had voted Conservative and could not understand the reason for this step on
the part of their womenfolk.”61 Grummett asked these men if their wives had provided
any rationale for voting Conservative, especially in light that the men were CCF
supporters. “In almost every instance, the wife informed her husband that she had an
opportunity to hear more radio broadcasts than her husband and had become convinced
of the truth of statements made by many of the speakers,” he claimed. Grummett noted,
“The wife pointed out to her husband in each case that a great majority of the broadcasts
she had heard which made a strong impression were delivered in the daytime, a number
of them by women speakers.”62 Grummett added that broadcasts delivered during the
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night were “more in line with traditional political subjects, such as taxes, employment,
and international affairs.”63
From the information garnered during the daytime broadcasts, women came away
with a sense of political superiority compared to their husbands. “These women told their
husbands they felt they [the men] were not sufficiently informed on the topics of the day
and that they [the men] were being completely fooled by the CCF leaders,”64 Grummett
stated. He remarked, “I was able to convince some of them that their wives were giving a
true explanation of their actions, and that they were, in reality, victims of clever Tory
propaganda. Of course, some of the men simply could not understand their wives voting
against them.”65

Election Post-Mortem in Québec
The 1945 federal election was another washout for the CCF in Québec. For the
third time in as many general elections, the party failed to elect a single Member of
Parliament from Canada’s second most populous province. While CCF support was
doubled in the largely French-speaking province, the party still only garnered 2.8 percent
of the votes cast. The party contested just fifteen of the forty-nine ridings off the island of
Montreal, garnering less than one percent of the tally.66 Although Frank Scott and other
Québec CCF officials believed the party was poised to make inroads in the Québec City
area, the 1945 election results were dismal. The CCF participated in only two of the four
63. Grummett to Lewis, 1.
64. Grummett to Lewis, 1.
65. Grummett to Lewis, 1. The conversation between Grummett and Lewis was mirrored in a
letter from Ontario CCF leader Ted Jolliffe to Frank Scott shortly after the 1945 elections. Jolliffe was
dumbfounded that women in Ontario were so influenced by Conservative election radio spots during
afternoon soap operas.
66. Frank Feigart, Canada Votes: 1935-1988 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989),
Québec—1945 Election Results by Riding, 172-73.
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Québec City districts, capturing only a scant one percent in both those contested
ridings.67
Another measure of the CCF’s anemic showing outside of Montreal can be
registered by the fact that the Social Credit Party won seven times as many votes as the
CCF did in the remaining Quebec ridings.68 Founded during the Great Depression, Social
Credit developed an element of support in Québec’s farming and rural communities by
the early 1940s.69 Operating under the name Union of Social Credit Electors, the party
refused to present a program for the 1945 Québec campaign, instead promising that
elected representatives would come back to the people for important decisions.70 While
this strategy won votes in rural ridings, it failed to elect any Social Credit members from
the province. In Montreal, the CCF ran candidates in fourteen of the sixteen districts,
polling a more respectable five percent.71 Given that the CCF was a Montreal-centered
organization, these results should not have come as a surprise. The reaction of the Québec
CCF to these most recent dismal electoral outcomes ranged from rededication, to
reorganization, to, finally, resignation.
In an exchange of letters discussing what had gone wrong for the party in Québec,
David Lewis and Raoul Dion (a recently defeated candidate in the Montreal riding of
Maisonneuve-Rosemont) offered several factors that had worked against their movement.
67. Feigart, Canada Votes, 172. The CCF received 0.8% of the vote in Québec-Est (East) and
1.2% in Québec-Ouest-et-Sud (Southwest) in the 1945 federal campaign.
68. Feigart, Canada Votes, 172-73. Indeed, Social Credit captured nearly 60,000 Québec votes
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However, despite the healthier numbers, these votes did not translate into seats for the party, at least not in
1945. Very shortly, Social Credit would become a political force in Québec.
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Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), 7.
70. Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party, 7.
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376

Lewis strongly believed that the disappointing results of the Ontario provincial election
just one week before the federal election was one of the major reasons for the
underwhelming performance of the CCF in Québec. Dion, however, was not so certain.
“You mentioned in your letter that the Ontario election had caused an ill effect in this
province. Concerning the federal election that was not the only cause. Here in
Maisonneuve-Rosemont [Montreal area riding], we have to fight the church also,” Dion
explained.72 He stated that, on the day before the election, Father Arthur Charlemagne
told his Saint Francois congregation that it should not vote for the CCF because that party
was unfit to run Canada.73 Dion had been informed that the church was actively
discouraging parishioners from joining the CCF. Dion told Lewis that he planned to
speak with Father Charlemagne to ask why he told his parishioners to withhold their vote
from the CCF. If Dion did not receive a satisfactory explanation, he planned on
discussing the situation with Monseigneur to explain why CCF policies should not be
condemned.74 Despite these obstacles, Dion explained to the national secretary that he
planned to start a local CCF club, and reorganize for future electoral battles.75
In responding to Dion, Lewis touched on several important aspects of postelectoral life for the CCF in Québec. The first unpleasant reality was finances. Lewis
observed, “I sincerely hope that your organization will see to it that the amounts owing to
the National Office for campaign literature will be fully paid.”76 The National Office had
already absorbed the loss of half of the literature expenditures for the 1945 campaign in
72. MG 28, IV – 1, CCF Papers, Québec General Correspondences, 1944-1947, letter from Raoul
Dion to David Lewis, July 12, 1945, 2.
73. Dion to Lewis, 2.
74. Dion to Lewis, 2.
75. Dion to Lewis, 2.
76. MG 28, IV – 1, CCF Papers, Québec General Correspondences, 1944-1947, letter from David
Lewis to Raoul Dion, August 9, 1945, 1.
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Québec, but now it was in dire fiscal straits and needed help from the various Québec
CCF clubs. Lewis stated, “Even undertaking to carry half of the cost as I did in my last
letter to you will amount to a very large total sum for the National Office, and we are
relying on the Local constituencies in Québec paying their share.”77
Regarding the question of church interference in the June election, Lewis was
disappointed, but sanguine: “I was terribly sorry to hear of the action taken by your local
priest, but I don’t suppose one should be surprised. There are still quite a number of local
clergy whose attitude toward the CCF is most unfriendly, although the number of those
who are being fair to us is also increasing.”78 Convinced of the inevitability of the CCF
brand of socialism, Lewis predicted, “Time and events will prove to them, as they will
prove to the rest of Canada, that only in the Democratic Socialist program of the CCF lies
our hope for unity and progress. When the people of Québec reach this conclusion they
will support us.”79 Lewis added a caveat to that support from voters in the largely Frenchspeaking province: “Those of us who carry on the work in the meantime (must) impress
them with our sincerity and integrity.”80 From there, Lewis launched an attack on the
latest leading CCF French Canadian to let the party down—David Coté. Lewis claimed,
“Actions such as that of David Coté, or in other words selfish financial considerations, on
the part of any of us will brand us, rightly, as the old kind of politician, no more worthy
of support than those who have betrayed their interests through the years.”81 Lewis
believed that by offering the Québec [and Canadian] electorate a “new” kind of
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politician, one long on honesty and integrity, voters would come to appreciate and
support the CCF.82
Lewis was not the only CCF member who came out of the disappointing results
with a renewed sense of optimism. That same month, Lewis received a heartening letter
from another recently defeated CCF candidate. Philippe Pepin ran for the party in
Sherbrooke and was easily outdistanced by his opponents, finishing fifth with just over
one percent of the vote in the district.83 Despite these dismal results, Pepin wrote, “We
understand the last campaign was one of education and we are not at all disappointed.
You can be assured that we will do our very best, in the future, for the CCF movement in
our constituency.”84 Pepin found inspiration from political events that had recently
concluded in England. He noted, “We hope the future will be more favorable and the
victory of the Labor Party, in Britain, will have considerable influence upon the people of
our country.”85
While encouraged by Pepin’s letter, the CCF secretary cautioned Pepin not to
read too much into the Attlee victory in Great Britain.86 Lewis noted that the victory of
the British Labour Party did not come suddenly or quickly. It was the result of many
years of hardship, grueling work, and many setbacks.87 Regardless, Lewis admitted the
Labour Party win in England provided the CCF with a blueprint from which to work. “I
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am confident a similar victory awaits us if we work as hard and remain steadfast to our
principles and duties,”88 he claimed.

Internal Divisions within the Québec CCF
As often happens after underwhelming electoral results, the Québec CCF received
a heavy dose of criticism. The latest admonishment came from members of the Verdun
District Council. It should be noted that the strongest vote for the CCF took place in
Verdun, where the party won twenty percent of the vote—more than twice the second
best figure for the party in any constituency in the province.89 From the party’s point of
view, it had been forced to fume from the sidelines as the Provincial CCF and the
National Office continued to fail the socialist movement in Québec. At the party’s annual
convention in August, the Verdun Council distributed a three-page memorandum to
delegates expressing its displeasure with the direction and past actions of the Québec
CCF Provincial Council and Provincial Executive, as well as with the National CCF
Office. While reviewing the record and accomplishments of the Québec CCF, the Verdun
Council declared, “Our fundamental criticism of past activities fall under three headings:
1) Failure to take Socialism to the people, 2) Failure to undertake an adequate educational
programme, and 3) The undemocratic approach to political and economic needs by the
Québec Provincial Executive.”90
In substantiating their first claim, the Verdun Council argued party propaganda
had failed in the past because it had been too academic and general in character. The
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group cited the housing situation in Montreal, the layoffs in war-specific plants or the
educational crisis in Montreal’s Protestant schools as fine examples of issues the party
should have been highlighting during the election campaign.91 Another element of
discord for the Verdun Council was the suspension of Le Canada Nouveau. The council
asserted that the press was an essential element of any party, without which it is
impossible to build up a rank and file membership.92 The memorandum declared,
“Without the support of the French people, without channels through which to
communicate with them, we remain but a clique of parlour Socialists.”93 This perception
of the CCF in Québec had haunted the party since its beginnings in the early 1930s. A
dozen years later, the most successful local CCF group insisted the party had only
cemented this view of socialism in the province. Regarding inadequate educational
programming, the Verdun group found much to criticize. On this point, the main thrust of
its argument was that the party had not adequately educated the electorate and the
membership to be able to withstand the “scare campaigns” waged against the CCF.94 The
third critique of the Verdun Council—that the CCF in Québec had acted in an
undemocratic way that betrayed the spirit of socialism—was the most damning. This
critique detailed the council’s unhappiness with the party leadership’s handling of David
Coté’s sudden departure from the party, the termination of Jacques Casgrain, and
secretive discussions concerning CCF affiliation with major trade unions.95
The Verdun group was incensed at the defection of David Coté and the entire
“Affair Coté,” but not for the reasons one might expect. The Verdun Council was angered
91. Meeting Notes, September 30, 1945, 5-6.
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at being kept in the dark regarding Coté’s intentions, and downright livid with efforts to
convince the MLA from Rouyn-Noranda to remain with the party. The Council was upset
that efforts were made to arrange a deal with Coté, in spite of the fact that his declared
intention of quitting the party without resigning as an MLA revealed him, in their
opinions, as “a man completely alien to Socialist principles.”96 The Verdun Council also
spoke at some length about the leadership vacuum created by the hiring and subsequent
firing of Jacques Casgrain as Provincial Organizer. The memorandum claimed that the
party leadership exhibited poor judgment in hiring Casgrain. Their displeasure regarding
Casgrain’s appointment was compounded by the council’s attempts to defend his
behavior and secure him employment after he was terminated from the organizing
position in Québec.97 Given the evidence presented, the Verdun group concluded that
control of the Québec CCF was “vested in a few dilettantes who are sentimentally
interested in human welfare, but who have no understanding of the methods necessary for
building up a Democratic party. We have no leadership in this Province.”98
This group had one more issue to address: that of National Office interference
regarding affiliation with a major trade union organization. The Verdun Council
memorandum stated that negotiations were conducted by the national secretary without
talking to the Québec Provincial Council or Executive until the day before the final
meeting with the CCL. Representatives of the provincial organization were thus unable to
inform or prepare themselves fully.99 In the estimation of the Verdun Council, “Local
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information, which could have been supplied, might well have prevented the failure of
the negotiations.”100 As well as criticizing the party and its leaders, the Verdun Council
was also armed with a series of recommendations to help move the party forward in
Québec. The council not only promoted the idea that all officers of the Provincial CCF
should be elected at Provincial Conventions, but it also wanted the party to research the
Québec economy and resources to develop a definite program answering the immediate
needs of the people. The council also asserted that it was imperative that Le Canada
Nouveau immediately resume publication.101 As might be expected, the discussion
following the introduction of this memorandum produced a degree of discord among the
Québec CCF Provincial Council. Council meeting notes stated, “Supporters of the
document declared that it contained fair and constructive criticism of the Provincial
Administration. Others pointed out that it was circulated in a highly irregular manner and
in addition to criticism it contained specific accusations against officers of the party.”102
This episode illustrates the toxic relationship that had developed between the leadership
of the federal and Québec CCF, and its most electorally successful local club in the
province. This also dredges up the contention that organization and leadership were
proving chronic issues for the party in Québec.
In the face of repeated electoral setbacks, the CCF in the province was clearly
wracked with internal divisions. Over the next four weeks, the two factions battled to set
the record straight. Ultimately, more light was shed on the circumstances of the
dismissals of Jacques Casgrain and David Coté, and the negotiations between the
100. Meeting Notes, September 30, 1945, 8.
101. Meeting Notes, September 30, 1945, 8-9. Other elements included the establishment of the
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Canadian Congress of Labour and the CCF. It was also discovered how the party dealt
with vocal critics of the Québec and federal CCF. The first clarification came over the
hiring and dismissal of Jacques Casgrain. Casgrain had been hired as Québec Provincial
Organizer in late 1943 and at first he received lavish praise from Frank Scott and David
Lewis. By late spring of 1944, however, Casgrain was removed from office under
mysterious circumstances.
After the memorandum by the Verdun District Council, Scott took the opportunity
at the October 14, 1945, Québec Provincial Council meeting to address allegations of
wrongdoing on his part during the Casgrain episode. “Casgrain’s failing was well known
to all members of the Executive and council,” Scott stated. He added, “However, in view
of Casgrain’s great ability and of his unquestioned devotion to Socialist principles, I felt
that every effort should be made to save him and arranged for Casgrain to visit a wellknown psychiatrist.”103 Scott reported that the psychiatrist found that, “Casgrain might be
able to overcome his weakness but gave no definite assurance on that point.”104 At the
same time, Scott recalled that, “The Saskatchewan CCF asked the National Office to
secure Casgrain’s services for them for a few weeks.”105 David Lewis and Frank Scott
gave the Saskatchewan organization full and complete information about Casgrain,
including the psychiatrist’s report.”106 Even with this information, “The Saskatchewan
CCF decided that they could use Casgrain’s services anyway, whereupon the (Québec)
Provincial Executive gave Casgrain leave to go.”107 Scott declared that he did not oppose
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Casgrain’s dismissal; on the contrary, Scott agreed that Casgrain should be relieved of his
responsibilities.108 However, because of the Casgrain’s undoubted talent and devotion to
the party, Scott stated, “The Council could still use his services in some unofficial
capacity, such as writing tracts, pamphlets, etc. This the Council did not agree to.”109 A
motion was moved that, “The assertion of wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Scott in the
Casgrain affair is entirely unfounded.” The motion was carried without dissent.110
In the contest between the Québec CCF and the Verdun District Council, the first
round had gone to the party establishment. While it is clear that Scott admired Casgrain
and the positive traits he brought to the party and advocated on Casgrain’s behalf, some
parts of the narrative remain circumspect. First, given the difficulty the Québec CCF had
in finding productive French-speaking organizers, it seems odd that it would agree to
have Casgrain offer his skills to the Saskatchewan wing. Second, the decision by the
Québec Provincial Council to dismiss Casgrain while he was working out west does not
ring true. The council had previous knowledge of Casgrain’s weakness, so it is unclear
why they decided to fire the best organizer they had ever had while he was on loan to
another branch of the CCF. While the Quebec Provincial Council records may not
provide the complete story of the Casgrain incident, they do offer more information than
had been previously documented. More importantly, the council notes clearly indicate
serious divisions within the Québec CCF. That would become increasingly apparent with
the discussions regarding the resignation/expulsion of David Coté from the party in July
1945.
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At the next Provincial Council meeting the Coté issue, the matter of affiliation
between the Québec CCF and the Canadian Congress of Labor, and the fate of the leaders
of the document alleging wrongdoing on the part of the leadership of the provincial wing
of the party were settled. As was often the case in CCF affairs, David Lewis would have
much input on each of these topics.

The Post-Election Québec CCF: Discord, Disarray, and Dismissal
Throughout this ordeal, Lewis was receiving reports of serious tensions at the
Provincial Council, this time from council member Mike Rubenstein. Rubenstein had
been elected Chairman of a Committee of Inquiry to examine a number of charges. He
explained to Lewis, “There is quite a bit of bickering going on in the Provincial Council
in Montreal and that a lot of good energy is being wasted which should be utilized for
constructive purposes.”111 He added, “The task of the Committee of Inquiry is to have
hearings and to issue and prepare a written report for the Provincial Council meeting to
take place October 28th, where the whole matter is to be cleared.”112 Lewis was very
much a central figure in the debate within the ranks of the Québec CCF. In requesting to
have the National CCF Secretary return all the records of the last National Convention in
Montreal, Rubenstein wrote, “Your name is mentioned in connection with the Coté
incident and, indirectly, also in connection with Casgrain, and, also more directly, in
connection with the C.C.L. (Canadian Congress of Labour).”113 Not one to shy away
111. MG 28, IV – 1, CCF Papers, Québec General Correspondences, 1944-1947, letter from
Michael Rubenstein to David Lewis, October 19, 1945, 1.
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from defending his actions, Lewis promptly responded to Rubenstein. He submitted an
eighteen-page document that explained his version of events and his suggestions as to
how the party should deal with the members of the Verdun Group.114
On October 28, 1945, all the issues were addressed at the Québec Provincial
Council meeting with the report of the committee of enquiry. With regard to the
resignation of David Coté, the committee wanted to know if Lewis and the members of
the Provincial Executive were aware of the possibility of Coté’s quitting the party
considerably prior to June 30, 1945.115 The committee was also, “anxious to find out
what kind of deal was being referred to by the authors of the “Memorandum.”116 The
committee of enquiry stated that it had questioned several of the authors of the document
and noted, “Only one, Frank Watson, supplied information in this connection.”117 Watson
stated that the deal meant the following: “That if David Coté gave an ultimatum that,
unless a remunerative job was found for him he would have to resign, the fact of trying to
keep him by providing him with a job and knowing that he was ready to resign otherwise
constituted a deal.”118
one group believed that Lewis and other CCF leaders should have overlooked Casgrain’s expenses and his
erratic behavior. Yet, another group was not pleased as to how Casgrain was foisted onto the Québec CCF
by the National Office. Regarding the CCL allegations, Lewis believed that the issue of union affiliation
with the party should be handled by the National Office and not through the individual provincial units. In
fairness, Lewis had afforded the Ontario CCF more leeway in this regard, perhaps because many Union
headquarters were located in that province (largely in Toronto). This could be another small sign that Lewis
did not entirely trust the Québec CCF to successfully work with these large labor organizations. His
decision might also be symptomatic of Lewis realizing that the party, by this time, was much stronger in
Ontario than in Québec. In short, it would be easier to gain the attention and cooperation of trade union
groups in areas where the party was a significant political force (as in Ontario), as opposed to one where
the party was operating at the fringe of political life (as in Québec).
114. MG 28, IV – 1, Québec General Correspondences, 1944-1947, letter from David Lewis to
Michael Rubenstein, October 23, 1945, 1. The letter to Sauvé was 18 pages long. In the narrative, Lewis
explained and defended why he did what he did with regards to Coté, Casgrain, and the CCL.
115. Québec CCF Provincial Council Meeting Notes, Minutes of Provincial Council Meeting,
October 28, 1945, 19-20.
116. Meeting Notes, October 28, 1945, 20.
117. Meeting Notes, October 28, 1945, 20.
118. Meeting Notes, October 28, 1945, 20.
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In his letter to the committee of enquiry, Lewis wrote, “Sometime after the federal
election, Coté came to see me and asked for a full-time job. I also informed him of the
state of National Office finances and the impossibility of increasing expenditures.”119
Coté responded to Lewis and others that his financial difficulties were very serious and
that he might have to quit unless he found a solution to his difficulties.120 Lewis wrote
that in view of Coté’s “obvious nervousness and tension during the conversation, I
dismissed his statement in my mind as merely hysterical.”121
Lewis was not the only party official to learn of Coté’s financial difficulties. Coté
repeated his statement to F.R. Laroche (a member of the Québec CCF Provincial Council
and CCF National Vice-Chairman) and Omer Chartrand (then acting Québec CCF
secretary) that he would have to resign his seat as a member of the Legislature if he did
not find some additional employment.122 Curiously, the committee of enquiry ruled “that
at no time were either the National Secretary, Mr. Laroche, or Mr. Chartrand under the
impression that Mr. Coté intended to resign from the Party or the Legislature. His
statements to Laroche and Chartrand that he would have to resign from the Legislature
were simply taken by them as an expression by Mr. Coté of his desperate financial
situation and consequently not taken seriously.”123 The mistaken impression that Coté’s
threat to quit was not taken seriously by Lewis, Laroche, and Chartrand does not hide the
fact that Coté had informed national and provincial officers of the possibility that he
might have to resign from elected office. The committee of enquiry (as well as the

119. Québec CCF Provincial Council Meeting Notes, Minutes of Provincial Council Meeting,
October 28, 1945 letter from David Lewis to Bill Sauvé, for the Committee of Enquiry, October 27, 1945,
22.
120. Lewis to Sauvé, 20.
121. Lewis to Sauvé, 23.
122. Lewis to Sauvé, 20.
123. Lewis to Sauvé, 20.
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national and provincial officers) was clearly paying more attention to Coté’s activities
than his words at this juncture. On June 24, 1945, at a meeting of the Provincial
Executive, Coté was entrusted by the Provincial Council to look after all the
arrangements of the forthcoming provincial convention, projected to be held in either
October or November in Québec City.124
Whether or not either the national or the provincial CCF were informed of Coté’s
possible resignation from the party, the evidence shows that verbal warnings had clearly
been issued by Coté. These warnings were dismissed and officers in Ottawa and Montreal
focused on Coté’s actions, which indicated that he had every intention of staying on with
the CCF. The question of whether Coté was offered additional employment to ease his
financial burden is equally unclear. The committee of enquiry ruled, “At no time was
there any question of any deal with Mr. Coté as he at no time ever intimated to them his
intention to resign from the Party. We are convinced that at no time was there any
question of any deal with Mr. Coté—either arranged, attempted or made.”125 This
judgment overlooks Coté’s stated intentions and the fact that he had received an
organizing position with the CCF national office in January of 1945. The declaration
also indicates a different interpretation of the word “deal” between the Committee of
Enquiry and the Verdun District Council.
The next allegation which the Committee of Enquiry addressed was whether
David Lewis had conducted negotiations with the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL)
without informing the Québec CCF Provincial Executive or council.126 Lewis responded
with a detailed outline of events, but not before chastising members of the Verdun group.
124. Lewis to Sauvé, 20.
125. Lewis to Sauvé, 21.
126. Lewis to Sauvé, 21.
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He noted, “As in all other instances, the authors of the memorandum made no effort
whatever to find out what it was all about, but slapped down on paper the first distortion
that occurred in their minds, with an eye only to the extent to which it could be made to
serve their purpose of undermining people of responsibility in the CCF.”127 The CCF
National Secretary contested each point in the Verdun Council’s document. He stated that
the discussions were begun not by the Québec representatives, but by the heads of the
CCL in Ottawa. Lewis added that he immediately brought in CCF officers and that the
National Executive was kept fully aware of the discussions.128 Next, Lewis noted, “There
was never at any time any suggestion of affiliation. In fact, it was made clear that that
was not and could not be in question.”129 He then wrote, “The discussion was merely on
the plane of a survey of the situation, and was begun by the heads of the CCL because of
their support of the CCF and their desire to give the Québec section of their movement a
channel for political expression.”130
To defuse the secrecy complaints of the Verdun group, Lewis insisted that the
Québec Executive be brought into the discussion at the first opportunity.131 While stating
he was open about these discussions between the trade union body and the CCF, Lewis
added that some degree of secrecy was needed. He remarked that it “isn’t possible,
desirable, or helpful to give publicity to all discussions which necessarily take place with
one group or another.”132 Lewis further asserted that had the discussions reached a point
where any action had to be taken, the matter would have been formally and fully brought
127. Québec CCF Provincial Council Meeting Notes, Minutes of Provincial Council Meeting,
October 28, 1945 letter from David Lewis to Bill Sauvé, for the Committee of Enquiry, October 27, 1945,
24.
128. Lewis to Sauvé, 24.
129. Lewis to Sauvé, 24.
130. Lewis to Sauvé, 24.
131. Lewis to Sauvé, 24-25.
132. Lewis to Sauvé, 25.
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before the appropriate provincial and national bodies for decision.133 Lewis then
lambasted the perpetrators of the document that condemned the provincial and national
CCF leadership:
I feel it my duty to say frankly to the Provincial Council that some
members of your Provincial Executive whom I need not name and who
have, I imagine, had a major part in the circulation of the memorandum,
were not brought in on these discussions. I also feel it my duty to add that
I personally would not under any circumstances take the responsibility of
placing in their hands, or within their knowledge, a matter which was
intended to remain confidential and which had to be treated with the
greatest care in the interests of our movement and its future with the trade
union movement of Canada. The circulation of the memorandum and the
reckless statements in it are a complete endorsation [sic] of my judgment
in this regard.134
Regarding David Lewis’s undue secrecy about the discussions with the Canadian
Congress of Labour, the committee of enquiry ruled that these discussions were a
national matter. As such, Lewis was seen to have acted properly by informing the
National Council and by advising the Québec Provincial Executive as soon as Québec
representatives of the CCL were brought in to the talks.135 The committee then took
Frank Watson, a Québec member of the National Council and an author of the
memorandum, to task for his role in the attack against Lewis. The committee then
remarked that given Watson’s presence at the National Council meeting where these
discussions were reported, he must have known what was taking place in regards to the
CCL discussions.136 Not surprisingly, the committee of enquiry concluded that the charge
against the National Secretary is “both unfounded and vicious.”137 With these issues

133. Lewis to Sauvé, 25.
134. Lewis to Sauvé, 25.
135. Québec CCF Provincial Council Meeting Notes, Minutes of Provincial Council Meeting,
October 28, 1945, 28.
136. Meeting Notes, October 28, 1945, 28.
137. Meeting Notes, October 28, 1945, 28.
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settled, the Québec Provincial Council was faced with the thorny question of what action,
if any, to take against the authors of the memorandum. For his part, Lewis had strong
views on the appropriate action for the Québec Provincial Council, though he did make
allowances that criticism alone was not bad for the party. Lewis argued, “Had the
memorandum satisfied itself with a critical analysis of what the CCF had done and failed
to do—a critical and constructive analysis such as is contained in some of the
paragraphs—it would have done a service.”138 Having made a statement that encouraged
criticism of the CCF, Lewis argued that this document fell short of providing a useful
critique of the party. He contended, “Memoranda of this sort, when widely distributed, do
not remain private affairs. The statements in it will undoubtedly come to the attention of
our enemies. They can and undoubtedly will do incalculable harm to the movement. The
whole matter is the most scandalous, irresponsible action I have experienced in many
years in the labour movement except for tricks indulged by the Communists.”139 While
admitting that he had made mistakes, Lewis made it clear he had no tolerance for people
questioning his motives or integrity, and he expected the Québec CCF to do something
about that.140 To that end, Lewis appealed to the Provincial Council to vigorously reject
the memorandum and those responsible for it. The CCF National Secretary further
advised the Québec Provincial Council to put an immediate end to this drama.141 Indeed,
the Provincial Council would follow Lewis’s advice and take firm action to end this
internal struggle within the Québec CCF.

138. Québec CCF Provincial Council Meeting Notes, Minutes of Provincial Council Meeting,
October 28, 1945 letter from David Lewis to Bill Sauvé, for the Committee of Enquiry, October 27, 1945,
27.
139. Meeting Notes, October 27, 1945, 27.
140. Meeting Notes, October 27, 1945, 27.
141. Meeting Notes, October 27, 1945, 28.
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After the report from the Committee of Enquiry was moved and carried, the
council turned its attention to disciplinary action against the authors of the memorandum.
Acting Québec CCF Secretary Bill Sauvé read a resolution which he had prepared and
moved to have adopted. It stated that a three-page memorandum had been given wide
circulation across Québec and that the document only undermined the confidence of party
members. Furthermore, Sauvé wrote that the authors of this memorandum (Messrs.
Watson, Wevrick, and Bedard) were members of the Provincial Council and were well
aware of the proper channels with which to express their concerns.142 After some
discussion, the Provincial Council voted to expel Watson and Wevrick from the party. It
also voted to allow Bedard to remain a party member, but suspend him from the
Provincial Executive for the remainder of his term in office.143 The Provincial Council
then composed a letter to the secretaries of all the CCF Québec clubs to explain the
memorandum and the Provincial Council’s actions, including the expulsion of two
Provincial Executive members and the suspension of a third.144 This move was intended
to put a quick end to the unpleasant divisiveness that erupted within the Québec CCF in
the immediate aftermath of the disappointing federal election of June 1945. This letter
concluded by asserting, “We must lay constructive plans now for a new advance for the
CCF in the coming years.”145 In the period that followed, evidence of advances by the
CCF in Québec was difficult to ascertain.

142. Québec CCF Provincial Council Meeting Notes, Minutes of Provincial Council Meeting,
October 28, 1945, 30.
143. Meeting Notes, October 27, 1945, 31. Mr. Bedard was allowed to remain with the party
because he had urged clubs to not allow the memorandum to split the party.
144. Meeting Notes, October 27, 1945, 34-35.
145. Meeting Notes, October 27, 1945, 35.
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The Immediate Coté Hangover
While the Cartier loss by David Lewis was an unpleasant disappointment for the
CCF in Québec, the Coté resignation was certainly more harmful for the party. The
demoralizing impact on the Québec CCF was manifested by the decreased attendance at
party meetings, lay-offs at party headquarters due to lack of funding, and continued
electoral humiliations.146 The temporary suspension of the provincial party newspaper, Le
Canada Nouveau, put in place in July 1945 lasted until January of 1948.147 The
suspension of this publication hindered the already weak outreach to francophone
Québeckers. In addition, efforts by the Québec CCF to move beyond its anglophone
Montreal base ground to a halt. Once again, the party became increasingly concerned
with retrenching the existing base on the Island of Montreal.148
Electorally, the effects of Coté’s departure appeared in 1946 during a federal byelection in the district of Pontiac, the neighboring district to Rouyn-Noranda. The party
nominated Bernard Molloy, a miner from Malartic, in an effort to re-establish the party in
Québec. The CCF had tallied about eight percent of the vote in Malartic during the 1945
federal election, but hoped to make significant in-roads with Molloy. Lewis and National
CCF leader M.J. Coldwell made speeches on behalf of Molloy in the riding.149 In spite of
this assistance, Molloy garnered just six percent of the vote on Election Day, finishing
fourth behind Social Credit victor Real Caouette and two other candidates.150 According
to Molloy, the reasons for the CCF’s weak showing pointed to three main causes: “No
146. Québec CCF Provincial Council Notes, November 11, 1945, November 25, 1945, December
16, 1945, and January 26, 1946.
147. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 40, CCF – Provinces, Québec – Newspapers, 1943-1950, letter from
Bill Sauvé to David Lewis, January 30, 1948, 1.
148. Québec CCF Provincial Council notes, September 30, 1945, 1-2.
149. MG 28, IV-1, Québec General Correspondences, 1944-1947, letter from Bernard Molloy to
David Lewis, August 17, 1946, 1.
150. Feigert, Canada Votes, Table 2-56 – Federal By-Elections, 1945-1949, 60-61.
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organization, the Communist “bogeyman”, and the “Affaire Coté,”151 Regarding Coté,
Molloy wrote, “There is no doubt that Coté has done the party a lot of harm. The vote in
Rouyn proved this, as we only polled about 125 votes, out of 3,500 who voted. Messrs.
Prevost, Bently, and Moore can tell you that they were reminded several times of the
Coté incident.”152 These results in Pontiac were no fluke; the CCF was truly outside the
political mainstream in Québec. Shackled with under-funding and non-existent
organization, and combined with a political fiasco of its own making, the CCF was
hamstrung in its efforts to gain political traction in Québec.

The Québec CCF Starts Fresh—Again
In the period between the 1945 federal election and the 1948 Québec campaign,
evidence indicated that the CCF in Québec continued to suffer due to a distinct lack of
organization. Bill Dodge, the chairman of the organizing committee, wrote to David
Lewis that one of the main reasons why the CCF had failed to make a significant impact
in Québec was because the party had held too few public meetings.153 Dodge’s solution
was to get help from other CCF groups outside of Québec. He inquired as to whether the
National Office would be able to send (and pay the expenses for) any CCF Members of
Parliament willing to come speak in Québec when the House of Commons returned in the
fall.154 In addition, Dodge asked Lewis if ministers from the CCF government in
Saskatchewan, the leaders of the Ontario CCF and the provincial secretary from New

151. MG 28, IV-1, Québec General Correspondences, 1944-1947, letter from Bernard Molloy to
David Lewis, October 2, 1946, 1.
152. Molloy to Lewis, 2.
153. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 35, Québec General Correspondence, 1947, letter from Bill Dodge to
David Lewis, August 24, 1947, 1.
154. Dodge to Lewis, 1.
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Brunswick would be available to help organize the Québec branch of the party.155 Dodge
also sought the assistance of the National Office both to visit the province and to provide
a list of female speakers to aid the Québec cause.156
These requests highlight two stark realities facing the Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation. The first was that the party outside the province of Québec
had mostly overcome the major obstacles in terms of organization. Thus, their expertise
was sought by Dodge and the Québec branch. Second, nearly fifteen years after being
formed, the Québec CCF had yet to establish a bonafide organizational structure. The
party remained on the periphery of the political stage in the province. In addition, Lewis’s
response to Dodge’s correspondence indicated that the National Office was growing
weary of attempting to aid the failing Québec wing. Lewis stated that the National Office
would not send a delegation of CCF members of parliament to Québec for speaking
purposes, offering instead to have “one or two MP’s…routed through Montreal during
the national membership drive taking place between October 15 and November 15.”157
Moreover, the National Secretary indicated that headquarters was not enthusiastic about
sending staff to Québec. Lewis remarked that national staff was available, but added,
“Ingle, MacDonald and I are available as speakers depending on (a) whether we can take
the time, and (b) the meeting covers the expenses.”158
Clearly, the National Office was prepared to offer the Québec branch very little in
the way of personnel and financial assistance, and that whatever help it could send would
not be immediate. Lewis also turned down requests for ministers from the Saskatchewan
155. Dodge to Lewis, 1.
156. Dodge to Lewis, 1.
157. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 35, Québec General Correspondence, 1947, letter from David Lewis
to Bill Dodge, August 28, 1947, 1.
158. Lewis to Dodge, 1.
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government and for female speakers. He noted, “I am afraid it would be extremely
difficult to get Saskatchewan Ministers to go to Montreal for meetings. The difficulty in
this regard is that we so seldom know sufficiently in advance of their movements.”159 On
the matter of female speakers, Lewis wrote that the most notable female speakers (Gladys
Strum, Grace MacInnis, Beatrice Trew, and Gretchen Steeves) all lived in the west and
the expense of sending them to Montreal was too great.160 The message to the Québec
CCF was that the National Office was not going to invite outside speakers. Lewis,
however, did offer a more optimistic response regarding assistance from the Ontario
provincial wing. He stated that he was certain that several of the leading Ontario figures
would be able to go to Montreal for meetings and encouraged Dodge to contact Ontario
CCF leader Ted Jolliffe, Omar Chartrand (Ontario organizer), Charlie Millard (union
official), Andrew Brewin (Ontario CCF Provincial Council member), and George Grube
(Ontario CCF Executive Council President).161 Despite these suggestions, Lewis quickly
added “I am afraid that the national office would not be able to cover any part of the
expenses for visiting speakers.”162
The refusal to assist the Quebec branch was replayed three months later, this time
involving National Office participation with a Montreal area district. Sol Ventesky,
chairman of the Laurier-Outremont CCF Club, attempted to gain help from Lewis and the
CCF MPs. Venetsky appealed to Lewis along organizational and religious lines.
Venetsky noted that, while their club had doubled its membership, many Jewish people

159. Lewis to Dodge, 1.
160. Lewis to Dodge, 2. Lewis added that there were excellent female CCF speakers in the East
but they were not very well-known.
161. Lewis to Dodge, 2.
162. Lewis to Dodge, 2.
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of the area were reluctant to join given the CCF’s position on the Palestinian issue.163
Venetsky argued, “We have to break down this attitude and create a positive and
sympathetic position to the CCF. This is the main reason we felt it necessary that you
should come and help us out.”164 He closed by requesting that the party send a sitting
CCF Member of Parliament if Lewis could not attend the meeting.165 As had been the
case with Dodge’s request, the National Office would provide very little assistance to the
Laurier-Outremont CCF Club. Lewis replied that he was unable to attend due to a party
conference meeting, and further attempts to locate a speaker for the club were rejected by
caucus.166 This exchange of letters provides a distinct picture that while the National
CCF was not abandoning its Québec wing, neither was it willing to part with scarce
financial and personnel resources to bolster party fortunes in the province.
After the electoral results of the 1945 federal election, the composition of the CCF
in Québec returned to what it had been prior to 1942, i.e., a mostly English group
centered in Montreal. From 1942 to 1945, the party had attempted to expand outside of
greater Montreal—Frank Scott’s recruitment efforts in Québec City and the
organizational work of Jacques Casgrain throughout the province being notable
examples. In addition, during that period the members of the Provincial Council and
Provincial Executive in Québec were roughly balanced along language lines. In the years
1945-1947, the composition of the Québec CCF’s Provincial Executive and Provincial
Council indicated the party was slowly becoming an anglophone organization once again.

163. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 35, Quebec General Correspondence, 1947, letter from Sol Venetsky
to David Lewis, November 27, 1947, 1.
164. Venetsky to Lewis, 1.
165. Venetsky to Lewis, 1.
166. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 35, Québec General Correspondence, 1947, letter from David Lewis
to Sol Venetsky, December 5, 1947, 1.
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Geographically, the party was reverting to the Montreal Island enclave it was in the
1930s.167 Seven members of the ten-person Provincial Executive were francophones, thus
indicating that the CCF was still holding onto a degree of the French element it had
cultivated during the war years.168 The party, however, was less successful in maintaining
interested persons off the Island of Montreal. Of the ten people on the CCF Executive,
nine lived in Montreal and the other, F.X. Perron, resided in nearby Valleyfield.169 On the
Provincial Council ledger, French representation dwindled to less than twenty-five
percent, with francophones holding just four of the seventeen seats on the council.170 In
terms of geographic diversity, the Provincial Council was less dominated by Montreal
members; five lived outside of Montreal proper. Indeed, the council had representatives
from Québec City, the Eastern Townships (Sherbrooke), the Lanaudière region (La
Tuque), as well as from nearby Valleyfield and Verdun.171
The situation dramatically worsened for the Québec CCF early in 1948. In the
period before the 1948 Québec election, the party began to hemorrhage members from
leadership positions. In January 1948, Lewis received a letter from acting Québec CCF
Secretary Bill Sauvé that four francophones had resigned from the party.172 Sauvé
informed Lewis that the CCF had lost F.X. Perron, Québec CCF vice-president and
Provincial Council member, Lucien Perras, a member of the Provincial Executive, Roger
Provost, the Provincial Secretary, and Roger Lupien, Québec CCF office manager.173

167. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 35, Québec General Correspondence. 1947, Québec CCF Provincial
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Sauvé offered no explanation for the resignations. Less than four months later, with the
provincial election campaign underway, the CCF National Secretary received written
word that the Québec branch had lost several more members. Provincial Council member
François Laroche delivered the news to Lewis: “You are no doubt by now informed that
our three friends resigned en bloc from the Provincial Executive.”174 Worse for the party,
word of this mass exodus had reached the media. As had so often been the case for the
CCF in Québec, the party was scrambling to maintain a degree of organization and an air
of legitimacy while conducting an election campaign. Already engaged in a difficult
battle against a popular premier, a hostile press and lingering disdain from the Catholic
Church, the Québec CCF did not aid its cause by ruptures of this nature during an
election contest. This is yet more compelling evidence of the party undermining its
efforts to deliver its version of Democratic-Socialism to the voters of Québec.

1948 Election Results in Québec and Ontario
At the beginning of World War II, both the Ontario and Québec CCF branches
were in a damaged state. By late 1942, that had changed as the Ontario CCF bolted into
prominence, while the Québec wing, despite some improved numbers, seriously lagged.
Despite the dual disappointments for the CCF in Ontario from the provincial and federal
1945 elections, it still held a considerable advantage over its Québec counterparts. The
1948 provincial elections in both provinces solidified these differences. The Ontario CCF
was a force on the political scene, while the CCF in Québec was pushed even further to
the margins of the political stage in that province. In Ontario, voters re-elected the

174. MG 28, IV-1, Québec General Correspondence, 1948-1954, letter from François Laroche to
David Lewis, May 17, 1948, 1.
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Progressive-Conservative government of George Drew and also returned the CCF to the
position of Official Opposition.175 The CCF rebounded from its underwhelming 1945
results to claim nearly twenty-seven percent of the vote as well as twenty-one seats at
Queen’s Park.176 Its fortunes improved without the party making many changes to its
overall platform. The CCF leadership held tight to the opinion that the disappointing
results from three years earlier was the result of unprecedented welfare and social
security legislation offered by the Drew government.177
In addition, the party leadership remained intact and the CCF gained favorable
reviews for two of its policies, both of which were extensions of the CCF wartime policy.
The first was “buy from Britain” campaign that garnered some sympathy for the party,
and the second expressed the demand by the CCF that wartime price controls be
maintained during the early postwar period.178 That the Ontario CCF remained a vital
electoral component should not come as a surprise. Despite the humbling results of June
1945, there were several silver linings for the party. Although the Ontario CCF had won
just eight seats in the ninety-seat provincial legislature, the party captured the soldier vote
in thirty-two of the ninety districts. In addition, the CCF finished in second place in
nineteen ridings.179 Moreover, results indicated that the Labour-Progressive Party
(Communist Party) was successful in its objective to inflict electoral harm on its
Democratic-Socialist competitor. It was estimated that vote-splitting along these lines
175. Feigart, Canada Votes, Ontario Provincial Elections – Summary of Votes Received and Seats
Won, 1937-1987, 246.
176. Feigart, Canada Votes, 246. Drew’s Conservatives scored a solid majority despite seeing
their popular vote share slide to 41 percent, and their seats dip from 66 to 53 percent in the 90-seat Ontario
legislature.
177. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, 193-94.
178. J. T. Morley, Secular Socialists: The CCF/NDP in Ontario – A Biography (Montreal and
Kingston: Queen’s University Press, 1984), 53-54.
179. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 58, File 3, Ontario Newspaper Clippings, 1943-1949, June 25, 1945,
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denied the Ontario CCF another four-to-six seats at Queen’s Park.180 These figures
indicate the party was reasonably positioned to rebound in the following provincial
campaign and demonstrated that an organization was still in place for the CCF in Ontario.
Another important element was that Ontario had maintained the same leader, Ted
Jolliffe, in the years between the 1945 and 1948 elections. Jolliffe, as The Globe and Mail
gleefully pointed out on election night 1945, had lost his seat because of his spurious
attacks on Premier Drew, with his “Gestapo” speech alleging political espionage on the
CCF and other groups. Despite operating outside the confines of Queen’s Park, Jolliffe
stayed on as party chief and helped to rebuild his and the CCF’s profiles. He did this, in
part, by defending his “Gestapo” accusations during the LeBel Commission. Indeed,
Jolliffe lost his seat in 1945 by around 900 votes, out of more than 30,000 cast in his
York-South district.181 In the subsequent election, Jolliffe and twenty other CCF
members were returned to the provincial legislature.182 The Ontario CCF leader was once
again the leader of the Official Opposition by handily reclaiming his seat in York-South,
finishing with the second highest percentage vote total of any CCF candidate in the 1948
campaign.183 While still a distant second to the Drew Progressive-Conservatives, the
Ontario CCF had cemented its position as a significant political player in Canada’s most
populous province. Certainly, their Québec counterparts could only dream of results such
as those produced by the Ontario wing of the CCF during the 1940s.

180. Ontario Newspaper Clippings, June 25, 1945, 1-2.
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The 1948 Québec Provincial Election
In the immediate post World War Two era across Canada, governments of all
stripes which happened to be in office when the war ended were rewarded for presiding
over the prosperous economy. Québec was no exception. In the province’s election of
July 28, 1948, voters returned the Union Nationale under Maurice Duplessis with a
comfortable majority over the Parti Liberal. The CCF was a non-factor in this campaign,
winning less than one percent of the vote, and no seats.184 The party’s sole representative
in Québec City, David Coté, had resigned from the party in 1945 to sit as an independent.
Coté completed his term and did not run for re-election in 1948.
The climate was not conducive for socialist political groups in Québec. Indeed, a
case can be made that the Cold War had been ongoing in the province and was
accelerated by the reelection of Maurice Duplessis and the Union Nationale in 1944.
Historian Herbert Quinn noted that the hatred and fear of communism in Québec became
intensified in the immediate post-war period. He cited the arrest and murders of priests
and bishops which followed the Soviet occupation of countries such as Hungary and
Poland.185 Duplessis took full advantage of these developments by intensifying his
crusade against the movement. He did this by rigorously enforcing the Padlock Law and
by mounting a campaign against trade union leaders.186 Duplessis also attempted to label
both the provincial and federal Liberal parties as “followers of Moscow,” and flatly stated

184. Feigart, Canada Votes, Québec Provincial Elections – Summary of Votes Received and Seats
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that close cooperation existed between the Liberals and the Communists.187 Quinn
asserted that in the aroused anti-Communist state of the early Cold War, Duplessis’s
arguments won a measure of support among the people of Québec. Operating in this
climate made the socialist CCF’s difficult task even more daunting. As had often been the
case, the CCF did itself no favors during the 1948 Québec campaign.
The party endured several self-inflicted handicaps during this election cycle. As
the letters from Dodge and Laroche stated before and during the Québec election, the
provincial CCF continued to struggle with two very serious and persistent issues: lack of
organization, and not enough leadership. Indeed, in terms of organization, National
Secretary David Lewis instructed the Québec wing to get in contact with the Ontario CCF
in an effort to improve its continuous organizational difficulties.188 As argued above, the
Ontario branch of the CCF did experience severe organizational problems during the
1930s and early 1940s. These struggles were resolved in 1942 with the Noseworthy
triumph and the selection of Jolliffe as Ontario CCF leader. Indeed, the consistent
leadership of Jolliffe in Ontario contrasts strikingly with that of the revolving door of
Québec CCF leaders. The provincial party never had an official leader throughout this
period; it opted instead for a series of de facto chiefs. Frank Scott, Bill Dodge, J.S. Allen,
Hal Rugge, Jacques Casgrain, and David Coté all could be considered leaders of the party
in Québec. The party, however, refused to select a designated leader until the early 1950s.
There was no documented explanation for this vacuum. Clearly, the party leadership
sought a strong French-Canadian leader for the Québec post although the most promising

187. Quinn, The Union Nationale, 127-28.
188. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 35, Québec General Correspondence, 1947, letter from David Lewis
to Bill Dodge, August 28, 1947, 1.
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francophones, Casgrain and Coté, were not on the scene long enough to attract a large
following within the party or the province.
Regarding the 1948 Québec campaign, the leadership issue was but one factor
that brought embarrassment to the provincial CCF as four francophones had left the party
in January of that year.189 Worse still, three more members of the Québec CCF Provincial
Executive resigned from the party at the height of the election campaign.190 Also of note,
francophones began to leave the Provincial Executive and council for the CCF. Rosters
for June 1948 indicate only thirty-five percent of the Québec CCF Executive was of
French extraction, down from seventy percent just one year earlier.191 Given this
leadership and organizational chaos, the dismal results could not have been a surprise to
the CCF leaders. Shortly after the Québec election concluded, Lewis contacted CCF
Vice-Chairman Francois Laroche, writing, “I suppose you feel as sad as I do about the
election results in your province,” he wrote. Lewis bemoaned, “I am naturally
disappointed by the poor showing our candidates made. The election result shows again
the terrific magnitude of our task before our movement.”192 Lewis did not mention the
National Office’s attitude toward the Québec branch in terms of financial and
organizational assistance in the period right before and during the election. It should be
noted that Lewis was not acting out of disdain for the Québec CCF; resources were tight
and Québec had repeatedly proven to be a poor choice in terms of financial investment.
Once again, Lewis offered the Québec CCF suggestions to bolster the party’s
189. MG 28, IV-1, Québec General Correspondence, 1948-1954, letter from Bill Sauvé to David
Lewis, January 26, 1948, 1.
190. MG 28, IV-1, Québec General Correspondence, 1948-1954, letter from François Laroche to
David Lewis, May 17, 1948, 1.
191. MG 28, IV-1, Québec General Correspondence, 1948-1954, Roster of Québec CCF
Provincial Executive and Provincial Council, June 13, 1948, 1.
192. MG 28, IV-1, Québec General Correspondence. 1948-1954, letter from David Lewis to
François Laroche, July 30, 1948, 1.
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position in the province. He wrote Laroche, “You will recall that some time ago I briefly
mentioned to you that in my opinion it would be very valuable to have Madame Casgrain
in a public and leading position in the national party. If I am not mistaken, you fully
agreed with that view.”193
Thérèse Casgrain was a well-known political personality in Québec. She was also
a leading suffrage figure in the province of Québec, the last province to grant women the
right to vote, in 1940, in provincial elections. Given her high prominence, gender and
linguistic make-up, Casgrain was seen as someone who could shore up CCF deficiencies.
Lewis continued, “The only way in which Madame Casgrain can be placed in nomination
is with the intention of replacing one of the present vice-chairmen. Since we work on the
premise that the two vice-chairmen should be one English-speaking and one Frenchspeaking, it necessarily follows that you are the one she would be expected to replace.”194
Lewis also noted that Frank Scott had informed him that Madame Casgrain had agreed to
accept the nomination of vice-chairman, if offered.195 Realizing that he was placing
Laroche in an awkward position, Lewis suggested that the current vice-chairman take a
position on the National Council. In his response, Laroche announced that he
“wholeheartedly supported the idea. I believe that the name and ability of Mme Casgrain
could be a great asset to our party—and God we know how badly we need it in this
province.”196 With the movement to promote Thérèse Casgrain as Quebec CCF leader,
this study is completed.

193. Lewis to Laroche, 1.
194. Lewis to Laroche, 1.
195. Lewis to Laroche, 2.
196. MG 28, IV-1, Québec General Correspondence. 1948-1954, letter from François Laroche to
David Lewis, August 4, 1948, 1.
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During the years of the Second World War, the Ontario CCF had moved from a
near comatose political group to one ensconced as a political force in that province.
Meanwhile, despite a desperate search for a solid French-Canadian leader and various
attempts to create an organization capable of growing democratic-socialism among
working-class Québeckers, the Quebec CCF leaders found themselves in virtually the
same marginal place they had occupied prior to the war.
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CONCLUSION

The Second World War profoundly changed Canada. In terms of foreign policy,
the nation forged stronger ties to the United States while gradually loosening its historical
bonds with Great Britain. Domestically, the laissez-faire attitude of the Great Depression
years by the Canadian federal government was replaced by far greater governmental
involvement in the economy and the construction of a welfare state. Research indicates
this change did not “just happen.” Indeed, these adjustments were the result of a swiftly
changing political reality taking place across Canada. Since its inception in 1932, the
CCF had advocated a strong, centralized, planned economy, and a fully functioning
welfare state was necessary to help Canada put people before profits. In the early years of
the war, this message began to resonate with a significant number of Canadians. It was at
that moment that Mackenzie King quickly and wisely picked up the mantle of social
reform and ushered in many of basic tenets of the welfare state. The path he established
after 1942 set Canada on an entirely different economic and social course.
While the CCF surge prompted King to make serious changes, the evidence
presented in this dissertation suggests that the CCF had its growth hampered by both
internal and external factors in Ontario and Québec during the period under examination.
Compared to the older Conservative and Liberal parties, the upstart CCF was the target of
vicious attacks from both contemporary media and from practiced propagandists who
intentionally twisted CCF policies to hurt the party’s image with voters across the
country. In addition, the party also was condemned by the dominant Roman Catholic
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Church in the province of Québec. Efforts by leading CCF figures to have the church
treat the party of Canadian Socialism in a more neutral matter were largely unsuccessful.
Despite these external factors, this analysis maintains that the party in both
Ontario and Québec was often its own worst enemy. Numerous documents refer to the
disorganization that plagued the party in each province throughout much of the CCF’s
early years. For example, National Secretary David Lewis expressed dismay after the
poor performance of the Ontario CCF in the 1937 provincial election. The scene repeated
itself three years later when Lewis lamented the disorganization and defeatist attitude
displayed by the CCF in Ontario. Indeed, only when the Ontario branch improved this
perspective (in 1942) did the CCF make significant strides in the province.
Frank Scott had voiced similar perceptions regarding the CCF’s performance in
the province of Québec in the aftermath of that 1940 federal election. Scott said, “In six
years we have not found any real organizing ability, nor moved at all beyond the small
circle who are faithful, persevering and incompetent.”1 This organizational problem was
never fully solved by the Québec wing of the party. The leadership of the Québec and
National CCF was painfully aware of this shortcoming, but seemed incapable of finding
the formula to correct this deficiency. No matter how frequently the Québec CCF
attempted to establish a semblance of organization, the party simply could not construct a
solid organizational framework from which to operate.
Another element which hamstrung the Québec branch of the CCF was the
“English” label. Indeed, its early roster of leading party members was overwhelmingly
anglophone. Worse, attempts at recruiting committed French-Canadians to the party were

1. MG 28, IV-1, Volume 34, CCF Papers – Provinces, Québec General Correspondences, 19321958, letter from Frank Scott to David Lewis, February 4, 1940, 1, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa.
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hindered by a latent bias against the dominant linguistic group in the province. For
example, Squire Blackshaw consistently made derogatory remarks regarding French
Canadians. His words and actions toward French Canadians earned the scorn of Lewis
and contributed to a hostile environment for French Canadians considering joining or
actively working for the CCF.2 It must also be noted that the party was not responsive
when it came to understanding French Canadians. Virtually all the CCF leaders at both
the provincial and federal levels viewed their politics through lenses of economic
determinism. The possibility that other elements, such as Québec Nationalism or a
decentralized Canadian federation, seemed almost absurd to leading CCF figures.
Another problem that beset both wings of the party was the lack of leadership.
Prior to 1942, the leadership essentially rotated in Ontario, thus making it impossible for
the provincial CCF to achieve any consistency. With the selection of Ted Jolliffe that
year, the party finally had one recognized head of the Ontario CCF. During his tenure, the
CCF became the official opposition in both 1943 and 1948. These electoral successes
allowed the Ontario CCF to establish a presence in the province through the life of the
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). While seat totals dwindled during the
1950s, CCF vote shares never dipped below seventeen percent in Ontario provincial
elections.3 Starting in the 1949 federal election, Ontario CCF Members of Parliament
became a small but established reality in federal politics. In each national campaign

2. MG 28, IV–1, Volume 34, CCF Papers – Provinces, Québec General Correspondences, 19321958, letter from David Lewis to Squire Blackshaw, July 20, 1938, 1, Library and Archives Canada,
Ottawa.
3. Feigert, Canada Votes: 1935 – 1988 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), Table 9-21,
Ontario Provincial Elections – Summary of Votes Received and Seat Won, 1937-1987, 246. Indeed, in the
final three Ontario elections of the CCF era (1951, 1955, and 1959), the party garnered 19.1%, 16.5% and
16.7%, respectively. These results exposed another issue for the CCF, the inherent bias in the Parliamentary
first-past-the-post system. In those campaigns, the CCF was awarded just 2.2%, 3.1%, and 5.1% of the
seats in the Ontario legislature.
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during the remaining CCF years, the party polled at least ten percent of the vote in
Canada’s most populous province. As was the case at the provincial level, the percentage
of seats won by the CCF was far below its popular support.4
The CCF in Québec could only dream of such comparatively robust figures. The
year 1945 proved the high-water mark for the party in Québec, yet those results were
considered disappointing at the time. The party never captured a single seat in any federal
election and was not represented in the provincial legislature in Québec City after David
Coté resigned from the party in July 1945. During the remaining CCF era, the party
consistently contested about one-quarter of the ridings in federal campaigns and captured
less than one vote for every fifty cast in those four federal elections.5 In addition, the CCF
in Québec became even more centered on the island of Montreal. In 1949, for example,
the party contested just seven of the fifty-five ridings off the island of Montreal. In
Montreal, the CCF ran candidates in thirteen of the twenty ridings.6 The CCF captured
less than 3,000 votes out of more than one million ballots cast in the remainder of
Québec. These figures highlight the weakness of the party outside of Montreal.7
Throughout the 1950s these results continually repeated, with the Québec CCF running
only a handful of candidates off the island, while running nearly a full slate in Montreal.8

4. Feigart, Canada Votes, Table 2-10, 2-13, 2-16, 2-19, 2-22, Summary of Votes Received and
Seats Won, by Province and Party, 1945-1958, 28-36. The percentage of CCF votes and seats for the party
in Ontario were as follows: 1945 – 14.4% and 0.0%, 1949 – 15.2% and 1.2%, 1953 – 11.1% and 1.2%,
1957 – 12.1% and 3.5%, 1958 – 10.5% and 3.5%.
5. Feigart, Canada Votes, Table 8-1, Table 8-2, Québec – Summary of Votes Received and Seats
Won, 1949-1958, 166. After the 2.4% share of popular vote in Québec in the 1945 election, the party
polled, 1.1% in 1949, 1.5% in 1953, 1.8% in 1957, and 2.3% in 1958.
6. Feigart, Canada Votes, Table 8–7, Québec – 1949 Election Results by Riding, 174-175.
7. Feigart. Canada Votes, 175.
8. Feigart, Canada Votes, Table 8–8, Table 8–9, Table 8–10, Québec – 1953, 1957, 1958 Election
Results by Riding, 176-181. In these three elections, the CCF off Montreal Island polled; 0.6%, 0.6%, and
0.7%. In Montreal proper, they captured 3.5%, 4.0%, and 4.0%. Both were consistently underwhelming
results.
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While these returns were anemic, the Québec CCF performed even worse at the
provincial level during the same period. In the three provincial elections during the final
CCF years, the party registered zero-point six percent, zero-point one percent, and zeropoint six percent respectively.9
Lack of leadership was another one of the major contributors to the CCF struggles
in Québec. During the reign of Premier Maurice Duplessis, the socialism espoused by the
CCF was often lumped together with communism. For that reason, it was imperative that
the Québec branch of the CCF have an impressive leader to stand up to these charges and
to explain the party’s chief objectives to improve the lot for working-class citizens of the
province. Although the CCF desperately searched for a strong, committed French
Canadian to inspire voters, those efforts only produced a series of disappointments for the
party. Jean Péron, Jacques Casgrain, David Coté, and Thérèse Casgrain all tried, but were
unable to pull the Québec CCF into a position of relevance in that province. English
leaders of the Québec CCF, such as Frank Scott, Bill Dodge, and Dr. J.S. Allen either
lacked the charisma deemed necessary, or a French surname to capture the imagination of
Québeckers. After 1945, the party contested very few seats in the provincial and federal
elections, with predictable results.
Importantly, leadership and organizational issues dogged both the Liberal and
Conservative Parties during this period in Canadian political history. Still, those groups
could muddle through such events as they each had deep historical roots firmly
established in Ontario and Québec. Much of the established press ran along either

9. Feigart, Canada Votes, Table 8-21, Québec Provincial Elections – Summary of Votes Received
and Seats Won, 1935-1985, 202-203. The Québec CCF changed its name to parti Social Democratique
(PSD) in 1955. As the results indicate an easier to pronounce party name did not result in dramatically
improved electoral fortunes for them.
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Conservative or Liberal lines, and thus had a steady stream of positive outlets to support
their particular party and its policies and positions. The CCF had no such advantage. As a
young and, to some, an intrepid and slightly dangerous political group, the party had little
margin for error. No major newspapers sided with its policies and objectives. Often, the
CCF was sharply criticized, ignored, or had its programs misrepresented by the media. It
is not a coincidence that the youngest provinces in Canada, Saskatchewan, and Alberta
had the least binding ties to the established Conservative and Liberal parties. Indeed, in
those provinces, new parties such as Social Credit and the CCF were able to overcome
the dominance of the Conservative and Liberal duopoly. In the case of Saskatchewan, the
CCF did have a history because the cooperative movement from which the party
eventually formed began in the early decades of the twentieth century. At the same time,
strong labor ties helped finance and promote socialism and a working person’s party in
British Columbia. These elements were largely lacking in Ontario and Québec.

What’s in a Name? – The End of the CCF and a New Beginning
After the landslide election of the federal Progressive-Conservatives under Prairie
firebrand John Diefenbaker in the 1958 federal election, CCF leaders across Canada
determined it was time to re-assess their party’s positions. Indeed, two years earlier, the
CCF had replaced the Regina Manifesto with the less strident Winnipeg Declaration. The
party realized that its anti-capitalist message was not striking voters as being realistic
during the prosperous post-war period.10 Capitalism’s sorry state during the Great

10. Desmond Morton, NDP: The Dream of Power (Toronto, Hakkert Publishing, 1974), 19-20.
While the Regina Manifesto called for the end of the capitalist economic system in Canada, Morton wrote
that the Winnipeg Declaration indicated that the CCF had come to accept the reality of a mixed economic
system. He added that the new, moderate objectives of the Winnipeg Declaration did not provide the party
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Depression was gone from the collective memory and replaced by a much sunnier
version that emerged during and after World War II. The CCF had continued to rail
against the system that had produced the Great Depression during buoyant economic
times. The Diefenbaker victory reduced the party to just eight seats in the House of
Commons and CCF officials determined that something had to be done to make the party
relevant. Their solution was to rename the party, forge stronger ties to organized labor,
and update CCF policies and programs to reflect the new reality of post-war Canada. As a
result, the New Democratic Party (NDP) was born in 1961.11 Almost immediately, the
successor to the CCF began to experience improved electoral fortunes in Ontario and
Québec.
The saga of the New Democratic Party is an ongoing epilogue to this story. The
history of the CCF is one of those early chapters. This work sought to highlight several
areas that were either ignored or dismissed by many historians. The first point was the
belief that the CCF’s “third-party” role was pre-ordained. The evidence presented here
would strongly suggest otherwise. During the party’s halcyon years of 1942-1944 it was
entirely plausible that the CCF might well emerge as a major player on the national
political stage. A second element worth consideration is the insufficient scholarly
attention of the growth of the party in Canada’s two largest provinces during the Second
World War. There existed a perception that the party was better suited to the province of
Ontario than of neighboring Québec due to religious and trade union factors in the latter.
The evidence suggests this was not the case. The CCF in Ontario and Québec were
virtual non-entities for the party’s first decade of operation. Indeed, both suffered from
with a new image. Morton argued that the party was still viewed by the voting public by its continued
name, same faces, and its ever-present righteousness.
11. Morton, NDP: The Dream of Power, 20-21.
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the same issues: lack of finances, organizational problems, and ineffective leadership.
This reality brings forth the third major contribution of this work.
The CCF was, in many instances, its own worst enemy in these provinces.
Granted, the party had many powerful enemies that stunted the CCF’s development. This
work does not discount that. However, it also does not hide the fact that both the Ontario
and Québec CCF were poorly organized, hampered by internal divisions, and tightly
bound to the belief that their socialist ideals were self-evident and would, eventually, win
the day on their own merits. In addition to these traits, the party in Québec was further
hamstrung by a thinly disguised racism towards French Canadians. This study maintains
that the Ontario CCF satisfactorily addressed many of these problems during the years of
the Second World War. By organizing well enough to lift Joe Noseworthy to an upset
victory in the York South by-election in February 1942 and selecting a formidable
provincial leader in the person of Ted Jolliffe a few months later, the Ontario CCF was
able to place itself on equal footing with both the Conservative and Liberal parties.
The Québec CCF leadership attempted to duplicate the success of the Ontario branch.
Archival materials indicate the party in Québec did break new ground. However, it was
never able to overcome its long-standing issues and failed to plant real roots in the
province. As a result, the CCF became a fixture on the political scene in Ontario
throughout the remainder of the party’s existence, while the group in Québec continued
to wander through the political hinterlands.
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